Australian external policy under Labor : content, process and the national debate by Albinski, Henry S. (Henry Stephen)
Australian 
External Policy 
under Labor 
Content, Process and 
The National Debate 
HENRY S. ALBINSKI 
University of Queensland 
Press 
IS-
- \ 
a 
©University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1977 
This book is copyright Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of 
private study, criticism, or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 
no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. 
Enquiries should be made to the publishers. 
Typeset, printed and bound by 
Academy Press Pty. Ltd., Brisbane. •n 
Distributed in the United Kingdom, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and 
the Caribbean by Prentice-Hall International, International Book 
Distributors Ltd., 66 Wood Lane End, Hemel Hempstead, Herts., 
England. 
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-Publication data 
Albinski, Henry Stephen. 
Australian external |X)licy under Labor. 
ISBN 0 7022 1212 I. 
1. Australia—Foreign relations. I. Title. 
327.94 
To Australian friends and colleagues 
Contents 
Preface ix 
1 The Liberal Inheritance: I 1 
2 The Liberal Inheritance: II 28 
3 Australia and the International Scene: 
Perceptions and Frameworks 60 
4 Operationalizing External Policy: 
Diplomatic Dimensions I 92 
5 Operationalizing External Policy: 
Diplomatic Dimensions II 124 
6 Operationalizing External Policy: 
Economic Dimensions 178 
7 Operationalizing External Policy: 
Defence Dimensions 225 
8 The External Policy Process 274 
9 Electoral Politics and External Policy 321 
Bibliography 355 
Index 359 

Preface 
This book is an analysis of Australian external policy under the first 
Labor Party government elected to federal office in nearly a quarter 
of a century. The choice of the term "external policy" is deliberate, in 
that the study deals with defence and international economic dimen-
sions as well as with more conventionally construed "foreign policy". 
The object is to link policy outputs with policy process. In addition to 
emphasizing what policies were evolved, the book is concerned with 
such themes as the assumptions and perceptions underlying policy 
movements, the weight of historical and party traditions, the con-
tributions of key Elites, the various sources of advice and pressures 
that sought to influence policies, the environment in which dialogue 
between the government and its critics was conducted, and party 
political and electoral implications. 
The principal research was carried out in 1974-75, during the 
author's appointment as a Senior Fulbright-Hays Scholar and 
Visiting Professor at the University of Sydney and the Flinders 
University of South Australia, and during a lateral visit to New 
Zealand. The materials consulted included official documents, news-
paper and secondary sources, party and interest group publications, 
and survey and electoral data. The book's preparation has been great-
ly assisted by factual and interpretative comment supplied by scores 
of individuals, a number of whom were interviewed more than once. 
The respondents were predominantly Australians, but included a 
number of New Zealanders and Americans who were interviewed at 
various times in Australia, New Zealand and in the United States. 
Among the Australians interviewed were parliamentarians of various 
parties, including former and present ministers and backbenchers. 
Also interviewed were official and diplomatic personnel, ministerial 
advisers, party organization figures, interest group spokesmen, jour-
nalists and academics. The author is deeply indebted to these many 
individuals. Conversations with them were, however, conducted on 
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the understanding of non-attribution of their remarks. It is therefore 
the author's responsibility to introduce such internal evidence 
without disclosing sources, while offering reasoned judgements as to 
their relative value. This involves criteria such as the credibility and 
the position of interviewees, and the cumulative weight of cross-
checked information and opinion. 
A considerable debt is acknowledged to various Australian and 
New Zealand universities, and to Australian Institute of International 
Affairs and New Zealand Institute of International Affairs branches, 
where seminar and lecture appearances elicited helpful criticisms of 
the ideas presented there. A similar acknowledgement applies to 
members of the Australian foreign policy class taught at Flinders 
University. 
Funding for the research project was provided from several 
sources, notably the Australian-American Educational Foundation. 
Other sources included the New Zealand-United States Educational 
Foundation, the University of Sydney, Flinders University and the 
Department of Political Science and the Central Fund for Research of 
The Pennsylvania State University. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to a number of in-
dividuals and bodies who facilitated the project. Professors Henry 
Mayer of Sydney and David Corbett of Flinders, and their colleagues, 
provided sponsorship for the Australian visit and were generous 
hosts. Considerable gratitude is owed to Messrs H.F. Willcock, B. Far-
rer and G.C. Weinman of the Australian-American Educational 
Foundation. Exceptional source material assistance was provided by 
Mr Ian Hamilton and his associates at the Australian Information 
Service, Canberra, and by information officers at the Australian Em-
bassy, Washington. 
Much valuable material was obtained from certain specialized col-
lections and bibliographic services. Among these were the federal 
secretariats of the Labor, Liberal and (National) Country Parties, as 
well as the ALP and Liberal state branches in New South Wales. 
Included were the offices of the Prime Minister and of the Foreign 
Minister, the Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, and the 
legislative research service of the Parliamentary Library. Considerable 
assistance was provided through the facilities of the Department of 
Political Science, the Department of International Relations, and the 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, at the Institute of Advanced 
Studies, Australian National University. 
Finally, some special notes of thanks to friends and facilitators: To 
Dr Peter Boyce, for permission to draw on material published in the 
August 1974 issue of Australian Outlook, a publication of the Australian 
Institute of International Affairs and of which Dr (now Professor) 
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Boyce was editor. To Ms Merril Yule and her associates at the Univer-
sity of Queensland Press. To Ms Wanita Askey, for her par excellence 
typing of manuscript. To the author's wife, Dr Ethel Bisbicos Albinski, 
for her many supportive expressions during the period of research 
and manuscript preparation. 
Henry S. Albinski 
University Park, Pennsylvania 
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The Liberal Inheritance: I 
At the December 1949 Australian House of Representatives election, 
the Chifley Australian Labor Party (ALP) government was defeated 
by a Liberal and Country Party (L-CP^ coalition led by R.G. Menzies.* 
The L-CP won nine consecutive elections and governed for twenty-
three years. Finally, at the election of 2 December 1972, Labor was 
returned to office, where it remained for almost exactly three years. 
Inescapably, this inordinately long tenure in office enabled the 
Liberals to leave an indelible stamp on Australia's foreign and 
domestic affairs. In early 1966, when he stepped down after fifteen 
years as Prime Minister, Menzies maintained that the most momen-
tous step during his era had been in foreign policy, specifically, the 
negotiation of the ANZUS Treaty with the United States and New 
Zealand.' Looking back on the success of his party in the 1972 elec-
tion, Labor Prime Minister E. G. Whitlam wrote that "The foreign 
policy of the 1950s which served the previous government politically 
into the 1970s was clearly exhausted. The Liberal Party itself had 
ceased to defend or justify it." However, Whitlam speculated that 
"even if there had been no change of government, there would have 
been a change of policy; and 1 am not so churlish as to suggest that it 
would not have changed for the better."^ Plainly, the foreign policy 
legacy of the Liberal years conditioned what Labor set out to do, why 
and how it did it, and the resulting international and domestic recep-
tion. 
L-CP foreign policy, like the foreign policy of other governments, 
derived from a mHange of factors. These included perceptions of the 
character and requirements of the nation itself, the constellation of 
In 1975, the Australian Country Party changed its name to the AustralLin National 
Country Party. Reference in this study wil l be to the Country Party and Its CP form of 
abbreviation. 
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forces operating within the international environment, the timing 
and sequence of events abroad, the temperamental and political 
orientations of those who governed and other miscellaneous con-
siderations. 
The Liberals entered office against a background of exceptional 
security anxiety in Australia. The Second World War had finished 
only four years earlier. The swift Japanese thrust down South-East 
Asia and into New Guinea, the bombing of Darwin and other points 
in northern Australia, the belief that an invasion of the Australian 
mainland had barely been averted had traumatized many 
Australians. Fears of a Japanese military revival persisted well into 
the 1950s. Rather than bringing settled conditions in Asia, the war's 
aftermath was seen to have released new and ominously destabilizing 
forces. Familiar, friendly colonial powers in the region were being 
challenged by indigenous, often insurrectionist movements, and 
replaced by unfamiliar, at times erratic and radical local regimes. A 
communist regime was declared in China only two months prior to 
the 1949 Australian election. The communist-related "Emergency" in 
Malaya had begun well before the Liberals entered government. Half 
a year after taking office they had to contend with the opening of the 
Korean War ' Other international crises followed rapidly: French 
Indo-China, the Chinese off-shore islands, Indonesian pressures 
against the Dutch in West New Guinea. There was the Sino-lndian 
border war, Indonesia's "Confrontation" of Malaysia and, of course, 
Vietnam and its associated reverberations in Laos and Cambodia. 
L-CP governments came to interpret the chain of international con-
Hicts and internal upheavals in Asia as interconnected. In one degree 
or another, Australian governments attributed communist inspira-
tion to nearly all such disturbances. Moreover, in the pithy phrase of 
former External Affairs (Foreign Affairs) Minister Paul Hasluck, "at 
the end of the road there is always China".* 
In other words, L-CP governments came to office and then 
governed in an atmosphere of what they saw as interminable, often 
violent and largely communist-directed turbulence in Asia. We 
should also remember that L-CP governments represented the prin-
cipal conservative strain within the Australian political party system. 
They were temperamentally bitterly hostile to communism as such, 
real or suspected. Domestically, they tried, but failed, in 1951 to out-
law the Communist Party of Australia; overseas, they saw com-
munism as an especially pernicious force.' As J. D. p. Miller sum-
marized it in 1963, they were "anti-Communist for basic reasons of 
belief, sentiment and social condition. They would be anti-Com-
munist if the Australian Communist Party was the only one in the 
world. The fact that Communism is a world movement hostile to the 
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kind of institutions we have in Australia and to the countries with 
whom our associations are closest, fortifies their natural in-
clinations."* Indeed, the L-CP's preoccupation with a communist 
menace was not basically inconsistent with widespread, historically 
conditioned popular conceptions of threats and of communism. Post-
war L-CP governments may have fed anti-communist sentiment and 
exploited it eleciorally, but they did not invent it. Australians on 
various sides have often treated communism in rather simplistic, 
categorical terms. This phenomenon has been widely noticed by stu-
dents of Australian foreign policy. Harry Gelber has written on the 
way in which, since the nineteenth century, Australia's isolation "en-
couraged ideological or emotional or liturgical approaches to foreign 
problems", among them anti-communism.' In their understanding of 
the Australian ethos, Camilleri and Teichmann have argued that 
"Ideology has not played an important role overall—hedonistic 
materialism being the governing theme. Anti-communism is probably 
the nearest approach Australians have had to a fully-blown ideology," 
starting with the Russian Revolution and proceeding through the 
cold-war period.* In late 1948, when Labor was still governing, opi-
nion surveys in ten nations, including the United States, Britain and 
Italy, indicated that Australians had the highest expectation that 
another world war would occur within ten years.' 
Serious dislocation in Asia, coupled with a sense of communist con-
spiracy, bore directly on the classical image of Australian security 
definitions. The foundations were set in the nineteenth century, 
before Federation, and relative to the rise of Russian and then 
Japanese power, and of colonial rivalries in the Pacific. The theme is 
familiar. Australia was, and is, a very affluent, western, basically 
white society, placed on the rim of Asia, far removed from either 
Europe or North America. Its relatively small population (currently 
13.5 million) is mostly nestled in the south-east corner of an island-
continent of nearly 7 million 7 hundred thousand square kilometres 
and of 19000 kilometres of coastline. The integrity of its communica-
tions and access to far-removed friends in time of crisis have been felt 
to require reasonable tranquility in the Asia-Pacific region and 
neighbours neither aggressive themselves nor subject to control by 
unfriendly powers. Hence the joining of historically-fixed security 
concerns with putatively communist-inspired disorder gave rise to 
the essential rationale of L-CP foreign policy: "We are a small nation. 
We are a non-Communist nation. We are a nation possessing many 
things that others more powerful must envy. There is no small 
country in the world to whom the protection against external aggres-
sion is more important, is more utterly vital, than Australia."'" 
From these general perceptions of what was happening in the 
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Asian neighbourhood, and what was implied for Australia, L-CP 
governments drew several interlocked conclusions. Firstly, and most 
broadly, it was necessary to deter, and if required, to defeat, those 
movements or nations that might wish to sow discord or undertake 
actual aggression. In South-East Asia, the weakening or absorption of 
a particular nation would encourage more provocation by China or 
other interested parties, demoralize and outflank other smaller states 
and restrict the strategic elasticity of non-communist nations. In par-
ticular, it would denigrate the credibility of the American security 
shield, the single most important source of deterrence in the region. 
L-CP governments were therefore quick to condemn threat responses 
that were, or could be, construed as being tardy or irresolute. 
Since Australia's own power and resources were limited, L-CP 
governments placed much emphasis on the presence/commitment in 
Asia and the Pacific of friendly major powers. Expressions of such in-
terest would, depending on circumstances, provide a mix of military, 
diplomatic and economic dimensions. The notion of a major regional 
"protector" for Australia was itself of very old lineage. For decades, 
the protector had been Britain. But the quick victories of Japan 
against British forces in and around Malaya and Singapore at the 
start of the Pacific war caused Australia, under a Labor government, 
to look to America. It was American forces that won the battles of the 
Coral and Bismarck Seas and primarily American forces that carried 
the war towards Japan during the subsequent Pacific campaigns. 
After the war, though Britain retained a presence in Asia, Australia 
pre-eminently viewed the United States as the great power guarantor 
in the area. Under Liberal governments, the United States was not 
simply believed to be the most powerful and attractable protector, but 
there also was the lustre of recent history. When faced with the 
prospect of a Japanese attack, Australia had found a saviour. That im-
age, though weakened over the years, has continued to colour the 
debate over the US-Australian alliance and over relations between 
the two nations generally. The American memorial, built in thanks 
for US assistance during the Second World War, is the only monu-
ment of its kind In the city of Canberra. It is symbolic that, on its 
perch on Russell Hill, it is surrounded by the complex of Australian 
Defence Department buildings. 
L-CP governments further concluded that Australia must itself 
pursue policies contributory to the stabilization of conditions to its 
north. At minimum, it had to appear to be interested, active, helpful, 
and so on, in the employment of policy instruments. The rationale 
was in three parts. In the first place, though modest, Australia's own 
contributions In men, maieriel, development assistance, or whatever, 
could be of some tangible value. Secondly, as a member of the Asian-
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Pacific region, Australia could by example bolster the resolve of Asian 
nations against aggression or subversion. An Australian "cop-out" 
was thought in Canberra to be disproportionately debilitating to the 
cause. Thirdly, and most important, L-CP governments felt that an 
appropriate, supportive Australian demeanour was vital to the en-
couragement of great power roles In the region. L-CP governments 
reasoned that It would be politically, diplomatically and militarily 
easier for great powers, such as the United States, to become and to 
stay involved: in Hasluck's words, to alleviate the feelings of the 
"loneliness of a great power" from which an already widely commit-
ted nation might suffer." But "impressing" Washington, or London, 
was not simply conceived as serving to maintain their Interest in 
Asia. It had two subsidiary motives. One was to widen Australia's 
entree into major power councils, to exert an infiuence over their 
policy movements, which might otherwise be unavailable. Also a sup-
porting, at large Australian role was regarded as an opportunity to at-
tract great power attention in controversies of special Australian con-
cern, but which would normally be secondary in the calculations of 
great powers. 
Calculations of Australian interest, threat perceptions and prefer-
red responses Imposed by the L-CP did not, of course, go unchal-
lenged. Bruce Grant, for instance, cautioned against the temptation 
"to try to involve our protector more and more in the region, so that 
we can demonstrate our loyalty by dispatching small military units In 
support. We have become crisis-prone."'^ This was a reasoned 
criticism. But positions sometimes became polarized. As Donald 
Home remarked, "Different security-diagnoses were needed for these 
opposite faiths: for the vassals, the world had to be threatening; for 
the individualists, there had to be a diagnosis of no threat. There was 
no provision for more muddled situations."" 
Security-related policies were among the most conspicuous steps un-
dertakan by L-CP governments to implement the objectives outlined 
above. Security treaties were regarded as the cornerstones of the 
security system. The notion of engaging other powers in the region, 
and linking them to Australia's security requirements, was not new. 
It had been broached by the Lyons government in the late 1930s and 
Labor's External Affairs Minister, Dr H. V. Evatt, pursued such pos-
sibilities quite earnestly in the late 1940s. But it was under L-CP 
governments that first, ANZUS was launched in 1951, and then 
SEATO three years later. Australia was very energetic in its quest for 
an alliance with the United States. The tripartite ANZUS Treaty came 
to be regarded as the fulcrum of Australia's security protection. As we 
saw, Menzies defied it as the greatest ahcievement of his prime 
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ministership. ANZUS was thought to represent good value for three 
reasons. Firstly, it was an extension of American security alliances in 
Asia to the Pa'cific, and to Australia specifically. It promised that 
"each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any 
of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its constitutional process. "'* While the language of this obliga-
tion was softer than NATO's, it was accurately construed by Australia 
as equally strong in intent. Secondly, as a pact among a very few and 
very friendly nations, ANZUS facilitated Australian access to the 
United States for consultation and for planning among the armed ser-
vices of the three participants. Finally, it was visualized as a stepping-
stone to a more inclusive Asian alliance system. 
A broader alliance was produced in 1954. Canberra did not find 
SEATO ideal. Among SEATO's eight original members only t h r e e -
Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan—were truly "Asian" and the 
United States was firmly opposed to organizing any form of standing 
SEATO force. All the same, Britain and France joined the ANZUS 
partners in their broader security arrangement. Thailand was brought 
under a security shield and the Indo-Chinese states were made eligi-
ble for assistance. Military consultations, planning and exercises were 
to be carried out under SEATO's aegis and defence-related economic 
assistance to Asian states could be jointly arranged. In time, even 
after SEATO's stature had declined, Pakistan had withdrawn and 
French involvement had became nominal, L-CP governments in 
Australia refused to deprecate it. They found some continuing 
material value in it. They did not wish to "demoralize" Asian states by 
tampering with it. They took seriously American admonitions in the 
early 1970s that if the security guarantees available to Thailand under 
the Manila Pact (an adjunct of SEATO) were dismantled, the viability 
of ANZUS would probably decline. 
L-CP governments believed that Australian contributions to the 
deterrence or defeat of what they understood to be aggressive, 
communist-inspired activities in Asia were a natural complement to 
the security treaty system. Until the election of the Whitlam govern-
ment, Australia had contlnously since the Second World War main-
tained an active military presence in Asia. The post-war Labor 
government contributed occupation forces in Japan, assisted the 
British counter-insurgency effort in Malaya with arms and munitions, 
and contributed warships to voyages up the Yangtze River to provi-
sion and otherwise relieve Nanking during the Chinese civil war. 
When the Liberals came to power, they Increased the level of military 
support in Malaya. Two Australian battalions, plus supporting forces, 
were eventually committed to Korea. Materiel was supplied to the 
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French in Indo-China. A battalion was garrisoned in Malaya In 1955. 
First non-combat units and then in 1965 an infantry battalion saw 
service in Malaysian Borneo during Confrontation. Advisers were 
first dispatched to Vietnam in 1962. The first combat troops were 
posted there in 1965 and at their peak Australian forces in Vietnam 
exceeded 8000 of all services. The cost in Australian casualties in Viet-
nam was nearly 500 dead and 3000 wounded. When the Liberal 
government fell in December 1972, combat troops had already been 
withdrawn from Vietnam, though advisers remained. At that time, 
the major force remaining overseas was in Malaysia/Singapore. In 
1971, Australia had entered a "Five Power Agreement" with 
Malaysia, Singapore, Britain and New Zealand. This agreement 
pledged common defence co-operation in the Malaysia/Singapore 
region and immediate consultation among the signatories regarding 
responses to actual or threatened attack. Australia volunteered as-
sistance to the integrated British-New Zealand-Australian (ANZUK) 
force in the region. The Australian contribution of about 4000 
represented almost half of the ground force, all of the air defence 
capability, some naval support and the bulk of the logistical back-up 
and of a special communications monitoring facility. 
None of the overseas troop commitments undertaken by L-CP 
governments was especially large, and some were token. Separately 
and collectively, however, they were designed to fulfil broad policy 
objectives, which in turn related to official perceptions of the mean-
ing for Australia of what was happening to its north. The Korean and 
Vietnamese commitments, for instance, were designed to check what 
was defined as overt communist aggression. They were to provide a 
test of collective will for anti-communist forces in the region. They 
were supposed to serve, especially in the later stages of the two con-
flicts, as psychological tonics for the principal contributor, the United 
States, when the wars had begun to drag out and were subjeaed to in-
creasing criticism in America. In both cases, Australia was looking for 
something special for itself Its early and enthusiastic Korean War 
commitment was partially aimed at raising American sympathy for a 
security alliance with Australia. Canberra's original combat contribu-
tion to Vietnam was partially aimed at making Washington more 
sensitive towards Australia's very special concern over Indonesia's 
Confrontation of Malaysia. The placement of a battalion in Malaya in 
1955 was, in part, aimed at stationing troops that, however informal-
ly, could be linked and give content to the emergent SEATO alliance. 
Australia's security role in Malaysia/Singapore during the late 
1960s and early 1970s posed an unusual dilemma. By 1968, Britain 
had expressed its intention to disengage from a fixed military 
presence in the region by 1971. This seemed to denigrate a basic 
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Australian strategic tenet. Prime Minister John Gorton admitted that 
The concept of forward defence by troops stationed outside Australia-
valid when based on participation with other forces and forces of a major 
Power—needed minute exainination when the forces of that Power were 
to be withdrawn and the circumstances of their re-entry were not know. 
Although Britain's continuing presence seemed improbable, 
Gorton eventually decided to maintain troops In Malaysia/Singapore 
after 1971. While a number of fartors, including domestic political 
argument. Impelled the decision, it nevertheless was a decision consis-
tent with underlying Australian assumptions and objectives. In part, 
the decision related to shifting American, and more gradually 
Australian, perceptions of Asia's security requirements in the 1970s. 
A retracted US presence, but a call for Australia and other Asian-
Pacific nations to shoulder a larger share of burdens, was forecast. 
More of this later. Additionally, however, 
The Australian-New Zealand military presence was very distinctly an an-
nouncement to the major powers. Such a physical presence would 
facilitate a British return, albeit from a distance, should a great emergency 
arise in future. The Australian gesture was designed to be, and was, highly 
appreciated in Washington. Although the British departure was regretted, 
there was no political taste or possibility that the US could replace the 
British in the Malaysia-Singapore area. The Australian decision to stay on 
was therefore welcome. Australia could also hope to capitalize on a 
swifter US response should difficulties arise. The Australian.gesture, taken 
as it was in the context of there being no immediately assisting great 
power, was believed in Canberra to enhance Australian entree into 
American decision-making, either on matters of mutual concern or where 
Australian interests were manifestly involved.'* 
There were other forms in which Australian contributions were ex-
pressed towards resisting dislocative forces, engaging great power In-
terest and support, seeking "reassurance" for Australia's special con-
cerns and gaining improved entree Into great power councils. We 
specifically refer to Australian-American intelligence linkages and to 
the presence of defence-related American facilities on Australian ter-
ritory. 
Some features of Australia's intelligence activity can most ap-
propriately be treated In other contexts. Here we emphasize aspects 
that particularly touched on Canberra's willing relationship with 
great powers, especially the United States." A general but important 
point Is that until very late In the L-CP's tenure of office, the early 
1970s, Australian intelligence assessments were inordinately depen-
dent on foreign, and especially American, data and analyses. The 
situation developed in part because of the limited data-collecting 
resources of a nation such as Australia, a certain amount of lethargy 
and because the routines of the time made it fairly natural to receive 
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and depend upon American data and assessments. There Is no 
evidence that the United States actively discouraged a more energetic 
Australian intelligence-gathering or intelligence-assessing role, al-
though the largely American filter through which intelligence passed 
Indirectly made It easier for Washington to get Australian-based ap-
praisals, and ultimately policy decision, that coincided with American 
positions. The reconstruction of the principal Australian intelligence-
assessing b(xly Into the Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO) In 1970 
finally gave Australia a competent agency for such purposes. All the 
same, before and after Australia undert(x)k more lndep-)endent intel-
ligence assessment, the fiow of US and British materials remained 
constant. There was a great deal of It, and much of it was of very high 
grade. Foreign intelligence personnel were attached on liaison to JIO, 
fully sharing In Its work, apart from the actual formulation of assess-
ments. In late 1974, two years after the change of government, this 
group included 'two or three' Americans, 'one or two' Britons and a 
New Zealander, a junior military officer 
The intelligence-sharing practices were based on an arrangement 
concluded in the early 1950s among the United States, Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada. We say "sharing", because a 
great deal of Australian-collected data, and assessments, were made 
available to the partners. Some of the Australian capability was excel-
lent, notably the signal surveillance and interception, cypher and, to 
an extent. Interpretative work performed under the Defence Signals 
Division (DSD). The American National Security Agency highly ap-
preciated data passed to it from DSD operations. A DSD unit In 
Singapt)re, first disclosed by Whitlam in 1973, had for some years 
been monitoring civilian and military radio traffic In Asia. 
Less valuable was ASIS, the Australian Secret (or Security) Intel-
ligency Service. Originally established by Menzies in the deepest 
secrecy, ASIS was nominally placed under the aegis of the Depart-
ment of External Affairs (later Foreign Affairs). It evolved under 
British Intelligence auspices, but later became much more American-
ass<Kiated. Its members developed contacts with the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) and other branches of the US intelligence com-
munity, both for training and for bilateral liaison work. 
ASIS personnel, who in their field work were concentrated on 
Asia, operated under cover. In years past, most of this cover was on 
the familiar pattern of overseas mission members (but excluding 
chiefs of mission) having ASIS as well as more conventional duties. 
More recently, persons outside of diplomatic/consular establishments 
were recruited as well. By far the greatest part of work performed by 
ASIS personnel was in data gathering, sometimes but apparently In-
frequently in tandem with friendly American or British counterparts. 
10 Australian External Policy under Labor 
ASlS-collected data were fed into Canberra and became part of the 
Australian intelligence take. Because of its modest scope, because 
Australia for years took exceptional notice of non-Australian intel-
ligence, ASIS's contribution was limited. All the same, piecing the pic-
ture together as well as one can in a very sensitive field, the impres-
sion emerges that ASIS-supplied intelligence had some value, but not 
evenly over time. 
There were Innuendoes that, to obtain results, ASIS operatives 
became engaged In "dirty tricks" operations such as bribery, 
blackmail, perhaps even more formidable escapades. The author's in-
vestigations Into how this might have worked under the Liberals 
produced the following inferences: 1. There was not much, but ap-
parently some of a classical "dirty tricks" and espionage component 
in ASIS operations. 2. What there was of "dirty tricks" operations 
was roundly condemned, including by professionals in the Australian 
intelligence community. The objeaion was pragmatic. Australia 
lacked the resources and expertise needed to carry out serious cloak-
and-dagger work. Worse, if cover should be blown during such opera-
tions, Australia stood to lose a great deal of diplomatic credit, es-
pecially in countries with which it tried to stay on side. If there had to 
be dirty trick operations, leave them to those, such as the Americans 
or the British, who could do the job professionally. Their govern-
ments, at all events, passed many of their discoveries to Australia. 
3. Under L-CP governments, ministerial control over ASIS was vir-
tually non-existent, a point we need to follow in some detail. 
The "blame" did not really rest with the ostensibly responsible 
senior ministers but with the nature of ASIS itself Menzies had suc-
ceeded In making It so secretive that a succession of Liberal ministers 
barely knew what was happening, or even that such a clandestine 
organization had acquired a personality of its own. William Mc-
Mahon became Foreign Minister In November 1969 and Prime 
Minister in March 1971. Astonishingly, he apparently did not acquire 
a reasonably clear picture of ASIS until the later stages of his prime 
ministership, I.e. the second half of 1972.'" McMahon seemingly 
wished to have the country's intelligence/security community 
bn)ught under systematic examination and, if needed, correction, but 
the 1972 election was too close at hand to launch an Inquiry. 
Parenthetically, it might be mentioned that from 1970, the Secretary 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs (FA) was Sir Keith Waller, a 
person of considerable administrative talent and a man who won 
Labor's respea following its translation to government. Yet It is possi-
ble that even this top public servant In the department to which ASIS 
was outwardly responsible was himself not fully cognizant of what 
was transpiring. 
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These observations are background for an appraisal of two par-
ticular involvements Imputed to Australian Intelligence during the 
later stages of L-CP government. One American-inspired report 
argued that ASIS had taken over some surveillance "eyes and ears" 
work for the CIA after the election of President Allende In Chile. The 
United States itself was said to be poorly placed to perform the task, 
because of its known hostility towards the regime. The Australian ef-
fort was reputed to have continued to the end of 1972, when the in-
coming Whitlam government discontinued it." McMahon, by then a 
member of the opposition, publicly denied knowledge of any 
Australian intelligence operations in Chile, whether to overthrow the 
Allende regime or just to spy on it.^ ° It is possible, though with an un-
known degree of likelihood, that both parts of the story may have been 
correct. An Australian agent or agents may have kept a "watching 
brief on Chilean developments, though it is unlikely that this could 
have been the CIA's substitute for its own potential efforts. According 
to Internal evidence from one highly reputable source, there ap-
parently was an ASIS agent in Chile, but his role was not tantamount 
to any particular "involvement" on behalf of the Americans. In the 
meantime, even the Australian Prime Minister may honestly have 
been ignorant of what was transpiring, given the secretiveness of 
ASIS's operations. 
Another report, also from American sources, charged that In the 
late 1960s, after the closure of the US embassy in Cambodia, 
Australian intelligence assumed responsibility on behalf of the CIA 
for surveillance of the Sihanouk government, and that various covert 
and electronic methods were used.^' The ostensible purpose was to In-
criminate the Sihanouk government. Peter Young, a former 
Australian army major with intelligence service in Indo-China, 
severely disputed this account. The United States had its own surveil-
lance methods, Australia lacked the facilities or the personnel in the 
places attributed etc. What Young did argue, however, was that 
Australians work hand-in-glove with their American counterparts .. 
[and] it is a one-sided co-operation, heavily exploited by the Americans 
and-capable of affording them the opportunity of feeding in slanted infor-
mation which in turn could produce policies favourable to the 
originators.^ ^ 
Other sources consulted by the author were considerably less con-
vinced that Australia had been receiving cooked intelligence. 
More of the US-Australian intelligence nexus in other connections. 
We now call attention to another L-CP effort to build a security 
shield for the region, and for Australia itself. Over time, some thirty 
American facilities were established in Australia, most under L-CP 
governments. Most were jointly operated In conjunction with 
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Australians. Some had only marginal defence applications, but rather 
were concerned with scientific research and operations, especially in 
aerospace. None were "bases" in the ordinary sense of housing gar-
risons or weapons systems. A few were stood down after their tasks 
had been fulfilled. But within the network were some extremely im-
portant and sensitive facilities. These included the US naval com-
munication station at the North-West Cape, Exmouth Gulf, Western 
Australia, whose ultra-low frequency transmissions were beamed to 
American submarines. Two other key facilities remained highly clas-
sified, even as to their basic functions. They were Pine Gap, at Alice 
Springs, Northern Territory, and Nurrungar, near Woomera, South 
Australia. They elicited considerable speculation as to their nature. It 
Is sufficient in present context to state that they were part of a 
monitoring system of Soviet and Chinese nuclear missile launchings, 
systems and tests. 
Taken together, this network of American facilities fully com-
plemented Australia's foreign policy/security objectives, as visualized 
by Liberal governments. Firstly, they served to enhance the military 
capability of the United States and of the anti-communist nations, 
Australia Included, in their deterrent as well as their retaliatory or 
confiict-conduct aspects. Secondly, the emplacement of a large 
number of expensive and sophisticated facilities in Australia, some of 
them critical to global strategic objectives, was believed to commit 
the United States to a physical and psychological presence, the net ef-
fect of which would be to enmesh America with Australia on a long-
term basis. This was a variation on the theme of the "great power 
presence". Finally, Australia hoped that, by -being hospitable, a 
manifestly good ANZUS partner, it could persuade the United States 
to continue to improve upon provision of intelligence data, security 
planning and acceptance of Australian counsel on assorted issues. 
From the foregoing, how close to the mark were the frequent accusa-
tions that L-CP governments were mesmerized by military responses 
to problems, addicted to conservative values, hopelessly unoriginal 
and willingly bound to American direction? "The task of Australian 
diplomacy was not so much to influence in any particular direction 
the policies of these outside powers," Joseph Camilleri argued, "but 
rather to ensure their continued economic and military presence ... 
Australian policies were almost wholly derivative, expressing little 
more than Australia's dependent relationship with one or other of 
her 'great and powerful friends'."" 
Even in brief compass, a look at the evidence Is worthwhile. In pre-
sent context, our concentration Is on the early and middle perlcxJs of 
L-CP government. Firstly, were L-CP governments simply Imitative 
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of great power, and especially American, preferences? In the large 
sense, yes, but with qualifications on whose meaningfulness people 
were and continue to be divided. Australia condemned the North 
Korean and Chinese roles in the Korean War, contributed troops to 
the United Nations effort and argued that the allies should not lose 
resolve when a costly stalemate developed. But, both privately and In 
public, the Menzies government made representations against steps 
that could enlarge the conflict with China, against General 
MacArthur's impetuousness and against "unleashing" Chiang Kai-
shek from Taiwan against the mainland.^* During and between the 
Chinese off-shore Island disputes of 1955 and 1958, Australia carefully 
avoided any commitment to help defend the. islands (the United 
States had thrown a protective mantle over them through its 1954 
security treaty with the Nationalists) and was especially reluctant to 
be sucked In via Its ANZUS obligations. The islands were felt to carry 
no strategic value and they were felt to be, as the Nationalists were 
utilizing them, provocations to Peking. Exacerbation of conditions 
could only upset the tranquil conditions desired by Canberra; In Men-
zies' words, the islands were not "worth another great war".^' 
Australia did not want Taiwan abandoned, nor a precipitous aban-
donment of the off-shore islands at an inopportune moment. 
However, "During the three-year lull between the crises ... [Australia] 
worked for a complete disengagement at an Internationally suitable 
moment. When the second crisis arrived and nothing had been done, 
Australia told Washington of its displeasure in no uncertain terms."" 
Australia was not a formal participant at the 1954 Geneva con-
ference on Indo-China, but was active there. The Australian govern-
ment was distressed about the prospect of a communist victory over 
the French. It grudgingly accepted the partition of Vietnam. As a reas-
surance for itself, and for the region, it favoured what came to be the 
Manila Treaty and SEATO. But the internal evidence is very substan-
tial that Australia firmly opposed US feelers for an allied military in-
tervention. Such intervention would have been wrong because, in 
former External Affairs Minister R. G. Casey's words. 
It would not have the backing of the United Nations. It would put us in 
wrong with world opinion, particularly in Asia. It would probably 
embroil us with Communist China. It would wreck the Geneva con-
ference, and it was most unlikely to stop the fall of Dien Bien Phu. These 
were the views that I expressed on behalf of the Australian Government 
to Mr Dulles, Mr Eden, and other leaders at Geneva." 
Australia's approach to prosecuting the^Vietnamese conflict was, In 
most important respects, sturdily pro-American. Australia was eager 
to include its forces In the military effort and generally opposed a 
"negotiation from weakness" posture. But even here there were some 
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exceptions, however slight. There was a period when, shading off 
from US policy, Australia favoured more flexibility in approaching 
negotiations with the other side and was not averse to the participa-
tion of the National Liberation Front. L-CP governments did not ac-
cede to all American pressures for troop contributions, beyond what 
Australia eventually supplied. For a time, even after combat troops 
had been committed to Vietnam, Australia allowed trade with North 
Vietnam to continue. Although Australian passports were marked 
"Not Valid for Travel In North Vietnam", Australians travelling there 
In contravention of this prohibition were not subject to legal dis-
abilities upon returning home.^* Australia's approach to China itself 
carried two prongs. Diplomatically, Australia accorded full support to 
Washington's position of non-recognition and resistance to seating of 
Peking at the United Nations, especially at Taiwan's expense. But 
Australia pursued a vigorous trade with China at a time when 
America had prohibited it entirely and numerous Australians, among 
them some official persons, visited China. 
Our final Illustration of Australian divergence from American 
policy refers to Bangladesh. For a variety of reasons, at the time of the 
East Bengali revolt against Pakistan and of Indo-Pakistani fighting, 
US policy carried a decided tilt in favour of Pakistan. The McMahon 
government, however, not only was the first Commonwealth nation 
to recognize Bangladesh, but with salutary results, "scored a 
remarkable success when it orchestrated the recognition of 
Bangladesh by a small consortium of Asian and Pacific nations".^' 
The above examples span a variety of situations. They include in-
stances of relations with great as well as with smaller powers, of cir-
cumstances In which Australia both did and did not have a military 
stake, of unilateral and multilateral settings, and so on. Of course, 
detractors of L-CP policy said that any "divergencies" from an 
American lead were highly exceptional or only marginally important. 
Viewing the bigger picture, on the big issues, Australia was seen as 
clinging to America. 
What of the related charge that L-CP governments were preoc-
cupied with the security aspects of the Asian neighbourhood and sub-
scribed more to military than to socio-economic policy responses? 
L-CP governments sought and obviously valued security treaty con-
nections and on numerous occasions committed troops and arranged 
military assistance programmes. One additional measure of this ques-
tion was the scope of Australia's investment in its own military es-
tablishment. During the 1950s and early 1960s, L-CP governments 
constantly warned of threats and of the need to defend against them. 
They did post troops abroad, but In small numbers. Indeed, not much 
more could have been done, given the state of the country's forces. In 
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the late 1950s, total regular service strength averaged about 47000. 
By 1961, the army had reached a ten-year low of under 20000. 
Capital military expenditures were neglected and the proportion of 
national income spent on defence declined for some years after the 
peak of the Korean War, from 6.1 per cent In 1952-53 to half of that 
In the early 1960s. For many years, Australia could not have mustered 
more than two Infantry battalions for simultaneous overseas duty. 
By the mid-1960s, the pattern changed. Conscription for unlimited 
overseas service was introduced In 1964. From its effective start In 
1965 to the fall of the McMahon government in late 1972, some 
64000 men were conscripted and over 15 000 saw service in Vietnam. 
The regular armed forces reached a peak of nearly 87000 In 1970. The 
defence budget was increased, to meet both personnel and capital 
costs. It rose to its peak of 4.6 per cent of Gross National Product at 
the crest of the Vietnam conflict and then gradually declined. 
The Inconsistency between dire professions of threats at Australia's 
doorstep and of very meagre military preparedness could be In-
terpreted in several ways. It could be seen as an exercise in hypocrisy 
and lack of real conviction that there indeed was an overriding re-
quirement to stand up to communism. Or it could be seen, as L-CP 
governments themselves explained it, as an effort by Australia to 
divert most of Its resources Into domestic Australian economic 
development, in itself a long-term, militarily-related capability, both 
for Australia and for Its allies. Or it could be seen as a case of having 
cake and eating it too. There were modest defence costs, but a con-
tinuous, symbolic Australian military presence in Asia, demonstrating 
co-operativeness towards powerful friends and reassuring ostensibly 
threatened nations in the region—a form of defence on the cheap. Or, 
taken in perspective, a mixed conclusion is possible. One such in-
terpretation was that 
the Menzies policy of defence through national development was a bril-
liant success—where would our living standards be today if we had con-
sistently spent say 10 per cent of G.N.P. on defence in the past twenty-five 
years rather than 3 per cent? However, and here is the rub, we have there-
by become as conditioned to the luxury of cheap defence as developed na-
tions have to cheap oil.'" 
What of Australia's approach to nuclear weapons? L-CP govern-
ments never made it a matter of policy to move towards the acquisi-
tion of an Australian nuclear capability. Could their handling of the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) have been indicative of 
hypothetical options to go nuclear at some point? The NPT obligated 
signatories to refrain from developing, controlling or otherwise ac-
quiring nuclear explosive devices and prohibited provision of second 
parties with militarily applicable nuclear technology or weapons. 
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After considerable procrastination, the L-CP signed the NPT in early 
1970. It had offered various arguments for-its reluctance to embrace 
the treaty, including presumed hardships imposed on peaceful 
nuclear development, scepticism over the inspection system and the 
extended failure of other nations to sign. The United States en-
couraged Australia to sign, and there was anxiety that continued 
dragging of feet would not only offend Washington but hamper 
civilian, nuclear-related assistance from various countries. All the 
same, although Australia signed, it failed to ratify the NPT 
throughout the remainder of Liberal government, a period of nearly 
three years. There Is intimation that perhaps two or three L-CP 
ministers wished to stall on the NPT because they thought it prudent 
for Australia to retain a nuclear option. New Zealand informants sug-
gested to the author that they sensed a certain nuclear option senti-
ment in the outgoing L-CP government, though here we are dealing 
with impression rather than evidence, and the author's overall In-
quiries suggested that the "open" nuclear option played a very small 
part in government calculations." 
Australia's attitude towards nuclear testing is germane. Australia 
made direct representations to Paris in criticism of France's at-
mospheric testing In the Pacific. Late in 1972, together with New 
Zealand, it helped to organize and then co-chaired a meeting of six-
teen Pacific nations, to declare opposition to French tests and to plan 
appropriate strategy at the United Nations. It co-sponsored a resolu-
tion that condemned nuclear tests generally, and French tests in par-
ticular. Although Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen took considerable 
pride in Australia's efforts at mobilizing international opinion in 
favour of his government's "declared policy" of opposing nuclear 
tests, he was sceptical about the feasibility of applying economic sanc-
tions against France. At that time, about 11 per cent of France's 
uranium came from Australia.'^ 
We now consider how L-CP governments utilized non-military in-
struments of foreign policy, notably foreign economic and technical 
assistance. In 1950, the new L-CP government was a moving force In 
organizing the Colombo Plan, one of the earliest multinational aid 
consortia. Foreign-aid spending stood at $74 million in 1962-63. At 
the close of L-CP govemment, spending for 1972-73 was projected at 
nearly three times that figure, $220 million, with $216 million actual-
ly spent. By 1971 and 1972, Australian overseas aid ranked amongst 
the four highest In the world, measured by proportion of GNP. 
Moreover, L-CP governments followed some practices, or initiated 
foreign policy Schemes, the special value of which was widely broad-
cast. Australian aid was provided Interest-free. The government 
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entered into an export certificate scheme, which enabled Indonesia to 
purchase Australian goods without hard currency. The government 
introduced, and then expanded, a system of reduced or fully removed 
tariffs on various goods, within stated quantitative quotas, that could 
enter Australia from less-developed countries. L-CP aid programmes 
did not, of course, escape criticism. If the Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
share of some 70 per cent were excluded, not all that much remained 
for others. There was excessive reliance on bilateral assistance, not 
enough on multilateral. Too much stress was said to be placed on 
Australian grants requiring use or purchase of Australian goods. All 
the same, Australia's foreign aid programme under the L-CP was 
not, at large, either inconspicuous or unimaginative." 
How did the aid effort relate to broader foreign p)ollcy con-
siderations? To be sure, there was a humanitarian feature in it, but 
more accurately it was conceived as enlightened self-interest. Apart 
from any economic spin-offs for Australia, the programme was 
justified as helping to shore up recipient nations economically so that 
they could become more Immune to destabilizing domestic or exter-
nal pressures. Harold Holt, Menzies' successor, was particularly im-
pressed by the salience of economic considerations in stabilizing new 
and poor nations. Australia felt that, like Its frequent military con-
tributions in Asia, its aid contributions would also serve as incentives 
to other donor nations. The L-CP's concentration on South-East Asia 
as Australia's principal security/strategic concern was complemented 
by the direction of foreign assistance. For a time India was, apart 
from Papua New Guinea, the single most generously treated nation. 
This shifted to Indonesia by the mid-1960s, and the concentration of 
aid shifted to South-East Asia generally. We should also mention cer-
tain L-CP aid programme characteristics that implied a close aid/-
politlcs/security nexus, though such reasoning can be easily exag-
gerated. For instance, Australia provided some defence co-operation 
assistance to nations in the region. But, in relative as well as absolute 
terms, this was not a major programme. In 1972-73, $33 million was 
spent on defence aid, compared to the $216 million spent on civillian 
economic assistance. It can be calculated that, with Papua New 
Guinea aid excluded from the equation, foreign-aid spending, as a 
proportion oi defence expenditure, aaually declined in the late 1960s, 
compared to the early part of the decade—to below 5 per cent of the 
defence allocation. But it should be remembered that defence 
spending was inordinately low before the mid-1960s, that economic-
assistance spending continued to rise (in absolute terms) over each 
financial year and that Australia's comparative international 
standing was strong. It can also be shown that, by the time of its exit 
from office, the L-CP was, within South-East Asia, concentrating Its 
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economic assistance on politically safe, distinctly anti-communist 
regimes, such as Indonesia, Thailand, South Vietnam and Malaysia, 
rhe anti-communist colour of these regimes was an incentive for the 
Australian government. However, given the L-CP's understandable 
aid focus on South-East Asia, there simply were very few neutralist 
nations In the region to which to grant aid. When, in 1965, President 
Johnson expressed a wish for a massive development assistance 
programme in South-East Asia, Hasluck quickly agreed. Though there 
was no chance to carry this through before the L-CP left office, 
Hasluck emphasized that Johnson's offer was not limited to anti- or 
even non-communist countries, but to "North Vietnam no less than 
South Vietnam".''' Despite its position outside the South-East Asian 
region, and its non-aligned foreign policy, India remained the second 
most generously treated nation, next to Indonesia. On a per-capita 
basis, of course, India received very little. 
Particularly heavy Australian aid started to flow to Indonesia after 
President Sukarno had lost his power the Indonesian Communist 
party (PKI) was rooted out and an anti-communist military regime 
was Installed. Prior to this time, the PKI had been influential in In-
donesian politics, Jakarta was on close .terms with Peking and 
Australia had sent an infantry battalion to Malaysian Borneo to help 
resist Indonesia's Confrontation efforts. In these circumstances, many 
felt that Australian diplomacy realized one of its finest hours. Gordon 
Greenwood recounted the Australian reaction as follows: 
Australian diplomats in Indonesia, who had been cast in the difficult role 
of combining expressions of firm opposition to confrontation with the 
maintenance of as friendly relations as possible, performed their task with 
calmness, patience and adroitness ... The extent of their success may be judged from, the fact that more or less normal relations were continued in 
quite abnormal circumstances. It must be rare indeed for two countries to 
face one another over a vital conflict of policy, with troops not only in the 
field but actually fighting one another, and at the same time not only 
maintain unbroken diplomatic relations, but participate in joint 
educational schemes and in other aid programmes requiring mutual co-
operation." 
During the Confrontation crisis, a trade treaty was negotiated. A gift 
of rice was made. Australian medical and technical personnel con-
tinued to work in Indonesia. Equipment and other materials under 
the Colombo Plan were delivered. Indonesian students continued to 
arrive and study in Australia. 
Australian behaviour during the Confrontation dispute actually 
had two faces. It included a very graduated military response, dex-
trous diplomacy and a continuation of aid programmes. This Is what 
the Indonesians saw. There also was something else. As recounted 
elsewhere, based on impeccable sources. 
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Australia pressed the U.S. very hard to use economic aid to Indonesia as 
leverage in the hope of bringing Sukarno to his senses. This was done with 
full appreciation of the possibility that unwanted ricochet effeas would 
result, but the sanctions policy was urged nonetheless. Chinese Com-
munism could not be allowed to have its way in disrupting the Malaysian 
experiment, and Australia was responding accordingly.'" 
On the matter of the tone of policy under L-CP governments, one 
more sub-theme needs to be covered. Critics went beyond charging 
that Australia was being slavish towards the United States and 
enamoured of military solutions. Asia was that part of the world 
where L-CP governments acknowledged Australia's vital interests to 
lie, and where there was greatest need to exercise Influence. Yet it 
was alleged that the image of Australia projected under the Liberals 
was of a nation that was callous, opposed to currents of national 
aspiration and even racist. This was characterized as a narrowness, a 
conservatism that complemented other features of a stubborn L-CP 
foreign policy. To illustrate the subject, we focus on the L-CP ap-
proach to non-European migration and to colonial/racial questions, 
especially in the context of the United Nations. 
L-CP governments did not, of course, invent the restrictive Asian 
exclusion, frequently called "White Australia" policy. Its roots 
reached to the nineteenth century and became a form of settled 
national policy virtually from the start of Australian Federation. In 
the late 1940s, while Evatt on behalf of the Labor government was 
beginning to build bridges towards emerging nations in Asia, Im-
migration Minister Arthur Calwell was enforcing White Australia 
with Implacable single-mindedness of purpose. The succeeding L-CP 
governments proved themselves less crude, more "small I liberal" In 
administering the general exclusionist policy. By the late 1950s, the 
government rescinded the notorious dictation test from the country's 
migration regulations. It then, gradually, proceeded to ease, but not to 
erase, restrictions on the entry of non-Europeans. The basic reforms 
were introduced in 1966, shortly after Holt had become Prime 
Minister. No explicit numerical quota was ever devised, though the 
net effect of the government's approach was to limit the number and 
character of non-European migrants. Individuals were screened ac-
cording to such criteria as potential for integration into Australian 
society and their ability to render "positively useful" contributions. 
Their families were allowed to accompany them. Rules governing 
non-permanent entry into Australia were considerably simplified and 
liberalized. Those who originally arrived on temporary visas were not 
precluded from applying for permanent residence. Gradually, the 
period required for Australian naturalization was equalized between 
non-Europeans and Europeans. By the early 1970s, about 4000 non-
Europeans and some 6000 persons of mixed racial ancestry were 
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entering Australia annually. Basically, what remained of a dis-
criminatory policy was that standards for non-Europeans remained 
more stringent than for Europeans, and assisted passage was virtually 
unavailable to non-Europeans. 
Various factors influenced the erosion of the White Australia 
policy. During the many years of L-CP rule, Australia generally 
became less defensive about having its social fabric torn and its 
economic standards reduced by unfamiliar migrants. The post-war 
economy held up and grew. The influx of great numbers of white, but 
not Anglo-Saxon, migrants accustomed the nation to a new flavour of 
population. The presence of thousands of Asian students at 
Australian universities and the movement of Asian businessmen, 
journalists and official persons made Asians more familiar and less 
suspect. Australia's own opening up in foreign fX)licy, with its 
emphasis on Asia, conditioned acceptance of Asian migrants. An ef-
fective Immigration Reform Group campaign helped to publicize the 
cause of lowered migration barriers against non-Europeans, though 
for most of the L-CP period of office the ALP actually remained 
behind the L-CP in reconstructing its own approach." 
The general impression is that L-CP governments liberalized the 
Asian migration policy largely for the reasons suggested above—there 
was less ostensible "need" for stringency and the climate of reform 
had spread. To some extent, change was spurred by foreign policy 
considerations. One consideration was to avert untoward incidents 
with Asian nations and to enlarge Australia's credit in the region. 
However, apart from sporadic difficulties, primarily with the Philip-
pines, there was little hard evidence that the L-CP's pursuit of 
Australian interests was being damaged by restrictive migration prac-
tices. The 1966 reforms were, at all events, welcomed in Asia.'* 
Relatedly, as the 1960s progressed, the government in Canberra found 
that pressures against racially discriminating regimes, such as in 
South Africa and in Rhodesia, were rising at the United Nations, as 
well as in such bodies as the now much expanded and thoroughly 
multi-racial Commonwealth of Nations. Thus to forestall possible at-
tacks upon its migration policy, or its treatment of the native 
Aboriginal population, Australia was given an additional Incentive to 
mend Its approach. 
Overall, the L-CP attitude towards the United Nations was sym-
pathetic but restrained. The coalition parties were less attracted by 
idealistic conceptions of the value of a world body as a venue for deal-
ing with the really hard problems of international life than Labor 
was. This attitude was strengthened by the high security threat that 
was perceived to exist in Asia and the Pacific region. The belief was 
that such threats could best be countered by non-UN-derlved arrange-
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ments such as a great power presence, a network of alliances and flex-
ible military responses. Scepticism about the United Nations was com-
pounded by the UN's inability to deal appropriately, or at all, with 
problems that were seen by the L-CP as Intimately connected to 
Australia's Interests. Hence the United Nations was seen as valueless 
in persuading Sukarno to call off his Confrontation of Malaysia. 
Earlier the United Nations had acceded to a settlement of Indonesia's 
claims to Dutch New Guinea (West Irian), which Australia In-
terpreted as acquiescence In Indonesian bully tactics. 
Such predisposing factors made it even more difficult for L-CP 
governments to welcome the consequences Indicated for colonial and 
racial issues by the proliferation of assertive Afro-Asian members at 
the United Nations. Throughout the decade of the 1950s, Australia at 
the United Nations voted a distinctively conservative line on most 
colonlally related questions such as self-determination. Independence 
or equal rights. As Geoffrey Sawer put it, the Australian instinct was 
to say one of two things. 
Relying on a broad interpretation of what constitutes "domestic jurisdic-
tion" under Article 2 (7), Australia voted against United Nations con-
sideration of such issues unless there was a clear element of danger to the 
peace or unless a Trusteeship Agreement under Chapter XII of the Charter 
itself brought the matter within the sphere of international competence as 
interpreted by Australian conservative governments. Even when not rely-
ing on Article 2 (7), Australian delegations tended to resist United Nations 
intervention in such matters on broader political grounds, such as the un-
likelihood of the intervention being for the benefit of the colonial or op-
pressed peoples concerned, and the likelihood of discussions being 
dominated by mischief-makers more interested in weakening the western 
powers than in benefiting Africans, Arabs, etc." 
Australian's reaction was in part dictated by the conviction that 
much that was being advocated before the United Nations was either 
unrealistic or actually dangerous to world order, In itself a high-
priority Australian concern. The L-CP's posture also reflected a reluc-
tance to encourage undesired. Internationally sponsored interference 
In Australia's management of Papua New Guinea, or Its migration 
policy, or Its treatment of Aborigines. The peak, as well as the 
turning-point, in Australian policy was reached in the 1960-61 crisis 
over the Sharpevllle shootings in South Africa and that nation's 
membership In the Commonwealth. Australia had previously been a 
strict constructionist of the UN Charter, denying that the United Na-
tions enjoyed jurisdiction over South Africa's domestic policies. At the 
1960 and 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences, Men-
zies was the staunchest white Commonwealth exponent of the view 
that it was impermissible for the Commonwealth to delve Into the in-
ternal concerns of a fellow member. At the 1961 conference, he did 
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what he could to forestall pressures that proved so intense that South 
Africa was de facto pushed out of the Commonwealth. But in April 
1961, Australia abandoned its earlier approach at the United Nations 
and supported a resolution highly condemnatory of South Africa. 
Menzies himself concluded that Australia could no longer afford to be 
Isolated: "What would have happened to Australia if we had been the 
only country holding out? We would have been misunderstood all 
over Asia about our attitude, and we were not going to be misunder-
stood. We had had enough.""" 
Henceforth Australian voting at the United Nations on South 
African apartheid, and on South-West African, Portuguese and 
kindred colonial questions, became less legalistic and more inclined to 
stand with anti-colonial opinion. It was not, however, by any means a 
180 degree turnabout. L-CP governments continued to disapprove of 
actual sanctions such as economic or diplomatic boycotts against of-
fenders. The government did agree to support sanctions against 
Rhodesia, though it did so with "profound distaste" and was not 
punctilious in enforcing them. 
At all events, Australia's reorientation on colonial/racial issues was 
impelled by essentially the same considerations that had led it to as-
sume a much firmer posture in the 1950s. Australia now not only 
wished to avoid the general penalty of becoming isolated, especially 
among Asian nations. More particularly, it wished to temper Third 
World nation temptations to pry into Australia's own affairs, racial 
and colonial. W.J. Hudson, one of the most assiduous students of 
Australia's relations with the United Nations, has written that "There 
seems to be at least a prima facie case for assuming that Canberra, in 
the early sixties, finally decided that Papua and New Guinea were not 
worth the diplomatic price that Portugal, South Africa and perhaps 
Spain were prepared to pay. In such an event, it was, of course, essen-
tial also to dissociate from South Africa and Portugal.'"" Regarding 
the L-CP's tack on Rhodesia, another observer wrote that "While 
New Guinea and Rhodesia bear no comparison, the fart remains that 
Australia Is being pressured in the UN, however irrationally, over its 
administration of the Territory in a way that makes It quite impossi-
ble to support Rhodesia.""^ 
Indeed, apart from trying to build a more attractive image for itself 
among potential international critics, Australia proceeded to institute 
substantive reforms in the handling of its own colonial/racial 
policies. By the late 1960s, more forceful attention was being given to 
Improving the condition of Australian Aborigines. As seen earlier, 
1966 marked an important liberalizing departure from previous ap-
proaches towards non-European migration. Liberalization of the 
government's policy towards Papua New Guinea was a more complex 
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undertaking. For generations, serious attention had been paid to the 
security Implications of the territory's position to Australia's near 
north, and anxiety was heightened by Japan's invasion of It during 
the Second World War. The eastern portion of the island technically 
had two parts: Papua was Australian territory and New Guinea 
proper first a League of Nations mandate, later became the only sur-
viving United Nations non-strategic trust territory. Since 1949, the 
two portions were administratively connerted and subject to com-
mon policy. The western half of New Guinea was Dutch, until its ac-
quisition by Indonesia as West Irian in the early 1960s. Australia's 
concern with forcing the pace of New Guinea independence was, inter 
alia, coloured by security considerations. An extremely economically 
backward, socially fragile and administratively inexperienced Papua 
New Guinea would be a potential source of instability, and possibly an 
inviting target for an externally sponsored radical takeover. With the 
PKi carrying strong influence In Sukarno's Indonesia, with Indonesia 
courting China and expressing militancy in Its foreign policy, the 
prospect of West New Guinea falling under Indonesian control 
further constrained Canberra's willingness to allow Papua New 
Guinea to slip out of Australian control. 
By the mid-1960s, however conditions had changed. Sukarno was 
out of power the PKI was In disarray and Indonesia's foreign policy 
became much more accommodative. Furthermore, L-CP perceptions 
of the actual security importance of Papua New Guinea to Australia 
were lowered. Such factors, combined with steady UN pressure on 
Australia to expedite the decolonization process in Papua New 
Guinea, influenced Canberra's approach. L-CP governments believed 
that criticism laid against Australian administration In Papua New 
Guinea was sometimes tendentious or otherwise wholly unhelpful. 
But Canberra admitted that much of what was recommended was 
sensible, and It found that among Asian (as opposed to most African, 
Middle Eastern and communist nations) there was understanding of 
the magnitude of the political and economic tasks Involved in Papua 
New Guinea. There is Internal evidence of private assurances to 
Australia by Asian spokesmen that their votes or occasional critical 
remarks at the United Nations reflected more a need to impress par-
ticular sectors of domestic or international opinion than a revulsion 
against Australian policy. There was no particular diplomatic fall-out 
when, in 1969, Australia resigned from the UN Special Committee on 
the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
(briefly Committee on Decolonization, or "Committee of Twenty-
Four"). The committee had been organized in 1961 to help implement 
the General Assembly's declaration on terminating colonialism. From 
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1964, the committee had been concerned with Papua New Guinea. 
Australia consistently rebuffed what it regarded as its dogmatic 
criticisms and refused to allow It to send Its own delegates to Papua 
New Guinea, on grounds that Australia was answerable to the 
Trusteeship Council alone. 
Australia eventually committed itself to the principle of self-
determination for Papua New Guinea, though it resisted the imposi-
tion of target dates. A new, primarily elected Papua New Guinea 
House of Assembly first met in 1964. Responsibilities for self-
administration began to be transferred to the embryonic Papua New 
Guinea government. Rapid progress was made towards Indigenizing 
the territory's public service and socio-economic assistance generally 
was conspicuously stepped up. Momentum was especially noticeable 
from 1970. It became extremely rapid from early 1972, coinciding 
with the appointment of Andrew Peacock as Minister for External 
Territories under the McMahon government. Peacock laid the final 
foundations for what, a year after the departure of the Liberals from 
office, was to become the acquisition of self-government by Papua 
New Guinea. Formal independence did not arrive until 1975. 
Peacock's contributions were later acknowledged by the succeeding 
Labor government. Whitlam was pleased to "pay tribute to him and 
his work". Among other things, "Andrew Peacock did go a long way 
towards restoring the [interparty] consensus—a genuine, progressive, 
concerned consensus, not the phoney consensus of the 60s.'"" 
In the formal sense, what was done for Papua New Guinea in 1972 
was authoritative government policy. In another sense, however, it 
was a bit different. It was very largely a Peacock initiative, carried out 
within nine or ten months in a very personal manner. The Prime 
Minister's role was essentially one of concurrence. Cabinet was hardly 
consulted in advance, and it only in general, sporadic and after-the-
fact fashion acknowledged the policy. In its way, it was an episode in-
dicative of the rather disjointed state of affairs In which the L-CP 
government was approaching external policy In Its last years of office. 
On New Guinea, the result of such an approach proved salutary. In 
other instances, including on colonial and racial Issues, results were 
less salutary. In 1971, a South African Rugby Union football team was 
scheduled to play in Australia. Opinion on the advisability of the visit 
divided sharply. In some quarters, it was argued that, by allowing the 
visit, Australia would be according de facto acceptance to South 
Africa's practice of racially segregated sport and to Its apartheid 
policies generally. In other quarters, including within the govern-
ment, the view was that political considerations should not Intrude 
into sport. People who wished to attend matches should have the op-
tion to do so. Sincere anti-racialist people were found on both sides of 
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the controversy. But, to the mortification of some of his ministers, 
when trade-unionist, student and other elements threatened to dis-
rupt the matches if the South Africans came, McMahon pushed the 
issue into very sharp political relief. He said that RAAF aircraft 
would. If needed, be placed at the disposal of the travelling South 
African team and warned that he would not be averse to calling a 
snap election on a "law and order" issue. In effect, his theme was who 
governed Australia—the government or agitators?"" 
In the following chapter, we will concentrate on the final stages of 
L-CP government. We will examine in some detail the conceptual, 
political and policy process problems that increasingly affected 
foreign policy movements and that contributed to Labor's ascent to 
power. 
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The Liberal Inheritance: II 
In the preceding chapter the approach of L-CP governments to exter-
nal affairs was characterized according to governing perceptions of 
the international order, the assumptions they drew as to what 
Australia's Interests required and the policy instruments they 
employed. In general, the L-CP saw the region to Australia's north as 
distressingly volatile. It ascribed much of this to communist influence 
and especially to China's machinations. It saw such developments as 
inimical to Australia's Interests and sought the presence of major non-
communist powers in the region as a counter to dislocation and ag-
gression. Australia needed to devise a foreign policy that would en-
courage and complement a great-power checking role. L-CP policy 
displayed a strong "security" component, a posture that placed 
Australia solidly at the side of great and powerful friends, and a 
reticence about embracing the aspirations of nations within the Third 
World community. We now consider to what extent, why and with 
what consequences these patterns may have been reconsidered 
towards the close of Liberal government. 
By the late 1960s, and then more expressly into the early 1970s, a 
reordering appeared to be taking form in the international balance. 
The world became less polarized between communist and anti-
communist camps. The super-powers were less able to dictate to 
clients or to dispose of International disputes as they saw fit. New 
clusters of Important national and regional influence became more 
apparent. Including China, Japan and the West European region. 
World politics became affected by the Sino-Sovlet dispute. Many saw 
these phenomena as the emergence of a new balance of forces, more 
complex than In the past and requiring adjusted policy responses. 
While the United States and the USSR remained intense rivals and 
maintained formidable nuclear and conventional military 
capabilities, they began to move towards a guarded yet mutually In-
terested accommodation-or dhente. China itself expressed Interest in 
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adjusting its diplomatic relations with non-communist states. The 
United States and a number of other anti-communist nations moved 
away from fixed confrontational postures. 
Official American thinking more explicitly steered away from set-
tings that might require such uncomfortably polar responses as 
capitulation or massive retaliation. A standing-down in Vietnam and 
closer relations with China were started. In Richard Nixon's "Guam 
Doctrine" and in other contexts, the United States expressed reluc-
tance to maintain a large-scale American military presence in Asia. 
As corollary, America's interests were felt not to require, nor Asian 
conditions permit, extreme Asian-Pacific dependence on and confor-
mity to the United States. Washington wished nations in the region to 
assume more self-responsibility for security and economic develop-
ment, especially within the framework of intra-regional co-operation. 
Australia and Japan were regarded as two of the region's members 
most suited to contribute towards such goals. Before it left office, the 
Johnson administration counselled Australia against an approach of 
simply clinging to America. Uncreativeness would not only detract 
from South-East Asian regionalism and could depreciate Australia's 
chances of having America "on call" in Invoking ANZUS or otherwise 
satisfy Canberra's unique international requirements. Donald Home 
said it succinctly: in "varying degrees of politeness or bluntness the 
American attitude is that something more positive is to be expected of 
Australia than the role of loyal hanger-on and urger ... One of the 
paradoxes of the position Is that what is most likely to impress the 
Americans is not 'loyalty' but Independent initiative."' Nixon was ap-
parently able to transmit some of this sentiment to Australia even 
before his Inauguration.^ Nor could Britain's declining interest in 
sustaining a serious presence east of Suez be overlooked by Australia. 
Our Interest In present context is to recapture the extent to which, 
in their later years, L-CP governments themselves may have 
reconceptuallzed the international scene and Australia's place in It. 
We can then more profitably proceed to examine the variety of incen-
tives and disincentives that may have influenced actual policy deci-
sions and their management. 
Australian academic observers did not themselves agree on what 
was happening within L-CP government circles. Hedley Bull, for ex-
ample, felt that Australian policy-makers had been slow to perceive 
change and that their conversion was not complete by December 
1972. He did, however think that they had recognized that while the 
United States remained an essential element in an Asian great-power 
equilibrium, the Soviets, Japanese and Chinese could also contribute 
to It by providing a check to the ambitions of others. Also he thought 
he saw a L-CP realization that American power would in the future 
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be less available, and indeed less necessary, for the region's security.' 
Fred Medlansky was less persuaded. He thought that old assumptions 
about continued reliance and shared interest vis-d-vis the United States 
had hardly been reconsidered, with the danger that "Australian 
diplomacy will seek to continue paying 'dues' for an insurance con-
tract where the terms of coverage have radically changed."" 
Official pronouncements during the late stages of Gorton's prime 
ministership, and then during McMahon's, do not settle the point. 
The documentary record, plus the present author's Inquiries among 
senior ministers of the period, leave a picture of ambivalence and 
even contradiction In what L-CP governments really thought. There 
are indications that a "new balance" in Asia was recognized, but there 
was much uncertainty as to what the range of implications was. In a 
strategic assessment completed in early 197h, the government's ad-
visers suggested that there was no serious likelihood of a major threat 
to Australia's Integrity that could develop within the region for 
perhaps up to ten years. However one former minister told the 
author that in this respect the advisers' frame of reference was 
narrow—simply the lack of direct foreseeable threat to Australia. Con-
ditions in the neighbourhood, which could indirectly yet seriously im-
pinge on Australia's safety, were not believed to have changed 
measurably. Another former minister said that the gcwernment 
proceeded within a three- or four-year forecast period, not ten years. 
Yet another former minister tended to dismiss this feature of the 
strategic assessment entirely. The assessment had mainly been an ex-
ercise, while he, in his position of responsibility, had needed to react 
to the world as it "really" was. 
The Defence Report for 1972 itself pointed In more than one direc-
tion. It acknowledged an evolving detente among the great powers and 
their concern to maintain a strategic balance, this being a basis for the 
tension-relaxing hopes that had been stimulated in many capitals. 
Serious great-power competition was, however, expected to continue. 
Within South-East Asia, communist states persisted in exacerbating 
conditions by abetting insurgency and subversion. North Vietnam 
"undeniably" held "expansionist designs", while China had expressed 
"no meaningful undertaking" to "work with established governments 
In the region and not against them". While the report t(X)k notice of 
no "immediate" situations that could create a "high probability" of 
involvement by Australian forces. It cautioned that "circumstances 
could change quickly because of the latent forces of Instability In 
South-East Asia" ' 
McMahon wrote in late 1972 that there were signs of eased ten-
sions, but the causes of tension remained. It was vital for Australia and 
Its friends to keep in being, not dismantle, security alliances and 
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military preparedness; "just when they have proved their effec-
tiveness in bringing Peking and Moscow to the conference table", the 
guard must not be let down.*' 
What emerged was an ambivalent, hesitating L-CP reaction to 
changes in the international climate and to implications for Australia. 
Such reaction was not, of course, a necessary sign of "confusion" or of 
"weakness" on the part of the government. But conceptual ten-
tativeness was only one element affecting L-CP policy at this time. 
Australian Liberal governments, like governments elsewhere, were 
subject to a host of historical, intra-party, electoral, personality and 
other influences over their behaviour. Before looking at actual policy 
outputs and management, it is therefore helpful to catalogue the 
dominant incentives, and Inhibitions, that intruded upon any deci-
sions to reorient policy. 
We begin by discussing the incentives for moving away from 
orthcxiox positions. In the first place, there was the goad of great and 
friendly nation behaviour and advice. The United States and Britain 
were, after all, Australia's trusted friends and partners. The United 
States in particular was active In rescaling Its approach ;o the great 
communist powers. In Itself suggesting a more relaxed International 
atmosphere. There were first-stage strategic arms limitation agree-
ments with the Soviets and other signs of coexistence. Washington's 
diplomatic and economic isolation of Peking was prominently 
reduced. The United States was turning down Its ground presence in 
Asia and urging Australia and others to be less passive, more original 
In their regional roles. Although the original British threat to dis-
engage from South-East Asia by 1971 was retracted, the remaining 
British presence was slight and insecure. While reducing its obliga-
tions In Asia, Britain was Increasingly turning towards Europe. Japan 
itself was searching for a more personally distinctive role In Asia. In 
other words, if Australia's major friends and allies were no longer 
construing the world as they once did, were making policy adjust-
ments and to an extent were inviting Australia to cast another look at 
its own policies, this should have served as Incentive for L-CP govern-
ments. 
Another factor in the equation, which can also be viewed as an in-
centive for change, was the movement In Australian political life. The 
Liberal and Country Parties enjoyed their longevity as parties of 
government. Between 1949 and 1966, their presence In office had 
been electorally seriously threatened only once. The reason for their 
near-defeat in 1961 had been their handling of the economy, not ex-
ternal policy problems. The L-CP won handsomely In 1966. It ac-
quired i 10 per cent first-preference popular vote lead and a huge 40-
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seat (81-41) representational advantage over Labor in the House. 
Foreign policy was widely and bitterly argued in the 1966 campaign, 
and an exceptionally large proportion of swinging voters believed 
that Australia's Vietnamese commitment and conscription were 
salient in making their own electoral choice. Such voters dominantly 
opted for the L-CP—or, perhaps more exactly, against the ALP and its 
then leader, Arthur Calwell. His reproaches against the Holt govern-
ment's Vietnamese policy were filled with expletives. He demanded 
the unceremonious withdrawal of Australian forces from Vietnam 
and the immediate termination of conscription.' A number of the 
L-CP's critics did more than regret that Labor had been defeated in 
1966. Discussing the Australian public mood at that time, Blazey and 
Campbell approvingly refer to the remarks of Graham Freudenberg, a 
former Calwell press secretary. Freudenberg 
described Calwell as one of the three "guilty jnen" responsible for the 
deepening war in Vietnam [Menzies and Holt being the other two] ... 
Calwell, because ... he had caused an electoral catastrophe. The loss of 
Labor seats after this single-cause campaign, persuaded the Liberals they 
had a mandate to significantly increase the commitment of troops in Viet-
nam. "Arthur has blood on his hands. He is directly responsible for that 
commitment," Freudenber said.' 
The L-CP's inflated 1966 majority, the ostensible popular support 
for its policies and various self-wounding tendencies within the 
Labour Party initially created an atmosphere that served as a dis-
incentive for the government to reappraise Vietnam policy or foreign 
policies more broadly. Within a few years, however, changes began to 
appear in the configuration of international politics and within 
American thinking. A massive deflation of the government's earlier 
complacence can be regarded as incentive to undertake review of 
older assumptions. Whitlam replaced Calwell as ALP leader in early 
1967. He was by far a more electorally attractive and marketable per-
sonality than Calwell. He was more politically agile and pragmatic in 
his outlook on foreign and defence policies and otherwise. Calwell 
had helped to polarize opinion on Vietnam and related external is-
sues. Whitlam, being more temperate and persuasive, made himself, 
and the party he led, appear increasingly reasonable and appealing as 
an electoral option. Calwell excoriated Whitlam for selling out on 
Labor's principles and for having undermined him during the 1966 
campaign over foreign and defence issues." In style and to a degree in 
substantive terms Whitlam dissociated himself from Calweil. He kept 
a safe distance between himself and the more strident manifestations 
of the anti-Vietnam and anti-conscription protest movement. He 
deplored what he regarded as the sycophancy of professions such as 
Holt's "All the Way with LBJ" slogan, but conveyed the impression 
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that he was acceptable to Australia's traditional friends. On a visit to 
America In 1967, he met with some of the most influential foreign 
policy figures in the country. He scored handsomely in Australia 
when Johnson described him as the "young and brilliant leader of ;he 
Australian Labor Party".'° Thus when Whitlam called for reappraisals 
In Australia's foreign policy, he was seen as reputable and taken 
seriously. The impression was more striking than if Calwell had not, 
under his leadership, helped to create such a wide gulf between Labor 
and the L-CP. 
Several other political/electoral developments during the late 
1960s and early 1970s brought concern to L-CP governments and 
could likewise be construed as incentives for reordering their foreign 
policy directions. Whitlam and others worked hard to refurbish 
Labor's image and the quality of Its programme. The party had In the 
past been reviled for being tied to irresponsible, outside (especially 
trade-union) dictation. It had been charged with taking decisions in 
camera and without even allowing Its parliamentary leadership to 
have seats in conference or on the Federal Executive. The conference 
was portrayed as "36 faceless men" and the Federal Executive as "12 
witless men". As of the 1967 Adelaide Federal Conlerence, a number 
of such liabilities were removed. Although the party continued to 
wash much of its dirty linen in public, Whitlam usually managed to 
be on the side of "respectability", as when he differed with the party's 
left-wing Victorian branch, with Calwell and with Dr J. F. Cairns, 
who in 1968 came close to dislodging Whitlam from the ALP 
leadership. On that occasion, the burden of charges against Whitlam 
was that he had substituted expediency for party principles and obser-
vance of collegially taken decisions. 
When engaged In electoral politics, Whitlam earned a reputation 
for energy, articulateness and, above all, success. The first general 
election fought by Whitlam as ALP leader was In 1969. Labor failed to 
gain control of government, but won in most other respects. What 
helped to make it appear to be such an impressive Labor electoral per-
formance was the inordinately low level to which the party had 
slumped in the 1966 debacle. In 1969, there was a resounding 7 per 
cent popular swing to Labor and the government's margin in the 
House over Labor was cut from 40 to 7. The ALP's come-back was 
construed by many observers as a prelude to the elertion that was to 
follow. Labor now needed only a modest push to gain office. This it 
accomplished in 1972, with a favourable swing of only 2.6 per cent. 
There were various reasons why Labor's fortunes Improved from 
1967 onwards, and some dealt with foreign policy. Whitlam himself, 
as we have seen, assumed positions and exhibited a style on foreign 
policy Issues that were electorally profitable. In the public Image, his 
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personal leadership qualities were fully competitive with Gorton's, 
and well ahead of McMahon's. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
public support for specific L-CP external policies began to wane. In 
1969, as in 1966, key, potentially swinging voters continued to place 
high salience on the Vietnam issue. This time, their disposition was to 
start bringing Australian troops home, rather than keeping the com-
mitment intact, which had been the main disposition among 
Vietnam-interested swinging voters In 1966." 
Various reasons atfected decline In public support for standard 
L-CP external policy approaches. These included perceived weak-
nesses In the substance of government policies, the government's 
problem of explaining Its policies credibly and the appearance of a 
credible ALP alternative government. The ALP under Whitlam 
helped to make alternative policies more palatable. The protest move-
ment of the period, though widely suspect among the public, did 
serve as a kind of politico-cultural solvent. It attracted a number of 
"respectable" middle-class people. Including churchmen. Out of this 
peri(xi also sprang the Liberal Reform Movement, later called the 
Australia Party. It originated among progressively minded members 
of the middle and upper-middle class, whose sympathies would 
otherwise have been with the Liberals. Among other life-quality and 
civil libertarian issues that It publicized, the Australia Party proffered 
Ideas about fundamental reorientation In foreign policy, which in 
some respects were even more radical than Labor was urging. The 
Australian public was becoming more sensitized to foreign policy con-
cerns, socialized Into considering less-conventional and categorical 
Impressions of the world and of Australia's place in it. Denis 
Murphy's conclusion was that 
the opening of Australians' visions of the rest of the world through the 
war, the changed emphasis and scope of education and the necessity for so 
many Australians to think out their positions on the Vietnam war, 
produced stirrings within those concerned about foreign affairs for 
something more positive, more tolerant, less radically based and more in-
ternational in its orientation.'-' 
To summarize: Towards what came to be the close of their reign, 
L-CP governments were subjected to an assortment of incentives to 
redirect their traditional foreign policy assumptions. These incentives 
included reconfigurations in the international environment, shifts in 
the postures of classical great-power allies, the appearance of an effec-
tively challenging Labor Party, declining popular enthusiasm for a 
number of L-CP policies and a generally more questioning public 
mo(xl. Running counter however were circumstances that con-
strained the governments of the time. 
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A very Important obstacle to policy reorientation was the internal 
state of L-CP governments, especially after Holt. Firstly, there was the 
problem of continuity. Menzies had served as Prime Minister for over 
fifteen years. Less than seven years separated his retirement In early 
1966 and the defeat of the L-CP government In late 1972. During that 
period there were three Prime Ministers. There also were five Foreign 
Ministers, and all served during the fewer than five years of the com-
bined period of the Gorton and McMahon governments. Gordon 
Freeth served only nine months and Leslie Bury only five. In and of 
itself, turnover at this rate was prejudicial to long-range attempts at 
basic re-evaluations and to the implementation of sustained policies. 
The problem was compounded by the circumstances under which 
ministerial leadership changed. There was little to suggest smooth 
transitions. Gorton became Prime Minister upon Holt's sudden ac-
cidental death. McMahon succeeded Gorton when the latter was 
dumped in a Liberal caucus leadership spill. Among the Foreign 
Ministers of the period, two (Hasluck and Bury) surrendered their 
portfolios in circumstances of poor rapport with Prime Ministers. Mc-
Mahon was diverted to the portfolio after he had the first time, un-
successfully, contested the leadership against Gorton. 
Gorton and McMahon, the last two Liberal Prime Ministers, both 
suffered from certain disabilities that reflected adversely on their 
ability to deal systematically with Australia's external affairs. Gorton 
was disposed to rethink the underlying communist threat and 
forward defence postulates of the Menzies-Holt era. But the manner 
In which it was done may have done more to retard than to advance 
a genuine re-evaluation. Gorton had a proclivity for personalizing 
policy In a way that others saw as graceless, even tactless. He 
sometimes showed an innocence of basic facts and was Inclined to 
speak off the cuff. Not only was he inclined to overlook advice from 
officials, but he manifested a certain insensitlvity in handling his col-
leagues. Menzies had created a Foreign and Defence Committee 
within Cabinet. It considered issues in some detail and passed the 
more Important ones upwards for full Cabinet consideration. The 
committee met Infrequently under Gorton and eventually was aban-
doned. Cabinet at large was not given adequate opportunity to con-
sider forthcoming policy announcements. When they came, they 
were sometimes resented for their impetuosity, sometimes for their 
substance, sometimes for both. A number of Gorton's senior more 
conservatively minded colleagues such as Hasluck, Defence Minister 
David Fairhall and the powerful CP leader and Deputy Prime 
Minister John McEwen, resisted his essays into a new diplomacy. 
Gorton's problems were partially temperamental. Sir Alan Watt 
has suggested that they were also attributable to under-preparation 
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for the role. Previously, to be sure, as a Senator, Gorton had deputized 
for the Minister for External Affairs and had served as chairman of 
the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. However, 
"Australian hesitations and uncertainties were enhanced, during the 
period of re-appraisal, by the fact that ... Gorton ... had not been a 
member of inner Cabinet circles which, over the years, had dealt 
regularly with problems of foreign policy and defence."" 
Another factor was Gorton's political weakness generally. This 
weakness partially derived from his stylistic shortcomings. It also 
came from intra-L-CP opposition to his external and domestic 
policies, for Instance his approach to federalism and to the states. It 
was exacerbated by the fact that with the overshadowing figure of 
Menzies gone from the Liberal headship, the party began to break out, 
to feel its way and simply to be more critical of lesser leaders. 
Gorton's intra-party political weakness was also attributable to the 
putatively cardinal flaw of politicians—electoral failure. It was In 
1969, with Gorton leading the L-CP, that Labor scored a great 
political recovery. All these factors precipitated two attempts at a 
leadership spill against Gorton, the second of which succeeded. All 
told. It was not surprising that, during the Gorton years, a serious and 
above all orderly re-examination of foreign policy directions was both 
distracted and obfuscated. 
Personality and intra-Cabinet problems during McMahon's prime 
ministership also constrained effertive foreign policy remodelling. 
Unlike Gorton, McMahon entered the leadership with almost ideal 
paper credentials. He had been a senior minister for many years and 
his most recent assignment had been as Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
He enjoyed a well-deserved reputation for listening carefully to his 
advisers and for mastering his briefs. He had been a first-rate 
Treasurer. As Foreign Minister, he had been Instrumental in 
reorganizing the department. Partially because of official advice, he 
had shifted his own thinking on several subjects. For instance, he ac-
quired a more flexible attitude towards China. 
The McMahon government had a pcxir press during Its period In of-
fice and criticism of it did not mellow with time. The criticism in-
cluded the conduct of foreign policy. There were difficulties, some 
outside McMahon's reach, which In their way continued to inhibit a 
serious L-CP reappraisal of conventional policies. 
Part of the problem lay with McMahon. His talents apparently 
were more ministerial than prime ministerial. He was short on the 
skills needed to lead, co-ordinate and accommodate an array of 
ministerial colleagues and departments. In foreign policy, the old 
Menzies Cabinet committee system was not revived. Cabinet-level 
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policy discussion and planning was sporadic, exasperating some 
ministers who had just passed out of the trying Gorton period. The 
earlier example of Peacock's dealings with Papua New Guinea sug-
gested how casual were aspects of the policy process. McMahon tried 
to do both too much and too little. The result, testified to by ministers 
who sat in his government, was tangle and, at times, incoherence. 
In defence of McMahon, suggestions have been made that he faced 
exceptional burdens, the impingement of which prevented clear and 
decisive approaches to foreign policy. These were said to include an 
Insufficiency of expert personal aides, obstructionism from sectors of 
the public service establishment, a very busy personal schedule, dif-
ficulties with the partner Country Party, and various distractions as-
sociated with the forthcoming election. 
The political/electoral picture is most worth exploring. McMahon 
became Prime Minister of a L-CP government at a deplorably in-
auspicious time. The Liberal Party was restless. It had just toppled 
Gorton. It saw its grip on office in Canberra slipping, as Labor's for-
tunes brightened. It wanted a leader who could accomplish marvels— 
give it resolute leadership, resuscitate its image and polish its policies 
without offending more traditional party elements, allow the party, 
and its Elites, freedom of spokesmanship and, above all, counter 
Whitlam and forestall a Labor government. It would have been an 
unenviable assignment for any person. 
McMahon was distracted by mnning controversy between himself 
and the Country Party, especially the CP leader and Deputy Prime 
Minister, J. D. Anthony. While the CP was a "sister" coalition party to 
the Liberals, It had Its own mind and a tradition of decisive leaders. It 
could not be controlled by a Liberal Prime Minister, especially one 
operating under a multitude of other pressures. McMahon was reluc-
tant to launch major foreign policy reviews, in part because he felt the 
Liberals needed a period of peace and healing in 'the aftermath of 
Gorton. But, stylistically, he was not a good consensus leader. Nor did 
he enjoy a good platform presence, which prevented him from stating 
clearly and attractively what his government's foreign policy really 
was all about: Was it old? New? A blend? His position was not 
helped by some unexpected turns in American foreign policy, which 
on occasion made the L-CP look sluggish and uncreatlve. 
As 1972 wore on and an election approached, Whitlam's public 
image stocxi vastly ahead of McMahon's and the polls were showing 
little encouragement for a Liberal return to office. In the foreign 
policy area, McMahon found himself stuck on the horns of a dilem-
ma. He could try to "freshen" Australia's foreign policy, bring it closer 
to Labor's and thereby neutralize Labor's self-professed appeal as a 
party of creativity and accurate assessment of world conditions. Or he 
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could largely resist this temptation, partially to avert divisive outcries 
among more traditional L-CP figures, partially to escape the charge of 
conceding that Labor had somehow been right all the way along and 
the L-CP wrong. He chose the latter course. 
The McMahon government's foreign policy initiatives were con-
strained by another factor the Democratic Labor Party. The DLP 
grew out of the great ALP schism of 1954-55. Its Influence on succes-
sive L-CP governments was expressed in two related ways. One in-
fluence was as a publicist. It took a consistently hard line on foreign 
policy and defence. It asserted that the communist danger to 
Australia's interests was real and obvious, and that the nation had to 
maintain a stiff guard in its military, diplomatic and economic 
policies towards this threat. It promoted this argument assiduously 
during and between electoral campaigns, and in various settings, in-
cluding the forum of the Australian Senate, where it was consistently 
represented. Most of its partisan diatribes were directed against the 
ALP, whom it accused of unfitness to govern. Labor was said to har-
bour radical elements and to foster sell-out foreign and defence 
policies. This suited L-CP governments well. The DLP was doing 
them a favour. As a result, the turgid external policy discourse 
engendered by the DLP made L-CP governments less resilient, less in-
clined to "give way" to the "street politics" of the protest movement, 
less disposed to re-examine or realign their own foreign policy direc-
tions. 
The other side of DLP influence on L-CP governments was more 
explicitly electoral. While the DLP "was not uncritical of L-CP exter-
nal policies, it found L-CP government much preferable to the 
prospects of Labor government. It therefore urged its electors to cast 
their second preferences for government party candidates in House of 
Representatives elections. DLP voters responded with remarkable 
faithfulness: 80 per cent and more of DLP second preferences went to 
the L-CP. The result was striking. Although the DLP never elected 
one of its own to the House, and its national popular vote varied from 
a high of 9.4 per cent in 1958 to 6 per cent by 1969, it had a major ef-
fect on who did form a government or by what margin. In 1958, 1963 
and 1966, the L-CP could have won government outright, without 
DLP preferences, though less conclusively. Without DLP help, it 
would have lost the 1961 and 1969 elections. The 1961 election was 
won by the L-CP by only two seats. In seven seats, the distribution of 
DLP preferences reversed the lead of candidates who had topped the 
ballot on first preferences. In 1969, the L-CP won by seven seats; DLP 
preferences reversed the first preference vote in twelve seats. With 
the approach of an election In 1972, the McMahon government could 
not overlook the DLP factor. The prospects for a L-CP victory were 
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bleak enough. The government would almost surely be defeated 
should a reorientation of Its foreign policy cause the DLP to sit on Its 
hands, or to withhold preferences from L-CP candidates, or should 
DLP voters simply no longer find the L-CP far preferable to Labor.'" 
On balance, both Gorton and McMahon were interested in re-
examining and possibly redressing conventional L-CP approaches to 
external policy. During both prime ministerships, there were incen-
tives as well as inhibitions that coloured the actual outcomes. We will 
now try to recapture some of the spirit of what did eventuate, tying 
together through examples the substantive and policy process dimen-
sions of external policy in the closing stages of L-CP government. 
Events In late 1968 and in 1969 illustrated how Gorton's Interest in 
reconsidering conventional external policy approaches were caught 
In the cross-fire of personality and political forces previously alluded 
to. The issues related to Australia's military contributions to 
Malaysia/Singapore and to its reactions to the Nixon Doctrine and 
the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 
We have seen that, when Britain announced its intention to retract 
Its forces from Malaysia/Singapore, the Gorton government faced a 
difficult choice. Should It, once the British had gone, continue Its own 
troop presence there, contrary to the well-established Australian 
doctrine of standing in support, but not independent of a great-
power presence? It was a logical question to raise. Gorton wrestled 
with it for some time. Gorton's way was not eased by some of his 
earlier vague, or impromptu, references to the prospect of "fortress 
Australia" and of an "Israeli-type" defence orientation. To many, a 
"forward defence" posture remained sacrosanct. The DLP's assess-
ment was that Gorton had become a 
man of drift ... [who] does nothing to adapt Australia to changing inter-
national circumstances. He wants to avoid responsibility for the defence of 
Malaysia and Singapore. He put a financial ceiling on defence spending, 
limiting the contribution Australia can make to any collective 
American-Australian military operation. And he does nothing positive by 
way of initiative to help build the regional structure we need for self-
defence in South-East Asia." 
About that time (late 1968) there was a prospect that Gorton would 
call an early election. The DLP threatened to withhold preferences in 
selected seats if an election did take place without proper clarification 
of the government's intentions on Malaysian and Singapore defence. 
The DLP reasoned that this would jarr the government into mending 
Its position. If the government still went ahead with an election 
without having satisfied the DLP, the reprisal of selective DLP 
preference denial would mean an L-CP government with a reduced 
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majority. The new but weakened government would then, in fear of 
future DLP reprisals, correct Improvident policies. In the event, no 
early election was called. Gorton promised to continue an Australian 
presence in Malaysia/Singapore, but denied that the DLP had in-
fluenced his behaviour.'" But there had been discussion in Liberal 
Party circles and within the government about the DLP threat. A 
former Liberal parliamentarian has suggested that intra-party pres-
sures may have contributed to the eventual decision to convey the 
security commitment." 
In August 1969, External Affairs Minister Gordon Freeth made 
what proved to be a most controversial statement in the House. It 
was an attempt to place recent international developments into 
perspective; It was a sign of movement. There was no contemplated 
turnabout in policy as such, but some ideas about new realities 
generated by the Nixon Doctrine and by polycentrism In the com-
munist world. It played down alleged dangers of a Soviet presence in 
the Indian Ocean, questioned implacable ostracism of China and in-
timated that Australia might wish to review its orthodox approach of 
forward defence in concert with great powers.'* Criticism flowed 
from several directions. Some of the criticism was on procedural 
grounds, but nonetheless biting. The speech had been drafted in the 
Department of External Affairs, then reworked in Freeth's office. 
Freeth and Gorton were the only ministers to have perused it. It had 
not been seen by Cabinet, or even the Defence Minister or Deputy 
Prime Minister and CP leader McEwen. Thus there was resentment at 
having been taken by surprise. There also was resentment over the 
content df the speech, which was construed by some senior ministers, 
by a number of conservative backbenchers and by the DLP as a 
shameful document. As Liberal and Country Party rafters shook, the 
DLP returned to its tactic of electoral blackmail. An elertion had to 
take place within a few months, and selective withdrawal of 
preferences was in store unless the Freeth speech and other disturb-
ing Gortonisms were repudiated. Gorton capitulated by the time an 
election occurred in October 
An Australian "forward defence" presence in South-East Asia was essen-
tially confirmed; the Soviet Indian Ocean presence was given more 
ominous interpretation; adequate defence expenditures were promised, as 
was a naval base at Cockburn Sound in Western Australia (that is, on the 
Indian Ocean); doubts were raised about the advisability of Australian ac-
cession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. All this gratified the DLP, 
and the threat of second preference allocation was lifted. The DLP had in-
timidated the government and in so doing slowed Australia's movement 
away from standard but in some minds increasingly frayed cold war 
rhetoric, assumptions and policy." 
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In policy process terms, the Malaysia/Singapore troop commit-
ment and Freeth speech controversies underlined more than the con-
servatizing leverage available to the DLP. They illustrated how 
Gorton's style of hasty expression and lack of consultative care 
weakened him, and thereby the value of his ideas. The controversies 
exposed the fractures that had surfaced after Menzies's departure and 
the willingness of L-CP ministers and backbenchers alike to put pres-
sure on a Prime Minister The events not only dampened enthusiasm 
in the Gorton and then McMahon governments for fundamental 
policy reappraisal but made the L-CP appear confused and suscepti-
ble to arm-twisting. This widened the L-CP's public credibility gap 
and enhanced Labor's elertoral position. 
Some security matters, and then the China question, comprise our 
remaining illustrations of the effects on policy outcomes and presen-
tation brought on by the interplay of incentives and disincentives to 
reorient established approaches. 
Australian combat troops underwent phased withdrawal from 
Vietnam, starting in 1970. Australia followed American leads in the 
disengagement process. The Gorton and McMahon governments had 
been unwilling to pull troops out precipitously, to counterart an 
otherwise over-rapid American withdrawal. It also had been 
politically imprudent to start moving out troops before the 1969 elec-
tion, given the DLFs posture. However as the withdrawal began, no 
longer could the government charge that withdrawal's champions 
were simply a noisy, unrepresentative minority in the country and its 
dupes in the Labor Party. By 1970, military disengagement from 
Vietnam had actually become politically judicious for the L-CP. 
General public opinion had swung in that dirertion by late 1969. By 
the time Labor entered office, only military advisers remained. This 
lessened political pressures that might otherwise have been imposed 
on the L-CP during the 1972 elertoral campaign. In a way, so did the 
announcement that a negotiated settlement had apparently been 
reached by the United States and the other side. It was, however a 
surprise announcement and further undercut the credibility of L-CP 
claims about the intimately collertive nature of the allied effort in the 
region. 
When, however, the United States launched its military 
intervention into Cambodia in April 1970, Australia's response was 
very cautious. The American action carried a stated limited purpose: 
to clear away North Vietnamese sanrtuaries and base-camps on the 
South Vietnamese border in the hope that this would shorten the 
conflict at large. To be sure, the United States had not called for an 
allied effort in Cambodia, Australian military resources were already 
stretched in South-East Asia and there was little Australia could 
42 Australian External Policy under Labor 
meaningfully contribute. But there was a genuine relurtance to 
plunge into a "new war" and to escalate the regional conflict at large. 
When Australia did make a gesture to assist the new Lon No I regime 
in Cambodia, it did so tardily and with modest paramilitary 
equipment aid. 
Perhaps the controlling motive behind Australia's low-key reaction 
was to exploit opportunities opened by the Asian-Pacific conference 
on Cambodia, then in process of being organized and which convened 
in Jakarta in May. Australia's approach to the conference was an 
instructive example of the nature and extent to which the L-CP was 
prepared to adjust to shifting conditions. An artive Australian role 
would make possible a demonstration of willingness to assume a 
more positive and broadly acceptable position within the Asian-
Pacific community. It would be a gesture of reassurance to 
Washington, to show that the entire burden for managing conflict in 
the area did not fall on American shoulders. It was stimulated by a 
wish to engage both Japan and Indonesia in more artive and 
influential roles in Asia. This was in keeping with Australia's already 
established role, together with Japan, in the Asian and Pacific Council 
(ASPAC) and its general encouragement for the regionally co-
operative activities of the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
ASEAN), of which Indonesia was the key member Australia took 
care to eschew an anti-communist complexion within the Jakarta 
conference, to avoid prejudice to any brokerage opportunities for the 
conference. This had been a major reason for Australia not to become 
directly involved in the American military intervention in Cambodia. 
All the same, Australia was privately never hojjeful about the 
conference's eventual success. Its interest in a genuinely neutral 
Cambodia, free of any foreign troops, was consistent with American 
objectives, though of course the American intervention was regarded 
by detractors as an aggravating rather than a pacifying measure. 
McMahon was Foreign Minister during these events. At Jakarta, 
where he was advised by some of Australia's most senior and 
experienced officials, his performance was skilful.^" 
This L-CP approach to the Cambodian problem gave the Labor op-
position little ammunition with which to attack the government. The 
government's commitment to Malaysia/Singapore through its par-
ticipation in the ANZUK force was another matter Remarks made in 
early 1972 by McMahon and by spokesmen of the Malaysian govern-
ment created an impression either that Canberra and Kuala Lumpur 
were not in harmony on security issues or if they were, that 
McMahon had confused and misrepresented the position. The 
Intrinsic L-CP view was that Australia was willing to retain armed 
forces in Malaysia/Singapore as long as those governments thought 
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they were serving a useful purpose, either to help during the build-up 
of local defences or to provide a form of security reassurance per se. 
McMahon at one point said there was no real necessity for the Five 
Power Agreement, though he did not mean that in its literal 
interpretation. He was embarrassed when a Malaysian official said 
much the same thing, and clarifications from Malaysia had to be 
sought. The McMahon government in principle accepted, as a long-
term proposition, the 1971 Malaysian Initiative for a zone of 
neutralization in South-East Asia. But to the puzzlement of Malaysia, 
it implied that Australian forces could continue to be stationed in 
Malaysia and Singapore once such a zone had been declared into 
being. Although Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore were clearly 
not there to suppress disputes between Malaysia and SingapxDre, that, 
again to Malaysia's chagrin, is the impression McMahon left. 
McMahon's tendency while he was Prime Minister to speak 
inexactly on complex and sensitive issues such as these made 
Australian policies themselves appear less coherent and self-assured. 
It further reduced McMahon's stature as an advocate of prevailing 
policies and as a political match for Whitlam. Most of the domestic 
political value McMahon had hoped to harvest from his mid-1972 
visit to South-East Asia was dissipated. Labor was able to allege that 
the L-CP's forward defence strategy had become nonsense. Either the 
government itself, or recipients of Australian protection, such as 
Malaysia, or both, were portrayed as caring little for it. The L-CFs 
keystone proposition of Australia sustaining or partially substituting 
for a great-power presence in Asia was brought under further 
question. Labor's own policies, which called for a removal of 
Australian troops from South-East Asia, became more palatable.^' 
Australia continued to garrison troops overseas in 1972, but the 
disengagement from Vietnam lowered the numbers. What was to be 
done about the armed forces generally? We have seen that the 
government conceded that Australia needed to be more self-reliant. It 
accepted that prospects for sending troops abroad had been reduced, 
though it by no means discounted the possibility. The proportion of 
GNP devoted to defence had fallen to 3.5 per cent from its 1967-68 
peak of 4.6 jaer cent, and the size of the armed forces fell by a few 
thousand. Labor promised to maintain the level of defence spending 
at more or less the 3.5 per cent figure, but would have made some 
further reductions in manpower The army, for instance, was 
projected to decline from 40000 to about 36000. The government 
retorted that Labor could not be trusted with Australia's defences. 
Labor's figures for the army were argued to be dangerously low and 
would prevent the overseas recommitment, if ever necessary, of a 
major task force. Also Labor was charged with refusing to give the 
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services the tools with which to do their job: "Past history has warned 
... that when pressures come from the Labor Party for increased 
payments in other fields it usually experts Defence spending to bear 
the brunt of reduced costs."" 
Politically, the government's arguments about defence 
preparedness were eroded by the ostensible decline of visible threats 
In the region, the spreading mood of great power dhente, the winding-
down of the combat commitment in Vietnam and the confusion over 
whether, and in what role, Australian armed forces were required in 
Malaysia/Singapore. The government's persuasiveness was rendered 
even more difficult by the conscription issue. The principal rationale 
on which conscription had earlier been applied was now missing. 
Conscription, which had had a contentious history in Australian 
politics, had become an especially acrimonious public issue, tied as it 
was to the use of conscripts in Vietnam." The government conceded 
some change in circumstances by reducing the period of service from 
two years to eighteen months. Towards the close of its time in office, 
it was insisting that conscription foreseeably had to continue if army 
strength levels were to be upheld. The most the government was 
prepared to concede was that, as justified, efforts would be made to 
reduce reliance on conscription.^" On its part. Labor was on record 
favouring the immediate abolition of National Service. 
Various members of the L-CP government were not unmindful of 
the political value of doing away with conscription. Such sentiment 
was found among both Liberals and CP ministers. Apart from 
shortening the period of service, however Cabinet rejected other 
attempts to tamper with the system. Then came an alleged episode 
the authenticity on which senior ministers of the period are 
themselves divided, but the outward importance of which bears 
mention. According to one tangent of internal evidence, supported in 
its essentials by two former ministers, McMahon inserted a pledge of 
outright abolition of National Service into an early draft of his 1972 
policy speech. If so, this could be construed either as a bold initiative 
by the Prime Minister or as another example of impetuous 
government. When McMahon's idea came to Anthony's attention, 
the account continues, he reacted vehemently and threatened, if 
necessary, to carry his protest into the open. McMahon is then said to 
have relented, being unwilling to create further division in the 
already bruised coalition or to allow Labor to turn the "unfitness to 
govern" accusation on to the then government parties. It must be 
emphasized that some ministerial recollections give no credence to 
this story. If true, however the episode was only one among several 
external policy differences on which the Liberal and Country Parties 
made their joint electoral tasks more difficult. 
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Australian policy towards China in the last stages of L-CP 
government further illuminates our policy process/output theme. 
Australia had for years been conducting lucrative trade with China. 
Wheat, Australia's principal export commodity to China, earned an 
average of $100 million annually, and the two-way trade balance 
tipped heavily in Australia's favour. Australia continued to recognize 
Taiwan only and to oppose giving the Chinese UN seat to Peking, but 
insisted that trade and politics could be neatly separated. 
Australia concluded a major wheat deal with China in December 
1969, and in 1969-70, China ranked sixth among Australia's 
customers. But in 1970-71 and again in 1971-72, no new wheat 
contracts were negotiated with the Chinese and China became a 
negligible Australian customer. It was then, in the very late 1960s and 
the early 1970s, that China began to emerge from its diplomatic 
hibernation. Various Western governments, including Canada and 
other NATO members, opened diplomatic relations with Peking. 
Evidence began to accumulate that the Chinese were staying away 
from the Australian wheat market because they disapproved of 
Canberra's diplomacy towards China. This was corroborated by a 
Labor Party mission that Whitlam led to China in mid-1971. The 
Chinese said that they were not buying Australian wheat because its 
sale was in the hands of the Australian Wheat Board, technically an 
Australian government Instrumentality. A senior Canadian mission 
to Peking was told that Canada would receive special preference for 
its wheat sales to China, and "If the Australian Government changes 
its policy toward China, we will give you the same consideration as 
we have given to Canada."" 
There definitely had been wheat negotiations between China and 
the Wheat Board in 1971. The price difference between the 
negotiating parties was apparently slight and an Informant claimed 
that the government at one point instructed the Wheat Board to 
lower its asking price. Ministerial informants indicated that the deal 
collapsed for commercial reasons. On balance, the author is inclined 
to believe that Chinese political considerations could not be 
discounted. In September 1972, less than three months before the 
L-CP lost office, the Chinese finally placed a wheat order with 
Australia, but virtually as a last resort. They had first made sizeable 
purchases from Canada, the United States and France, in that order. 
Their return to the Australian market had not been inspired by 
changes In Canberra's diplomatic policy. In terms of actual policy 
movement, the McMahon government had done relatively little. In 
May 1971, it finally abolished the "China differential" on the sale of 
strategic materials to China. In the same month. Informal exchanges 
of views between Australian and Chinese officials were undertaken in 
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third nation capitals. These continued sporadically into the next year 
without any tangible results. When in late 1971 Peking was awarded 
China's UN seat, Australia had co-sponsored an alternative, 'two-
China' resolution, the terms of which were of course entirely unaccept-
able to Peking and its supporters. In 1972, Australian Foreign 
Minister Bowen did have conversations in New York with the new 
Chinese UN delegates and Australia encountered no Chinese 
interference with its election to the Security Council in that year. 
At the level of rhetoric and gesture, the McMahon government's 
handling of Chinese issues left an impression of confusion and 
misadventure. When the ALP delegation went to China, McMahon 
denounced it in the strongest terms, calling it an exercise in "instant-
coffee diplomacy" and worse than naive, since the ALP had gone to 
China to play politics with wheat, when trade and politics did not in 
fact mix. He charged that it had been Labor's fault that Australia's 
wheat sales to China had been forfeited. He further remarked that the 
China issue had beena "political asset" for his party in the past, and 
was likely to remain so in the future." 
The Labor Party mission to China was neither a disaster for 
Australia nor for the ALP. Indeed, the visit gave the party a substan-
tial political boost. This was attributable to the sense of initiative 
shown by Labor and the manner In which Whitlam and his delega-
tion comported themselves. It also owed much to the government's 
own appearance of having been left behind. The most striking exam-
ple of this came almost immediately after McMahon had so 
strenuously denounced the ALP's China trip and had attacked it for 
betraying Australia's bonds with America. It is understood that Mc-
Mahon first cleared these remarks with Washington, and no objec-
tions were offered. McMahon had barely finished delivering his 
remarks when. In a joint Sino-Amerlcan announcement, It was 
revealed that Henry Kissinger had just paid a secret call to Peking and 
a visit to China by Nixon had been arranged. Laurie Oakes' summary 
speaks volumes: "McMahon, shaken and embarrassed, issued a state-
ment claiming: 'The President's purpose of normalising relations with 
China has been the publicly announced policy of the Australian 
Government for some time.' Reporters were forbidden to ask him any 
questions."" 
Not only was McMahon himself tangled by these developments, 
but he and his then Foreign Minister, Leslie Bury, appeared to be 
operating on separate wavelengths. 
The Prime Minister had taken over the role of making policy statements 
on China and when Mr Bury was questioned about Australian policy 
towards Chjna on television on 27 June, he appeared unaware both that 
the government had started a dialogue with China and that Mr McMahon 
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had announced that the Chinese were responding. Despite the Prime 
Minister's welcome of the news of President Nixon's Peking visit, Mr Bury 
stated publicly that he had "profound misgivings about the process in-
volved" and that he hated to see Australian interests "dragged by the 
chariot wheels of American political processes and perhaps scattered by 
an overall deal between two men who may not even be aware of them".'''' 
Suddenly, or so it seemed, the ALP's approach to China was more 
harmonious with US policy than was the L-CP's. In 1973, after 
becoming Prime Minister Whitlam openly acknowledged that "if it 
had not been for President Nixon's initiative, my own Peking visit 
would, given the Australian climate of the time, have been no 
political advantage to me, even as late as last December [i.e. during 
the 1972 election]."" 
In the second half of 1971, potential opportunity arose for the L-CP 
to redress some of its political injury over relations with China. 
Andrew Peacock, at the time Minister for the Army, was called from 
Hong Kong by .James Kibel, an acquaintance with Chinese business 
connections. Kibel said that the Chinese government wanted Peacock 
to come for a visit. This was confirmed by the Foreign Affairs Depart-
ment through Chinese agents in Hong Kong. No conditions were im-
posed on Peacock. It was clearly established that the Chinese did not 
require Peacock to resign his portfolio to undertake the trip. Not only 
did the Foreign Affairs Department and its Secretary, Sir Keith Wal-
ler endorse the visit, but apparently so did Foreign Minister Bowen. 
McMahon considered the matter, and so did the L-CP "inner" 
Cabinet, which did not include Peacock. Permission for the trip was 
refused. It may have had something to do with an erroneous belief by 
McMahon that Peacock would need to surrender his portfolio. It may 
also have been related to an intrusion by Anthony. He and the CP 
were then quite concerned about China's refusal to buy Australian 
wheat. Anthony wished to be the minister who would go to China 
and as head of a trade mission. For their own reasons, this was 
something the Chinese would not accept. 
Towards the end of 1972, with an election approaching, McMahon 
volunteered that he would be pleased to send BQwen to China, if 
there were an invitation. But he was quick to add that recognition of 
China was not fundamentally Important to Australia, and in no cir-
cumstances would Australia "capitulate" to Chinese terms, i.e. the 
abandonment of Taiwan.'" McMahon preferred that Australia's 
relationship with China "go along carefully, methodically"." A few 
months earlier an official Liberal Party foreign policy document had 
described Labor's approach to China as "sycophantic".'^ Enter the 
Country Party. The Chinese had resumed buying Australian wheat in 
September but the CP was plainly worried about the future. For some 
time, Anthony had been Implacable on the subject of the Chinese 
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menace and on recognition. He had been saying that he would not 
sell his conscience "just to try to do a trade deal" with China." But in 
the concluding weeks of the 1972 campaign, with the L-CP running 
behind in the opinion polls, he indicated that the CP regarded 
recognition of China as "In the best interests, not just of the trade and 
political considerations, but of the Australian people and the Chinese 
people".'" The CP's deputy leader, Ian Sinclair though cautioning 
against rushing Into recognition of Peking, openly disagreed with Mc-
Mahon's formulation that recognition was "not fundamental" to 
Australia's interests." 
The China issue illustrated many of the difficulties endemic to the 
McMahon government and the obstacles that faced those who might 
have wished to refurbish Australian foreign policy. There was real dif-
ficulty in breaking new ground, simply because of deeply ingrained 
habits and formulas. When American policy unexpectedly jumped 
ahead on China, the Australian government was unable to cope and 
had much political credit shot out from under it. McMahon succeeded 
to the prime ministership In a period of severe party unrest and was 
constrained from launching serious policy departures that more 
pronouncedly could have divided the Liberals and presumably 
hampered prospects for re-election. Within two months of succeeding 
Gorton, he did adjust the government's policy towards China in 
modest ways. But when the ALP trip to China came up, his political 
instinct was to take a very hard critical line, in the hope of solidifying 
his own authority and bolstering party fortunes at the expense of a 
reviving Labor Party. In the general disorientation characteristic of 
the government's workings at that time, any opportunity that may 
have been available in a Peacock visit to China was aborted. In this 
instance, McMahon disregarded official advice. The start of an infor-
mal dialogue with China brought McMahon closer to official advice, 
but short of basic reorientation. One document summarized the 
general situation as follows: Official advice "could not induce the 
Government to break radically with its past ideological framework, 
unless there were compelling reasons for it to do so on independent 
political grounds.""' While he was Prime Minister, McMahon's recep-
tivity to official advice on China was diminished by his growing dis-
enchantment with much of the Foreign Affairs Department generally. 
On more than one occasion, as we have seen, the expressions of 
Liberal and Country Party coalition partners were at variance, or the 
CP was able to Impose Its own stamp on policy. This further limited 
the government's manoeuvreabillty and complicated Its already 
severe credibility problem. When the 1972 electoral campaign was 
launched, MqMahon on Chinese policy seemed to project flexibility in 
form but firmness In content. He could still not overlook the recent 
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past, when the DLP had extracted foreign and defence policy conces-
sions from the Gorton government yet contributed to the return of 
the L-CP to office in the 1969 election. Hence in an October 1972 In-
terview, when asked whether DLP preferences would be an element 
in his judgement on China, he replied "Some, yes—but not decisive."''' 
Had the L-CP been returned to government in 1972, would it have 
proceeded to recognize Peking, essentially on Peking's terms? The 
question is not entirely Idle, because a search for Its hypothetical 
answer might further Illuminate the circumstances under which the 
McMahon government was operating in 1971 and 1972. The author Is 
inclined to answer affirmatively. The new Liberal leader B. M. Sned-
den, and Bowen, addressing themselves to this question in 1973, both 
said that this would have happened, but without undue haste, and 
without automatically granting the Chinese every demand they 
might impose. The point is that neither man said that Australia under 
another L-CP government would have held out for any "two-China" 
formula.'* The author's own inquiries among former ministers bear 
out this conclusion. It should be remembered that, by the end of 1972, 
the CP was already, and publicly, disposed towards recognition. 
Moreover, the circumstantial evidence is strong. A L-CP victory 
would have placed McMahon in a more secure position than he oc-
cupied before December 1972 and, at all events, his personal instincts 
on China were not hidebound. The DLP, whose decline continued in 
1972, would have been taken less seriously, and especially so if there 
was some time before the next scheduled House elertion. Further-
more, the continuing trend toward US-Chinese dtente and the closing 
of the US and allied side of the war in Vietnam would have supplied a 
more congenial international climate for such a step. There would 
also have been incentive from across the Tasman. The Labour govern-
ment elected in New Zealand in late November 1972 quickly moved 
to recognize Peking. There is very persuasive evidence that If a 
National Party government had instead been returned in Wellington, 
within a year and probably less it too would have recognized Peking, 
after a few preliminary but not too convincing gestures to work out 
some kind of two-China formula. The incentive for Australia to fol-
low the New Zealand lead, or even to move alongside it, would have 
been considerable. 
L-CP governments developed certain stylistic patterns In their handl-
ing of foreign and defence issues. We have noticed some of the results 
that followed for policy outcomes. Also affected was the mood In 
which external matters were dealt with vis-d-vis the general public, 
and the Labor opposition more specifically. Probably rather more 
than most governments in parliamentary systems, L-CP governments 
became suspicious and secretive. 
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We first consider the penchant for secretiveness, a theme to which 
Jim Spigelman, a personal aide to Whitlam, devoted an entire book." 
L-CP governments were culpable for having gone too far too often. 
But special Australian circumstances should not be overlooked. 
Probably any party or coalition that remains entrenched in office as 
long as the L-CP, tends towards self-righteousness and smugness. 
Layers of authority within the system acquire an autonomy of their 
own. The system becomes less open, less penetrable, less fathomable. 
Predisposition towards this tendency was also probably contributed 
to by governing parties that were based far more on downward than 
on upward linkages of authority and by traditions of bureaucratic 
power. In Australia, the partisan foreign policy debate had been 
pungent, even doctrinal. This was heightened by the bitterness of 
party conflict over Vietnam and conscription. It was hardly mitigated 
by the little-love-Idst personal relations between party leaders, 
notably Holt and Calwell and McMahon' and Whitlam. Also the 
floridness with which the L-CP, spurred by the DLP, often invested Its 
electoral presentations on external policy inhibited a more sensitive, 
trusting approach towards the parliamentary opposition between 
elections. Labor's disposition to reply in kind did not ease the situa-
tion. 
Our Illustrations here are brief, but representative. A Joint (House 
and Senate) Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs was 
originally authorized in 1951. Until 1967, the ALP refused to par-
ticipate, for among other reasons because it felt the committee was a 
ministerial handmaiden. It was neither a watchdog nor a critic of the 
government, nor a platform for the presentation of reasoned alter-
native policy options. Labor relented after the government had made 
some modifications in committee procedures. Further amendments 
moved by Labor in 1970 to permit Parliament itself to refer topics for 
study to the committee, or to meet in public for the most part without 
ministerial consent, were refused. The L-CP had a natural desire to 
preserve the Executive's authority in forelen policy. It also harboured 
suspicions about the advisability of investing much strength in a com-
mittee on which Labor was represented, despite the fact that once the 
ALP had joined, virtually all of its committee members were 
moderates."" The disclosure of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 suggested 
that Australia's original combat commitment in Vietnam had not, 
contrary to the Menzies government's exposition, been made on 
Saigon's initiative. The ALP was incensed by what it believed to have 
been sheer government duplicity. It was further disturbed by what it 
regarded as the government's lame explanation of these events and 
by Its disallowance of full access to relevant papers. Labor members 
Insisted on at least a predominantly open hearing on this matter by 
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the joint committee. The request was refused and the Labor members 
temporarily withdrew in protest from the committee's work."' 
When the L-CP accepted American defence facilities such as Pine 
Gap and Nurrungar It at first refused even to acknowledge that they 
had defence applications. The government later did make this 
acknowledgement, but categorically refused to provide any informa-
tion whatsoever as to what the facilities were about. The confiden-
tiality claim was made on grounds of security. The government also 
obstructed selected access to the facilities by the ALP leadership, in ef-
fect the alternative Australian government. As we will notice later, 
when Labor came to office and learned about the facilities. It too 
refused to divulge their function. However, the L-CP's handling of the 
US facilities was excessively rigid. There Is some internal evidence 
that, while portraying blanket secrecy as an American-imposed re-
quirement, Canberra imposed stricter restrictions on Labor's access to 
them than Washington Itself thought necessary. A partial exception 
to this generalization may be needed. It is based on a remark of a 
former minister but is short on detail and could not be confirmed 
through other sources. The claim is that before his complete falling 
out with the L-CP over Vietnam, Calwell, as Leader of the Opposi-
tion, was given a confidential briefing on American defence-related 
facilities as they were then constituted. Calwell, in turn, advised the 
government not to share such information with his deputy Whitlam, 
calling him untrustworthy. The claim Is plausible. Not only was 
Calwell reasonably well regarded by his opponents until 1966 or so, 
but Calwell's enmity towards Whitlam had begun before that time. 
The offer to Whitlam was not made. The "guided tour" of Pine Gap 
accorded to Whitlam by the Americans in 1971 was courteous, but 
quite uninformative."^ 
The government's treatment of Australia's intelligence organiza-
tions Is consistent with the tenor of secretiveness. We have seen that 
ASIS was never officially acknowledged to exist, let alone identified 
by function. In 1973, Whitlam admitted the existence of the DSD 
electronic monitoring unit in Singapxjre. It was a revelation to most 
Australians. Four reasons suggest themselves for the L-CP's 
secretiveness about the nation's intelligence services. Firstly, 
secretiveness was fostered by ASIS's British-oriented origins and early 
staffing. The British Intelligence tradition was and continues to be 
considerably more closeted than the American. Secondly, there was 
the overall secretive ethos of L-CP governments. Thirdly, there was 
the lack of confidence extended towards the Labor opposition, with 
whom foreign policy differences were often sharply drawn. Fourthly, 
there was a feeling that Australian opinion might not have been well 
disposed to accept "spy" organizations. At all events, we have already 
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noticed how this secretiveness promoted lack of firm authority over 
and even ministerial information about ASIS. Once again, Calwell 
may have been an exception to the rule of secretiveness. The account, 
taken from a source other than the one who commented on Calwell's 
US defence-facility briefings, was that Calwell was at one time ap-
prised of ASIS's existence. The account continues that Whitlam may 
have surmised that Calwell had been made privy to something. Late 
in the life of the L-CP government, he is said to have approached Mc-
Mahon for access to whatever Calwell may have had. McMahon is 
said to have thought the request too broad and asked Whitlam to be 
more specific. In the end, nothing was disclosed. 
Prior to the 1972 election, contingency plans for a Labor victory 
were drawn up In the Foreign Affairs and Defence Departments, in-
cluding on means for winding down conscription. Although there 
had been some reports to the contrary, Lloyd.and Reid correctly con-
clude that "The McMahon Government was aware that contingency 
planning of this sort was going on in a number of departments but no 
attempt was made to interfere.""' Lloyd and Reid do, however also 
mention that Labor shadow ministers failed to receive the co-
operation of the incumbent McMahon government in gaining access 
to various departments. Lloyd and Reid remind us that, basically, "It 
was perhaps too much to expect an electorally besieged Prime 
Minister to introduce procedures scorned by his predecessors in much 
more propitious electoral circumstances. The entrenchment of a 
government for an excessively long period prevents the development 
of rational conventions to regulate the transfer of political power.""" 
Another aspect of the L-CP government's style relates to its 
politically defensive posture. Specific policy questions aside, the Mc-
Mahon government was eager not only to maintain good credentials 
in Washington but to cast Labor in the worst-possible light with the 
Americans. This was being done at a time when US policy was itself 
being adjusted and when Labor's electoral fortunes were improving. 
For Instance, during November 1971 conversations between Mc-
Mahon and Nixon in the United States, the establishment of a Canber-
ra-Washington "hot line" was agreed upon. The idea had not 
specifically been broached by himself, McMahon later said, but had 
"evolved"—though It clearly did not "evolve" on American instiga-
tion. The facility was a closed telex machine to which, in Australia, 
only McMahon, his private secretary and Waller had access."' It was 
used several times on important business. But the enthusiasm for the 
link-up was far more with McMahon than with Nixon. There was a 
symbolic need to demonstrate a special relationship between 
Australia and the United States, and perhaps need to forestall such 
embarrassments to Australia as were caused by the July 1971 
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Sino-Amerlcan communique. Indeed, it Is really not clear why or-
dinary communications facilities, such as a telephone with a scrambl-
ing mechanism, were thought Insufficient. Also Illuminating is that 
the existence of the telex link-up was not publicly disclosed until 
August 1974, by McMahon himself Although the "hot line" was an 
innocuous arrangement, the secretiveness involved seemed to com-
plement other aspects of L-CP government procedures. If 
secretiveness should be discounted, then at minimum, pettiness re-
mains. An explanation given for keeping the facility secret was that it 
represented an Australian pipeline to Washington not enjoyed by 
other US allies, such as Britain, whom Australia did not wish to of-
fend. The link-up was discontinued when Labor became the govern-
ment. 
Less innocuous were remarks by Australian ministers. One of the 
more notable was by Bowen in October 1971. Speaking in the United 
States, he warned that certain American policies affecting Australia 
could abet the ALP's electoral fortunes. This would work against 
American Interests, because of Labor's anti-Americanism and com-
munist control over sections of the trade-union movement, which 
supported Labor."'' Such admonitions were unlikely to cause the 
United States to slow the pace of detente with China, or whatever. 
They indirectly may, however have added to American disquiet 
about Labor as an Australian party of government. 
It is this effect that also may have flowed from some of the ac-
tivities of ASIO, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization. 
ASIO's existence and general range of work was publicly known. 
ASIO did, however acquire considerable latitude in conducting its 
operations. One of its projects—usual, to be sure, for an agency of this 
type—was to compile dossiers on politically suspect personalities. 
These came to Include parliamentarians, among them Cairns, on 
whom a report was prepared in 1971, when he was artive in the 
protest movement. Among the conclusions reached was that his ad-
vocacy and behaviour could bring about "anarchy and, in due course, 
left-wing fascism.""' Materials of this nature found their way to 
American sources, given the wealth of intelligence exchange between 
the two countries. Once again, because of biases Introduced from 
Australian sources, an inference is possible of further suspicion of the 
ALP being stimulated in America. 
Concluding our survey of the period, we turn to uses of external af-
fairs themes in the 1972 electoral campaign."" We will look first at the 
L-CP and then the ALP approaches, and then make some effort at ap-
praising outcomes. The government's campaign, especially as pro-
jected by McMahon, did not devote undue attention to external Is-
54 Australian External Policy under Labor 
sues. Rather they seemed to pop in and out. In part, this was symp-
tomatic of what at large was not a particularly well-synchronized 
campaign effort. In part, it resulted from the L-CP's rising distur-
bance over the prospect of losing, which caused patchwork efforts as 
the campaign moved on. For instance, McMahon hastily introduced a 
prominent law and order anti-permissiveness ingredient into his 
presentations. Also the L-CP was ambivalent about the value of exter-
nal issues. It sensed that their electoral salience had declined among 
the public and that the L-CP's image as manager of the nation's 
foreign policy had not been the best. On the other hand, the govern-
ment parties could not forget that foreign policy attacks on the ALP 
had, as a whole, been electorally serviceable in the past. When the 
L-CP did hit external subjects, it tended to assert their primacy. 
Hence McMahon's comment towards the close of the campaign that 
"of all the issues facing the Australian people at this election, the 
defence and foreign policies of the major Parties were undoubtedly 
the most critical.""' 
Much of the L-CP external policy portrayal was stark and reminis-
cent of anti-Labor attacks of earlier times; if implemented, ALP 
policies were predicted to be catastrophic for Australia. Liberal 
Speakers' Notes advised that, unmistakeably, "The defence and 
foreign policies of the Government and the Labor Party differ on 
almost every issue."'" McMahon insisted that Labor's policies were a 
"recipe for an isolationist, friendless and ultimately defenceless 
Australia."" For McMahon, the essence was that "Labor's policies are 
left-wing madness"." Much of the media publicity issued on behalf of 
the government parties was colourful. One fairly typical newspaper 
advertisement showed an artillery piece pointed towards a body of 
water, and asked "Mr Whitlam—after two world wars, you still 
haven't got the message?"—Whitlam's defence policies antagonize 
South-East Asia and the United States, destroy security systems and 
"leave the region with a door open for any aggressor to walk in"." 
In 1972, Labor consciously played down external affairs. This 
strategy was partly based on the belief that the public was not overly 
susceptible to making voting choices on external themes. The other 
side of the coin was that Labor was afraid to invite a major debate on 
a subject that, in the immediate past, had been employed by the L-CP 
to Labor's electoral detriment. Some ALP figures felt that the L-CP 
had survived the 1969 election because Gorton had stepped up his 
foreign and defence policy attack against Labor In the late stages of 
the campaign. 
When Labor spoke on external affairs. It was not reluctant to 
repeat its established positions, such as diplomatic recognition of 
China, downgrading SEATO, pulling Australian combat troops out of 
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the ANZUK force and abolishing conscription. The presentation 
usually was such as to avoid exposing differences among the party's 
own wings and personalities, and the tone tended to be subdued.'" 
Wherein the government's media advertisements accused Labor of 
harbc^uring policies that threatened Australia's security. Labor's own 
presentations were more likely to allege staleness and confusion in 
government foreign policy and to portray McMahon as unsuited to 
his role. For instance, a Labor advertisement proclaimed that "You 
would have to be worried"—McMahon's leadership was "not good 
enough for Australia". As an example of McMahon as an inter-
national figure, it cited his remark that "Our attitude Is a clear one. 
As yet we have not made up our minds definitely as to what our 
policy should be."" Labor criticized the L-CP for falling to regulate 
the massive flow of foreign Investment Into Australia and imputed 
political panic to McMahon's tardy introduction of anti-takeover 
legislation. But the party couched its policy on foreign Investment 
controls In appeals to Australian pride, maturity and self-respect.'* 
In line with its controlling campaign theme of "It's Time", Labor 
argued that world events had outrun conventional thinking. It was 
now time for a change of government to deal with changed realities. 
It was now the L-CP that was divided and disoriented. Labor main-
tained, thus turning the argument of the 1960s back on the Liberals. 
Summing up the campaign, Whitlam said that his party had been "-
vindicated on all the great matters of foreign affairs for the last 
twenty years", and that it was the party of rebuilding and healing for 
a national community that had been abraded by Vietnam, conscrip-
tion, and so on: "Unity and co-operation between all sections of the 
community must once again become the Australian way."" 
Which of the two contending party groups observed the more elec-
torally profitable approach to foreign and defence issues?'What was 
the net impact of such issues on the election? We must work from In-
ference, even with the availability of survey data. 
Throughout 1972 and extending into the campaign, foreign/ 
defence policy ranked far down the list of national issues regarded as 
personally important by the electorate. External policy was identified 
by some 6 or 7 per cent of the electorate, well below the two previous 
House elections. Moreover, in mid-1972, among those who felt that a 
change of government would make a big difference in some aspect of 
public policy, only 17 per cent identified defence as the potentially 
most affected area. Isolating for the moment this fartor of low exter-
nal policy ranking, the inference is that Labor was right in not ex-
pending its oratory on the subjert, and the L-CP less sensible in giving 
it moderate weight. 
Elections can, however, be won or lost by very slight electoral 
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movements, and In 1972, Labor won a nine-seat majority on a 
favourable swing of well under 3 per cent. In other words, a very 
small fraction of the electorate, if properly sensitized, decides the out-
come. The data for 1972 are quite clear that Liberal and DLP sup-
porters were much more inclined to identify foreign/defence policy 
as personally significant that were Labor supporters. Hence In mid-
1972, while the general population figure was 6 per cent, the propor-
tion among Liberal followers was 10 per cent, but only 3 per cent 
among Labor voters. In November the party breakdown was 8 per 
cent and 4 per cent, respectively.'" In a sample drawn immediately 
following balloting in six swinging electorates in Sydney, foreign/ 
defence policy as the principal voting Inducement was mentioned by 
7 per cent of Liberals and 4 per cent of Labor votes." It is plausible to 
infer that these differences were mostly attributable to differences in 
the socio-economic make-up of the two party group clienteles. The 
Liberal electorate at large, better educated and more highly socio-
economically placed than its Labor counterpart, would be experted to 
take a stronger interest in non-bread and butter issues. But the poll 
just cited also found that there was no exact or nearly exart cor-
respondence between party preference and preference for the foreign 
policy of a particular party. Overall, some 51 per cent preferred 
Liberal external policy and 38 per cent chose Labor's. Liberal voters 
chose Liberal Party foreign policy over Labor's by 92 per cent to 1 per 
cent, but Labor voters preferred Labor's over the Liberals' policy by 
only 67 per cent to 19 per cent. Analytically, an inference can be 
taken that in the 1972 campaign, (1) the government's moderately 
strong emphasis on foreign policy helped to avert more defections 
among normal Liberal voters to Labor's side than might otherwise 
have happened; and (ii) since the content of the government's 
foreign policy was not wholly unattractive to Labor voters, the Labor 
campaign may have given insufficient focus to foreign policy, so as to 
dispel doubts about it among its own followers. 
The Sydney six-electorate survey found that the great majority of 
persons who swung to a party other than the one previously adhered 
to, went Labor. In a population sample of 345, 76 switched to the 
ALP. Of these three (or 4 per cent) listed defence policy as their basic 
reason. This of course was a very small sample from which firm con-
clusions could be teased. However swinging and new voters are the 
real targets of political campaigners, especially in marginal seats. 
We can now try to reconstruct our various data. Foreign and 
defence Issues, qua issues as handled by the parties, probably had the 
following instrumental effect on electoral outcomes: In very marginal 
terms, they persuaded some persons to switch to Labor. To a greater 
extent, among people who already were non-Labor in sentiment. 
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temptations to change to Labor were dampened. In both instances, 
therefore, external Issues can be seen to have impinged essentially on 
established L-CP rather than on Labor voters. Standing alone, 
however, this interpretation is definitely, but to an unquantifiable 
degree, Inadequate. There is extremely persuasive evidence, empirical 
and otherwise, that the electoral swing that enabled Labor to capture 
office In 1972 was attributable to public acceptance of the "It's Time" 
exhortation. The L-CP looked tired, overcome by events and without 
effective leadership. Labor looked fresh, reasonably clear and self-
confident, and effectively led. These Impressions were moulded in 
many ways, including by the images cast by the two parties In their 
treatment of external affairs. It is quite reasonable to suppose that if 
the government's stylistic image on external policy had been decidedly 
more attractive, and Labor's image worse, fewer people would have 
been captivated by the "It's Time" slogan and less tempted to vote 
Gough Whitlam into office. 
Discussing foreign policy in 1972, Bruce Grant, himself a Labor sup-
porter had made a simple but astute observation. The reason for a 
change to Labor that appealed to him most was that "both Govern-
ment and Opposition have become, in different ways, Irresponsible". 
After twenty-three years, the L-CP no longer understood the role of 
an opposition, while Labor had lost sight of the obligations of power. 
It was time to reverse roles.*" 
NOTES 
1. D. Home, Bulletin, 23 November 1968. Also see C. Burns, Sydney Morning Herald, IS 
October 1968; and B. Grant, Melbourne Age, 13 November 1968, 
2. Bulletin, 19 January 1969. 
3. H. Bull, "Australia and the Great Powers in Asia ", in Australia in World Affairs. 196-
6-1970. eds. G. Greenw(X)d and N. Harper (Melbourne: Cheshire. 1974), p. 326. 
4. F.A. Mediansky, "Now Here is Our Foreign Policy", Current Affairs Bulletin 49 (I 
September 1972): 112. 
5. Department of Defence, Defence Report 1972 (Canberra: 1972), pp. 3-4. Also see the 
remarks of D.E. Fairbairn, Minister for Defence, Commonwealth [Australian] 
Parliamentary Debates (APD). House of Representatives (HR) (28 March 1972), pp. 
1247-55. 
6. Brisbane Courier-Mail, 27 November 1972. 
7. For the electorate's outlcxik on Vietnam and conscription and the salience of issues 
in the election, see H.S. Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: The Impact oj 
Vietnam and Conscription (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 191-209, 
Also see Albinski, "Vietnamese Protest and the Australian Political Process", Polity I 
(Spring 1969): 359-75. 
8. P. Blazey and A. Campbell, The Political Dice Men (Melbourne: Outback Press, 1974), 
p. 30. 
9. See his Be Just and Fear Not (Melbourne: O'Neil, 1972), esp. pp. 230-35. 
10, Melbourne Age, 16 June 1967. For a political biography of Whitlam, see L. Oakes, 
Whitlam PM (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973). 
11. Australian Gallup Polls, no. 206 (October 1969). 
5 8 Australian External Policy under Labor 
12. D. Murphy, "New Nationalism or New Internationalism: Australian Foreign Policy, 
1973-74", World Review 13 (October 1974): 16-17. 
13. A. Watt, "Australian Defence Policy in South-East Asia after 1971", Pacific Com-
munity 1, no. I (1969): 15. On the Gorton period generally, see A. Reid, The Gorton 
Experiment (Sydney: Shakespeare Head Press, 1971). 
14. For a general review of the DLP, see P.L. Reynolds, The Democratic Labor Party 
(Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1974); and P.J. Duffy, "The DLP in the Seventies", in 
Australian Politics: A Third Reader, eds. H. Mayer and H. Nelson (Melbourne: 
Cheshire, 1973), pp. 435-45. On the DLP vote, see in particular L.F. Crisp, "The DLP 
Vote, 1958-69", Politics 5 (May 1970): 62-66. 
15. Senator V.C. Gair, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 January 1969. 
16. For accounts, see E. Walsh, Nation, 26 Oaober 1968; A. Reid, Bulletin, 12 October 
1968; and A. Reid Bulletin, 19 and 26 October, 9 November 1968 and 1 February 
1969. 
17. E. St John, A Time to Speak (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1969), pp. 127-30. 
18. G. Freeth, APD. HR (14 August 1969), pp. 310-17. 
19. H.S. Albinski, "Foreign Policy", in Public Policy in Australia, ed. R. Forward 
(Melbourne: Cheshire, 1974), pp. 3 5-36. For an approving view of the retreat 
forced upon the government, see B.A. Santamaria, ""Struggle on Two Fronts: The 
DLP and the 1969 Election ", Australian Quarterly 4\ (December 1969): 33-42. For a 
disappointed view, see A. Farran, ""The Freeth Experiment'", Australian Outlook 26 
(April 1972): 46-58. 
20. On Cambodia, see H.S. Albinski, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January-
June 1970"", Australian Journal of Politics and History 16 (December 1970): 313-16. 
21. On aspects of the 1972 arguments, see A. Barnes, Melbourne Age, 17 June, 5 and 10 
October 1972; H. Armfield, Melbourne Age 14 June 1972; M. Richardson, 
Melbourne Age 24 November 1972; F. Brenchley, Australian Financial Review, II 
August 1974; and P. Browning, Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 October 1972. 
22. Australian Defence: The Liberal Party's Objectives (Canberra: Liberal Party Federal 
Secretariat, 1972), p. 5. For a summary of defence policy differences between the 
parties, see Sydney Morning Herald, 30 Oaober 1972; and P. Samuel, Bulletin, 2 
September 1972. 
23. On Australia's conscription experience, see R. Forward and R. Reece, eds.. Conscrip-
tion in Australia (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1968); J.M. Main, 
Conscription: The Australian Debate. 1901-1970 (Melbourne: Cassell, 1970); and G. 
Wither, Conscription: Necessity and Justice (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1972), esp. 
pp. 1-22. 
24. For instance, see Fairbairn, Sydney Morning Herald, 15 August 1972; and Melbourne 
Age, 4 September 1972. 
25. Cited in S. FitzGerald, Talking with China: The Australian Labor Party Visit and Peking's 
Foreign Policy, Contemporary China Papers, no. 4 (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1972), p. 29. FitzGerald's piece is very useful reading for 
Sino-Australian relations generally. Also, especially on the trade side, see H.S. 
Albinski, ""Foreign Policy Considerations Affecting Trade with the People"s 
Republic of China: Canadian and Australian Experience", Law and Policy in Inter-
national Business, 5, no. 3 (1973) 805-35. 
26. Australian, 16 and 17 July 1971. 
27. Oakes, Whitlam PM, p. 225. 
28. R. O'Neill, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, July to December 1971", 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 18 (April 1972): 2-3. 
29. Australian Foreign Affairs Record iAFAR) 44 (August 1973): 528. 
30. Australian, 23 November 1972. 
31. Sydney Morning Herald, 7 November 1972. 
32. Australian Foreign Policy (Canberra: Liberal Party Federal Secretariat, 1972), p. 5. 
33. Australian, 7 April 1971. 
34. Australian, 21 November 1972. 
35. Melbourne Age, 24 November 1972. 
36. Derived from non-attributable source. 
37. Television broadcast interview, 9 October 1972, transcript. 
38. On Snedden, see Press Statement, no. 73/36 (address of 9 March 1973); and his 
remarks in APD. HR (31 May 1973), p. 3017. On Bowen, see APD. HR (31 May 
1973), p. 2993. 
The Liberal Inheritance: II 59 
39. J. Spigelman, Secrecy: Political Censorship in Australia (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 
1972). 
40. For an early account, see H.B. Turner, "The Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Australian Parliament", Australian Outlook 20 (April 1966): 18-27. 
41. See Australian, 19 June and 3 July 1971. 
42. For summaries, see Spigelman, Secrecy, pp. 146-50; and R. Aitchison, Thanks to the 
Yanks? (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1972), pp. 135-36. 
43. C.J. Lloyd and G.S. Reid, Out of the Wilderness: The Return of Labor (Melbourne: Cassell, 
1974), p 11. 
44. ibid., p. 10. 
45. See Australian. 13 August 1974. 
46. Australian, 7 October 1971. For a highly critical analysis, see B. Grant, The Crisis of 
Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 2nd ed., 
1973), pp. 31-32. 
47. The dossier is summarized by P. Samuel, Bulletin 22 June 1974. 
48. For treatments of the role of external issues in Australian eleaions generally, see 
C.A. Hughes, "The Rational Voter and Australian Foreign Policy, 1961-69'", 
Australian Outlook 24 (April 1970): 5-16; N.S. Roberts, "Foreign Policy and 
Australian General Elections"', World Review 12 (July 1973): 22-30; Albinski, Politics 
and Foreign Policy in Australia, pp. 24-30; and J. Dalton, 'Foreign Policy and Domestic 
Politics in Australia", Dyason House Papers 2 (Oaober 1975): 1-4. The principal ac-
count of external policy in the \972 campaign is by C. Clark, "Foreign Policy and 
the 1972 Eleaions", in C. Clark, ed., Australian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment 
(Melbourne: Cassell, 1973), pp. 3-16. For the 1972 campaign in perspeaive, see L 
Oakes and D. Solomon, Tlie Making of an Australian Prime Minister (Melbourne 
Cheshire, 1973); and H. Mayer, ed.. Labor to Power: Australia's 1972 Election (Sydney 
Angus and Robertson, 1973). 
49. Statement of 27 November 1972, Office of the Prime Minister Release. 
50 Liberal Party of Australia, Federal Secretariat, Speakers: Notes (Canberra; 1972), p. 
11. The details of Liberal Party f)ositions were expounded earlier in Australian 
Foreign Policy and in Australian Defence, both issued by the Federal Secretariat. 
51. Melbourne Age, 31 Oaober 1972. 
52. Statement of 27 November 1972, Office of the Prime Minister Release. 
53. Sydney Morning Herald, 28 November 1972. 
54. For major delineations of Labor's position, see Australian Labor Party, Defence and 
Foreign Policies, 16 pp. booklet in the /('j Time series (Canberra: 1972); and Lance Bar-
nard's address to the National Executive of the RSL, 14 August 1972. Labor's 
programme generally can be taken from a reading of the various selections in J. 
McLaren, ed.. Towards a New Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1972). 
55 Melbourne Age, 18 November 1972. 
56. See especially, Australian Labor Party, Ii's Time—Foreign Investment, in It's liwif series 
(Canberra: 1972) and, as a representative advertising vehicle, "Grand Australian 
Land Sale". 
57. Sydney Morning Herald, 1 December 1972. 
58. See ASRB (Australian Sales Research Bureau) polls in Melbourne ,45?, 4 and 10 July 
and 15 November 1972. For related data, see Australian Gallup Polls, no. 234 
(September 1972). 
59. McNair Poll, 2 December 1972. 
60. B. Grant, "Labor and the World", in Labor in Power: What is the Difference?, Victorian 
Fabian Society pamphlet no. 22 (Melbourne: 1972), esp. pp. 11-13. 
Austraha and the 
International Scene 
We open our treatment of Labor's period in government with some 
ground-laying material, on which subsequent discussion of policy out-
puts, processes and criticisms can more securely be placed. We wish to 
identify those factors that produced assumptions about the inter-
national scene, and Australia's role in it, within Labor as a party and 
as government, within the parliamentary opposition and among 
other sectors of opinion. In a sense, we are talking about the "concep-
tual frameworks" that ordered the thinking of personalities, parties 
and movements. Nevertheless, the notion of a "conceptual 
framework" is both too grand and too limiting. It is wrong to assume 
that even those involved or expert in external policy shaped for 
themselves pictures of world forces that were full, clear and logically 
consistent In all major respects. Moreover, It is a misplaced view of 
reality that assumes that people arrive at their conceptions simply by 
building logical systems. They are also affected by such factors as their 
temperaments, their own roles and experiences, the traditional 
milieu of the parties or movements to which they belong and their 
appreciation of political constraints. 
While searching for patterns or tendencies, we will need to avoid 
the temptation to superimpose an over-rationalized, and therefore 
characaturized, mcxlel of spokesmen and parties. While it Is possible 
to piece together a coherent account, a good deal of it is based on 
reasoned inference. Fairly extensive use will be made of interview 
data, much of it representing the impressions by persons of both 
themselves and of others. 
Our fullest attention will be given to Labor as the party of govern-
ment. Labor has its wings and factions, but for the moment we con-
centrate on the party's more characteristic, or authoritatively enun-
ciated, foreign policy perceptions and formulations. Between his elec-
tion as ALP leader in 1967 and his accession to the prime 
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ministership, Whitlam was Labor's principal foreign policy 
spokesman. He travelled widely and acquired a wealth of contacts 
overseas. He was therefore able to build up an elaborately thought-
out set of ideas on external affairs by the time he came to office. Once 
In government, he took on the Foreign Affairs portfolio. When he 
relinquished it late in 1973, it was to Senator Don Willesee. Wlllesee 
had until then been government foreign affairs spokesman in the 
Senate and had been involved on the administrative side of foreign 
policy in his role as Special Minister of State. After Whitlam sur-
rendered the Foreign Affairs portfolio, he continued to exercise a 
prominent role In the field and was acting Foreign Minister during 
Willesee's absences from Australia. Lance Barnard had been deputy 
ALP leader under Whitlam from 1967 to 1972 and the party's shadow 
Defence Minister. When Labor came to office, Barnard became 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence and held his 
deputy's position until mid-1974. When In mid-1975, Bernard 
resigned his portfolio and his seat in Parliament, he was succeeded as 
Defence Minister by William Morrison. Morrison had at one time 
been a career External Affairs officer. Before coming to Defence, his 
ministerial responsibilities had included assisting Willesee on Papua 
New Guinea matters, and assisting Barnard more generally. These 
lieutenants were, in political temper and general approach, close to 
Whitlam. 
The meaning of all this is that foreign and defence policy under 
Labor featured continuity, experience and general compatibility of 
outkx)k among the central figures. But the limelight fell on the Prime 
Minister. When Whitlam decided to resign the Foreign Affairs port-
folio, the job would normally have gone to Barnard, to whom It had 
been previously promised and who wished to undertake it. But Bar-
nard had not yet completed the task of reorganizing the Defence 
Department, one of the new government's major objectives. At all 
events, Whitlam reconsidered his opinion that Barnard was fully 
suited for the role of Foreign Minister. Whitlam's willingness to 
renege on a pledge to a trusted friend and political ally could be con-
strued as another sign of the Importance the Prime Minister personal-
ly attached to foreign policy. 
Labor's perceptions of the world were brightly coloured by the 
political circumstances in which the party entered office. The fact of 
its inordinately long period in opposition was central. The party's 
reaction was an impatience to attack Australia's foreign policy con-
cerns head on, both to give exposition to what Labor believed to be the 
realities of international life, and more particularly, to launch 
remedial policies. The urgency to "set things right" was prompted by 
what Labor thought to have been unconscionable L-CP preoccupa-
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tions with such symbols as the Chinese threat and the American al-
liance. With the L-CP at last out of office, Whitlam remarked, "the 
foreign policy debate and foreign policy decisions can never again be 
so limited, so restricted, so distorted. In that liberation, I find the 
chief distinction of my Government's foreign policies—and the 
greatest challenges and opportunities for the future."' Relatedly, as 
we saw before. Labor felt that on key international problems such as 
China and Vietnam, its own position had been vindicated by events. 
This introduced an additional spur for Labor as a party of government 
to challenge orthodoxies and it instilled self-confidence. Labor's in-
centive to reconsider what it identified as misplaced L-CP tenets also 
was personal to the party. The ALP was distressed by what it thought 
to have been the shameless insinuations that Liberal spokesmen had 
levelled against it for political gain. As Whitlam had previously ex-
pressed this sentiment. 
There is no English-speaking democracy in which the ruling party has for 
SO long, so cynically, used the great matters of foreign policy for domestic 
political purposes. ... It is incredible that in 1971 an Australian Prime 
Minister should seek to gain political mileage out of kicking the Com-
munist can in respea of China. The tactics of the past are as futile as the 
policies of the past.^  
So, when Labor was elected, Whitlam and his colleagues, more 
than they would have had preceding circumstances been different, 
construed their victory as a clear mandate for change, an instruction 
to get on with corrective surgery. Whitlam acknowledged that, in the 
earlier stages of his govemment, the primary need was to stress 
"those aspects of its policies which emphasised its independence from 
its predecessors". All the same, whether in earlier or later stages of its 
tenure. Labor continued to underscore its vision and sense of con-
fidence: "We are not merely repairing the past; we are preparing for 
the future."' 
This takes us up to Labor's actual dispositions. These were shaped 
by its qualities as a social democratic party, a party that, though 
perhaps belatedly in comparison with sister socialist and Labor par-
ties, had evolved a streak that was not only reformist but idealistic. 
This does not necessarily imply that Labor simply substituted naive 
idealism for a sober Australian national-interest assessment of inter-
national problems. But various people close to the foreign policy 
centre remarked to the author upon the sense of "principle" they 
noticed in men such as Whitlam and Willesee, and from which much 
of Labor's anti-racialist and anti-colonialist foreign policy followed. 
The "benefit" element in the cost-benefit equation was a better world 
and the reorientation of Australian society towards deeper sensibility 
and tolerance. 
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The author asked Senator Willesee what, after about two years in 
office. Labor's one or two most significant foreign policy contribu-
tions had been. The answer was building towards a structure of anti-
racialism and anti-colonialism, and the achievement of world-class 
standing by Australia, predominantly among Third World nations. In 
a paper delivered in mid-1974, Willesee argued that his government 
still believed "in the rather old-fashioned and optimistic notion of the 
possibility of progress: in the idea that by co-operative effort men and 
nations can bring about a betterment in their circumstances and 
hence a more just and equitable world." To Willesee, counter-
arguments about the need to replace principles with "realism" were 
simply masks for selfishness." We recall that Menzies, on his part, had 
identified the ANZUS alliance as the greatest achievement of his 
prime ministership, 
Labor's outlook on the world and Australia's place in it was also 
conditioned by the disposition towards a "new nationalism" 
philosophy. The fullest symbolic exposition of this notion was 
delivered by Whitlam in Ballarat, Victoria, on the 119th anniversary 
of the Eureka uprising. The speech was circulated to all Australian 
overseas posts. Its new nationalism qualities were depicted by a 
Foreign Affairs Department public Information officer as a "main-
spring of the Government's political philosophy and hence a 
motivating force In its actions and reactions on foreign affairs".' For 
Whitlam, the new nationalism was a movement to restore and en-
vigorate .Australia's authentic traditions, especially egalitarlanism, 
fair play and independence. These, he said, were values with long and 
deep meaning for the Australian Labor Party. The new nationalism 
was not to be confused either with isolationalism or xenophobia. 
Labor abjured these values. The link between constructive and 
mature national pride and international politics was plain. Imitative 
and unself-critical societies found little respect abroad and made few 
contributions. "Echoes and shadows, satellites and vassals are not 
forces for peace and co-operation; they are more likely to be the first 
victims when peace and co-operation are overthrown."* Again, 
therefore, we find Labor eager to break old and confining moulds, to 
set new parameters of conduct, or at least to revive those that were 
dissipated under the Liberals, to see the world more as plural rather 
than as ranged into blocs and—with special emphasis—to portray 
Australia as a distinctive and unintimldatable nation. 
The new nationalist image of Australia was associated with certain 
Labor Party predispositions about the international environment, 
which we will examine more closely later Here we wish to say that 
these predispositions included misgivings about great-power regula-
tion of world affairs and about resort to force majeure or extortive 
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methods generally as appropriate means to settle international dis-
putes. Excessive followership of the United States was especially un-
welcome. It was nationally demeaning. It had led to flagrant distor-
tions of policy under the L-CP and to nauseating political abuse of 
Labor It was associated with America's far-flung economic interests 
and capacity to exert damaging and debasing influence. We should 
remember that the ALP was not and is not Marxist, but that it has 
stood in the social democratic tradition of mistrusting various 
features of capitalism. When capitalism entrenched itself inter-
nationally, when, as in Australia, it took the form of extensive foreign 
ownership and elaborate multi-national company operations, it had 
to be reigned in. Although it has not subscribed to economic deter-
minism as an animating principle. Labor's attention to the economic 
dimensions of the play of international life has in this way been 
heightened. We will see in other contexts how Labor reacted, in word 
and deed, to international capitalism. For emphasis, we should point 
out here that at least the rhetoric was frequent and heavy, including 
invocations by Whitlam of dangers posed by foreign investment to 
Australia's very birthright.' 
One other extremely important element contributed to the way in 
which the Labor government saw and reacted to the international en-
vironment. By late 1972, international conditions were somewhat dif-
ferent from what they had been when Menzies was taking pride in 
having promoted ANZUS, or when his successors were shipping 
troops to fight in Vietnam. Whitlam himself acknowledged that his 
government's task of taking a fresh tack in foreign affairs had been 
simplified by shifts towards great-power accommodation and by the 
defusing of acerbic issues such as Vietnam within Australian politics: 
"many changfes we are making occur within the context of even more 
far-reaching changes being made by and between powers far greater 
than Australia, and principally by the United States herself"" Taken 
In this light, whether or not one subscribes to Labor's rhetoric or 
policy movements, it should not be overlooked that "re-examination" 
was ongoing throughout most world capitals by the end of 1972. It is 
worth considering James Richardson's conclusion that Whitlam was 
a man of the Kissinger era, not a throwback to some previous period. 
His foreign policy projections were "unusual only in the Australian 
context" and reflected "Australia's return to the mainstream of world 
politics after a long period aground in Vietnam".'' 
We now turn to Labor's perceptions of the world scene; first to its 
views of general tendencies, then to prescribed guidelines for 
Australian policy. Australian Labor saw the international politics of 
the 1950s and 1960s as having been dominated by super-power con-
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frontatlons, directly or through surrogates. Then, together with other 
observers, it sensed the emergence of new International parameters. 
It took particular notice of pluralization among communist nations, 
Britain's progressive disengagement and the retrartion of a major 
American military presence from Asia, and the various steps towards 
great-power detente. The ALP was encouraged by these trends. They 
seemed to lower the risk of conflict, to pave the way towards more 
durable efforts at building a structure of International co-oF>eration. 
They also freed Australia from constantly feeling it had to take sides 
in great-power or communist versus anti-communist disputes. This 
met Labor's conception of Australian national interests and also com-
plemented the party's broader sense of values. Henry Kissinger, as the 
prime Western architect of detente, was at least selertively adopted as a 
kind of Labor Party hero. While Kissinger's initiatives would not 
always be successful, Whitlam remarked, "log-jams are broken, stale 
habits of mind are abandoned, and movement is often preferable to a 
dogged preseverance" with an outmoded status quo.^° 
The Labor government was especially relieved that a more relaxed 
climate in Soviet-American relations had diminished the prospect of 
critical and possibly nuclear confrontation. It especially deprecated 
others' denigrations of dtente, since its essential meaning was the 
avoidance of nuclear mass destruction. This was "the highest goal a 
nation could ever set for i tself ." 
Another equally important yet sometimes overlooked Labor 
government reaction must be noted. The government was 
temperamentally ill-disposed towards fostering international stability 
by military means. It devoted itself to disarmament and the propaga-
tion of regional zones of peace objectives. It encouraged such tension-
relaxing measures as were concluded between Moscow and 
Washington under SALT, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. 
Without excessive fanfare, however it committed itself to what it 
saw as the corollary proposition that existing nuclear balance 
restrained the super-powers and therefore enhanced the survival of 
dtiente. This can be read in some snatches of ministerial remarks and 
was widely confirmed from internal evidence.'^ What it meant in 
practice was that Labor accepted an effective American nuclear deter-
rent capability. Instrumentally, as we will show later this view car-
ried great importance for government policy towards American 
defence Installations on Australian soil. 
As with Soviet-American (and Sino-American) accommodation, 
the Labor government generally welcomed tendencies towards multi-
polarity, though its conceptualization of this phenomenon was not as 
crisply articulated as It might have been. In the first place, it noticed 
the concurrent tendencies of super-power reduction of influence and 
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the emergence of other centres or clusters of regional or world in-
fluence, such as China, Japan and the European community. The dif-
fusion of world power was a "good thing", insofar as it encouraged an 
international buffering effect to confrontational relations and gave 
Australia and other smaller nations improved room for manoeuvre. 
Nevertheless, the dispersion of power in the contemporary world was 
seen to have another facet, with a potential for engendering instability, 
especially within the international economic order: "The conse-
quence of ... [such developments] as the 'energy crisis', the growing 
world shortage of food, and efforts to regulate the environment and 
use of the sea, is that foreign elements will have an increased capacity 
to influence or substantially determine domestic and foreign 
policies."" 
The Labor government was seriously concerned about inter-
national difficulties that such claims and rivalries could stimulate. 
Concern with them served to strengthen the ALP's tendency to think 
that International tensions Carried a prominent underlying economic 
component. It also tended to reinforce the party's predilertion to 
downgrade the notion of contemporary international relations as a 
contest between communist and anti-communist forces, and to 
downgrade communism per se as a fearsome phenomenon. The world 
competition for scarce resources was much more connerted to Arab 
oil, Japan's raw material and trading requirements, African and 
South Asian famine, the pressures of under-development, etc. than to 
communist conspiracies. For instance, Whitlam openly said in April 
1975 that "Who rules in Saigon is not, and never has been, an in-
gredient In Australia's security."'" 
Also through the prism that it used to view the world, Labor pulled 
in the party's anti-racialist and anti-colonialist sentiments. Resource 
imbalances and scramble for economic advantage tended to get iden-
tified with the legacies of colonialism and the exploitation of the 
weak by the strong. There are various sources from which'corrobora-
tion can be suggested. For instance, in his 1973 study of the attitudes 
of parliamentarians, Oliver Mendelsohn found that Laborites were 
far less Inclined than Liberals or CP members to take an "antagonistic 
and fearful view of communist movements and regimes". Only 8 per 
cent of ALP respondents Identified communist and terrorist move-
ments as a prime or fairly important cause of continuing under-
development, as against 62 per cent of Liberal and 81 per cent of CP 
respondents. Two-thirds of Labor respondents viewed communism in 
Asia as posing no threat to Australia, but no opposition respondents 
t(X)k this view." Or we can turn to Whitlam himself Speaking to a 
group of journalists in August 1973, he remarked that disparities in 
the rates of national economic development were directly tied to 
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whether a country had been a colony. Colour and colonialism were 
the two principal internationally destabilizing tendencies—"All this 
garbage about communism or the threat of China Is nothing com-
pared with these two Issues which will be around for a long time."'* 
Everything considered, what were Labor's assessments of potential 
threats to Australia? Its conclusions generally harmonized with both 
the theoretical assumptions and the party dispositions already 
recounted. Throughout most of its time In office the government 
relied heavily on a "strategic basis" assessment that, together with 
other sources of official advice, was prepared in the first half of 1973 
by the Defence Committee, composed of senior military and civilian 
public service personnel. This strategic basis remained classified, 
though selections were alluded to by the government, especially Bar-
nard. The government noted with approval the strategic assessment's 
apparent overall optimism. Circumstances under which Australia 
could be drawn into great-power perhaps nuclear conflicts were un-
likely, since the prospert of great-power armed confrontation had 
receded. Also the risk of endangered supplies of raw materials and 
resources had made the major industrial nations more cautious about 
resorting to military force. At all events, only the Soviet Union and 
the United States possessed a capability to launch an invasion of 
Australia, and neither could realistically be expected to do so. 
Respecting Australia's own geo-political environment, the strategic 
basis did not discount frictions. It felt that in South-East Asia there 
had been movement towards a great-power disengagement, lessening 
chances that countries in the region could fall victim to great-power 
competition. Any foreseeable localized conflicts in South-East Asia 
were not construed as directly or indirectly threatening to Australia's 
integrity. The security contingencies, it was pointed out, were quite 
different from those of a decade earlier. The framers of the strategic 
basis speculated that Australia could reasonably expect to live in a 
low-threat environment from ten to up to fifteen years, though with 
decreasing certitude towards the outer end of that time-scale. At all 
events, enough lead time would probably be available to allow 
Australia to react appropriately if tremors in the neighbourhood 
threatened to cloud the security outlook." 
In late 1975, during his brief period as Defence Minister, Morrison 
backed away from the earlier projection of a likely period of up to fif-
teen years free of threat, and he otherwise seemed to pull in his 
predecessor's relative optimism.'" We will see later that, all the same, 
throughout its tenure, the government continued to be seriously dis-
puted in various quarters for Its acceptance of allegedly "sanguine" 
evaluations. The critics might have been even more severe had they 
been aware of an unannounced feature of the strategic basis. The as-
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sessment apparently hedged its overall optimism somewhat by 
speculating on possible Australian security difficulties with Indonesia 
and Japan. Within the Defence Department, planners eventually 
drew up papers and scenarios that stressed how a resource-hungry 
Japan might, in a decade or two, try to enforce its writ by military 
means." On its part, the government might have been spared some 
criticism of projecting for up to fifteen years in advance were it not 
for a quirk of events. Among those who helped draft the strategic as-
sessment there came to be some retrospective feeling that it had been 
injudicious to have probed as far ahead as fifteen years. Why then had 
it been done? The assessment's drafters had recalled an earlier Bar-
nard remark in which a period of "the next fifteen years" had been 
promised for evaluation,-'" so they rather casually elected to adopt 
that time frame. 
What policy guidelines were subsumed under Labor's assumptions 
about the international environment of the 1970s? In the broadest 
sense. Labor said that It wanted Australia to contribute towards the 
verification of assumptions about the world heading in rational, less 
threat-surrounded directions. This included great-power accommoda-
tion, normalization of relations among Asian and Pacific countries 
and further efforts at extirpating racialism and colonialism. For 
Australia itself, Whitlam insisted, "It is not just a matter of blithely 
accepting our advisers' view that there is no foreseeable major threat 
to Australia for fifteen years; it Is a matter of actively, consciously, 
pursuing policies to make the prediction come true."-'' Labor felt 
there had been too many lost opportunities for international recon-
ciliation In the past, as in the aftermath of the 1954 Indo-China settle-
ment. After the change of regimes In South Vietnam and Cambodia in 
1975, Labor was especially eager that all nations should think of these 
events as an opportunity, as "the beginning of a new era of widened 
regional co-operation and progress in the entire South-East Asian 
area".^^ 
Labor reasoned that Australia's external policies would not only 
need to disencumber themselves of the fetishes of the past but to 
widen their ambit. Labor construed L-CP foreign'pollcy as having suf-
fered from preoccupation with South-East Asia as a security shield 
and with the United States as patron and protector. Diplomatic diver-
sification of virtually global proportions was called for. Such diver-
sification could In and of itself suppress repetition of what were 
regarded as earlier distortions and obsessions. The world's parts had 
become Interlocked. External policies needed to take on an orienta-
tion that was less bilateral and more functionally framed. Australia 
had to demonstrate Its internationalist credentials and scope for in-
fluence. 
Australia and the International Scene 69 
The ALP government was persuaded that independence was to be 
the linchpin of Australia's overseas policies, "the idea of a more asser-
tive, purposeful, self-reliant and distinctively Australian policy"." The 
idea of "independence" in foreign policy was a "good thing" to 
embrace because it conformed to Labor's ideological and sentimental 
predispositions, and It was a gratifying drum to beat in reaction to 
L-CP years. It was an objectively good thing, since it enlarged the 
range of Australia's options and could facilitate the achievement of 
perceived national interest objectives. It was a pragmatically gocxi 
thing, since it was believed to leave the right appearances among 
those whom Australia wished to Influence. Whitlam declared that the 
aim of Labor's early policy decisions, and of future decisions, was to 
"establish a reputation for Australia as a nation with an independent 
and distinctive foreign policy. We want to be regarded as a friendly, 
tolerant and co-operative neighbour."" Independence was, moreover 
a good thing because of a combination of the breakdown of great-
power domination and Australia's special capabilities as an inter-
national actor Again to Whitlam: 
We are far and away the richest nation in the neighbourhood. We have a 
gross national product equal to that of all the countries between the Bay 
of Bengal and the South China Sea. Those countries have 20 times our 
population. We are an island continent with one of the most formidable 
natural defences in the world. We have no serious conflict of interests 
with any of our neighbours and there are no foreseeable conflicts likely to 
arise well beyond the decade." 
The foreign policy net was to be cast more ambitiously than before, 
and its hallmark was to be "independence". What, however, was to 
be done, or avoided? In the first instance. Labor wished to de-
emphasize military instruments of policy. The party believed that 
L-CP governments had subordinated foreign policy to defence policy, 
a relationship that the government felt it had to redress, in fact, in-
vert. It also made certain assumptions about the international scene. 
Military responses were thought to be less relevant—indeed, often 
counter-productive—when the emerging global theme was detente, not 
confrontation. It believed that prospects of a threat to Australia itself, 
and which would require a military response, were low. It looked 
back on Vietnam and defined it as a classical example of a foolish 
brandishing and squandering of military resources. It was eager to 
persuade many nations that Australia was not only peace-loving but 
its own master "Independence" in foreign policy meant, inter alia, 
removing some of the trappings of a follower nation, and fol-
lowership under the L-CP had prominently been displayed by 
military support at the elbow of great powers. 
Australia would not dismantle its military forces, but would adjust 
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them to new circumstances. It would contribute military advice and 
materiel to neighbouring states still In process of building up their own 
security. But, in striking contrast to the L-CP's forward defence 
strategy, Whitlam pointedly pledged that "Australia shall never again 
send troops to fight in Asian mainland wars. Australia shall never 
again garrison troops abroad as part of a military commitment to in-
volve this country in Asian wars."" Australian intervention In Asia's 
Internal conflicts was precluded, Barnard added, because it was both 
"repugnant" and "ultimately ineffective"." Labor's general 
philosophy was clear. But, as will be seen later there was some 
reason to believe that Its self-denying ordinance on interyention 
overseas may have been tempered by the special case of Papua New 
Guinea. 
The alliance system with the United States, especially through 
ANZUS, was to be retained. The Labor government made no bones 
about Australia being an "aligned" country. Defence liaison with and 
actual security assistance from the United States under some con-
tingencies made the connection worthwhile. So did the opportunities 
for access to, and therefore possible enhanced influence over, 
American policy-makers. And, as we have seen, the Labor govern-
ment concluded that, since the nuclear balance was an important un-
derpinning for detente, American defence-related facilities in Australia 
were foreseeably to be retained. But security alliances, and the 
American connection especially, were to have their profile lowered. 
Labor wished to "move away from the narrow view that Anzus Is the 
only significant factor in our relations with the U.S., and the equally 
narrow view that our relations with the United States are the only 
significant factor in Australia's foreign relations."^" At least symbolic 
Importance can be attached to Willesee's lack of any direct mention 
of the US alliance, or ANZUS, during his major foreign policy exposi-
tion to an Australian Institute of International Affairs conference in 
June 1974. 
Diplomacy rather than military responses was Labor's preferred ex-
ternal policy instrument. Consistent with Its dispositions, there was to 
be a distinctive anti-colonlallst and anti-racialist ingredient In such 
diplomatic pursuits. This was regarded as complementary to helping 
things along, in the context of decelerating great-power confrontation 
and promoting nation-building efforts, in Asia particularly: "The pre-
sent Government's policies are directed towards encouraging the-
militarily and economically dominant powers to cease disruptive in-
tervention in the region, so as to let social and political conflicts work 
themselves out in tmly national solutions."" Indeed, on a point we 
will need to amplify considerably later, the ALP government defined 
the promotion of regional co-operation as a keystone of its foreign 
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policy efforts in the 1970s. This objective was not simply aimed at 
politically stabilizing or, in some security sense, immunizing nations 
in the region, but at constructing more systematic mechanisms for at-
tacking poverty, Ignorance, disease and other ills. Such an approach 
would bring into play Labor's conviction that multi-lateral, func-
tionally oriented diplomacy was increasingly overshadowing 
traditional bilateral relationships. It also was a natural outgrowth of 
the party's attraction to socio-economic explanations of international 
forces and of the belief that Australia enjoyed a wide economic, as 
well as moral and jx)litical, resource base from which to exercise a 
meaningful role. From this followed another tangent of Labor's 
concerns—resource policy. This is a complex theme, full of offshoots. 
In the very simplest sense, it meant synchronizing the exploitation 
and merchandizing of the nation's natural mineral and energy 
resources in ways that would contribute towards various external 
economic and diplomatic objectives, as well as to commercial gain. 
The Labor government's approach to constructing a foreign policy for 
Australia was challenged In various quarters. Some of the more cut-
ting criticism emanated from persons and groups who found the 
government tcx) timid rather than over-zealous, too conservative 
rather than tcx) leftish. In numbers, these "radical" critics represented 
a distinct minority within the party and among the general popula-
tion. But their presentations were widely ventilated in political, 
academic and other circles, and affected the mood within which the 
government-opposition dialogue was itself conducted. Later we will 
need to examine the influence of the "left" upon policy processes and 
outputs under Labor. Here, continuing the general theme of our nar-
rative, we focus on general assumptions and policy guidelines, as criti-
ques of the Labor government per se and as proffered alternatives. 
Our undertaking is difficult. It is plainly not possible to sf)eak of a 
single "radical" or "left" phenomenon. We are dealing with a number 
of persons, factions and organizations, of assorted vintage, size, 
membership, audience, inspiration and inflection of outlook. For in-
stance, we can identify several communist parties and movements. In-
cluding pro-Moscow, pro-Peking and Trotskyite. Much of the thrust 
of the radical movement In Australia was not, however communist 
In inspiration or direction, and indeed often condemned communists 
as old-fashioned or as committed to national political systems, such as 
the Soviet Union, which were taken to be imperialist, repressive, or 
whatever. 
Even within the "new" as opposed to the more traditional and 
largely communist based "old" left, there were considerable dif-
ferences. One generalization that seemed to fit was that the newer 
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left arose In part from circumstances symptomatic of protest move-
ments in contemporary Western societies generally. In part, it arose 
from somewhat distinctive Australian circumstances. Among 
Western societies, Australia was for a long period more sheltered, 
inward-turning and not given to a vigorous intellertual climate. 
When change did occur about from the decade of the late 1950s, it 
came rapidly. Australia experienced an infusion of new migrant 
types, rapid economic diversification, rapid extension of higher 
education, rapid exposure to newer values and a rapid scramble to es-
tablish an Australian personality in foreign affairs and towards Asia 
especially. Within such an environment, doubt, estrangement and 
protest were more easily induced. 
Also important was the chararter of Australian politics. Many 
came to regard the L-CP not just as political parties with occasional 
turns at government but as virtually synonymous with national 
government. The stylistic and substantive shortcomings of the L-CP 
thereby reflected on the system. Since L-CP governments were 
depending on perspective, cautious or reactionary, the system was 
more likely to be impugned by people interested in a redistribution of 
domestic and foreign policy priorities. The Labor Party was not itself 
a fully appropriate vehicle for change. For a long time It projected a 
clumsy, rather cloth cap and anti-intellectual, and often internally 
disputatious image. Indeed, its consistent inability to win federal of-
fice persuaded some people that it was more sensible, and personally 
stimulating, to work around rather than within the conventional 
party system. Moreover, inordinately long periods of continuous 
government and opposition for the L-CP and Labor, respectively, 
made both groups less responsible in their behaviour There was a 
tendency towards exaggeration, polemicism and perhaps most impor-
tantly, especially on the L-CP's part, to politicize values and methods 
in foreign policy. As we saw earlier this grew worse during the clos-
ing years of Liberal government. 
There also were particular areas of public controversy that sparked 
radical thinking. Australia's position in and focus upon Asia 
stimulated concern about under-development and political change 
among new or Third World nations. Australia's own affluence, 
residual colonial responsibilities and heritage of racism suggested a 
contrast with the Asian environment and prompted demands for 
radical reorientations. Issues such as Vietnam and conscription ac-
quired a special emotive quality in Australia, and thereby nurtured 
radicalism. For some, L-CP policies on Vietnam and conscription 
were not simply unprofitable in cost-accounting terms, or contrary to 
national interests, or even broadly immoral. They were policies that 
were interpreted as being cynically exploited by the governments of 
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the day, governments that relied on fear as a standard technique of 
political self-service. They were policies that were Interpreted as 
degrading illustrations of the abnegation of national Independence to 
the cause of "follow the American leader". As Australian society was 
becoming more self-critical and outward-looking, this facet of already 
unpopular policies further strengthened the impulses for radical chal-
lenge. As the Australian anti-Vietnam and anti-conscription protest 
movement evolved, it enrolled a multiplicity of people and interests 
who thereby contributed an element of legitimacy to the movement 
at large. There were young people as well as older people, churchmen 
as well as secularists, middle-class professionals as well as some 
worker members, advocates of peaceful change as well as some 
professed revolutionaries, ALP parliamentarians as well as persons 
who had never been active in party politics.'" 
Once the L-CP had been replaced by Labor some earlier incentives 
for radical expression on foreign prolicy disappeared. Other incentives 
remained and new ones arose. The "radical movement" was an es-
tablished phenomenon. Many of its members had developed cynical 
dispositions towards government, authority and orthodox political 
party life generally. Some had cultivated a powerful sense of refor-
mist conscience, still others were absorbed by the romance of dissent. 
The new Whitlam government, by professing the need for indepen-
dent postures and reformed policies abroad. Itself helped to encourage 
a climate in which challenge and criticism flourished. Ironically, the 
Labor government's own reformism became the target of radical 
criticism and inspiration for continuing rather than standing down 
the radical effort. Labor was variously seen as unfaithful to its own 
standards or as simply being a captive of forces within the "system " 
and of unregenerate electoral expediency. It was seen as quite In-
capable of accomplishing anything of fundamental importance. Labor 
was thereby felt to deserve derision, while the radical movement con-
tinued to hold leading responsibility for provoking public debate and 
applying pressure for basic change. 
To say that Australian radicalism developed many countenances is 
not saying very much. There were persons within the spertrum of dis-
sidents who thought of themselves less as "radicals" than as activist 
reformers. Many, moreover, abjured any notions of attacking the 
system outright. For some, for example, inspiration for protest sprung 
from religious convictions. Action for World Development addressed 
itself to such causes as more severe Australian government sanctions 
against South Africa and Rhodesia. The group subscribed to Christian 
principles and took support from the Australian Council of Churches 
and the Roman Catholic Church's Justice and Peace Commission. In 
1973, a number of Catholics associated with Art ion for World 
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Development affiliated with Pax Christl. The group's aim was to 
"promote among Christians and throughout the community a greater 
social consciousness on the key issues of peace and justice as they 
relate to Australia's involvements and responsibilities. Pax Christl 
believes that non-violent Struggle offers the only real alternative to 
war and Injustice." Pax Christl chose as its foremost concern the 
presence of "foreign military bases"." 
In our effort to prototypify the radical movement, we probably 
should look outside the Christian groups as such, even though overlap 
of membership and sympathy existed. The two major radical "roof 
organizations were the Association for International Co-operation 
and Disarmament (AIDC) in Sydney and the Congress for Inter-
national Co-operation and Disarmament (CIDC) in Melbourne. Very 
important, especially In Its intellectual thrust, was a circle of 
academics, many of them associated with the journal Arena. Also im-
portant was the publicity given to radical themes by the leadership of 
the Australian Union of Students (AUS) and the student press, which 
became a kind of "underground" alternative-culture vehicle.'^ 
An important if not overarching assumption of the radical move-
ment was that imperialism, largely but not exclusively practised by 
the United States, had become an ugly, pervasive force: 
The US sought to maintain control of the world's resources by strengthen-
ing the dependence and internal domination of the Third World countries 
through a series of militarily powerful, reactionary client regimes, tied to 
US military and economic aid; while on the other hand, attempting to 
resolve the global economic contraditions of the capitalist system by the 
economic integration of the socialist countries through a process of 
detente.'' 
Through a series of manipulations, which included the machinations 
of multi-national corporations, the effect was "to leave the developing 
countries in a state of under-industrialization, exhaustion of 
agricultural and mineral resources, and perpetual under-employment 
and poverty".'" 
For Australia, this reasoning continued, the great lesson was to ac-
quire solidarity with the exploited peoples and definitionally to avoid 
complicity with, and to resist, imperialist designs. Yet, the radicals ob-
jected, Australia had done no such thing. Labor professed in-
dependence, but "contrary to the new nationalist viewpoint Australia 
is both a junior partner and competitor of US, British and Japanese 
business interests."" Labor's "reforms" in external policy were con-
demned as tokenism at best, and more accurately as a smokescreen 
behind which to hide. Maintenance of the US alliance, failure to op-
pose reactionary regimes, timidity in dealing with racist nations and 
the export of Australian goods and capital in exploitative roles were 
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among the symptoms of a party inherently incapable of performing a 
genuine transformation. Bruce McFarlane, one of the leading critics 
in this area, wrote that 
what is involved is a neo-colonial policy, streamlined, brisk, efficient and 
ruthless. It is Technocratic Labor's attitude to its own working class and 
to multinational corporations projected externally. It is a carefully 
thought-out nexus of power/investment/trade relations; it is 
Technocratic Labor's own creation, its own model.'" 
What policy guidelines did the radical movement recommend? It 
would have undertaken an uncompromising assault on all remaining 
racialist states and remnants of colonialism. It would stringently have 
opposed what it regarded as dlitist- led, imperialist-infected regimes, 
especially in South-East Asia. It would have embraced "peoples" and 
"liberation" movements, such as the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government in South Vietnam, before that group actually took 
power. It would have accelerated efforts at disarmament, purged 
American defence facilities from Australia and preferably dismantled 
Australia's connections with security alliances. It would have severely 
restricted the foreign economic presence In Australia and stopped the 
export of what It considered to be Australia's own economic subjuga-
tion of Third World peoples.'^ Australia would, unequivocally, have 
moved towards non-alignment and would have become an honoured 
champion of "progressive" forces. 
As far as could be adduced from the wealth of radical movement 
pn)nouncements, the "how to achieve it" question carried no single 
answer. There would, of course, have been publicity about the wrong-
headedness of prevailing policies, efforts at mobilizing sympathetic 
Labor parliamentarians and party members generally, as well as open 
attacks on forces and ideas held blameworthy. While we are not con-
centrating here on tactics and systemic and policy effects, one par-
ticular chord should be emphasized. The radical movement 
acknowledged that imperialism had no single national origin, but It 
Identified the United States as by far the most powerful and culpable 
imperialist nation. While the United States was a target for radical 
movements in many countries, circumstances gave the anti-American 
campaign in Australia special embellishment. The American idiom in 
Australia had become widespread, through US investment, US cor-
porate establishments, reliance by Australia on the US market, the 
ANZUS and SEATO connections, American defence installations, in-
creasing numbers of American secondary and tertiary education staff 
members, the untold number of everyday reminders, from Coca-Cola 
to Kentucky Fried Chicken to Time and Newswee/r to Ford, Chrysler 
and General Motors (-Holden's) cars, and so on. The recollection that 
Liberal governments had tied Australia's policies to the American 
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kite, with what were regarded as disastrous results, also accentuated 
the anti-American feeling, though much more in corporate than in in-
terpersonal terms. So, less directly, did the sense of disdain for a Labor 
government that was accused of having done nothing fundamental to 
dissolve the Australian-American linkage. 
All this gave rise to a literature on the adverse nature of the 
American presence. Conspiratorial theories were widely offered in 
radical circles, such as alleged CIA involvement in Australian politics 
to the sinister role In "war research" of American educational founda-
tions and academics. There were demonstrations at US consular 
facilities, at the North-West Cape signal-station, at affiliates of 
American companies involved In defence production, and even 
against an art exhibit in Adelaide, sent to Australia under the 
auspices of the New York Museum of Modern Art. Critics of the 
radical movement would have said that, as a fashion, anti-
Americanism became the anti-communism of the left. 
There may also have been some connection between anti-American 
feeling and outlooks expressed in the radical movement (but outside 
radical circles as well) on other matters. There was a certain affinity 
for China and its socialist experiment, but little affinity for the Soviet 
Union. In Australia, this had several causes, among them the feeling 
that the Soviets had become more like the Americans and less 
genuinely revolutionary. The Chinese, long the objects of American 
(and Australian) containment, were, by contrast, idealized for their 
sense of principle, social experimentation and their positive attention 
towards liberation causes, especially in Asia. The tendency in a 
number of radical quarters to move towards the Arab/Palestinian 
cause in the Middle Eastern dispute was in part afferted by portrayal 
of Israel as an American client state, resistant to the rights of disposed 
people. 
The radical movement did not, of course, simply address itself to 
opposing or promoting particular causes. Many In its ranks, though 
with considerably varying degrees of commitment, would have 
wished to remake Australian society. Only then could a sensitive ap-
proach to external affairs have been vouchsaved. Ordinary party 
politics or lobbying efforts were not enough. A "mass involvement" 
by a public all too deeply tranquilized by self-serving elites and the es-
tablishmentarian media somehow had to be brought about. Some in 
the movement would have subscribed to the Injunction of the inter-
national research officer of the AUS. He recommended that Australia 
follow Ho Chi Minh's directive that '"the best way to help the Viet-
namese revolution was to make revolution in your own country'".'" 
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We now turn to the Liberal and Country Parties, which in December 
1972 became Australia's alternative government. There are some dif-
ficulties in providing a confident assessment of the L-CP's un-
dergirding foreign policy assumptions and guidelines. Almost 
anywhere, an opposition is liable to be more free-wheeling in express-
ing Itself than are authoritative government spokesmen. Because the 
L-CP was exercising a prominent criticism role, there is some problem 
of disentangling political rhetoric from basic foreign policy convic-
tions. Necessarily, a fair amount of our analysis will reflect what the 
L-CP objected to as opposed to what It favoured. While Labor as a 
government had its share of dissident party voices on various policy 
questions, the opposition was literally two parties, each with its own 
leader and party orientations and loyalties. It was not until after the 
May 1974 election that a joint L-CP opposition shadow cabinet was 
formed. Finding itself in the unfamiliar role of opposition, the L-CP 
faced a multitude of tasks and concerns that prolonged or otherwise 
interfered with the systematic regroupment of external policy ap-
proaches. The public seemed only marginally Interested in foreign 
and defence policy issues, while becoming preoccupied with domestic 
economic conditions. The opposition's attention was thereby 
deflected from external affairs. There was a new Liberal leader who 
had to establish his credentials within his party, within the combined 
L-CP opposition and vis-d-vis the country. There were issues of Intra-
party reorganization, of inter-coalitlon party relations and of 
rebuilding political stock. New opposition spokesmen on external sub-
jects came forward. 
The opposition's spokesmen on external topics represented some 
subject-matter continuity with the L-CP when it had occupied office. 
The previous Foreign Minister Nigel Bowen, at first continued as 
Liberal spokesman in that area, but resigned from Parliament later in 
1973. His replacement, Andrew Peacock, had served as Minister for 
the Army and as Minister for External Territories, but had never been 
an L-CP "Inner Cabinet" man. Dr A. J. Forbes, who became defence 
spokesman, had held both the Army and the Immigration portfolios. 
B. M. Snedden, the new Liberal leader, had a considerable ministerial 
background, but not really central to external affairs—Immigration, 
National Service and Treasury. In his depth of interest, schooling and 
overseas contacts, he was distinctly less well-prepared than was 
Whitlam when the latter had served in opposition. Unlike Labor, 
moreover the Liberal and Country Parties were not parties with an 
authoritative body of party guidelines, such as a fixed party platform 
from which animating principles of foreign policy could readily be 
drawn. 
The Liberals eventually did set In motion an ordering of their 
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foreign policy thinking. Statements on foreign policy and defence and 
on International economics and foreign investment were (with CP 
concurrence) pulled together for the 1974 election. The foreign 
policy/defence statement was one of the few In the Liberal package 
that had been given prior systematic attention, though the effort was 
not begun until afier Peacock had replaced Bowen as Foreign Policy 
spokesman.'" Later in 1974, a new federal platform was approved."" 
By September of 1974, Peacock and Forbes had begun consultations 
with academics, to sharpen and make more sound party policy In 
foreign and defence policy and to find ways to make such policies 
inore graphic and presentable to the public Snedden himself set out 
to improve his grasp of foreign policy. As leader, he began to speak 
more frequently in this area than when his party had been in govern-
ment and he undertook occasional fact-finding trips abroad. As we 
will notice later, forceful external policy sjiokesmanship came quite 
easily to Malcolm Eraser who replaced Snedden as Liberal leader in 
March 1975. In October 1975, shortly before the election that ousted 
Labor fn)m office, the coalition parties published updated and refined 
versions of their external policies."' 
In any event, once in opposition, the L-CP had both more oppor-
tunity and more Incentive to reconsider its foreign policy outlooks 
than when it had governed. As one Liberal document admitted, while 
the L-CP was still is iiower "Precedent proved to be to some extent a 
barrier to change. However, once in opposition, this was less an ob-
stacle than It had been in government.""^ Snedden, while denying 
that the electoral defeat of December 1972 required an "abnegation of 
the past", averred that it did stimulate a healthy scrutiny of party 
foreign policy, to test it for currency and amenability to necessary in-
novation. As the world was fluid, static assumptions In foreign policy 
were inappropriate: "We may have been hindered at times by such 
assumptions In the past—1 intend that we should avoid them in 
future.""' 
Together with opportunity, the opposition also had motive to 
recast its position on external affairs. Esix'cially after Peacock had 
become shadow Foreign Minister, it helped to have new men in key 
siiokesinanship roles. There was an electoral incentive to produce, or 
at least to appear to have produced, a more up-to-date and creative 
foreign policy, to shed the "men of the past" Image that Lalx)r had 
pinned on the L-CP. The DLP lost almost all of its previous influence 
over Liberal external policy. In 1972, its electoral presence had failed 
to insure the government's survival. In the 1974 combined House and 
Senate election, the DLP was in disarray and lost all five of its 
previous Senate seats. The opposition also had to live with what the 
Labor government lidd done; decisions that, in varying degrees, the 
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Liberals often regarded as desirable, or difficult or impossible to 
reverse, or electorally popular. 
To be sure, there were some constraints on the ability of the 
Liberals to generate a "new Image" in foreign policy. Various implica-
tions of these constraints will be examined in other contexts. Here we 
might quickly mention two such constraints. On the Liberal side, 
Snedden had been elected leader largely for his consensus qualities. 
His management of the party reflected this, both because of his 
temperament and because he appreciated the Liberals' recent history 
of internecine conflict. He therefore was unprepared to push too hard 
or too fast on foreign policy renovation. A harsh, domineering style 
would have been resented, and more conservative party members 
would have taken particular umbrage. This was exemplified by his 
strategy in 1973. At Intervals rather than In omnibus fashion, he 
broached "new versions" of Liberal policy, such as acceptance of the 
recognition of Peking and the advisability of reshaping SEATO. By 
the 1974 election, some of this process had been completed and incor-
porated into the party's platform, though a platform not authoritative 
and binding on party members in the same sense that Labor's was. 
However, as will be indicated later, by late 1974, the pendulum of 
Liberal Party foreign policy "renovation" had started to swing back 
and became even more apparent when Eraser t(X)k over. 
A second constraint on Liberal foreign policy reform was the 
Country Party. Not only was It a separate party, but its outlook 
tended, as a whole, to be more traditional. Thus a few months after 
iTioving into opposition, Anthony remarked on his party's similarity 
to the DLP: "They are very anti-communist, they believe in the 
security of the country and basically they tend to be a conservative 
group, such as the Country Party.""" A year later, he was still 
emphasizing the anti-communist features of his party's outlook."' 
Among Liberals in particular, as we are about to see, "communism" 
as an assumed portentious force and threat to Australia lost some of 
its earlier dogma, but by no means receded Into obscurity as a factor 
in the party's international relations calculations. Liberal sjx)kesmen 
did not, as Whitlam had, dismiss communism's effects on South-East 
Asian nations as "so much garbage". In his 1973 study of parliamen-
tarians' attitudes towards foreign aid, Mendelsohn found that "Fear 
or at least apprehension about 'Communism' is still strong among Op-
position parties, but there Is no longer a belief that Australian in-
terests will necessarily be served by open or cold warfare against com-
munist movements or regimes.""* What the new Liberal leadership 
did stress was its brand of "realism". Part of this was criticisin of 
Labor's foreign [X)licy approach, which was characterized as all too 
frequently proceeding from ideological symbolism instead of objec-
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five assessments. Part of it was a portrayal of the opposition itself as 
sensible and unbllnkered. As Peacock wrote. 
The realities of international politics, which turn largely on the fart that 
relations are largely power relations and interests mainly national in-
terests, are not particularly pleasant ones and any civilised man would 
wish them to be different. But they arise from the fundamental conditions 
of international life and they will not easily or quickly be changed."' 
We recall that Labor made the corner-stone assumption that the in-
ternational climate, primarily because of great-power dtente and 
multi-polarization, had become less eruptive, more tractable. It then 
concluded that military responses were less relevant than before and 
that more room for independent manoeuvre for countries such as 
Australia had been opened. 
The opposition reacted sceptically. It did not pointedly deny that 
there had been shifts away from great-power confrontational 
postures, and from US and Soviet domination of the international 
order, and overall It welcomed such movement. But it was not con-
vinced that detente had progressed far, or that there no longer were 
many apparent or concealed sources of conflict—whether between 
the great powers or otherwise—that could easily overturn optimistic 
calculations. Despite some mutually accepted nuclear arms restraints, 
Washington and Moscow continued to build sophisticated weapons 
systems that could distort the "nuclear balance" foundation of detente. 
Active great-power rivalry was evident in many locations, perhaps 
most conspicuously In the Middle East. The Sino-Soviet dispute could 
itself spin off into a widely ramified conflict—this being one of 
Eraser's particular concerns. The scramble for resources was ominous 
for the cause of peace. Multi-polarity itself, by diffusing the loci of 
power, "may intrtxiuce new elements of instability, resulting in crisis 
situations In which smaller powers might eventually find themselves 
diplomatically helpless and militarily insecure," Peacock maintained. 
"To assume that mcxiest progress in the reconciliation between states 
of opposite political persuasions will thereby ensure fifteen years of 
peace Is wishful thinking: to rest one's security on an assumption of 
continued equilibrium between the great powers is folly.""* Contrary 
to Labor's assessment, the L-CP concluded that the fall of South Viet-
nam and Cambexiia raised, not lowered, dangers to regional security. 
From this oulkxik followed the L-CP's approach to the role of 
security/military measures in the international context. The opposi-
tion saw much evidence of instability, of ongoing or potential con-
flicts and of a continuing brandishing of arms as a fart of life. Perhaps 
some of the operiings created by dtente and the American retraction 
from Asia did recommend more manoeuvrable and possibly less ex-
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plicitly military reflexes in the external policies of many nations. But, 
as Forbes remarked, "Nations like individuals, need general insurance 
policies for an uncertain future.""** The corollary, according to Sned-
den, was that "You don't need military power to have a foreign 
policy, but you certainly do need military self-defence capacity in 
order to have credible diplomacy and alliances."'" 
Phenomena such as multi-polarity and global resource competition, 
the L-CP believed, had created a greater, not lesser, interdependence: 
an interdependence measured by interests and by practical need for 
collaborative international effort. Moving on an interdependent 
course in external policy did not imply servility towards others, or 
seeking their approval before decisions were made. A healthy 
nationalism, an independence of mind, were commendable, but not 
Labor's so-called "new nationalism". This was "not new nationalism 
but old-style aggressive nationalism, a petulant self-assertlveness"" 
and a dangerous illusion about the realities of interdependence. Na-
tions could neither afford to be brashly independent in security nor in 
economic terms, whether the latter touched on foreign investment or 
resource policy. When the Labor government vilified "outside" or 
"foreign" economic interests, it was flaunting Its simplistic symbols, 
parading a distasteful xenophobia, not talking sense. On its part, of 
course, the L-CP's response was governed both by Its assessment of 
what the realities of the world economic picture dictated, and by its 
traditionally more conservative and permissive temper In these mat-
ters. It came easily for Anthony to remark that 
I have no phobias ab<iut defending the mining companies. I've got no com-
plex about sticking up for the multi-national corporations, provided they 
act in accordance with our laws. They are way ahead of most politicians in 
their understanding of the internationalisation of the world that has been 
going on in the last 50 years—and generations ahead of the Labor Party.'^  
The opposition did not, as such, dispute the government's conten-
tion that foreseeable threats to Australia were not impending. It did, 
however take serious exception to three aspects of what it associated 
with Labor's formulation of the threat question. Unfortunately, the 
debate between the two sides became obscured by turgid rhetoric, 
semantic acrobatics and imputations of outright dishonesty. 
The opposition complained that the government had, to suit its 
own purposes, almost certainly misrepresented the actual variables 
required for a sensible threat assessment. Barnard quoted the 1973 
strategic basis document to the effert that "Australia's basic strategic 
concern is the security of our territory from attack and threat of at-
tack and from political or economic duress."" That would seem to 
have covered a wide spectmm of contingencies. But the L -CP argued 
that the government had conveniently emphasized "threat" in the 
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sense of Australia being drawn into a general war or facing invasion 
or other fairly direct pressures. Instead, "In an interdependent world, 
it may be that indirect threats from conflicts elsewhere should weigh 
more heavily on the scales, with less concentration on possible direct 
threats to Australia."'" There were occasional intimations from op-
position quarters that the strategic basis study had been written to 
please the government's known proclivities, and therefore the "in-
convenient", indirect facets of threat had been subordinated by the 
report's draftsmen. More forcefully, the opposition insinuated that 
while there may well have been adequate attention devoted to "in-
direct" threats In the official assessment, the government may have 
chosen to keep those portions classified. One senior opposition 
spokesman bluntly told the present author that Barnard had "lied". It 
was obvious to .this L-CP spokesman, as revealed in the 1971 and 
1973 strategic assessments, that Australia was not in danger of direct 
threat. But this was quite different from features of both reports that 
were far more cautious about turmoil in Asia, which could adversely 
affect Australia's interest and security. Imputations of this sort were 
heatedly denied by government spokesmen, who in turn castigated 
the opposition for its own disingenuoiisness and lingering cold-war 
mentality. 
There is no way to resolve the dispute over what exactly was said 
in the 1973 strategic assessment without Its full declassification, a 
most unlikely step. As indicated earlier however, there Is reliable in-
ternal evidence that a degree of unease was expressed in the assess-
ment about some possibly negative security implications for Australia 
impinging from Indonesia or Japan, features of the report never 
publicly disclosed by the government. Reluctance to disclose them 
could, of course, have been dictated by an understandable wish not to 
embarrass relations with Jakarta and Tokyo, and/or by the simple 
fact that the report could have spoken about Indonesia and Japan in 
terms so remote and contingent that their mention did not constitute 
a genuine exception to the stated general rule of threat unlikelihood. 
The question of what constituted a threat, or from where or In what 
form It might arise, was joined by a second point in controversy. 
Basically, it concerned the degree of threat expectation. Invoking the 
strategic assessment, the government had argued that while no one 
could speak categorically. It was sensible, and necessary for policy 
preparation, to prognosticate about likelihotxis of foreseeabilities. In 
exuberant moments, opposition spokesmen complained about a naive 
Labor prophesy of the absence of any possible threat developing— 
which definitely was not the government's position. In more con-
sidered contexts, the opposition drew a distinction between 
"likeIih(X)d" of threat and "possibility" of threat. The international 
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situation was not stable and all manners of breakdowns could, 
logically. Impinge on Australia's safety and well-being. In this sense, 
"to argue that there is no discernible threat for a given period. Is not 
to say that there will therefore be no threat during that period"," and 
that is what worried the L-CP. The coalition parties were reluctant In 
the extreme to subscribe to a threat assessment that not only could 
have been unrealistic in substantive emphasis but also in its potential 
for inducing complacency. 
A related third area In dispute was over the ;?mo(/covered by the of-
ficially supported threat assessment. The strategic basis report and the 
government's own remarks made it plain that, as one progressed 
further into the ten-to fifteen-year projection peritxi, the less confi-
dent could anyone be. It was also stressed that the strategic situation 
would remain under constant review and the estimates of threat 
likelihood would be adjusted if international conditions themselves 
changed. The opposition could not quarrel with an ongoing review 
programme, but in focused on the fifteen-year outside period for 
which low likelihood threat was being anticii')ated. It objected that 
fifteen years was in and of itself unreallstically deep into the future 
for meaningful, even tentative forecasting. It also objected because It 
felt that, like other features of Labor's threat evaluation, it could easi-
ly Induce a cozy but misplaced "She'll be right" confidence. We 
noticed earlier that the "up to fifteen years" time frame used by the 
Defence Committee in the strategic basis was a quirk. Had a- more 
conventional ten-year pericxi been used, the debate over Australia's 
safety could have been spared some mystification and the Labor 
government some politically trying moments. 
In substance, the mainstream opposition thinking was relatively 
less preoccupied with a communist threat than In earlier years. More 
varied types of international tensions that could affect Australia's 
security were now assigned special salience. The evaluation of poten-
tial dangers to Australia was notably less sanguine than In Labor 
government quarters. 
The opposition's foreign fX)licy guidelines reflected a trend to move 
away from the positions of the 1960s, but to fall short of, and In some 
instances to disavow. Labor's policy guidelines. The L-CP was 
prepared to take Australia along a more independent path than 
before. It agreed with Labor that this had become more possible as 
well as desirable in the context of international developments and 
was possibly politically expedient as well. What it refused to 
countenance was a foreign policy that, contrasted with what it chose 
to impute to Labor was "independent" for its own sake and brazenly 
executed. The opposition's version of a modified yet clearly continu-
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ing interdependence of nations in all spheres—security, diplomacy, 
economics—dictated what it felt was a more co-ordinate approach 
than Labor's. 
We previously noted the opposition's contention that a viable 
foreign policy, and especially one that hoped to exhibit a measure of 
independent behaviour required a credible defence complement. This 
outlook, added to its perspectives on interdependence, flavoured 
L-CP preferences in the security area. It meant, for one, an un-
apologetic commitment to security alliances. Whereas Labor thought 
of ANZUS as important but wished to deflate its previous status as the 
centrepiece of Australia's external relations, the Liberals were not 
averse to claiming that Australia's association with the United States 
and New Zealand, as embodied in ANZUS, was of fundamental im-
portance. The Labor government declared that Australia was an 
"aligned" nation, but it wished to engage the country more closely 
with Third World nations. The opposition was definitely less disposed 
to place a foot in each camp. It preferred to have a foot in one, only a 
toe in the other. While Snedden said that he would be on friendly 
terms with Third World nations, especially in trade and aid, Whitlam 
was said to have weakened Australia's defence system by "moving 
more into the Third World". The "reality is that the Third World is 
not really an option for us. We are part of the Western defence system 
and we should remain part of it."'* 
The opposition's clear endorsement of the alliance system carried 
certain 'corollaries. It meant maintaining the American defence 
facilities in Australia. It meant behaving as genuine partners with the 
United States. For Peacock, for instance, there were two sides to this 
coin. One was that while the Liberals welcomed something like a 
"special relationship" with America, they saw no reason why 
Washington could not respect a more independent Australian foreign 
policy, one that flowed from what Australia itself perceived as best 
for its interests. America's own foreign relations were "prosecuted 
along these lines in a very business-like way"." However, "Change 
and forthrightness in a relationship does not call for the abuse of a 
quite personal kind which has been levelled at the United States 
Government by the Labor Party."'* In the post-Vietnam international 
setting. Eraser remarked, America's credibility was bound to be 
questioned. Therefore, "the United States needs to know how her 
friends view her situation in the world and I believe that she would 
understand plain and friendly talk from Australia on these matters."''' 
In this sense, an "indeiiendent" Australian voice would call for 
American resolve. 
Partly to supplement some wider allied military effort in its region, 
to sustain its ANZUS obligations and in self-protection against low 
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level threats, Australia had to develop a reasonably self-reliant 
military capacity. Moreover in outward contradiction to Labor's posi-
tion, the opposition did not preclude the garrisoning of Australian 
troops overseas in situations short of all-out war; "while the defence 
of continental Australia, and a realistic capacity to defend continental 
Australia, is the first and basic aim, our forces must also be capable, 
should the eventuality arise, of being deployed outside Australia for 
so long as they continue to serve purposes common to those other 
countries involved and Australia's own national interests."*" 
Formulations such as these seemingly placed the L-CP very close to 
what it had espoused when in government. But some important 
caveats need to be drawn. For instance, though there was some am-
bivalence on this count, there was a noticeable disposition to think 
that arms counted for less than before. And, as Peacock expressed It, it 
was doubtful whether a concentration on defence would help 
Australia to evolve better regional relationships, "to endear us to our 
Asian neighbors who could scarcely do likewise without harmful ef-
fects on their vitally important development programmes".*' Second-
ly, as will be explained later opposition spokesmen admitted that 
under an L-CP government no major enlargement of defence 
capability could be expected in the short to middle run. Finally, 
despite in principle being prepared to post troops overseas, opposition 
figures did not envisage a return to a standard forward defence 
posture and conceded that the foreseeable circumstances for sending 
troops away for garrison or combat duty were remote, and that the 
political risks of such a step would probably be steep. 
The non-security features of opposition external policy guidelines 
also showed both continuity and change from older outlooks. There 
was a restlessness over the alleged impetuosity of Labor's preferred 
approach to communist and Third World nations. By this, for in-
stance, the L-CP meant Labor's haste (but not inherent error) in 
recognizing Peking and Hanoi. There was restlessness over Labor's al-
leged tendency to be severe In chastizing old friends and downplaying 
differences with Afro-Asian and communist states. There was dis-
pleasure over flirtations with the Third World at the expense of tried 
and valued friends. There also was feeling that, by ostensibly 
downgrading alliances and other security commitments, the Labor 
government was sowing confusion in Asia, thereby lowering rather 
than enhancing Australia's own credibility. What all this added up to 
was a predictably more cautious, less experimental L-CP policy style 
than Labor was prepared to follow. 
The L-CP was prepared to practice greater Initiatives in Asia than 
it had when in government. Some of these were of a diplomatic 
nature, but the stress was to be on economic dimensions of policy. 
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Hence it saw Australia's role in fostering South-East Asian, or Asian, 
co-operative efforts less in political than in aid-trade co-operation 
terms. Even before it had vacated office, the L-CP was sponsoring a 
substantial external aid programme. Now it wished to move further 
both in the generosity of Australia's assistance and in action towards 
harmonizing the efforts of donor and recipient states. The particulars 
of the opposition's programme can best be examined in later context. 
So can its attitude towards resource policy. What we wish to say here 
is that the L-CP became far more cognizant of the need to evolve a 
resource policy than it had before December 1972. Working from its 
assumptions about international economic interdependence, it 
visualized Australia's natural wealth as a great asset. In the exploita-
tion of the nation's resources, the Liberal Party had at least moved to 
a more "nationalist" outlook than the McMahon government had 
held. Hence the party's 1974 platform on overseas investment in-
dicated that Liberals sought "maximum Australian control and 
ownership of our national resources and industries". While foreign 
investment was welcomed, "there are certain costs which may be as-
sociated with such investment. The national interest ... is best served 
where the benefits of such investment are maximised and its costs 
minimised."*^ In theory, at least, this resembled Labor's own 
guidelines, though it lacked the impulses of ideology that buttressed 
the ALP's approach. It was on the disposition of resources that the 
L-CP's policy guidelines came to reflect its brand of international in-
terdependence. Once again, it censured what it portrayed as Labor's 
proclivity for nationalist expression and for over-organizing in wrong 
directions. "It may appear that Australia has a choice," Snedden told 
an American audience In late 1974. "On the one hand, greater co-
operation and shared prosperity; on the other, hoarding, pressure and 
eventual disruption. In reality, I believe there is no real choice. The 
selfish alternative could be maintained only in the short term and 
only at ultimate risk."*' 
The "conservative" persuasion in foreign policy criticism was not 
limited to Liberal and Country Party spokesmen. Some of it, matching 
or exceeding the force of L-CP challenges to the Labor government's 
assumptions and guidelines, emanated from party political or right-
radical circles. Some of it came from academics. Also some ranking 
military officers, serving or resigned, publicly questioned the govern-
ment's basic outlook on the firmness of detente and on the security 
risks foreseeably faced by Australia. The impact of these opinions on 
the broad external policy debate lay In the putatively non-partisan 
vantage-point from which they spoke: as professionals, with many 
years of career experience. Few officers actually chose to expose such 
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thoughts. Some senior officers volunteered general agreement with 
the government's conceptions. But the critics were accorded special 
publicity by opposition spokesmen and by the Australian right 
generally. They were held up as patriotic experts, realistic about the 
troubled state of the world and unafraid to call a spade a spade where 
Australia's need to keep good friends and fix its defences was con-
cerned.*" 
The party and lobby political "right" in Australia was even more 
amorphous than the political "left". Its composition emphasized the 
right wing of the Liberal and Country Parties, the DLP and its sup-
porting bodies, patriotic organizations and a radical right fringe. As a 
phenomenon, however it was less well internally co-ordinated than 
the left and probably enjoyed less outward publicity for its causes— 
unless, as some critics of the left argued, the media represented a 
built-in right-wing empire in Australian society. The Australian 
right's values leaned towards "conserving" or "restoring" rather than 
towards "radically innovating". Hence it generally was temperamen-
tally offended as much by swift change and experimentation as by the 
substance of those governmental assumptions and policy guidelines 
that it found obnoxious. It also suffered from certain situational han-
dicaps and from some ambivalence. Many of the left felt that they 
were moving with a tide such as the corrosion of capitalist and im-
perialist power and with the tide of anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, 
"peoples'" resistance to establishmentarian oppression, etc. The right 
was worried that the public had become t(X) preoccupied with nar-
row hip-pocket concerns to appreciate the downward slide of tried 
and tested values and of rising challenges from an unharnessed left, 
and to shake off pernicious illusions about the domestication of com-
munism and the safety of Australia. The right worried about what an 
irresponsible and allegedly left-inferted Labor government was doing, 
about what a "new style" L-CP opposition was trying or might try to 
do, namely to become more elertorally attractive by displaying 
"trendy", wrong-headed and even principle-subverting tendencies. 
Power realities, unreconstructed communist or other alien designs 
and Australia's tested connertions could not be dismissed as echoes 
from the past, or be shunted aside in the interest of political 
cosmetology. 
Some ranking members of the Liberal Party Itself found the ex-
perimentation of their colleagues uncongenial. Eraser even before he 
became Liberal leader, was one person who held some doubts. For 
him, changing international power relationships had created a more 
dangerous situation than before, a view not unshared by his L-CP as-
sociates, but perhaps more keenly felt by him than by most others. 
The Labor government had drawn wholly false conclusions from 
what was happening and had propagated a line about the nation's 
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security that deceived and bemused.*' Menzies, the grand old man of 
the Liberal Party, wrote of how "horrified" he was with a leading op-
position spokesman's comments that, apart from a few details, the 
spokesman had no quarrel with the government's foreign policy: 
"Heaven help usi The foreign policy of the present Government is the 
very antithesis of the foreign policy of the Liberal Party in my time;" 
defence through strength and close ties with powerful friends, not 
flirtations with communist and Third World nations did and should 
continue to matter.** In 1974, Liberal Senator George Hannan broke 
away from his party and stood separately for the Senate in Victoria as 
a "National Liberal Party" candidate. Among other things, he had 
become disillusioned with his old party's trendy and, as he saw it, 
myopic approach to international questions. By the opening of 1975, 
the National Liberals mated with elements from the much older 
ultra-conservative League of Rights, to form a National Australian As-
sociation. Later that year 4000 people marched in Melbourne under 
the auspices of the "People Against Communism Committee", in 
protest against communism's many-faceted evils.*' Writing on what 
he called "Whitlam's Foreign Policy Myth", Hannan minced no 
words: "The Whitlam foreign policy, such as it is, is so oleaginously 
servile to Communist powers and ingratiating to third world powers 
that it is not an Australian foreign policy at all—it is a fraud."** 
Hard-to-right outlooks on foreign policy and defence were not the 
dominant strain among the federal opposition parties, but had impor-
tant pockets of strength elsewhere. Hence it is understood that the 
foreign policy document drawn up by Peacock's study group prior to 
the 1974 election enjoyed a generally positive or at least uncomplain-
ing reaction among federal Liberal parliamentarians. But the 
"backwoodsmen" (as they were described to the author) in some of 
the party's state branches were far from captivated by the proposed 
"m(xlernized" policy guidelines. Queensland, with its strong anti-
centralist bias and the steadfastly anti-communist National (formerly 
Country) Party Premier Johannes Bjelke-Petersen at its helm, evinced 
a notably right-wing flavour In its politics. Political material that in 
good part would have been inappropriate to non-Labor parties in the 
southern states was freely disseminated. Not unrepresentative was a 
newspafx?r advertisement placed by the President of the Captive 
Nations Council of Queensland, opposing the constitutional referenda 
the Labor government was sponsoring concurrent with the 1974 
federal election. The advertisement enjoined people to reject the 
referenda as invasions of Australian freedom, "founded on the Chris-
tian ideal—not suppressed under harsh regimentation as in the Soviet 
Union (SOCIALIST REPUBLICS)".*" Brisbane was the headquarters of 
the National Association of the Australian Citizens for Freedom. Its 
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organ. National Message, carried the captions "Freedom, Justice and 
Democracy under God" and "God Save the Queen". In the December 
1974 Queensland state election, a Bjelke-Petersen campaign leitmotiv 
was admonitory about the spectre of communism in Canberra. There 
had been sell-outs to communists at home and abroad, the doing of 
despicable deals with those who would ruin and enslave Australia, 
among them the Russians, the Chinese and the North Vietnamese.'" 
The DLP had for many years been a paramount publicist for a right-
wing approach to external policy. In the 1974 election, though more 
forcefully in Victoria than in New South Wales, it continued to warn 
against dangers in Asia and urged vigilance and preparedness in 
defence. In that election, it lost all of Its federal parliamentary 
representation. The loss of its Senate forum considerably weakened 
its ability to project its views on the country or to continue to leave 
whatever very little imprint it still could on the L-CP. The DLP's 1974 
setback was very disheartening to B. A. Santamaria and his National 
Civic Council. Santamaria complained of "the Liberals having 
adopted the essence of the policies fastened on Labor by Dr Cairns and 
the Left"." Santamaria felt that, if anything because of the removal of 
the DLP from the federal parliamentary scene, it was imperative for 
those who understood and who cared to keep the external policy fail-
ings of the "identikit" Labor and Liberal Parties before the public. In 
time, the somnolent Australian people would rue the day they lost 
perspective on communism, on an unbalanced world order on their 
frail security shield and ultimately on their own safety. Some of San-
tamaria's formulations, such as finding a linkage between a red align-
ing Jim Cairns and a badly duped Bill Snedden or Andrew Peacock, 
were most notable for their shock value, or their appeal to true 
believers. But Santamaria remained among the most informed and 
trenchant publicists of a distinctive, right-oriented alternative to 
Labor's outlook on foreign policy.'^ 
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4 External Policy: Diplomatic Dimensions: I 
In the preceding chapter we examined the dominant dispositions of 
the Labor government, the opposition and other groups. We now 
begin to look at how, in diplomatic, economic and military/security 
terms, policy was operationalized under the Labor government. We 
will be interested in policy process, stylistic and political climate con-
siderations, as well as in policy outputs as such. As far as possible, our 
treatment will identify and link major subject-matter themes. Here 
and in the following chapter we concentrate on diplomatic features of 
external policy. 
We open with an analysis of Labor's efforts to promote a wide as-
sociation of Asian and Pacific states. The choice is in part dictated by 
the fact that, directly or indirectly, a good deal of the government's 
diplomatic activity can be related to this theme. It is also a theme that 
connects especially well with a number of the ALP's previously out-
lined perceptions and assumptions. 
From the beginning of its term of office, the government espoused 
the cause of a regional Asian-Pacific grouping.' It was reluctant to 
spell out a detailed blueprint of what it hoped for. The guidelines fore-
seen by Whitlam were of "an organization genuinely representative 
of the region, without Ideological overtones."'' Whitlam suggested the 
analogy of the Commonwealth of Nations. He conceived of something 
relatively unstructured, "not a body where decisions are made and 
then [made] binding, but where it is possible for heads of government 
regularly to exchange views which are of mutual interest."' 
What nations would be. included? Again, hard and fast specifics 
were not proffered, but definitely the ASEAN countries (Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines), and in all 
likelihcHid other South-East Asian nations such as the Indo-Chinese 
states and Burma, but the membership of South Asian states was less 
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clear. Australia and New Zealand would of course belong. So would 
China and Japan, but probably not the two super-powers, the Soviet 
Union and the United States." 
How would the construction of such a new forum proceed? Slowly, 
without any timetable. Australia was an interested party, but the im-
pulses mainly had to come from Asians themselves.' 
Why was the government interested in promoting such a venture? 
The various reasons, stated and otherwise, were consistent with 
Labor's sentiments, ideological dispositions and understandings of 
world forces. Government spokesmen emphasized that a wider 
regional community could help to break down long-standing preoc-
cupation with ideological conflicts and with defence oriented answers 
to fostering stability. Attachment to "containment" postures and to 
alliance systems had in the past served to feed, not mitigate, conflict. 
Great-power rivalries had destructively spilled into Asia. Now that 
the great-power writ was less obtrusive, new clusters of power were 
emerging and there seemed to be a de-emphasis on military instru-
ments of conflict management, it was opportune to proceed with in-
sulating the region against ideological interference from the great 
powers.* These theses not only squared with Labor's theoretical as-
sumptions about international life but also captured some of the spirit 
of the party's inherent idealism. War and strife in world politics could 
be attacked through reasoned interchanges. If the world was not 
"perfectable", at least it was improvable. A new reconciliation could be 
expected among nations as different in background and politics as 
China, Japan, Australia and the range of South-East Asian states. 
For Australia itself, encouragement of such a project could be seen 
as valuable beyond the large objective of working towards a less 
conflict-infected neighbourhood. The government's investment of 
time and energy in sponsoring the idea was a demonstration that 
Australia under Labor was capable of initiatives, of exercising an 
"independent" foreign policy. This was good for the soul of the party. 
It presumably won the applause of Asians. It helped to advance 
Australia's future credibility and influence in the region. Lacking 
direct institutionalized access to some important Asian councils such 
as ASEAN, Australia was well-advised to promote political machinery 
of which it would be a full and charter member. It would also, as 
Peter King remarked, serve to end Australia's traditional "obsession" 
with South-East Asia, to extend the nation's constituency of interests.' 
Moreover, should such a grouping of states be realized, Australia 
could expect to further some of its more specific favourite interests. 
For example, a functioning Asian—Pacific forum could become the 
springboard for declaring a zone of "peace, freedom and neutrality" 
in the region. It could not only facilitate economic co-operation and 
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joint endeavours among the various members, but supply a base on 
which both resource producer and consumer nations could har-
monize their activities, consistent with Labor's notions about 
"interdependence" and the appropriate wielding of resource policy. 
As it publicized its ideas about a broad Asian-Pacific community, 
the Labor government took notice of the smaller groupings already 
present in the region. Some it chose to downgrade, others to praise 
and support. This variable approach was dictated by the criteria by 
which Labor measured the inherent value of various groupings and 
by its perceptions of how, if at all, they might dovetail with the en-
visioned broader association. 
Two regional groups were downgraded by Labor. One was SEATO. 
It was a security pact of anti-communist origins, had very limited 
Asian membership, included non-Asian members and was considered 
to have become decrepit when Labor'assumed office. As we will see 
later Australia promoted a restructuring of SEATO on essentially 
non-military lines. But even when that was achieved in late 1973, the 
organization was regarded as unsuitable as a springboard for an ex-
tended Asian-Pacific association. 
The Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) was viewed in slightly dif-
ferent perspective. Unlike SEATO, it included no members from out-
side the Asian-Pacific region and was not a security alliance but a 
cultural and economic association. But its membership was 
characteristically anti-communist. It included not only South Korea, 
and South Vietnam while it was still under anti-communist rule, but 
Taiwan, the large thorn in China's side. Some attempts had been 
made to turn ASPAC into an anti-communist vehicle. Moreover by 
1973, three of ASPAC's members—Australia, New Zealand and 
Japan—had recognized Peking, even though Taiwan remained a 
member. A fourth, Malaysia, withdrew from ASPAC entirely. Hence 
the Labor government downgraded ASPAC. It did not consider it 
amenable to being remodeled. It did not follow Malaysia out of the 
organization and continued most of its financial contributions. In 
mid-1975, however it withdrew from ASPAC's Registry of Scientific 
and Technical Services, and increasingly watched ASPAC's apparent 
eclipse as a meaningful body. 
On the other end of Labor's enthusiasm scale stood ASEAN. Of all 
the past or present groupings in Asia, Whitlam noted, "ASEAN is the 
only one which has a proper regional relevance, the only one which 
has a thriving future."* ASEAN contained no nations from outside the 
geographical area, no Taiwan and, despite the slowness with which 
ASEAN's members were individually willing to normalize relations 
with Peking, no strident or "tainted" anti-communist nations such as 
Thieu's South Vietnam or South Korea. Unlike ASPAC, ASEAN in-
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eluded Indonesia, South-East Asia's single most important nation and 
with whom both L-CP and Labor governments attempted to evolve 
an especially close relationship.' ASEAN was believed to be giving 
gradual but positive evidence of the workability of regional co-
operation. Within its own ranks, it was evolving closer economic 
links and was helping to dampen potentially dangerous frictions, such 
as the Philippines' claim on Sabah, in Malaysian Borneo. It pointed 
the way towards an ALP Ideal by subscribing to a'zone of peace, 
freedom and neutrality in the area. It was beginning to fashion a com-
mon approach towards outsiders, as for instance the European 
Economic Community (EEC). It was investigating conditions under 
which other South-East Asian states could join it.'° In other words, 
ASEAN was inherently good value, a springboard, or example, for 
launching a larger association. 
The Labor government went out of its way to indicate that its own 
objective of an Asian-Pacific forum did not imply that ASEAN would 
thereby be absorbed, or even that it would be the structure that 
would be augmented to Include many more and diverse nations." 
Australia undertook to back up Its convictions with positive gestures. 
For instance, in 1974, it became the first nation to support collective 
all-ASEAN economic development projects, in addition to continuing 
economic and technical assistance to ASEAN's members on a bilateral 
basis or through International aid consortia. Later that year, Canberra 
was the site of the first ASEAN Secretaries-General Conference held 
outside of ASEAN capitals. 
The Labor government also encouraged links with other regional 
bodies in the area. Again the government had a dual rationale. Such 
bodies seemed to be performing constructive, socio-economic work 
and their activity held some promise for raising incentives for a wider 
association of Asian-Pacific nations. For instance, Australia took a 
keen interest in Pacific regional groupings. In 1973, Australia 
launched an initiative that later brought about a de facto merger of the 
"Commission" and the "Conference" facets of the South Pacific Com-
mission. These were, respectively, the Western metropolitan 
members, plus three independent island governments on the one 
hand, and these governments plus dependent Pacific territories on 
the other The Australian motive was to make the South Pacific Com-
mission (then Conference) at large more viable and to remove in-
vidious distinctions between dependencies and others.'^ Beginning 
under the L-CP and then continuing under Labor support was given 
to the South Pacific Forum, a group of independent or self-governing 
states dealing with problems that could not successfully be tackled by 
the Commission. Among the virtues attributed to the Forum by the 
Labor government was that in its councils Australia was able, with 
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New Zealand's support, to launch a successful initiative for a resolu-
tion condemning French nuclear testing in the Pacific. Australia men-
tioned this Forum action in conjunction with its legal presentation 
against French testing before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in The Hague. Virtue was found in Australia's ability to provide 
technical assistance to Forum members. Then, too, the Labor govern-
iTient saw a possible precedent towards building a broad regional as-
sociation. There were intimations from within ASEAN's ranks that 
useful links between ASEAN and the Forum could be forged. " Plac-
ing regional co-operation in even wider perspective, Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Malik suggested in early 1974 that Australia's wil-
lingness to deal with ASEAN as a group was an important prelude to 
any more ambitious plans for regional co-operation in the South 
Pacific.'" 
There were other means by which Australia strived to demonstrate 
initiative, to anchor itself more firmly in regional programmes and 
groupings, and to generate a climate conducive to building a broadly 
gauged Asian-Pacific community. For instance, the government was 
especially eager to promote China's membership in ECAFE, the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the. Far East: "The assumption of 
its rightful place in ECAFE by the largest country in the region should 
help to accelerate the movement towards better understanding among all regional 
countries and to give greater authority to the deliberations of ECAFE."" 
Under Labor Australia (and New Zealand) acquired membership in 
the Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of South-East 
Asia, theretofore a purely non-European organization. Canberra saw 
this as a building-block for an even more comprehensive regional as-
sociation, since the group now Included most South-East Asian na-
tions, Japan, and Australia and New Zealand. It also recognized the 
special role that Australia could discharge in regional affairs. The 
ASEAN states supported Australian and New Zealand participation 
because they saw their presence as something of a counterweight to 
Japanese influence, as well as an inherently important source of 
finance and expertise for their development plans.'* 
So far we have stressed the policy features of Labor's efforts to 
promote a wide Asian-Pacific forum. The style in which it proceeded 
is equally important for us, both insofar as it helped or retarded the 
government's objectives and in more general process terms. In 
January of 1973, Whitlam met in Wellington with New Zealand's 
Labour Prime Minister, Norman Kirk. The Idea of a broad regional as-
sociation was mutually agreed upon. Whitlam raised the idea in a 
public address later that month. In February, he travelled to In-
donesia. The proposal was put—and received very cooly. The merits 
of the proposal aside, Australia's approach was launched too 
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precipitously, with inadequate testing in South-East Asian capitals. 
Copies of Whitlam's January statement "were produced for foreign 
missions, but there was little in the way of supporting material. The 
flurry of activity was counter-productive given the lack of detail 
available. ASEAN ministers in mid- February informally discussed the 
proposal, and rejected it as it stood."" New Zealand informants in-
dicated that the genesis of the regional scheme was more Kirk's Idea 
than Whitlam's. New Zealand was not so much angered over not 
receiving due credit, as it was sorrowed because Whitlam's 
enthusiasm in launching the proposal may have set it back. Then, too, 
for a time afterwards, the government found some resistance to a 
European Australia acting as catalyst for Asian co-operation. It found 
some obstacles in persuading South-East Asians of its credibility. 
Rightly or not, the new Australian government was suspected of 
being more interested in emphasizing the best possible relations with 
the major Asian states, China and Japan, than in promoting a higher 
level of confidence in South-East Asia. It Is understood on good 
authority that, shortly before leaving office, the L-CP government 
was cautioned by all ASEAN governments about recognizing Peking, 
but this was one of earliest and most enthusiastic diplomatic steps 
taken by the new Labor government. Labor's promise to withdraw 
troops from Singapore was not only generally unwelcome among 
ASEAN states but was announced after only sketchy consultations 
with them.'* 
The Labor government continued to foster its regional objective 
among various Asian nations, but developed more subdued, refined 
and reassuring methcxJs. The zeal for change, the personal asser-
tiveness of Whitlam, were brought under restraint. Assurances were 
repeated that Australia had no intention of superseding or otherwise 
tampering with ASEAN, and that it could not, or would not, act as 
spokesman or intermediary for China vis-d-vis South-East Asian states. 
Australia would only try to give its own impressions of China and its 
role when treating with its South-East Asian neighbours.'" A s[iecial 
section was created in the Foreign Affairs Department to concentrate 
on regional affairs. Australian embassies in Asia were instructed to 
bring their efforts to bear. Prior to his early 1974 visits to various 
South-East Asian capitals, Whitlam sent a personal aide to discuss the 
nuances of each nation's special perspertives with Australian 
diplomatic personnel. Each of Whitlam's speeches was carefully 
tailored and it became "one of the first occasions before a Prime 
Minister's overseas visit that Australian embassies have played a con-
structive role in the stance adopted thr^ugh such close con-
sultation."^" How well, on its merits, was the idea of a broad Asian-
Pacific association received? The brief answer is "cautiously". China 
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was officially supportive, but without showing haste for the plan's 
consummation. Peking actually found the idea of extending its in-
fluence into South-East Asia quite attractive and began to employ its 
new Canberra embassy to stimulate interest among others.^' The 
Japanese were more circumspect. They first wanted time to 
straighten out their own complex bilateral relations with China, and 
were unsure of what their membership in a regional grouping would 
do to their already bruised commercial reputation in South-East 
Asia." 
Reaction within ASEAN became more favourable after early 1973 
and moved towards acceptance in principle. But, unequally among its 
members, sentiment remained guarded.'" There was pride in ASEAN 
as a viable Asian self-devised organ. There therefore was apprehen-
sion that ASEAN could, willy-nilly, be eroded if a rapid move towards 
the larger and unknown quantity desired by Australia were taken. 
Some apprehensions felt within ASEAN were based on the kinds of 
reasons that the Labor government saw as incentives to build more am-
bitiously. The Asian security situation was still volatile and fighting 
was in progress in Indo-China. Most of ASEAN's members had un-
dergone unhappy experiences with China and were not sure Peking 
should be allowed entree to them before it was perfectly clear that it 
had foresaken all aggressive or subversive intentions. These feelings 
were not entirely dissipated, despite growing links between them and 
China, begun by Malaysia's recognition of Peking in 1974 (for which 
Australia felt it deserved a measure of credit) and by Thailand's and 
the Philippines' recognition of China in 1975. ASEAN states feared 
that, with China in a wider grouping, South-East Asia could become a 
sort of regional cockpit for the Sino-Soviet rivalry. They had misgiv-
ings about Japan, with its appetite for resources and for investment 
outlets, and an already very heavy development aid stake In the 
region. A cohesive group of South-East Asian states might be 
overshadowed and exploited by a populous and militarily potent 
China, an economically powerful Japan and a resource-rich Australia. 
Indonesia, as the single most powerful state in South-East Asia, would 
find Its own relative influence impaired by the formal intrustion of 
important outside nations. 
Variations on a regional theme were occasionally broached. 
Perhaps the most analytically interesting was raised in late 1973 by 
Indonesia. Together with New Zealand, it urged a quadripartite as-
sociation among itself Australia, New Zealand and Papua New 
Guinea. For Indonesia, this was announced as a modest step, free of 
great powers, towards some distant ideal of the broad Asian-Pacific 
association, whose time had not yet come. It was also understood to 
be a device for heading off problems potentially flowing from the 
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much more rapid development of Papua New Guinea than on In-
donesia's western, Irian Jaya (West Irian) side of the island of New 
Guinea." The New Zealanders' interest was primarily dictated by 
their disappointment at the slow pace at which the original large-
grouping idea was incubating. New Zealand had been more explicit in 
admitting this than Australia and had not continued to pursue the ob-
jective as vigorously as Canberra.'" Hence as the big idea seemed to 
languish. New Zealand decided to support the stepping-stone that 
could emerge from Indonesia's idea of a smaller arrangement. New 
Guinea spokesmen were themselves cautious. Basically, they wanted 
close regional co-operation for their country, but with more emphasis 
towards the Pacific than towards South-East Asia, and in any event 
did not wish to prejudge the situation before formal independence 
had been acquired." 
Australia's reaction reflected the dilemmas Involved in pursuing a 
grand-scale diplomatic objective, the constraints imposed on the in-
fluence of any single international actor and the hard lessons learned 
about the need for respecting South-East Asian sensibilities. The 
documentary evidence indicates that Canberra did not endorse the 
quadripartite idea because details were missing and because "it would 
want to consider Papua New Guinean views on the proposal before 
forming its own judgment on it,"" and Papua New Guinea was not 
yet an independent state. The internal evidence suggests a somewhat 
more complex picture. The above reason is acknowledged. Among 
persons very close to the scene, there was some feeling but no con-
sensus as to whether Australia stood New Zealand's position on its 
head; i.e. that Canberra believed such a grouping would distract atten-
tion from rather than stimulating the wider Asian-Pacific community. 
What did emerge was Australia's misgiving that China might con-
strue such an experiment as having an anti-Chinese bent, and that 
other ASEAN states might resent the central role that would probably 
devolve upon Indonesia, the nation already dominant within ASEAN. 
Within Australia, the Labor government's proposal of a broad 
Asian-Pacific forum did not escape criticism. The critiques offered by 
the L-CP opposition and by the left were Instructive in that they il-
luminated both conceptual and normative differences with Labor. 
The opposition jabbed at the government for being too brusque and 
imperious in style, too little aware of Asian sensitivities, too 
enamoured of its own grand designs. Part of this criticism, of course, 
was aimed at scoring political points. It also reflected a somewhat dif-
ferent view of Asia and of Australian priorities. There was an under-
current of displeasure that Labor's proposal was trying to draw an as-
yet untamed China into the regional home of reluctant South-East 
Asians and that the scheme at large was an unwarranted departure 
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from Australia's more traditional definitions of security re-
quirements.^* 
The opposition was not, however, content to be negative. It sensed 
that regionalism, by whatever name or form, was a fashionable and 
inherently sensible idea. The Labor government's over-ambitious plan 
was weak on detail and apparently stalled. So were most other 
regional proposals. The quadripartite notion was weak because if 
deflected attention from building more meaningful regional struc-
tures. This, according to a Liberal document, "leaves a gap which the 
Opposition has an opportunity to fill—or on which we can at least be 
seen to be making a constructive and realistic effort. It.. . offers an op-
portunity to take a significant initiative in the foreign policy area." It 
would emphasize "progressive" humanitarian features, while also 
making a significant contribution to regional security." Snedden had 
by early 1974 begun to speak of practical co-operation between 
ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum, to which Australia itself 
belonged, and he then moved towards the language of a more in-
tegrated developmental assistance format for various nations in the 
region.'" The new, highly co-ordinated development scheme was en-
visaged as embracing aid, trade, communications, investment and 
other business ventures. It would embrace the South Pacific Forum, 
ASEAN and other South-East Asian and possibly South Asian states, 
and possibly even China and Japan. As an early internal Liberal for-
mulation of the plan read, "This proposal is distinct from Labor's 
'forum'—it is a strategy not an organisation; its purpose Is co-
operation and development not simply consultation (though that is 
part of it); it offers something practical to those who choose to par-
ticipate. It would also be a step toward rationalising, in our region, 
the tangled web of bilateral relationship."" At this time, in 1974 and 
1975, the Liberal Party was undertaking efforts to establish contacts 
with like-minded conservative/moderate parties in the region, for in-
stance in New Zealand, Japan and India. After Snedden had departed 
and Eraser was in charge, the Liberals' regional scheme continued to 
be advertised.'^ 
While the L-CP criticized the government for being ttxi bold, and 
for unguardedly and prematurely trying to introduce a communist 
China Into the councils of the region, left criticism insisted that 
Labor's plan was a pointless and deceptive exercise. The subjert was, 
in particular, addressed by La Trobe University political scientist 
Joseph Camilleri. One part of his thesis was that even under Labor, 
Australia was unfit to advance the idea of an organization designed to 
insulate the region form great-power ideological influence, since 
Australia remained in firm military and economic alignment with 
the United States. Moreover, and more trenchantly, one could 
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"interpret the Whitlam proposals for regional co-operation as an at-
tempt to evade the fundamental problem confronting Australian 
foreign policy, that is, its long-term attitude to the possibility of 
radical social change in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Basin." That, 
Camilleri argued, was what the affairs of the region were all about." 
Labor's approach to the twin themes of colonialism and racism was, 
like Its pursuit of regional arrangements in Asia and the Pacific, a 
mixture of idealism and perceived practicality. In the latter sense, it 
was regarded as a general yet supportive force behind Australia's 
wish to influence a new comity in its own region. It also was a way of 
following practices abroad that could temper Australian public pre-
judices: the construction of a qualitatively better more humane 
Australian ethos, in the desired context of a "new nationalism". We 
will first look at colonialism, noticing general orientations, 
characteristic policy movements and the treatment of concerns lying 
In Australia's own immediate environment. 
The remnants of colonialism were obnoxious to Labor's values. 
They represented an older and largely unsavoury tradition. They 
smacked of racial as well as economic and political exploitation. They 
meant denial to native peoples of the right to choose their own 
destinies. The party also thought of remaining colonialism as carry-
ing the potential for strife that could exacerbate relations between 
races and contribute to local, and possibly regional instability. Ad-
vocacy of the principle of self-determination (and frequently of in-
dependence as such) for dependent peoples had some practical value 
for Australia. It identified Australia as being a nation thinking and 
acting for itself, rather than as just another white and affluent 
country with its own colonial heritage in New Guinea. L-CP govern-
ments had been cautious about confronting colonialism head on. 
Labor stressing Its independent foreign policy credentials, felt it had 
to move boldly. In Asia, where acceptance and influence were being 
sought, energetic anti-colonialism (and anti-racialism) could help 
Australia establish its bona fides. 
The government's anti-colonialist posture was confirmed by 
various deeds and gestures. Willesee's widely ranging visit to African 
nations in 1973 was one such method. Under the L-CP, Department 
of Foreign Affairs recommendations for ministerial visits to Africa 
had been overriden. Another method lay in the government's 
laudatory remarks about solidarity with Africa's colonial peoples, 
with acclaim for events such as "Namibia [South-West Africa) Day", 
which marked South Africa's illegal jurisdiction over the territory, 
and in participation at such assemblies as the International 
Conference on Colonialism and Apartheid. Various anti-colonialist 
spokesmen were welcomed to Australia. 
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By and large, as we will shortly see, most of the practical steps 
available to Australia were diplomatic, whether through the United 
Nations or otherwise. But, in a late 1973 television interview, 
Whitlam went further than most of his colleagues, including Wil-
lesee, were prepared to go. He spoke about condoning revolutionary 
movements and characterized the Rhodesian and South African 
leaders as being "as bad as Hitler".'* Anti-colonialist sentiment could 
have been expressed forcefully but less starkly. It created misunder-
standings as to what the government really meant and triggered a 
flurry of domestic controversy that may have set back rather than ad-
vanced the cause of anti-colonialist and anti-racialist sentiment in 
Australia. It was an illustration both of Whitlam's deeply felt convic-
tions and of his more Impulsive side. 
Still, the government wished to do something more dramatic than 
conventional anti-colonialist diplomacy allowed. When in Australia 
in March 1974, Tanzanian President Julius Nyere openly called for 
Australia to arm liberationist forces in Africa." A national conference 
of Australian Young Labor had shortly before made the same appeal.'* 
The government was prepared to do something exceptional, but not 
so dramatic as becoming the armourer of liberation movements. The 
tack chosen, upon a submission from the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, was to allocate $150000 in 1974-75 for humanitarian assistance 
to African national liberation movements, channelled through es-
tablished organizations such as the Organization of African Unity. 
This was eventually narrowed to mean aid for women and children of 
liberation movements who had temporarily settled in Zambia." In es-
sence, this was a fairly innocuous step. With the colonial winding-
down process undertaken by the new Portuguese regime, not much 
"colonialism" remained in Africa, apart from the special circum-
stances in Southern Africa. Several other Western nations had 
previously committed funds for humanitarian purposes to liberation 
movements and the Australian contribution was very modest. But the 
gesture was there, and perhaps well-timed in anticipation of the 
forthcoming UN sessions, at which a major Australian role was 
foreshadowed 
Labor's diplomacy on major colonial questions such as the Por-
tuguese territories and Namibia could probably be described as 
"tempered enthusiasm". The switch from a more cautious L-CP ap-
proach at the United Nations came as soon as Labor had entered of-
fice. In January 1973, Australia rejoined the "decoloniallzation" com-
mittee or "Committee of Twenty-Four", from which the L-CP had 
withdrawn in 1969. Labor did this "because resumption of 
membership was consistent with the Government's policy of 
demonstrating Australia's continuing concern for the problems of 
decolonialisation".'* Australia's behaviour on the committee was not. 
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however over-zealous. In 1975, Australian intervention helped to 
avert consideration of a resolution—strongly opposed by the United 
States—that would have affirmed the "inalienable" right of the people 
of Puerto Rico to self-determination and independence. Australia un-
dertook to join the UN's Council on Namibia and supported resolu-
tions on behalf of self-determination in the territory. In 1973, at the 
United Nations, Australia abstained on a resolution that welcomed 
Guinea Bissau's (Portuguese Guinea's) independence, on grounds that 
Guinea Bissau did not fulfil proper criteria for determining sovereign 
status. But by the middle of the next year it accorded de facto recogni-
tion to the new Guinea Bissau regime. This was in keeping with 
prevailing de facto or de jure recognition practice among South-East 
Asian states, but unlike US and Western European practice. 
Australian spokesmen at the United Nations voiced reservations 
about the use of force to achieve complete decoloniallzation and 
refused to support some of the more extremely phrased resolutions. 
Still the government had moved a considerable distance. Australia's 
UN delegation reported that 
Australia emerged at this [ 1973 ] session of the Assembly as one of the two 
or three western countries most sympathetically dispxised toward the anti-
colonial causes that are a principal attraction to the third world. Its con-
tribution to those causes was widely recognised not only as a direct one 
but as having the potential capacity also to influence other western 
countries to modify their attitudes.'" 
Closer to home, the Labor government's anti-colonial professions 
were put to some hard tests. In principle. Labor came to office deter-
mined to release Papua New Guinea to independence as early as pos-
sible: 
We regard it as unacceptable that Australia, of all countries, should be one 
of the world's last colonial powers. ... It is not only a question of our 
responsibilities to the people of Papua New Guinea, it is not only a ques-
tion of our clear responsibilities under the United Nations Charter, it is a 
question of our responsibilities to ourselves."" 
Labor eagerly accepted its predecessor's timetable of self-
government for Papua New Guinea by 1 December 1973. T^is was 
met and acclaimed at the United Nations. An independence target of 
December 1974 was projected and various functions were rapidly 
devolved upon the Papua New Guinea government. But Australia had 
to accept some setbacks on the road to arranging a rapid and clean 
break for Papua New Guinea. The independence date had to be post-
poned. Papua New Guinea could not itself agree on the terms of a con-
stitution and, if anything, Australia itself was chided by some PNG 
figures for pushing a bit too hard for quick indeF>endence."' Efforts by 
regionally based separatists to declare their own right to national 
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identity had to be firmly rebuffed in Canberra."^ The Australian and 
PNG governments wished to delineate the boundary between the two 
countries. In the Torres Strait, historical accident had placed some 
small and sparsely settled islands, which were Australian and more 
specifically Queensland territory, virtually at Papua New Guinea's 
doorstep. One solution, at least theoretically favoured by the Whitlam 
government as well as by the authorities in Port Moresby, would have 
been a transfer of these islands to Papua New Guinea. However, the 
affected islanders vocally resisted a change from Australian 
citizenship and Whitlam acknowledged that their wishes would need 
to be honoured. 
Moreover, the position of the Queensland state government 
became an obstacle, whether resperting an outright transfer of the 
islands, or some form of settlement with Papua New Guinea short of 
the transfer of sovereignty. Queensland insisted that, under the Com-
monwealth Constitution, a state's boundaries could not be altered 
without the approval of the affected state's Parliament and electors, 
as well as that of the Commonwealth Parliament. Negotiations con-
tinued between Canberra and Brisbane, with Bjelke-Petersen making 
a variety of claims on Queensland's behalf, including over resource 
exploration and exploitation in the territorial waters off the conten-
tious islands. 
Bjelke-Petersen's position was an expression of his attachment to 
maximum state domain over the sea-bed. It also was an extension of 
his political warfare with the Whiflam government. Papua New 
Guinea leaders resented this intramural Australian haggling at their 
expense, and the inordinate delay of a settlement. The prospert of a 
Papua New Guinea appeal to the International Court of Justice was 
not ruled out. In sum, the Labor government's decoloniallzation effort 
had been flawed, and relations with a neighbouring and otherwise 
friendfy nation were strained."' 
Labor's handling of the Cocos (Keeling) Islands is also instructive. 
While the issue confirmed the government's concern for the welfare 
of dependent peoples, and in a sense for self-determination, it also 
showed that Labor was not unmindful of practical considerations. 
The Cocos Islatrds, lying in the Indian Ocean some 2700 kilometres 
north-west of Perth, were ceded to Australia by Britain in 1955. In 
1974, a delegation representing the Committee of Twenty-Four went 
to the Australian Cocos. The visiting team was told that Australia in-
tended to honour relevant UN resolutions and that the islands' future 
would be determined "with full regard to the freely expressed wishes 
of the inhabitants"."" So far so good; standard high-principled 
language, and in form consistent with an earlier Australian gesture at 
the United Nations. Very shortly after entering office. Labor sup-
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ported a UN resolution that called for self-determination and in-
dependence timetables to be established for a variety of small depen-
dent territories, including the Cocos. However queried about this in 
the House, Whitlam said, rather disarmingly, that such resolutions all 
contained "aspects which would be impractical or irrelevant". One 
had to look "at the overall effect of them". If a resolution were 90 per 
cent acceptable, it deserved support; "It does not mean one votes for 
every individual aspect of it." What he meant was that acceptable 
resolutions were those that stated good intentions, subscribed to by 
an Australian government wishing to demonstrate its anti-colonial 
credentials. But, regarding the Cocos Islands, no consideration had 
been given to independence and no one seriously believed that such a 
step would be appropriate."' 
Australia's reluctance to encourage independence for these islands, 
or even to consider a foreseeable referendum or other formalized self-
determination action, was understandable. These were a group of 
Islands with an area of 13 square kilometres, with a population of 
under 1000 and an indigenous economy no more diverse than a copra 
plantation. For over a hundred years the inhabitants had been under 
the seigniorial control of a succession of heads of the Clunies-Ross 
family, which enjoyed special privileges on the islands. There was an 
exceptional sense of interdependence between the indigenous Malay 
stock community and the Clunies-Ross establishment. The population 
was incredibly insular conservative-minded and reasonably satisfied 
with the political status quo. Forced independence for the Cocos in the 
early or mid-1970s would, in nearly every way, have been a travesty 
on common sense. 
Australia had other disincentives for not pushing the Cocos Islands 
out of its orbit. Spurred by the UN visit, Canberra decided to proceed 
with a variety of social, economic and political reforms, on the 
Islands, though gradually, and not so as to upset the intricate 
lacework of relationships there. If and when the islands were to "self-
determine" themselves into self-government or independence, 
Australia would at least have been in close charge long enough to set 
up an infrastructure amenable to more modern outlooks and prac-
tices. In August 1975, the Special Minister of State, Senator Douglas 
McClelland, visited the islands. He was unable to persuade John 
Clunies-Ross to undertake meaningful reforms. The following month, 
legislation was introduced in Parliament to strip the Clunies-Ross 
family of some of its powers. Essentially, it was a step towards enlarg-
ing the official Australian presence, providing residents with more 
genuinely consultative opportunities and towards expediting social 
reforms."* The prospect of eventual self-determination did not, 
however, arise. The Cocos also were valued for their use as an inter-
national stock quarantine.facility. The islands' demonstrated security 
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significance in both world wars had declined somewhat, but still mat-
tered. This was the official opinion In the Department of Defence and 
was variously shared by ministers. Their location in the Indian Ocean 
placed them in an area of increasing super-power naval rivalry. The 
major landing-strip was already being used by British, New Zealand 
and American military aircraft, as well as by Australia. The islands' 
Indian Ocean surveillance potential, especially after the reopening of 
the Suez Canal, was believed to be considerable. In and of themselves, 
such considerations outweighed the islands' economic liability to 
Australia."' 
Far more serious strains, and dilemmas, were imposed on the 
Labor government's diplomacy by Portuguese Timor. There arose a 
measure of conflict between "principles" and even competing ap-
praisals of expediency. The issue brings to mind the remark of one 
highly perceptive observer—himself by no means unfriendly towards 
the government—that Labor's idealism and sense of principle were 
less manifest the closer and more intimate for Australia was an object 
of diplomatic attention. 
The western half of Timor was Indonesian. The eastern portion 
was Portuguese from the sixteenth century. In the 1960s, the ALP, 
and Whitlam, had generally taken a conventional anti-colonial stance 
on Timor. After coming to office, the Labor government did not assert 
its indignation over East Timor as forcefully as It did over Portugal's 
African territories. Timor was close to home in more than one way. It 
was only 580 kilometres from Darwin and had been a staging-base for 
the Japanese in the Second World War. Unlike the Cocos, It was not 
quite a micro-country, with 19200 square kilometres and a popula-
tion of 650000. Australia had established close and profitable links 
with Portuguese Timor, in air communications, in commerce and in 
investment. Both BHP and the Melbourne-based Timor Oil were 
engaged in mineral exploitation activity. 
The 1974 coup in Portugal changed the entire Timorese picture. 
The new regime in Lisbon was quite happy to promise a genuine act 
of self-determination. Parties and movements surfaced. They 
represented pro-independence, home rule and association with In-
donesia options. One group even favoured association with Australia. 
The government in Canberra was pleased that the yoke of colonialism 
was being lifted and that an expression of self-determination was 
foreshadowed. What queered the pitch was that all available options 
had drawbacks. Australian thinking was constrained not only by 
what a particular political outcome would mean to Australia directly 
but to other neighbouring states as well, notably Indonesia. Too much 
was at stake to permit Canberra a totally detached attitude. Con-
tinued association with Portugal seemed unreliable as a long-term 
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proposition. It could mean economic neglect and the eventual surfac-
ing of revolutionary forces. There were distinct Australian economic 
interests involved, which might be sacrificed if an independent yet 
politically inexperienced and vulnerable East Timor were to succumb 
to a radical administration. A potentially unstable, economically 
fragile Timor so close to Australia, could carry adverse security im-
plications. Moreover, there was Indonesia's attitude. Indonesia in-
sisted it had no claim to lay against East Timor, but quickly came to 
favour a political outcome that would make it Indonesian. Jakarta 
felt that a decision favouring independence could restimulate seces-
sionist feeling on Indonesia's own scattered home islands. It was very 
much worried that an independent Timor could go politically radical, 
even communist, creating unacceptable security risks to an Indonesia 
that, according to its leadership, had in the mid-1960s barely escaped 
a communist takeover. It was uneasy about possible secessionist and 
security implications for Papua New Guinea, with which Indonesia 
shared a border. It was also suggested that association with In-
donesia, more than independent status or home rule, would be more 
economically sensible for Timor The Australian Labor government 
took these Indonesian anxieties to heart. For Australia, Indonesia was 
an extremely important near neighbour, the key nation in South-East 
Asia, and the nation which required special handling in the 
furtherance of such Australian projects as a broad Asian-Pacific 
forum."* When he visited Jakarta In September 1974, Whitlam 
acknowledged to his hosts that the best option for Portuguese Timor 
was connection with Indonesia, qualified only by the taking of such a 
step through a genuine expression of self-determination."'* Thus the 
ALP's commitment to self-determination was fulfilled, or so It 
seemed, but ntn its attachment to the principle of Independence or to 
an open non-prejudgmental position. 
If anything, Australia's endorsement of a pro-Indonesiaii .olution 
sparked Indonesian enthusiasm for obtaining the desired outcome. 
Apprehension rose in various Australian and other quarters that In-
donesia would not stop with a propaganda campaign in Timor but 
might try to infiltrate agents or even resort to military force, perhaps 
pre-emptively. Such prospects disturbed a number of Pacific nations, 
which did not overkxak Australia's indirect hand in the matter, as 
well as its extensible support for substituting Indonesian for Por-
tuguese overlordshlp. Imputations of this nature were not helpful in 
advancing Australia's campaign for regional co-operation. Within 
Australia, the complexity of the Timor question was highlighted by 
serious and at times brusque differences of opinion rendered by public 
servants. Foreign Affairs had advocated a self-determination positon 
for Australia, with a favoured outcome being association with In-
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donesla. Whitlam started by agreeing on both counts, but reversed 
their recommended Foreign Affairs order of Importance. The Defence 
Department was sceptical about encouraging the Indonesians in any 
way, but apparently at the early key stage made no formal submission 
on the matter. There was unease within sections of the Australian in-
telligence community that their warnings against a pro-Indonesian 
posture had not only not been accepted but had hardly geen given at-
tention. When Indonesian declamations rose, a "we told you so" reac-
tion was detectable. 
Political fall-out in Australia was noticeable. The Australian left felt 
that the government's behaviour on the issue was powerful testimony 
of its false radical colours. The left had been fervent in its opposition 
to Australian meddling in other people's affairs. On this issue, a 
representative radical-left document made the striking demand that 
the Australian government "must make very clear to the Indonesian 
generals that any invasion [of Timor] will be resisted militarily [sic] by 
Australia".'" 
Doubts about the wisdom of the government's position were 
strengthened within the ALP parliamentary caucus, in part through 
conversations with a touring pro-independence Timorese political 
figure. A reasoned brief, urging caution, was circulated among 
parliamentarians by a research officer of the Parliamentary Library, 
who had once been in Foreign Affairs and had served at the Dili con-
sulate in Timor." Some Liberal parliamentarians became interested 
in the discussions and exchanges of documents going round Parlia-
ment House and a mixed ALP-Liberal parliamentary delegation was 
planned for a fact-finding trip to Timor. For various reasons the trip 
was postponed and eventually a delegation composed exclusively of 
ALP parliamentarians went. Among their findings was that in-
dependence was the strongest popular sentiment on East Timor'^ 
The opposition's tactical position on the Timor question was comfor-
table. Not being the government, the L-CP was not required to make 
the hard choices. Instead, Peacock took the high ground. Without ac-
taully condemning a pro-Indonesian settlement, he chided Lab<ir for 
prejudging and constraining an act of self-determination. He used 
Timor as another instance of the government's "inconsistency" and 
"hypocrisy", of mouthing grand anti-colonialist principles but behav-
ing otherwise. Said Peacock: "Mr Whitlam's sanctimonious self-
righteousness does not bear scrutiny."" 
The government was for some time cross-pressured by conflicting 
official advice. It was challenged from within its own party and 
within radical ranks, mocked for its inconsistency by the opposition 
and compelled to readjust brave principles to pragmatic considera-
tions. The government eventually seemed to sofien Its position. It 
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backed away from announced advocacy of an "Indonesian" solution 
and emphasized the requirement of self-determination. It Involved 
itself in discussions with the Portuguese and Indonesian governments 
and, with the latter, stressed that duress should not be applied. It 
seemed to move toward J. A. C. Mackie's advice that "the way the 
issue is resolved matters to us far more than the conclusions 
reached".'" 
That Impression, however was put to a very severe test by early 
August 1975, when civil war broke out on East Timor among com-
peting groups. The residual Portuguese administration possessed 
neither will not ability to intervene. The tone of the Labor govern-
ment's public position was set by Whitlam late In August. Australia 
desired a genuine act of self-determination in the territory. It hoped 
that all concerned parties, including Indonesia, would come to a 
peaceful understanding. Australia understood Indonesia's concern 
that Timor should not become a source of instability. But Australia 
would not Intervene, either in a peace-keeping or even in a mediatory 
role. Australia could not, Whitlam said, be compromised by acquiring 
a quasi-colonial role or a de facto responsibility for East Timor." 
With very little variation, the government publicly held to these 
precepts during its remaining time In office, as the strife continued 
and Indonesia began to insinuate itself more directly Into the conflict. 
A few days before the Australian election of 1 1 December when the 
caretaker Eraser government was In office, Indonesia moved in in 
strength. Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East 
Timor), the group that had won out in the civil conflict and had 
proclaimed independence, was defeated by Indonesian forces and 
East Timor eventually was Incorporated into Indonesia. 
Two aspects of the Labor government's position are of special in-
terest to us. One is Whitlam's aversion to Involving Australia in 
anything that could smack of intervention, an intervention that, 
however benign, could suggest a quasi-colonial role. Such feelings 
were not only consistent with the international image Whitlam 
wished to mould for Australia but were personal for him as an in-
dividual. '* 
The second point of interest is the government's attitude towards 
Indonesia's professed interests and Jakarta's involvement in Timor. 
Whitlam certainly did not favour a forcible Indonesian take-over of 
East Timor, but he never rescinded his 1974 view that the best solu-
tion would be Timorese association with Indonesia. This view became 
increasingly firm within the Foreign Affairs Department. While it 
was generally felt in Canberra that Fretilin was not a dangerously 
radical movement, Whitlam and his official advisers accepted the In-
donesian position that this served as no guarantee for the future. 
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Quintessentially, Australia wished to placate Indonesia. Despite 
protestations to the contrary, there was suspicion among observers 
that Whitlam was willing to countenance an Indonesian take-over; 
concern for keeping on side with Indonesia blended with Whitlam's 
aversion to Intruding Australia on to the scene." Classified materials 
leaked in 1976 indicated that in October 1975, the Labor government 
had refused to make a public disclosure of and to express its regret 
over information that Indonesia was militarily involved in Por-
tuguese Timor.'* 
Strong internal evidence tends to corroborate speculations that 
during the civil strife on Timor Whitlam privately communicated to 
the Indonesians that he would not take umbrage if Indonesia in-
tervened. It is also believed that he asked the Indonesians not to em-
barrass his government by intervening in force before an anticipated 
Australian election. 
In the Labor government's mind, a determined anti-racialist policy 
was the natural complement of anti-colonialism and perhaps of even 
greater importance. Racism was believed to be inherently contempti-
ble. Attacks on it, at home and abroad, were needed in order to make 
the Australian public more tolerant and humane; again, this was part 
of Labor's new nationalist conception for Australia. The image of an 
Australia conscientiously challenging racialism helped to cultivate an 
Image that would enhance the nation's standing and influence 
abroad, especially among Third World Nations. Racialism could be 
the cause of pernicious, dislocative international tension. This could 
work contrary to Australia's interests, both at large and close to 
home. Australia was a white nation with a conspicuous history of 
racism. If it did not make its anti-racialist position abundantly clear, 
it was conceivable that, should there be strife in the region, its racial 
attitude could be bluntly called into question. 
With these incentives In mind. Labor undertook to attack racism 
domestically, as well as vis-d-vis other countries. Whitlam s summary 
was that 
By giving the Aborigines the same status before the law and the same 
political, economic and social opportunities as white Australians, by revis-
ing immigration laws and procedures to eliminate the racial criterion, and 
by demonstrating our sympathy and understanding of the aspirations of 
the black Africans, the (Government is making what it feels to be the most 
helpfuTcontribution to the lessening of international suspicion, fear and 
hostility." 
The government's domestic efforts were, inter alia, constrained by 
political and constitutional factors arising oiit of the federal distribu-
tion of jurisdiction. It therefore could not, with an executive or 
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legislative sweep, institute all reforms it wanted. It worked to per-
suade states to expunge their residual, racially discriminatory legisla-
tion. Because of both federal factors and an unconvinced Senate, it 
faced considerable delay in winning needed concurrence for the 
legislative implementation of the international convention relative to 
the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.*" The Racial 
Discrimination Bill was finally enacted Into law in mid-1975 and took 
effect shortly before Labor was evicted from government. 
The government gave serious attention-to Aboriginal improvement 
In Australia, though the results were mixed. Here we limit ourselves 
to brief mention of government attitudes and practices bearing on ex-
ternal policy. We find encouragement and funding for Aboriginal 
delegation visits overseas and for an Aboriginal cultural festival in 
black Africa. We also find a concern for traditional Aboriginal sites 
and for Aboriginal claims to land rights and entitlement to proceeds 
relative to mining operations, especially in the federally controlled 
Northern Territory. Such considerations impinged on foreign invest-
ment policy and on mineral sales to overseas customers. For instance, 
in 1974, restraints were imposed on the exploitation of rich uranium 
deposits at the Northern Territory site of Nabariek, situated on sacred 
Aboriginal lands.*' 
It is in Its immigration policy that the government hoped to make 
an especially prominent impact. Some of its steps were largely sym-
bolic, but still of value. As of 1975, all persons entering Australia (ex-
cept from New Zealand) had to obtain visas. This was done for several 
reasons, one of which was anti-racial. The step revised a long-
standing discriminatory practice under which European British sub-
jects (Commonwealth citizens) and Irish citizens, but not non-
European Commonwealth citizens, could enter Australia without visa 
formalities. The removal of this distinction was regarded as a move 
towards a thoroughly non-discriminatory immigration policy. 
More substantive were questions bearing on opportunities for non-
Europeans to migrate to Australia. As we saw, L-CP governments had 
considerably liberalized non-European migration and some thousands 
of non-European were entering the country before Labor was elected. 
The new government's Immigration Minister, Al Grassby, became an 
energetic apostle of breaking down remaining barriers. It was 
emphasized that the screening of prospective immigrants was to dis-
regard ethnic, racial and other considerations. Non-Europeans were 
placed on the same footing as Europeans in their entitlement to as-
sisted passage. Nettlesome regulations that, in particular, affected 
short-term Japanese business visitors were redone. Grassby himself 
toured Asia In mid-1973, to explain the government's commitment to 
anti-discriminatory principles and practices. The government's ap-
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proach did not go unnoticed or unpraised. Singapore's Lee Kuan-yew, 
on various counts a critic of Whitlam's foreign policy, acclaimed the 
"decisive break with the white Australia polocy" and related issues of 
race and colour*^ The favourable response from the Philippines was 
especially gratifying. It was there that Australia's discriminatory 
policies had been most acutely felt.*' Labor's intentions nevertheless 
had to contend with some distractions. Grassby was defeated in the 
1974 election. The Immigration Department was then merged with 
the Department of Labour As we will notice in more detail later the 
Foreign Affairs Department expressed a wish to take on a large por-
tion of responsibility from Immigration, notably in the handling of 
non-assisted migrant visas. The belief (though only one reason for the 
proposed change) was that Foreign Affairs' commitment to non-
European migrants was more positive than Immigration's. Therefore, 
an unquestionably more progressive approach would result if Foreign 
Affairs had a prominent hand in administering migration. A com-
promise of a sort was worked out after considerable bureaucratic 
scrapping. In the end, administrative practices came to conform to 
policy intentions.*" We should also notice that the government's aim 
was not simply to eliminate discriminatory practices against non-
Europeans but to provide visible proof of good intentions in the actual 
numbers of non-Europeans coming to Australia. One such oppor-
tunity arose from a proposal by the Leyland Motor Corporation to im-
port a thousand or more skilled Filipino workers for its Sydney fac-
tory. Whitlam was enthusiastic, and the Philippine government gave 
its support. A pilot group was to be brought in. And so it was, but not 
without reservations being raised by the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU). Job protection for Australians was the argument, 
though a number of commentators thought they heard sounds of an 
incompletely interred White Australia outlook.*' By the second half 
of 1974, the Australian economy had taken a serious downturn. 
Unemployment rose to disturbing proportions and there were com-
pany failures, Leyland among them. This meant the shelving of 
special foreign-worker projects. It also had consequences for non-
European migration at large. Economic constraints forced the govern-
ment to curtail the annual migration intake. Thus although non-
European applications for entry into Australia rose substantially over 
earlier times, the available number of places for migrants, regardless 
of race, shrunk. The tangible "proof of good intentions" desired by the 
ALP government was rendered less abundant. 
The Labor government also strived to assume an anti-racialist 
posture in its relationship with other countries, notably Rhodesia and 
South Africa. Willesee's 1973 African tour was partially designed to 
set the mood, to knock over traces of Australia's racist tag. The 
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government also tried to set the mood of sympathy for its anti-
racialist and anti-colonialist causes through such symbolic means as 
refernng to African countries by their African rather than their more 
familiar Western names. Hence the use of Namibia rather than South-
West Afnca. When questioned on why Australia referred to Rhodesia 
as Zimbabwe, Whiflam answered that "the overwhelming black ma-
jority of the people of that territory have adopted the African word 
'Zimbabwe' as the name for their country, and the Australian Govern-
ment sees no reason why, for everyday usage, their wishes should not 
be respected."** Both in regard to Rhodesia and to South Africa, 
however Labour found its policies bedeviled by political, legal and 
material constraints. 
On Rhodesia, the government quickly moved at the United Nations 
to the side of Afro-Asian nations, with far less equivocation than had 
L-CP governments. It did not favour armed intervention, but among 
its actions was support for efforts to broaden sanctions against 
Rhodesia, condemnation of the presence of South African security 
forces in Rhodesia and support for sanctions against Portugal for 
breaking the international embargo against Rhodesia. It endorsed 
resolutions calling for the rupture of all communications with 
Rhodesia and for the denial of landing rights to national air-carriers 
of countries that themselves allowed landing rights to Rhodesia. At 
the 1973 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, Australia 
backed Canada's idea to send a Cominonwealth police force to 
Rhodesia to supervise an eventual independence agreement.*' At the 
1975 Commonwealth Conference, Australia agreed with all other 
participants to assist newly independent Mozambique to blockade 
Rhodesian exports.'* 
Australia's implementation of such sentiments was generally but 
not invariably strict.*' The government swiftly banned further sales of 
wheat to Rhodesia. The L-CP's previously stated humanitarian excep-
tions were no longer said to apply,'" and trade sanctions were 
otherwise honoured. Strict implementation of other anti-Rhodesian 
measures encountered some difficulties and at tirhes created embar-
rassment for the government. Almost immediately after achieving of-
fice. Labor painted itself into a predicament over a group of Rhode-
sian Girls' Brigade (church and missionary work) youngsters who 
wished to spend several days in Sydney on their way to an inter-
national congress in New Zealand. The government invoked a dis-
cretionary 1968 UN resolution that had urged that Rhodesian passports 
not be honoured. But the girls were travelling on British and South 
African, not Rhodesian passports, and at all events could hardly be 
regarded as missionaries of racialism. In the end, the government al-
lowed them to remain overnight in Sydney." The government also 
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had some awkward moments with the Sydney-based Rhodesian In-
formation Centre, which in some respects was acting as a de facto 
Rhodesian mission. Crttics of the office, centred on the "Alternative 
Rhodesian Information Centre", wanted it shut down, or at least im-
mobilized. The federal government tried to cut off postal and 
telephone services to the Centre, but the High Court ruled that this 
was improper since the Centre had broken no existing legislation. In 
mid-1974, in the New South Wales state courts, the Centre lost its 
privilege to register its tide as a business name. The action was 
welcomed by Willesee, who saw it as a step towards fulfilment of 
Australia's UN obligations and a blow at the Centre and its de facto 
Rhodesian government sponsors.'^ However later efforts to delete 
the Centre's entry from Sydney telephone directories again ran foul of 
the High Cdurt. 
The government's approach to contact between private Australians 
and Rhodesia added further complications. Only very rarely were 
visas granted to Rhodesians and in 1975, a Rhodesian delegation was 
barred from attending an international air safety conference in 
Melbourne. But in 1974, it had been disclosed that former Australian 
military officers were being recruited for service with Rhodesian 
forces. This not only violated UN injunctions but Australian law as 
well. Access had apparenfly been gained to confidential Australian 
army personnel files. The recruiting was believed to be carried out oc-
casionally by mail from Rhodesia (not all of which was being blocked 
by the government), through the weakened but not liquidated 
(Rhodesian) Information Centre and through South African contacts 
in Australia." The government was obviously concerned and 
launched an investigation, but continued Rhodesian access to 
Australia had facilitated the recruiting efforts in the first instance. 
The government also took steps to block the publication of advertise-
ments designed to encourage travel or emigration to Rhodesia, or the 
sale of tickets thereto. This practice had been begun under the L-CP, 
consistent with prevailing UN resolutions, but observance by airlines 
and travel agencies was found to be incomplete. The Labor govern-
ment applied considerable but not legally enforceable suasion to ac-
complish this purpose. The Department of Foreign Affairs co-
operated in its enforcement and groups such as Action for World 
Development exerted their own influence towards discouraging con-
travention.'" 
The government's overall efforts towards Rhodesia reflected the 
various difficulties inherent in the situation. At times it seemed 
zealous, at other times constrained by lack of legal power or by 
hesitation to bring forward appropriate legislation, or by the in-
genuity of the Rhodesians and their supporters. It wished to honour 
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UN obligations, but ran foul of criticism that, as a party, Labor had a 
professed commitment to "open government", but was willing to 
restrict the ventilation of certain "unpopular" ideas, or the right of 
Australians to travel where and how they chose. It found itself at-
tacked by some groups, both radical and otherwise, as being pusil-
lanimous, and by others, such as the conservative Australian-
Rhodesia Association, for proceeding too harshly, or indeed for 
proceeding at all. 
Labor's approach towards South Africa and its racial policies had 
both stringent and mild features. Some would have suggested that the 
approach bordered on the cynical, others that it remained principled 
throughout, and that what seemed to be exceptions were more 
properly classifiable as common sense than as waffling or expediency. 
One area where the government took a reasonably hard line was in 
sport. Its position was made clear almost immediately after taking of-
fice and sharply diverged from earlier L-CP policy. Individual 
sportsmen (such as the golfer Gary Player) were not barred from com-
peting in Australia, nor individual Australians from competing in 
South Africa. However racially selected sporting teams were ex-
cluded from Australia and their transit through Australia to other 
destinations was precluded." While the principal target of the ban 
was South Africa, it was at least in theory made generally applicable, 
for instance to Uganda.'* Legally, of course, the government's right to 
deny visas was irreproachable. In early 1974, as the result of official 
pressure, the Lawn Tennis Association of Australia withdrew its in-
tention to send players to South Africa. Some months later, the 
government clashed with the Australian Cricket Board over sending a 
team to South Africa and the Board relented. The government could 
in theory have denied passports, but this particular legal recourse was 
distasteful to it. The L-CP opposition, never reconciled to a policy of 
excluding South African sporting visitors, was likewise displeased 
with efforts to dissuade Australian teams from playing in South 
Africa." At all events, the government's position on sport was more 
than a gesture of resentment against apartheid. It was felt to be part 
of an international effort to force changes in South Africa's approach 
to race in sport and to obviate the possibility that African, Asian and 
Caribbean nations might impose a boycott on playing against 
Australian teams should Australia turn a blind eye towards South 
African practices. 
Moreover, the government was prepared to grant asylum to South 
Africans who claimed persecution in their own country. Neville 
Curtis, a radical white South African student leader was allowed 
asylum in 1974. He then very quickly became associated with the 
Campaign Against Racial Exploitation and proceeded to write and 
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speak on the need for Australia to pursue a tenacious anti-apartheid 
South African policy.'* 
Also reasonably stringent was Australia's diplomatic posture 
towards South Africa. Bilateral diplomatic relations were not 
severed, as indeed no UN resolution required this. But, in 1974, in ac-
cordance with a UN resolution that enjoined members to sever all 
military and defence links with South Africa, South Africa was told 
that it could not replace its retiring military attach^ in Canberra. It 
was at the United Nations itself that Australia moved against South 
Africa, first firmly, then dramatically. Beginning in 1973, Australia 
co-sponsored a number of anti-South African apartheid resolutions. 
Only In one instance did it fail to endorse an anti-apartheid resolu-
tion, and then it abstained rather than voting against. It objected to 
features of a resblution declaring that only the liberation movements 
recognized by the Organization of African Unity were authentic 
representatives of the South African people and to features intended 
to justify the use of force in South Africa and South Africa's total in-
ternational isolation. A year later at the twenty-ninth regular UN ses-
sion, Australia took the leap. While it voted against suspending the 
South African delegation's credentials as long as South Africa 
remained in the United Nations, on the Security Council it voted for a 
resolution calling for South Africa's expulsion from the world body. 
It was a most controversial step, which the government took pains 
to explain. South Africa had been following repugnant and illegal 
practices for an inordinately long time. No amount of pleading and 
scolding seemed to work. This, it was said, undermined the argument 
that South Africa could be made more responsive to international 
opinion if it were in rather than outside the United Nations. Also, 
while Australia endorsed the principle of universality of membership 
in the United Nations, this "had to be weighed against the effects of 
the standing and efficacy of the Organization of continued 
membership by a nation which had clearly violated the Charter and 
showed no intention of reversing its policies."^' 
Was Australia's vote as simple and straightforward as that? It ap-
parently was primarily a Whitlam decision, taken in the face of some 
misgivings on Willesee's part. The original Foreign Affairs submission 
on the matter offered no recommendations. Whitlam determined 
that Australia would not allow itself to be compromised, and would 
not abstain. Was the step taken to gain the best of both worlds, to 
demonstrate vividly Australia's anti-racialist credentials before Third 
World nations, while knowing that South Africa would not, in the 
event, be expelled, since a veto would be cast by one or more perma-
nent members of the Security Council? Although Britain, France and 
the United States all in fact cast vetoes, the answer to the question is 
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almost surely not. It Is understood that Foreign Affairs calculations 
pointed to at most one and possibly no outright negative votes among 
the permanent members of the Security Council. There was nothing 
approaching a foregone conclusion that the motion to expel would be 
lost. But did Australia have a special purpose in courting the Third 
World by voting to expel South Africa? One possible explanation was 
an alleged wish to gather support for Willesee's election to the 
Presidency of the UN General Assembly at the following year's ses-
sion. This was a most unlikely motive. Firstly, Australia would have 
stcx)d as the nominee of the "West Europe and Others" group, whose 
turn It was to hold the Presidency. On precedent, other groupings at 
the United Nations went along with the nominee of the group eligible 
in rotation. Secondly, Australia's vote in the Security Council ran 
counter to the wishes of France and Britain, nations that belonged to 
the "WEO" group and whose possible pique at Australia could have 
caused them to resist Willesee's candidacy. On Its part, the United 
States unsuccessfully tried to limit Australia to an abstention on the 
expulsion motion.*" Was Australia working another angle, such as 
getting appropriately exercised about South Africa at the United Na-
tions and therefore Ingratiating Itself with Afro-Asians, while comfor-
tably retaining economic links with South Africa, plus representation 
in both countries that helped to keep such profitable relations alive 
and well? Australian-South African economic links are a large sub-
ject in Itself, and we pass to it now. 
The government's position on trade with South Africa was quite 
clear. Cairns, when Minister for Overseas Trade, said that one could 
not stop trading with countries simply because of disapproval for 
their politics. "If we did that, we would stop trading with just about 
every country except Sweden and Switzerland."*' Whitlam and 
others added that Australia would impose a trade embargo if it were 
sanctioned by the United Nations, and if South Africa's major trading 
partners did so.*^ Much the same attitude was expressed by the 
ACTU. Australia's trade with South Africa in 1973-74 amounted to 
$91 million in exports and $36 million in Imports. Australia had 
become a significant exporter of cars, car parts, machinery and other 
products of the sort for which it especially wished to find overseas 
outlets. It imported a number of important minerals from South 
Africa, including a considerable part of its industrial diamond and 
asbestos requirements.*' Moreover as J. D. B. Miller pointed out, the 
International Wool Secretariat, with headquarters in London and 
financed by Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, was largely run 
by Australia. It was the one international organization "in which 
Australia could strike an effective blow at vital South African in-
terests; but since these interests [research, publicity and marketing on 
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behalf of wool] are largely identical with Australia's, any blow at 
South Africa would create opposition within Australia itself, and 
would weaken the combined front of wool exporters struggling 
against the advance of synthetic fibres."*" 
The Overseas Trade Department's journal Overseas Trading carried 
promotional material on trade with South Africa and Australia's two 
trade commission offices in South Africa conducted considerable 
promotional activity. In 1974, the government declared that in future 
the trade commissions would art simply as facilitating bodies. In 
1975, the government went one small step further While retaining 
its facility in Johannesburg, it withdrew the trade commissioner from 
Cape Town. Impatience with what was described as half-measures 
was expressed among the government's critics. In 1975, the Cam-
paign Against Racial Exploitation launched a programme to dis-
courage public buying of selected South African imports.*' 
The Australian Labor government also perceived considerable 
national economic interest in not disturbing Australian investment 
operating in South Africa, especially since Australian overseas invest-
ment had become a prominent objective of the government and 
South African investments were generally highly profitable. This was 
challenged not only from conventional radical quarters but from 
among a large section of Australian church opinion. The argument 
was that such investment strengthened the grip of the South African 
regime, while at the same time tolerating procedures that exploited 
the native South African workforce. The government in Canberra 
took two slight remedial measures. It "ceased to encourage to sub-
sidise investment by Australian companies in South Africa."** 
Moreover, Willesee wrote to Australian companies with subsidiaries 
or associated companies in South Africa, asking them to improve pay 
and working standards for their black employees.*' The appeal was 
purely hortatory; no sanctions were to be applied in the event on non-
compliance. 
The government also assumed an essentially laissez-faire attitude 
towards South African Airways (SAA) flights to and from Australia. 
The principal argument for a hard line was that this link contributed 
to the South African tourist trade and in turn to South Africa's efforts 
to place a benign facade on its apartheid policies. The government fell 
back on a familiar argument: There were no UN prohibitions on in-
ternational air arrangements with South Africa or Its international 
flag-carrier and many lines flew to and from South Africa. Until such 
time as this position changed, Australia was not prepared to under-
take a unilateral shift.** There also were prartical considerations. If 
SAA were denied rights in Australia, Qantas rights in South Africa 
would undoubtedly be shut off This would injure a profitable route 
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and force a diversion that would require giving reciprocal landing-
rights in Australia to East African Airways, thus creating competition 
for Qantas on the Australia-Britain run. When SAA's Australian 
rights licence renewal came up in 1974, it was granted. The following 
year Cabinet deferred any decision on changes in airline policy.*' 
We asked earlier whether Australia's 1974 UN vote on South 
African expulsion might have had some bearing on Australia's 
economic ties with South Africa. The above narrative suggests that, in 
every major instance of economic and commercial liaison with South 
Africa, the ALP government refused to damage the relationship. 
Economically, its reasons were sound. Departmentally, Overseas 
Trade was disposed to stick to established links, and on available 
evidence so was Cairns personally. Once he took over the portfolio in 
late 1974, Frank Crean was more disposed to considering a stronger 
position. Foreign Affairs did not recommend breaking economic ties, 
but was not rigid on the subject. Furthermore, the government's posi-
tion was honest, insofar as there were no UN instructions requiring a 
different course of action. The letter to Australian subsidiaries in 
South Africa, and the curtailment of trade commission functions in 
South Africa, were announced virtually on the eve of the UN session 
at which Australia voted to expel South Africa. This could be in-
terpreted as a clever strategy Win friends among Afro-Asian nations 
at the United Nations, tinker a bit to soften official acquiescence In 
Australian economic ties with South Africa and thereby insulate 
Australia from criticism, at home or abroad, that the government was 
not "doing enough" or living up to its avowed anti-racialist principles. 
Although plausible, this interpretation is not satisfactory and no cor-
roboration could be taken for it from internal evidence. The minor 
screw-tightening announced in September 1974 came after many 
months of protest and lobbying by opposed interests and the company 
letter had been in preparation for some time before It was revealed. 
Moreover the decision to vote against South Africa at the United Na-
tions was almost certainly still unsettled when the economic deci-
sions were announced. Indeed, it would have been somewhat out of 
character for the Labor government to have planned and stage-
managed such an elaborate strategy. The simple explanation of the 
government's behaviour is probably the closest to the truth. Labor 
was pained by apartheid, did something to express Its feelings, in 
principle sympathized with those who wanted more drastic, punitive 
action, but believed that the price of an economic war against South 
Africa was excessive. As on a number of racial and colonial issues 
with which it dealt. Labor observed both principle and practicality. 
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External Policy: 
Diplomatic Dimensions: II 
The preceding chapter examined some of the Labor government's 
broader concerns, such as regional co-operation in Asia and the 
Pacific, and colonialism and racialism. Our analysis of Australian 
diplomacy continues under a somewhat different format. Firstly, we 
will consider a few representative issue areas, both for their intrinsic 
interest and for their wider policy process and outcome implications. 
We will then bring into perspective Australia's approaches to and 
relations with communist nations, with the Asian region and such 
world bodies as the United Nations, and finally with the United 
States. 
Issues relating to the Indo-Chinese region were a highlight of Labor's 
foreign policy and of domestic party politics. We suggested earlier 
how, before December 1972, Vietnam had become a point of acerbic 
partisan differences. When it came to office. Labor was persuaded 
that its own formulations had been proved right. Emotional as well as 
rational considerations affected the party. Involvement in the conflict 
had been a major miscalculation. Military reactions to complex socio-
economic problems were seen as having exacerbated rather than 
solved. The conflict in the region had been wasteful in blood and 
treasure. Western-supported regimes had shown themselves to be cor-
rupt and lacking in popular base. These reactions stimulated a feeling 
that an ALP government could not be Indifferent to developments In 
the region. Also evident were feelings that, on Indo-China as on other 
issues, it was desirable to demonstrate quickly, and firmly, the new 
government's independent turn of mind. Moreover, wider considera-
tions were taken into account. Continuing warfare in the region 
meant unsettled conditions in Asia generally. There were dangers of 
renewed great-power friction and threats to the evolution of detente 
Also Labor's objectives for Asia, such as an Inclusive Asian-Pacific 
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forum, would be hindered as long as the absence of a genuine peace 
settlement seemed to keep various South-East Asian states at a dis-
tance from China. 
When Labor entered government, it almost immediately ter-
minated the residual Australian military presence in Vietnam, by 
withdrawing advisers. That, literally, took Australia "out of the war". 
It had been a predictable step. Also predictable was Whitlam's un-
disguised pleasure in late January 1973 over the announcement of a 
Vietnamese cease-fire agreement. His praise of Nixon for having es-
tablished himself "in the foremost ranks of modern statesmanship" 
was indeed exceptional.' Also, rapidly and predictably. Labor ex-
tended diplomatic recognition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(North Vietnam). There was some opposition carping about undue 
haste, and there was distress in Saigon, but Washington registered no 
complaints. The recognition of Hanoi left unaffected Australia's 
recognition of South Vietnam. 
While these government actions were very popular within the ALP 
and excited relatively little domestic or external complaint, much of 
the rest of the government's reaction to Indo-Chinese events 
generated prominent controversy. At the heart of the matter lay the 
question of how the government, or certain members of It, felt about 
the Vietnam conflict, who was responsible for prolonging It and what 
needed to be done. 
In late 1972. Vietnam peace negotiations broke down and almost 
immediately after Labor assumed office the United States resumed 
bombing of North Vietnam and undertook harbour-mining opera-
tions. The reactions of the new government and within the labour 
movement more generally detonated a fierce debate, the effects of 
which lingered for a very long time. Whitlam transmitted a letter of 
complaint to Nixon. He publicly acknowledged that a letter had been 
sent, but declined to disclose its content. Three newly appointed 
senior ministers—Cairns (Overseas Trade and Secondary Industry), 
Cameron (Labour) and Uren (Urban and Regional Development)— 
volunteered public and extremely derogatory remarks about the US 
President and his administration: Cameron—"maniacs"; Uren— 
"mass-murders"; Cairns—"corrupt" US regime. Cairns proceeded to 
call for public rallies to oppose the bombing.^ Additionally, protesting 
dockside workers imposed a boycott on American shipping and there 
were threats of more widespread sanctions against American goods 
and services. 
The implications of these reactions for US-Australian relations 
generally will be assessed later. Here we should say that the US ad-
ministration was shocked and angered over what had happened in 
Australia. There were representations, intense conversations and, on 
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the part of American unions, a retaliatory boycott against Australian 
shipping. Whitlam himself was not personally blameworthy for over-
reacting, but impressions of him among critics in Australia, and in the 
United States, were unflattering. His letter to Nixon was not insulting 
in tone. But there was a feature of Whitlam's approach that in-
furiated some persons in Washington—a promise to draw the Indone-
sians and Japanese into common cause with Australia to protest 
against American interdiction of North Vietnam. This had not been 
Whitlam's idea, but rather the recommendation of a senior public ser-
vant. The idea was not only offensive to Washington but proved un-
workable. Whitlam dissociated himself from the more vigorous, anti-
American criticisms of his ministers, but was unable to enforce their 
silence. Cairns, on his part, then and thereafter, said he spoke only for 
himself on Vietnam, not for the government or for Whitlam, and 
would continue to do so as his beliefs dictated,' principles of Cabinet 
responsibility notwithstanding. Whitlam .opposed the shipping 
boycott, but this was trade-union not government artion. It lacked 
formal ACTU backing and brought on mediating efforts by R. J. 
Hawke, ALP as well as ACTU President. -In other words, Whitlam, 
and his new government, were portrayed by critics as wrong, inept 
and basically not in control of their own ministers and followers. The 
L-CP, still recovering from the shock of having being pushed into op-
position, attacked in full force. Labor was proving the historical L-CP 
prediction of being irresponsible and dangerous as a party of govern-
ment. Barely in office, it had severely damaged relations with the 
United States, abdicated its responsibilities as a cohesive government 
to wild men and shown its helplessness in the face of radical trade-
union pressure." 
In the hubbub, much of the substance of the debate over ap-
propriate Australian policy towards Vietnam was drowned out and a 
heavy coat of emotionalism was superimposed over subsequent 
dialogue about Vietnamese issues. Cairns in particular, though careful 
to represent his views as his own, on future occasions, speaking at 
home and overseas, was bitter against what he portrayed as a record 
of American aggression in Vietnam, the puppet status of the Thieu 
regime and deliberate efforts by Washington and Saigon to subvert 
the peace accords reached in early 1973, and he acclaimed the need 
for a "peoples'" victory in Vietnam.' Opposition spokesmen slapped at 
Cairns. His views were substantially wrong and turned a blind eye 
towards the behaviour of North Vietnam and the Vietcong; they con-
tinued to poison relations with America; they exposed the weakness 
of the proposition that there was a single government with a single 
authoritative Prime Minister.* 
What was the government's interpretation of conditions in a con-
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tinually strife-torn Vietnam? Whitlam himself was noticeably un-
comfortable with the regime in the South and with the background of 
US interdiction of Indo-China from Thai bases—"militarily ineffective 
and morally monstrous".' Overall, however the official attitude, 
firmly endorsed by Willesee and his department, became that blame 
for the mischievous conflict In Vietnam rested with both sides. If 
anything, breaches of the Paris accords by Saigon "are fully, and in 
some cases more than fully, matched by breaches by the DRV and 
PRG". The Paris accords were a reasonable framework within which 
to work out national conciliation in Vietnam. It would be presump-
tious for outsiders to weigh the sincerity and national feeling on 
either side. But this was not sufficiently explicit criticism of North 
Vietnam to suit many opposition members, especially as by early 1975 
they detected a more hostile Labor government tone against the 
Saigon regime.* 
What of Australia's diplomatic relations with the North and South 
Vietnamese regimes? Relations with Hanoi were satisfartory and cor-
rect, though not effusive. One accomplishment, announced in 1974, 
was that Australia's mission in Hanoi was to serve as a source of in-
formation and as modest conduit between North Vietnam and 
Thailand, which then lacked relations with Hanoi.' Official and other 
North Vietnamese visitors to Australia were accorded sympathetic 
receptions. The government's treatment of South Vietnam was also 
correct, though perhaps Inclining towards coolness. The Foreign Af-
fairs Department was certainly not disfxjsed to impose any ostracism 
on Saigon's diplomatic personnel. Departmental officials resented 
what they regarded as attempts to incriminate South Vietnam, and 
the department, by those who alleged that Foreign Affairs had, 
despite representations from Cairns, in effert countenanced the 
deportation of a number of Chinese Vietnamese from Hong Kong to 
incarceration in South Vietnam.'" The department, and indeed a 
number of Labor people as well, felt embarrassed by occasional 
episodes, such as at La Trobe University in 1973, when South Viet-
namese spokesmen were denied public forums or otherwise harassed 
by radical critics." The Labor government expressed its concern to 
Saigon over allegations of mistreatment of political prisoners, though 
ranking Labor ministers made similar representations in other Asian 
capitals, notably Jakarta and Manila. Moreover as will be shown 
more fully later the ALP government largely resisted pressures from 
some party sources and radical lobbyists to emasculate Its civil 
economic assistance to South Vietnam. 
While it was being pilloried by the opposition for its behaviour on 
Indo-China, the Whitlam government also found rising dissent 
on the left, both in and outside the ALP. Some of these critics felt that. 
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de facto, Australia's handling of Vietnamese issues was tantamount to 
culpable negligence. By doing litfle if anything, by risking few in-
itiatives, the government was countenancing the warfare, the preser-
vation of a discredited regime in South Vietnam and the postpone-
ment of a political settlement under more progressive leadership, 
such as the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). It was as-
serted that the Paris peace accords had recognized not only the Saigon 
government but also the PRG as an established administrative and 
political force in the region. Hence as an important start towards 
reconstructing its Vietnamese diplomacy, Canberra should extend 
diplomatic recognition to the PRG.'^  
The Whitlam government rejected these propositions. Publicly, it 
argued that the Paris peace accords in no way implied that the PRG 
was. by reason-of Its status, necessarily entitled to diplomatic recogni-
tion. It said that the PRG, while definitely an entity, was in no sense 
of the accepted word a government. Canberra already was able to 
maintain informal contacts with the PRG, but recognition would 
mean severance of relations with Saigon. The South Vietnamese 
regime was a government, entitled to value-free recognition, and a 
regime whose conduct Australia could better influence in a move-
ment towards free elections and an overall Vietnamese settlement if 
formal links were maintained." There were other disincentives for 
the government to recognize the PRG. The advice of the Foreign Af-
fairs Department was decidedly against. South-East Asian (ASEAN) 
states very firmly urged Australia not to change diplomatic course. 
These were governments with which close ties were highly valued by 
Australia. Th*e American outlook, also oppt«ed to PRG recognition, in 
and of itself probably counted for less in the government's calculus. 
The Labor government, in some ways rather attached to legal niceties 
and fond of its even-handedness in Its recognition policies towards 
the two Koreas and the two Germanies, was thus further disinclined 
to recognize a legally "questionable" government and to forfeit 
recognition of an unquestionably "legal" government. There also is an 
Intimation that, especially on a policy choice that would have meant 
adhering to what was an international recognition policy limited to 
communist and some Third World states. Canberra felt uneasy about 
the solidity of precedents for a recognition of the PRG on its own part. 
Even Hanoi had not accorded formal "recognition" to the PRG. Final-
ly, though not decisively, the government kept in mind the L-CP's 
resolute opposition to PRG recognition and its happy willingness to 
pin nasty labels on Labor in the course of electoral politics. 
Furthermore, in the party political sense, the ALP government 
found itself in something of a dilemma. If it acceded to rising de-
mands for PRG recognition and otherwise remodelled its posture on 
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Vietnam, it would be severely scored by the L-CP for having suc-
cumbed to left-wing and radical pressures. If it held its basic policy 
ground, it would be hit harder and harder by PRG proponents. This 
could lead to a formal Labor Party demand for PRG recognition 
and/or to serious, electorally damaging, intra-party frictions. 
Pressure on the government to recognize the PRG came from 
diverse sources. The PRG itself made known its wish, both to 
Australians visiting Vietnam and in Australia through touring PRG 
spokesmen, for the now more independently minded Australian 
government to soften its position. Cairns, though continuing to repre-
sent himself in a private capacity, urged PRG recognition. The radical 
movement launched a heavy campaign. An Australia-Indo-China 
Society was formed. Committees for the Recognition of the PRG were 
formed and co-ordinating groups arose. Bodies such as these, plus 
AlCD in Sydney and CICD in Melbourne more generally, began a 
systematic campaign of lobbying ALP parliamentarians. According to 
spokesmen for the pro-PRG lobby, the effort among parliamentarians 
was one of the radical/peace movement's most conspicuous successes. 
Literature, films and visiting speakers were made available. By late 
1974. nearly half of the ALP parliamentary caucus members, in-
cluding several ministers, had subscribed to a manifesto on Vietnam 
that, among other things, called for PRG recognition. More Labor 
parliamentarians later subscribed to a call for the observance of the 
Paris peace accords and a negotiated settlement, though not neces-
sarily to literal advocacy of PRG recognition as such. 
The government had never been inflexible towards the PRG and 
gradually proceeded to loosen its position. At the 1973 ALP Federal 
Conference, motions calling for recognition of the PRG were comfor-
tably, though not overwhelmingly, defeated. Whitlam was very firm 
in opposing such instruction. His margin of victory on the resolutions 
may have been increased by his promise to endorse another resolu-
tion that called for Australian representations to Saigon over political 
prisoners.'" Through indirect means, the government continued to 
channel funds for humanitarian projects in Vietcong-controlled areas 
of Vietnam. In 1974, it shifted its approach towards PRG representa-
tion at humanitarian-oriented international conferences to favouring 
observer/forensic status for PRG delegates." 
The ALP met in federal conference at Terrigal, New South Wales, 
in February 1975. The party's Foreign Affairs and Defence Commit-
tee, chaired by Whitlam. recommended that resolutions proposing 
PRG recognition be discharged. The mood of the conference was not 
so accommodating. Whitlam made a spirited defence of his govern-
ment's foreign policy, including reasons not to recognize the PRG. 
Then came a series of tangled events. A motion by Cairns favouring 
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recognition was put and passed by a single vote. Then, admidst much 
procedural confusion and bad-tempered remarks, Hawke, as 
presiding officer ruled in order an amendment stipulating that the 
PRG would be allowed to establish an information office in Australia. 
Whitlam himself endorsed it It passed, 31 to 0. Somehow, Cairns' 
motion, which had passed, slipped out of sight.'* Whitlam, Willesee 
and other moderate Labor ministers had found that first caucus and 
then conference had taken issue with them on Vietnam, and more 
particularly the PRG question. The outcome at Terrigal was, on paper 
a compromise. The compromise amendment worked, but its passage 
was fortuitous, a procedural accident. Some delegates had not 
realized that, at least according to the chair's ruling, support for the 
compromise motion negated the already approved Cairns motion. 
The episode was a commentary on struggles among fartions or bodies 
within the party and varied "lobbies" that strived to effert outcomes. 
It was a not very edifying commentary on how Labor formulated 
major policy. It also was commentary on perspertives on how, and in 
what way, an ALP government sought to deal with a foreign policy 
issue both emotional and substantively complex. We will return to 
Vietnam shortly, after reviewing government policy towards Cam-
bodia. 
Cambodia was a less emotionally tainted subjert that Vietnam and 
produced relatively little concerted party or outside lobbying. The 
government's approach was, however, afferted by many of the same 
considerations and constraints that had shaped its Vietnam policy. As 
with the South Vietnamese rdgime, the Whitlam government had lit-
tle personal sympathy for the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia. Australia 
was vigorously displeased by American interdirtion of North Vietnam 
at the turn of 1972-73. Less sternly, it took the view that heavy US 
support for Cambodia was misguided and probably contributed to 
prolongation of Indo-Chinese fighting at large. The Whitlam govern-
ment did not, however, find that it realistically could play a real 
mediatory role in the conflirt. In 1973, against American advice, it 
withdrew from an international economic stabilization fund for Cam-
bodia. But the programme had had an uneven reception in the United 
States itself, and when the LCP government joined the scheme in 
1971, it did so only after heavy lobbying from Washington." 
Australia's diplomatic relations with Cambodia also resembled its 
diplomatic attitude towards South Vietnam. Recognition of the Lon 
Nol regime was maintained, nominally on the mechanical grounds 
that it effectively controlled the capital and held the Cambodian seat 
at the United Nations. Prince Sihanouk's government in exile in 
China did not meet these tests, nor did the insurgent forces operating 
in Cambodia. All the same, as in regard to the Vietcong/PRG in Viet-
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nam, the Whiflam government was willing to maintain informal con-
tacts with Sihanouk. By the end of 1973, Sihanouk had held talks 
with Ambassador FitzGerald in Peking, with several Australian 
ministers and eventually with Whitlam personally—though against 
Department of Foreign Affairs advice.'* 
Foreign Affairs lost its case on the Whitlam contart with Sihanouk, 
but otherwise its own position on Cambodia was upheld by the 
government. The Department counselled against a change in formal 
recognition policy and opposed Australian artions to install a pro-
Sihanouk delegation in Cambodia's UN seat. Other influences afferted 
the government's position. Once again we see a trace of a rather for-
mal, legalistic approach. Moreover Cambodia was not South Africa. 
Unlike South Africa, the Cambodian regime had not egregiously 
flaunted UN principles and dirertives. As on the Vietnam/PRG issue, 
considerable lobbying was exerted on Canberra by foreign govern-
ments not to turn Australia's back on Lon Nol. This came from 
Washington, from ASEAN countries and, most energetically at the 
1974 UN session, from Indonesia and Japan. The argument, as with 
Vietnam, was that the abandonment of the Pnom Penh government 
would assist the cause of insurgent movements in the region and 
foreclose what little prospect remained for a negotiated Cambodian 
settlement. Hence the Australian delegation at the United Nations op-
posed efforts to displace the Lon Nol regime. Australia did impose 
one qualification. Distressed by the way the Chinese recognition issue 
had been handled for many years, holding to the proposition that the 
United Nations should be an open forum rather than a stage for 
procedurally delaying and obstructing tartics, the government refused 
to associate itself with such procedures, even though their sponsor's— 
America's—intent was also Australia's objective, namely salvaging 
the seat for the Lon Nol regime." 
In March 1975, following on the ALP resolution passed at Terrigal, 
the PRG approached Australia to establish an information office. 
Almost immediately, the matter became mooL Within two months, 
Australia had formally recognized the PRG as the government in 
Saigon, as well as the Royal Government of National Union of Cam-
bodia (GRUNC) as the effecitve government in Pnom Penh. The anti-
communist regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia had collapsed. 
The period March-May 1975 generated fierce public controversy in 
Australia and requires more specific attention. 
We might begin by asking whether the government and the opposi-
tion saw the outcome of communist takeovers in Indo-Chinese states 
as desirable or not. The question has two parts. The first is whether 
incumbent regimes were favoured over a communist alternative, or 
vice versa. The second relates to post-Vietnam forecasts for the region 
and for Australia's interests. 
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On neither side of the House was there particular sympathy for the 
Thieu and Lon Nol regimes, though Labor's views were more 
demonstrably critical. Whitlam, Willesee and others resented the 
venality of the Thieu regime in particular and felt it had resisted 
steps towards reaching a peaceful accommodation. They were not in-
herently well-dispc:)sed towards communist regimes in South Vietnam 
and Camb(xiia, but reconciled themselves to them, in part because at 
least and at last the killing would stop when established regimes in 
the capitals collapsed. The opposition, though not enamoured of the 
Thieu and Lon Nol regimes, nevertheless felt that more should be 
done to sustain them, at least so as to avert a full-scale communist 
takeover. Remarks such as by Cairns that it would be a good thing if 
Thieu fell and the inevitable takeover by the other side occur were 
denounced. After the denouement in Indo-China, Peacock remarked 
that the Liberals were unhappy not because they had unquestioningly 
wished to defend those who bad lost, but basically because "we fear 
that the Government which has replaced .. [them] may have greater 
faults based on dogmatic ideology"." 
More far-ranging in importance was the question of what the two 
party groups saw as the consequences of the end of conflict in Indo-
China. Their differences were considerable and a reflertion of their 
separate perceptions of the international order. To the government, 
the end of conflict was a healthy thing. It was desirable because it 
meant the end of carnage. It also was highly welcome because it 
brought to an end myths about the alleged importance to Australia of 
who governed In Indo-China. Australia could now concentrate on its 
vital interests and sources of security interest. The close of the conflict 
meant that great-power competition in the region was reduced and 
regional stability enhanced. Diiente would be helped and international 
priorities otherwise set right. American resources and energies would 
no longer be squandered. Adventitiously, the setback in Indo-China 
could serve to make future American policy in Asia wiser and more 
constructive.^' The opposition saw the Indo-Chinese outcome 
otherwise, as a destablizing event. The outcome raised the power and 
credit of communism generally, weakened American and anti-
communist nation credit and had the potential for spreading under-
mining effects across South-East Asia and elsewhere in the manner of 
an oil slick." A number of commentators interpreted the L-CP's 
posture as a combination of efforts to revive a sharp foreign policy 
debate and a return to domino-theory thinking.'" 
Another aspect of the March-May 1975 debate over Indo-China 
related to Australia's diplomatic role in the conflirt. The exchanges 
were ofien bitter, persor^al and politically supercharged, and tended 
to obfuscate the merits of the cases argued. Essentially, the opposition 
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maintained that Labor, and Whitlam specifically, had disguised their 
true feelings and had misled Parliament. The government was said 
not to be even-handed, but favoured the North and the PRG over 
South Vietnam. Labor denied the charge and said it was addressing 
itself to the realities of the situation. In the Senate, where Labor 
lacked a majority, a motion was passed condemning the government 
for duplicity in its dealings with the two Vietnams. 
The gravamen of the L-CP's charge was that the content of leaked 
cables sent to Australia's missions in Hanoi and Saigon for com-
munication to those governments had placed more blame on the 
South than on the North for protracting the struggle and were more 
gentle and'accommodating towards Hanoi. Not only was this said to 
be wrong, but it gave the lie to Whitlam's earlier professions that 
Canberra was steering a middle course and that its communications 
would bear this out."^ " Overall, the press agreed^' and US official opi-
nion felt that the government had "tilted". The government tabled 
the contentious cables, as well as earlier letters to the two Vietnams. 
Taken together, the government argued, these documents proved that 
Australia's objective throughout had been for both sides to stop 
shooting and to stop their evasion of the Paris accords, so that a 
reasoned settlement could be reached. Its efforts had been expended 
consistently, in all manners of diplomatic settings. It also publicized a 
letter from the Hanoi authorities that chided Australia for its lack of 
appreciation of the situation in the South." During these exchanges, 
the government was accused of being dishonest with Parliament, 
obsequious towards Hanoi and essentially hoping for a communist 
takeover. The L-CP was accused of having protracted a senseless and 
bl(X)dy war while in office, and in'opposition of having contributed 
no reasoned proposals for its resolution. Actually, an April 1975 op-
position fact-finding mission to Indo-China filed (the government 
would have added, very belatedly) not a recommendation for more 
American arms to bolster regimes there but essentially a recommen-
dation for mutual disengagement and observance of Paris accord 
procedures." 
It is not practical to undertake an exegetic analysis of the various 
contentious documents over which the parties argued. Messages to 
the two Vietnams were not identical. They did leave an impression of 
partiality towards the North, or at least that Australia was placing its 
bets on what it was persuaded would be the winning side. Some 
earlier Whitlam remarks had shown particular frustration with 
Thieu's unwillingness to bend. But it is also possible to view the mat-
ter in perspective, in the context of Australia addressing a tottering 
Saigon regime while momentum and the sight of virtory were clearly 
on the other side. Laurie Oakes' interpretation cannot be dismissed as 
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simple apologia. In his view, cables to Saigon hoped to change Thieu's 
mind about subscribing to a national reconciliation council. If this 
were done, Whitlam's communications to Hanoi were intended to 
persuade North Vietnam and the PRG that they should call off their 
military offensive. The specific formulations of language were 
designed as sweeteners and incentives to Hanoi, again in recognition 
of the relative imbalance of strength then enjoyed by the two sides.'^ * 
Another facet of government policy that aroused controversy was 
its handling of refugees. During March-May, the government com-
mitted more funds towards international relief efforts in Vietnam 
and urged public donations. It allowed Cambodian and South Viet-
namese students in Australia to remain. It also extended temporary 
residence permits to South Vietnamese and Cambodian diplomatic 
personnel and their families who were in Australia at the time of 
communist takeovers, but without guarantee of permanent residence. 
It participated in bringing orphans out of South Vietnam for reloca-
tion with Australian families. Its approach to accepting South Viet-
namese refugees was the major bone of contention. Whitlam delayed 
making a judgement on this issue, in the face of Willesee's efforts for a 
prompt prime ministerial decision. Some Vietnamese were brought 
out when the Australian embassy rlosed, but over two hundred who 
had been associated with Australia and Australians in Vietnam, and 
who would have wished to come out, were left behind. Immigration 
Minister Cameron apparently concurred in a set of refugee admission 
criteria drawn up by the Department of Foreign Affairs, but Whitlam 
had the criteria tightened. Even those who met the criteria were to be 
treated on a case-by-case basis. Out of thousands of refugees who ap-
plied for entry into Australia, only a few hundred met the screening 
criteria and were otherwise deemed suitable for admission. Whitlam 
eventually called upon, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees to sponsor a world effort on behalf of Vietnamese refugees 
scattered at various temporary reception centres, a scheme under 
which Australia promised to take its fair share. But the Australian 
offer was contingent on a multilateral effort rather than being uncon-
ditionally made. Then, in August 1975, an additional three hundred 
refugees were brought in. By the time Labor had left office, slightly 
over a thousand Vietnamese refugees had been accepted, nearly three 
hundred of them orphans scheduled for adoption in Australia. ' 
The opposition complained about the government's modest and 
stop-and-go refugee response, and so did most of the press. Although 
Labor accepted more refugees for permanent settlement than any 
country other than the United States, Labor was castigated for being a 
party committed to humanitarian principles but unwilling to serve 
humanitarianism in an appropriately generous way. Australia had 
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over the years been a refuge for Baits, Hungarians, Czechs and finally 
Chileans who wished to avoid political persecution. It had a capacity 
to absorb foreign, even Asian peoples. Was not the government also 
proud of its colour-blind migration policy? Why not South Viet-
namese?" 
Several factors seemed to have constrained the government, and 
Whitlam particularly. There were some technical obstacles to moving 
people out of South Vietnam when the old regime was disintegrating, 
but they were not insurmountable. When the government originally 
brought orphans out, Hanoi expressed concern that Australia was im-
properly involving itself in Vietnamese affairs. Some Cabinet 
members were very much concerned about the plight of refugees on 
humanitarian grounds, but there also was feeling that a major 
Australian intake of refugees could be further interpreted in Hanoi as 
an unfriendly gesture. Since Australia wished to have good access to 
Hanoi, and to a successor government in Saigon, perhaps cuation was 
in order. The government's principal efforts at assisting refugees came 
to' be carried out in circumstances that could be Interpreted as least 
likely to offend Hanoi or the incoming rdgime in the South. It was to 
be done under neutral international auspices; it was mostly to be 
done from refugee centres outside Vietnam, rather than directly out 
of Vietnam; it was mostly done after the excitement of the April-May 
period had subsided. One more interpretation is possible. Whitlam 
could remember how in 1974 the Baltic community in Australia had 
resented Australian recognition of Soviet sovereignty over their 
homelands and how much they had fuelled a partisan debate over 
this action. The Prime Minister may have felt that the introduction of 
thousands of overwhelmingly anti-communist Vietnamese could in 
time have created a potent lobby on behalf of hard-line Australian 
diplomacy and have exacerbated politics in a nation he, Whitlam, 
was striving to move towards a more balanced and relaxed outlook 
on Asia and towards communism.'" Later in this chapter we will 
more broadly examine the implications of government reartions to is-
sues of political asylum. 
As an issue area in Australian diplomacy, the Middle East outwardly 
lacked the sharpness and salience of Indo-China, and especially Viet-
nam. The Middle East was .half-way round the globe rather than in 
the Asian neighbourhood, Australia's centre of security and 
diplomatic concern. Moreover, it lacked the emotive content that for 
years had pervaded debate over Australia's stakes and proper role in 
Vietnam. Nevertheless, Middle Eastern questions, most of which 
somehow touched on the Arab—Israeli conflirt, became significant 
for Australia and in turn attracted considerable and heated political 
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controversy. For Labor the Middle East as an object of Australian 
diplomacy acquired Importance because the conflict there was seen as 
destabilizing progress towards great-power dhente and because it 
raised significant problems touching on such Labor Party concerns as 
self-determination, humanitarianism, the rights of states to exist free 
of intimidation and the peaceful rather than forceful settlement of 
disputes. Particularly after the Yom Kippur war of 1973, economic is-
sues such as trade with the Middle East, petroleum supplies and 
potential investment funds for Australia required special and delicate 
treatment. 
The basic guidelines for the Whitlam government's Middle East 
policies were spelled out in the party's 1973 Surfers Paradise Federal 
Conference resolution, passed unanimously: 
The situation in the Middle East remains the greatest threat to the peace 
of the world. There can be no peace until the Arab States respea and 
recognise Israel's sovereignty and right to exist. Equally, there can be no 
peace until Israeli forces have been withdrawn from occupied territories 
to secure and recognised boundaries and a just settlement of the refugee 
problem is achieved." 
Two important embellishments were imposed on this position by 
government spokesmen. The call for a "just settlement of the refugee 
problem" came to mean that "if the Palestinians want to create a 
state of their own alongside Israel, we will accept this. ... It accords 
with the Australian Government's attachment to the principle of the 
right of self-determination.'^ The other embellishment was less a mat-
ter of policy than of style or approach. Particularly for Whitlam per-
sonally, it was morally wrong and probably diplomatically counter-
productive to ascribe "blame" in the Middle East conflict. For in-
stance, though addressing a Jewish audience, he spoke of the Arabs 
"who [in 1973] it would seem [sic] invaded Israel". Provocative at-
tacks by one side and retaliatory strikes by the other for example 
Israel's reprisal sorties into Lebanon, were equally contemptible: "The 
bullying of Lebanon by Israel gets no public support. Israeli civilian 
women and children, Lebanese women and children, are all sacred 
alike. I condemn the terrorist attacks which have brought shame on 
both."" Such pronouncements, combined with Australia's actual 
behaviour at the United Nations and elsewhere, were publicized by 
the government as scrupulously even-handed, but pommelled bV 
critics as biased and unworthy. 
Unlike Vietnam and Cambodia, the Middle East did not pose 
problems of diplomatic recognition, but very prominently posed 
voting choices at the United Nations and related international agen-
cies. At the United Nations, Australian Labor supported injunctions to 
the parties principal in the Middle East to reach accommodation. In 
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July 1973, Australia supported a Security Council resolution (though 
it was described by UN Ambassador Mclntrye as "lacking in balance") 
that, inter alia, strongly deplored Israel's continuing occupation of ter-
ritories taken in the 1967 war and its lack of co-operation with the 
United Nations in this matter The resolution, sponsored by non-
aligned states, was vetoed by the United States. In Ortober 1973. fol-
lowing new hostilities in the Middle East, Australia joined the mas-
sive vote in favour of a resolution appealing for a cease-fire and im-
plementation of a 1967 UN resolution that had urged a return to 
earlier territorial boundaries, a proper settlement of the refugee 
problem and the inviolability of states In the region. In November 
1974, Australia abstained on a General Assembly resolution that reaf-
firmed the rights of the Palestinian people, because it lacked reference 
to Israel's right to exist as an independent state. During his visits to 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union at the turn of 1974-75, Whitlam 
emphasized the need for Israel's continued survival and in the USSR, 
supported the right of migration to Israel of Soviet Jews. All the 
same, there had been a report, unconfirmed, that during the Yom 
Kippur war Australia had spoken with US officials in criticism of the 
American arms airlift to Israel.'" In 1974, following a guerrilla raid 
into Israel and an Israeli counterstroke against guerrilla sites in 
Lebanon, Australia voted for a Security Council resolution that con-
demned Israel's violation of Lebanon's territory and all acts of 
violence generally. It also supported an unsuccessful amendment that 
would specifically have condemned the original guerrilla raid into 
Israel. In 1975, Australia rejerted any idea that Israel should be expel-
led from the United Nations or denied the right to participate in its 
work, and refused to support moves to equate Zionism with racism. 
Australia's position on the Palestine Liberation Organization's 
(PLO) involvement in UN affairs was guarded. In Ortober 1974, the 
General Assembly passed a resolution inviting the PLO to participate 
in the Assembly's plenary deliberations on the question of Palestine. 
The success of this resolution was a major triumph for the Arab na-
tions and a setback for Israel. The resolution passed 105 to 4, with 
twenty abstentions, among them Australia and a number of other 
Western nations. Australia saw value in allowing spokesmanship for 
the PLO, but had misgivings about the procedural corrertness In-
herent in the resolution and about its capacity to assist the delicate 
negotiations required for a lasting settlement in the Middle East. The 
following month, Australia abstained in the General Assembly, this 
time on a resolution granting the PLO permanent observer status at 
the United Nations—on procedural grounds, but without prejudice to 
Australia's willingness to take into account an Arab summit (Rabat) 
decision that the PLO should speak for all Palestinians. 
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Also Australia often chose to abstain or otherwise to assume a non-
categorical position on matters afferting relations with UN-related 
agencies. For Instance, in mid-1974, it supported observer status for 
the PLO at the World Health Organization, but later in the year it ab-
stained on admitting the PLO to the deliberations of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization. It also abstained in committee when 
Israel sought membership in the European regional group of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), though in UNESCO's plenary session it voted against anti-
Israeli sanctions that that body might impose. Australia also ab-
stained on a resolution calling on UNESCO to provide aid to various 
liberation movements and that expressed hope that Palestine would 
join the community of nations under the aegis of such international 
bcxiies as UNESCO. As an official Australian publication explained, 
"The effect of the motion barring Israel, supported mainly by Arab 
and Communist countries [but on which Australia had abstained], 
was to maintain Israel's exclusion from participation, as of right, in 
the regional activities of UNESCO."" 
In early 1975, by a very narrow margin, the ALP Cabinet decided 
against a PLO visit to Australia. Whitlam had previously been 
favourable. His explanation of the Cabinet refusal was that a visit at 
that time would have worsened divisions within the Australian com-
munity.'* He later indicated a wish that such a visit could be arranged 
in the foreseeable future." Shortly thereafter on the invitation of the 
Australian Union of Students, a delegation representing the General 
Union of Palestinian Students, affiliated with the PLO, was allowed to 
enter In June 1975, a ranking member of the PLO was allowed to 
tour Australia. Outwardly, he came under the sponsorship of the 
Arab League, not the PLO, but he was received by Whitlam and the 
matter of a PLO information office in Australia was broached.'* 
Given its emotional as well as diplomatic and economic dimen-
sions, the Middle East was bound to stir internal controversy. The 
government insisted that it was following the best policy for Australia 
and for the general cause of international morality and order, a policy 
that scrupulously aimed at even-handness, namely fairness to the 
claims of both Arabs and Israelis. A number of critics examined the 
government's actual behaviour and branded it as not at all even-
handed, but as tilted against Israel. They maintained that this bias 
was itself morally wrong and diplomatically unsound. They claimed 
that, as with the July 1973 Security Council resolution, Labor had 
supported a position that inordinately threw blame on Israel for the 
lack of a lasting settlement. They saw Australia's lack of opposition 
for the right of the PLO to present its position before the UN General 
Assembly as de facto anti-Israeli and unfortunately bereft of any 
External Policy: Diplomatic Dimensions: II 139 
Australian efforts to wring prior concessions for Israel's future 
security from PLO petitioners. They felt that at least part of 
Australia's vote on Israel and UNESCO was shameful and indefensi-
ble. At large, they bitterly complained that trying to steer even-
handedly by laying as much opprobrium on Israel's reprisals as on 
Arab terrorist provocations mischievously confused aggressor and vic-
tim. 
The chorus of criticism sprang from diverse quarters, ranging from 
the L-CP opposition to the inner circles of the Labor Party itself The 
L-CP did not declare itself openly pro-Israeli and acknowledged the 
rights of Palestinians. But, conviction apart, the opposition felt it had 
something to gain elertorally by exposing Labor's alleged hypocrisy 
and inconsistency—promises of high principle accompanied by 
deplorable favouritism and disregard for the Israeli underdog. 
Implicitly, there also was a tendency to look favourably upon Israel's 
interests because Israel was, in a sense, an American client, while the 
Arabs were supported by the Soviets, and the L-CP was prone to take 
seriously world events that brought deterioration to American in-
fluence. L-CP interest in the Middle East was reflected in the amount 
of internal research attention paid to the subject. Early in 1975, the 
first well-documented paper in the Liberals' foreign policy review 
process was devoted to the Middle East.''' Yet the Liberals' sense of 
unease about how the Middle East conflirt could adversely affect 
Australia was itself highlighted. It is understood that, in late 1973 and 
early 1974, party spokesmen deliberately refrained from remarking 
on the issue, in fear of exciting possible Arab retaliatory measures 
against Australia, such as skyjackings of aircraft or terrorism. 
Another source of criticism was Australia's Jewish community. The 
bulk of the Jewish community of some 75 000 though normally 
strongly Labor in voting preference, found the government's Middle 
East policy distasteful and entirely unsatisfactory. We will deal with 
some of the policy process and electoral spin-off implications of this 
theme later. What needs to be said here is that the Jewish community 
mobilized itself to question and if possible to correct Labor's policies. 
Its spokesmen held private as well as more open dialogues with 
Whitlam. Their distress over government policy helped to give birth 
to a pro-Israeli Mid-East Review, published in Melbourne. They were 
eager to organize a broadly based Australian Council of Concern and 
supported efforts by Jewish and non-Jewish ALP parliamentarians in 
the Friends of Israel group within caucus. In 1975, the Australian 
Union of Jewish Students launched a signature campaign aimed at 
keeping the PLO out of Australia. 
This brings us to the ALP itself The Arab-Israeli conflict touched 
Labor's heart-strings, and in so doing severely divided the party. A 
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pro-Israeli sentiment was easily understandable within important 
sections of an idealistic and humanitarian party. There were 
memories of the Jews as a persecuted people, victims of the 
Holocaust, and then besieged and fighting for their state's and their 
own survival against huge Arab odds. It was the Arabs who were the 
prime villains, not Israel. It was they, despite some valid claims of 
their own, who wished to dismember someone else's homeland and 
who as a result had periodically incited international crises. Feelings 
of sympathy for a deserving underdog were strengthened in the ALP 
by the party's inclination to favour democratic and socially progres-
sive regimes. An essentially labour/social democratic Israel fitted this 
description, but the Arab states did not. Close ties between the 
Australian and Israeli trade-union movements further strengthened 
sympathy for Israel's cause. 
This persuasion within the ALP could live with the language of the 
party's 1973 conference declaration on the Middle East, but not with 
many of the government's utterances and policy movements. To one 
degree or another the government's position was questioned by con-
ference delegates, members of the Federal Executive, caucus and even 
ministers. The Friends of Israel group in caucus, though not par-
ticularly effective as a lobby, was at least one evidence of intra-party 
interest and concern. More evidence was found in the barbed ques-
tions on the Middle East sometimes put to Whitlam in Parliament by 
members of his own party. The most dramatic evidence was Hawke 
himself, the party's Federal President. Hawke was a steadfast friend 
of Israel. He openly referred to the government's policy as not "even-
handed" but as "abhorrent"."" In November 1973, Hawke, himself not 
a parliamentarian, undertook to influence the Labor caucus to assume 
a more aggressively stated, pro-Israeli position."' After a January 
1974 speech on the Middle East question, Hawke told Whitlam's 
senior personal adviser, Peter Wilenski, that he considered the issue 
"almost as vital as the survival of the Labor government. He said he 
was seriously considering resigning from the party presidency. And 
he warned that if he did so he would not help in any future campaign 
to get the government re-elected.""^ In February 1974, he nearly suc-
ceeded In having his charges of the government's non-even-handed 
policy brought before the Federal Executive. He openly condemned 
the 1975 decision to allow a known PLO member to visit Australia 
and complained that had the matter gone before full Cabinet, permis-
sion would have been refused."' 
There was another dimension to the Labor Party's thinking about 
the Middle East. Again some characteristic Labor orientations were 
noticeable. This view was not strictly speaking anti-Israeli. What It 
emphasized was that, after the 1967 war Israel took and tenaciously 
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held territories that did not belong to it. In this sense. Israel's con-
quest by force majeure could not be condoned. Nor could Israel's treat-
ment of the Palestinian refugees, whose plight had become an inter-
national scandal. Nor was its unreasonable refusal to treat with the 
PLO. the most authoritative spokesman for the Palestinians. Less 
crystallized were some feelings that Israel, an essentially Western 
state, was resisting the claims of what basically were Third World na-
tions. Also present were occasional overtones that Israel had become 
a pawn of America's designs in the region. 
Generally, though not universally, those who took an especially 
sympathetic view of the Arab state and Palestinian position stood on 
the left of the party. One such figure was W. H. Hartley, a member of 
the Federal Executive. He and Hawke were the most vocal 
protagonists of the two competing strands within the party. Hartley 
opened another dimension of the intra-party and national debate in 
mid-1974. Returning from the Middle East as part of an unofficial 
ALP and trade-union delegation, he said that the PLO was receptive 
to opening an information office in Australia and to sending a group 
of its people on tour of Australia in early 1975. Such steps. Hartley 
and the PLO believed, were necessary to counter disproportionate 
Zionist propaganda in Australia."" Reaction from other ALP quarters, 
Jewish sources and the opposition was sharply critical. The PLO not 
only should be unwelcome in Australia because it was pledged to dis-
member Israel, but because It was, among other things, a terrorist 
organization. In the months following, not much was heard of the in-
formation office idea, but by the opening of the new year a group of 
PLO members was preparing for an unofficial visit to Australia. The 
Foreign Affairs Department undert(X)k an intensive security check of 
those proposing to come. All the same, the debate exploded. Hawke 
and other members of the Labor Party, including ministers and South 
Australia's Premier Don Dunstan, members of the Jewish community 
and the L-CP opposition condemned the idea."' 
There was acute embarrassment for the ALP as a party of govern-
ment. The party was gravely split on the issue. Its elertoral fortunes at 
that time were depressed and there was a possibility of another early 
election being forced by the opposition. Moreover the ALP was about 
to meet in federal conference, where it was eagerly hoping to 
promote the theme of party unity. In addition to standard anti-PLO 
arguments. Peacock was alleging that a visit would be another and 
deplorable government concession to Third World agitation and in-
consistent with a policy of denying visas to peaceful South African 
sportsmen."* Willesee, Immigration Minister Cameron, Whitlam and 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, though they would have preferred 
that the issue had not surfaced as it did, supported the visit. This was 
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not done on ideological but on "fair go" grounds for the ventilation of 
a particular point of view and because they felt that an international-
ly "isolated" PLO (as China had once been) would only persist in its 
intransigence. Federal Cabinet met on the eve of the Federal 
Conference and proceeded to make the first genuinely "collective" 
foreign policy decision since Labor's election in December 1972. After 
much impassioned debate, on a very close vote, the decision was to 
bar the PLO visit. Whitlam's official explanation of the artion was 
that such a visit would have worsened division within the Australian 
community. The explanation was superficial. More exactly, a 
favourable decision would have inflamed anti-PLO feeling within the 
party and enhanced opposition electoral fortunes. Whitlam was 
angry that two leading party associates, Hawke and Hartley, had in 
their separate ways unnecessarily envenomed debate over the Middle 
East."' Whitlam was especially vexed with Harley. Hartley's critical 
interventions in government foreign policy had been numerous. On 
this occasion, he was felt to have improperly taken over sponsorship 
of the PLO visit and to have precluded the consideration of visas for 
PLO visitors through normal diplomatic channels. The controversy 
did not die there. Whitlam indicated he would at some future point 
like to have a PLO delegation pay an unofficial call. Other exponents 
of a visit continued to champion their cause. Some felt a particular 
urgency to bringing in a PLO delegation, with whom a PLO informa-
tion office could be discussed. An early elertion was still possible, and 
so was a change of government. It was therefore important to set up 
an office before an unsympathetic L-CP might come to office."* As we 
have seen, visits by PLO-related persons were in fart allowed by the 
government. Among the consequences of the visits were physical 
clashes between pro- and anti-PLO demonstrators. We recall 
Whitlam's explanation of only a few months earlier that Cabinet had 
rejected a PLO visit because it would likely further divide the 
Australian community. 
Our present context is Australia's diplomacy towards the Middle 
East, not trade. But some comment on the diplomacy/economics 
nexus adds perspective to our subject. The Whitlam government's of-
ficial position was that its Middle East diplomacy was quite distinct 
from Australia's economic interests in the region. The point is 
hypothetical, but we can surmise that had Australia not had a distinct 
economic interest in the Middle East, its diplomacy would not have 
been much different. But if its economic interests had been substan-
tially tied to Israel and only incidentally to the Arab states and Iran, 
then there might have been a somewhat different diplomatic posture. 
Australia was dependent on Persian Gulf states for about 30 per cent 
of its crude oil arid enjoyed a meaningful primary product export 
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trade with the region. Prior to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war, 
Canberra had dispatched a seasoned emissary to the region to deal 
with Australia's continuing petroleum requirements and other mat-
ters. When the war broke out, the government had already been sub-
scribing to what it portrayed as an even-handed diplomatic policy. 
Although its Middle East oil bill jumped, Australia never faced an oil 
embargo of the sort that Middle Eastern oil-producing states imposed 
on ostensibly pro-Israeli nations. Plainly, Australia was interested in 
further insulating itself from oil and other trade difficulties. 
During the 1973 Middle Eastern hostilities, a wheat sale to Egypt 
was in the pipeline. The Wheat Board reversed its earlier decision and 
now wanted Egypt to pay cash, or to have the Australian government 
itself bear the risks if credit were extended. The government agreed to 
accept 75 per cent of the risk involved in the sale. Its decision was 
justifiable on strictly commercial grounds. But it also told the Wheat 
Board that it was eager to demonstrate an even-handed, not preferen-
tial, outkxik towards the conflict. Australian negativism on the wheat 
deal could have lent itself to an opposite. pro-Israeli interpretation."' 
Later, with strong diplomatically based arguments from Foreign Af-
fairs, the government agreed to expedite deliveries of the wheat. 
After the 1975 Cabinet decision to bar a PLO delegation visit, there 
were indications of Arab state displeasure and intimations that 
Australian trade would be adversely affected.'" Careful Foreign Af-
fairs Department monitoring of Arab capital reaction did not. 
however, indicate that explicit commercial retaliation against 
Australia was forthcoming. Indeed, the Labor government proceeded 
with an enormously ambitious search for petrodollar loans, an effort 
that, as we will discuss later precipitated a major political crisis in 
Australia. 
Nuclear testing was another issue area that highlighted the con-
fluence of values, party and interest group politics and diplomatic 
manoeuvre. Labor's basic view was emphatic: "We would like to see 
all atomic testing—by all nations—cease."" Within the party, the 
anti-nuclear view was both genuine and widespread. It was inspired 
by a mixture of idealism and perceived Australian and international 
benefit. Nuclear testing was a bad thing because it endangered human 
health and otherwise damaged the natural environment. Hence 
Australia was especially concerned about above-surface nuclear 
testing. Secondly, the government believed that nuclear testing was 
bad for the state of the world, bad for confining the ambit of conflict 
or for reducing its destructive consequences. Nuclear testing even by 
established nuclear powers could serve as an incentive for nuclear 
weapon proliferation among other nations and it increased chances 
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of conventional conflict escalating to nuclear levels. Hence the ALP 
government very rapidly ratified the NPT and unconditionally 
renounced acquisition of nuclear weaponry for itself. It was in-
terested in strengthening international nuclear information and 
materials exchanges for peaceful purposes. It was pained by the 1974 
Indian nuclear test, despite the test's ostensible peaceful applications, 
and also by the British underground test in Nevada in the same year 
since it occurred "at a time when other recent [i.e. Indian test] 
developments have justifiably increased apprehension in the inter-
national community about the nuclear arms race"." A final sub-
sidiary reason for Labor's campaign against nuclear testing was that 
such activity by Australia provided a convenient opportunity for 
demonstrating the government's sense of diplomatic initiative on a 
virtually global stage and for demonstrating its humanitarian creden-
tials among Third World nations. 
Labor's attention was focused on the two established nuclear 
powers that refused to subscribe to the NPT and that continued to test 
in the atmosphere—France and China. Particular umbrage was taken 
with France, which carried out its testing in French Polynesia, in the 
South Pacific, meaning in Australia's general geographic 
neighbtwrhood. Moreover, France was a party to an interwar treaty 
that provided for peaceful settlement of international disputes, but 
which in this instance France claimed inoperative due to a defence 
exigency exception clause. Australia discounted the French exception 
and believed Paris was acting in direct defiance of international law. 
Official Australian initiatives against French testing were numerous 
and varied. There were diplomatic conversations, diplomatic protests 
when tests occurred and intimations of withdrawing the Australian 
ambassador from Paris. Prior to France's mid-1973 test, New Zealand 
dispatched a frigate and Australia a support ship to the test area 
around (but not within) the test/fall-out zone, to publicize dis-
pleasure. Together with New Zealand, though with a somewhat dif-
ferent brief, Australia went to the International Court of Justice in 
the Hague, to force a legal restraint on France. In an interim decision, 
the ICJ issued a temporary restraining Injunction asking both France 
and Australia to refrain from aggravating the dispute, including by 
not proceeding with testing, until the Court could explicitly establish 
its own competence in the matter and render a full and binding judge-
ment. Paris did not honour the Court's injunction. But, while Canber-
ra continued to protest against French testing. It eventually felt that 
earlier official and unofficial Australian and other exertions had 
probably hastened France's decision to conduct tests underground. 
This was a safer procedure, and one against which Australian dis-
pleasure was less intensely expressed." 
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It must be noted that the Labor government's efforts to block 
French testing, or to censure France for testing, or at large to con-
demn nuclear testing, especially in the atmosphere, were not confined 
to unilateral Australian or bilateral Australian-New Zealand in-
itiatives. Especially in 1973 and in early 1974, senior Australian 
ministers used the United Nations and every other available inter-
national forum to press appropriate resolutions or other expressions 
of sentiment. These settings included the South Pacific Forum, Apia, 
April 1973 (Whitlam); June-July 1973 African ministerial visit (Wil-
lesee); Mexico City, July 1973 (Whitlam); Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers Conference, Ottawa, August 1973 (Whitlam); South Pacific 
Conference, Guam, September 1973 (Willesee); South Pacific Forum, 
Rorotonga, March 1974 (Willesee). Largely though not uniformly, 
Australia was able to evoke sympathetic responses in such forums. 
The Labor government was also able, at an early stage of its tenure in 
office, to display its credentials of interest, humanity and initiatory 
style. Several persons intimately associated with the Australian 
foreign policy scene remarked to the author that Australia probably 
gained considerable diplomatic credit through its anti-French testing 
diplomacy, especially among Pacific Island nations. 
Action against the French nuclear-testing programme was by no 
means limited to official, diplomatic initiatives. On the government's 
part, there were some intimations that French obduracy could lead to 
trade reprisals, including Australia's defence procurements.'" But the 
government elected not to play that game, and in fact discouraged 
trade-union action against France. In May 1973, Whitlam met with 
Hawke and requested that no industrial action against France be 
taken. More particularly, Whitlam urged unions to avoid a postal and 
telecommunications ban. Such action would not only contravene 
Australian obligations under international conventions on diplomatic 
and consular postal exchanges but could also possibly prejudice 
Australia's case before the ICJ." 
But, with the open support of several ministers, Hawke and the 
ACTU t(X)k their own counsel. For several months, a black ban was 
imposed on French shipping and air services to Australia, on the 
handling of French goods, on mail and telecommunications services, 
even on French artistic performers. The ban was not entirely success-
ful. Inconvenience was caused to France and French interests, but 
equally or more so to Australia, which enjoyed a profitable and 
favourably balanced trade with France. There were particularly in-
convenient spin-off effects upon South Pacific countries. In time, the 
ban petered out, with only sporadic and incidental revival afterwards.'* 
Moreover, the union boycott opened a party political controversy 
jn Australia. Earlier L-CP governments had been very firm in con-
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demning French atmospheric testing. When in opposition, the L-CP 
continued this position and endorsed Labor's submission to the ICJ. 
But it thought the Australian and New Zealand venture to be a case of 
grandstanding, and the union boycott as counter-productive and a 
sign of government helplessness in the face of outside pressures." 
Most of the opposition's criticism of the government was, however 
aimed at Labor's handling of Chinese nuclear testing. The L-CP's basic 
charge, as for instance expressed in a motion of importance moved in 
the Senate, was that the government was adhering to a double stan-
dard in its attitude towards French and Chinese nuclear testing, and 
that it had exerted itself less often and less intensely in denouncing 
Peking's nuclear programme; a "matter of national disgrace", Sinclair 
called it.'* 
What were ttie facts? The government filed protests over Chinese 
as well as French tests. Conversations were held with ranking 
Chinese officials In Peking by top Labor figures, including Whitlam 
and Cairns, and Cairns noted Chou En-lai's annoyance over the 
Australian criticisms." In its public pronouncements, the government 
made it plain that it condemned all atmospheric tests, Chinese and 
French alike. Australia brought French but not Chinese tests before 
the ICJ. This was fully understandable, since China had never 
covenanted to the ICJ's jurisdiction. On the other hand, the fact re-
mains that on some occasions, in international forum or bilateral 
communique settings, Australia pressed for a condemnation of 
French tests, but wished to avoid similarly explicit chastisement of 
Peking. It is also true that while there had been ministerial intima-
tions of officially sponsored commercial pressures against France, no 
comparable remarks appear to have been made about China. While 
Australia at one time toyed with recalling its ambassador from Paris, 
nothing comparable was contemplated opposite China. The tone of 
Australia's relations with France in 1973 over the testing issue was 
more angered than it was towards China. Furthermore, at a non-
governmental level, Australian unions effectively did nothing to im-
pose bans against Chinese goods, services or transport. 
Why did there seem to be a less-severe attitude towards China? 
One apparent reason was the ICJ situation. The Whitlam government 
was especially piqued with France for its refusal to acknowledge the 
jurisdiction of the Court in the testing matter since France was a 
party to the ICJ convention. We notice again a certain legalistic 
streak in the Labor government's outlook, as well as a preoccupation 
with regularized, international means of conflict settlement. The 
French flaunted both principles; the Chinese, technically, neither. The 
Whitlam government also was known to make a distinction between 
French and Chinese testing in that France had the effrontery to set off 
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nuclear explosions in someone else's backyard, while China at least 
operated on its own soil. This view was present despite the fart that 
the French nuclear devices seemed "cleaner" than the Chinese and 
their fall-out probably potentially touched no more people than 
China's. 
That leaves only one further explanation. For reasons of sentiment 
or diplomatic calculation, the Labor government did not wish to be as 
stern with China as with France. The present author supports Hedley 
Bull's conclusion: "whereas a political campaign against France on 
the issue suits the general line of our foreign policy, a comparable 
campaign against China would move so much counter to the main 
drift of our diplomacy as to be unthinkable."*" This interpretation 
was privately accepted, with various degrees of emphasis, in circles 
close to the Australian foreign policy process. Labor's view had 
something to do with its pleasure at having helped to discard open 
containment practices against China, and perhaps with a fear that 
overreaction against Chinese nuclear tests could lead to re-
estrangement between China and other countries. Labor's approach 
also related to its wish to be firm but not brusque with good, though 
admittedly ideologically distant, diplomatic colleagues. It also had 
something to do with the fact that China was felt to be a key factor in 
Labor's vision of a low-conflict Asian community, while France was 
not, and with Labor's wish to maintain standing and some influence 
with the Chinese leadership. In a nutshell, for Labor, China counted 
for far more than France and therefore deserved somewhat special 
handling, even after the original honeymoon of Chinese-ALP govern-
ment relations. 
We have, in several issue area contexts, mentioned Australia's reac-
tion to various communist states. A more explicit rendering of 
Australian-communist state relations is helpful in unravelling the 
motives, diplomatic style and political constraints that operated on 
and within the Labor government. We will look first at Australian 
diplomatic initiatives towards smaller communist nations and then 
turn to relations with China and the Soviet Union. 
Part of Labor's approach to communist nations was dictated by the 
conviction that realities needed to be recognized. Diplomatic connec-
tions implied nothing about political or ideological approval. Indeed, 
diplomatically "contained" nations were less likely, in Labor's view, 
to become respectably behaving members of the international com-
munity. Movement towards international detente had already set the 
tone for abandoning anachronistic postures. Sustaining Labor's feel-
ings was the memory of the prolonged and, the ALP felt, conspicuous-
.ly counter-productive isolation of China. 
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Labor quickly recognized East Germany (German Democratic 
Republic). The explanation was In part straightforward: It was to 
facilitate commercial as well as political relations. In part, it reflected 
a more particular Labor intention, namely to diversify Australia's 
contacts and interests beyond the traditional South-East Asian con-
centration.*' It was an unconditional step. The McMahon govern-
ment had itself been moving towards recognition and no political 
recrimination arose when Labor recognized. 
Within Asia, the recognition of North Vietnam was, for reasons 
previously alluded to, a natural step for Labor. It was more controver-
sial than the German step, but really more for its alleged "haste" than 
for its lack of justification. Relations with Saigon, we recall, were un-
affected until the Thieu regime collapsed. When in 1975 there was a 
change of regimes in Saigon and Pnom Penh, Australia quickly 
recognized the new governments. Again, what criticism there was 
from the opposition, and from the United States, was essentially for 
haste, not for the wrongness of the decisions. 
The recognition of North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea) was a more complex enterprise. In addition to conventional 
political and commercial recognition considerations, the government 
was animated by the belief that Australian, and more generally inter-
national, recognition would place both Koreas on notice that they 
were two de facto entities, neither of which was entitled to encroach 
on the other and that peaceful reunification as such might be 
hastened. It was a reason that carried both pragmatic and idealistic 
connotations. Moreover, even though recognition of North Korea had 
no bearing on Canberra's continuing recognition of South Korea 
(Republi(; of Korea), there was considerable resistance expressed by 
Japan, the United States, and most emphatically by the South 
Koreans; "premature" recognition of Pyongyang would weaken 
Seoul's position and possibly delay a reasonable unification settle-
ment.*^ 
The process by which Australia moved towards recognition of 
North Korea was nearly a model of preparation and sensitivity. Early 
in Labor's tenure, it was decided to avoid any hostile tone of voice 
towards North Korea and to promote various informal exchanges. An 
Australian trade mission to North Korea broke some ice in 1973. The 
South Korean and other governments were kept apprised of what 
became Australia's intention to recognize North Korea. The South 
Koreans requested that, at minimum. Canberra ask various com-
munist nations to consider recognizing Seoul. This was done, in-
cluding with China, despite obvious Australian reservations about 
prospects for success. Australian-North Korean negotiations were 
conducted slowly, and Australian patience was apparently sorely 
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tried. The North Koreans were."bloody obstinate" to deal with, one 
well-placed observer remarked. Australia did not "give anything 
away" in its recognition agreement with North Korea. Nor did It 
hasten to establish an embassy in Pyongyang, but decided to accredit 
a non-residential ambassador.*' An embassy, headed by a charge, was 
not opened until April 1975. Nor was the government innocent about 
the Australian political scene. Once the double dissolution of Parlia-
ment had been announced in April 1974, the author was assured that 
nothing would be done to consummate recognition before polling-
day. When, shortly before the election, South Korean objections 
became loud, Willesee turned the tables by taking the high road: 
Australians would resent any action by another country that might be 
interpreted as an intrusion into an Australian electoral campaign,*" 
When he visited North Korea In June 1975. Willesee cautioned his 
hosts about bombastic and unrealistic behaviour on the subject of 
Korean unification.*' Recognition had, he felt, made it easier for 
Australia to speak plainly. 
The Labor government's meticulous efforts at sensible relations 
with North Korea were laid waste just before Whitlam lost office. At 
the end of October the North Koreans peremptorily withdrew their 
personnel from Canberra and a week later ordered the Australians 
out of Pyongyang. A flurry of charges about "intolerably" provocative 
acts, sabotage of the North Korean people and harassment by 
Australia appeared. The Australian government was stunned, dis-
mayed and embarrassed. The day that the govemment was ended by 
the Governor-General, Willesee was describing North Korea's allega-
tions as "so transparently false that they do the People's Republic of 
Korea no credit and raise serious questions about its willingness or 
capacity to act in the normally accepted way."** 
North Korea's diplomatic insult followed immediately upon a vote 
in the Political Committee of the United Nations, where Australia had 
just cast an abstention on a North Korean-favoured resolution that. 
inter alia, called for eventual Korean unification talks between North 
Korea and the United States only. Investigation suggests that 
Australia's United Nations vote was not the only and quite possibly 
not the major factor behind the North Korean move. Apparently, it 
simply was the last straw for a North Korean government already 
very unhappy with Australia. The North Koreans had never adapted 
to dealing with a Western government, and to their position in 
Canberra in particular. They had not appreciated admonitions (equal-
ly placed before the South Koreans) not to engage in blatant 
propaganda within Australia against the other Korea, nor Australia's 
insistence on dealing with the two Koreas as equally sovereign in 
their respective areas. Indeed, when Australia first made publicly 
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known its intention to oppose the contentious United Nations resolu-
tion, and the North Koreans expressed their resentment, a decision 
was made to change the vote to an abstention. It was a decision taken 
impetuously, apparently by Whitlam personally, and satisfied no one. 
It failed to placate the North Koreans. It angered the Americans, to 
whom a negative vote had been explicitly promised. Canadians, 
Japanese and others also expressed their disappointment. While the 
resolution was expected to succeed whatever Australia's vote, it was 
believed that the final tally in the Political Committee was exag-
gerated due to the influence of Australia's early alphabetical vote.*' In 
the end, the Labor government earned recrimination from both sides, 
ironically on an issue where its United Nations vote seemed to be 
more symptom than cause of the diplomatic breach with North 
Korea. At all events, the caretaker Fraser government returned 
Australia's vote to negative once the resolution came before the 
plenary session. 
For different reasons, Cuba also proved a complex diplomatic 
enterprise. When Labor entered office, Australia and Cuba already 
recognized one another, but there was no representation on either 
side. For the first half year of its tenure, the Whitlam government 
turned aside Cuban inquiries about setting up a consulate and trade 
mission in Sydney. The principal public explanation as of June 1973 
was that the volume of bilateral trade did not justify such a move and 
that Australia lacked the resources to reciprocate with a mission in 
Havana. Whitlam did indicate, however, that American feeling may 
have played a part.** By July 1973. while in Mexico, Whitlam ex-
plored Latin American feelings towards Cuba in relation to a possible 
Australian move. By January 1974. a decision was taken to accept a 
Cuban consulate, temporarily with no Australian post in Cuba. 
Australia did, in fact, have something to gain from a consulate in 
Sydney, given the healthy and rising sales to Cuba. Representation by 
one party alone suddenly proved no obstacle to accepting a consulate. 
It is instructive what really did constrain Australia for a time. 
Canberra believed that the United States would have been furious 
with Australia, perhaps to the point of applying trade sanctions, had 
Australia made a friendly representational gesture towards Cuba in 
the first half of 1973. In the immediate background seemed to lie 
Washington's known hostility towards the Castro regime, and the 
climate of Canberra-Washington relations was at that time very chil-
ly, given Whitlam's Vietnam letter to Nixon and other factors. So, to 
avoid further aggravation, Australia did nothing about Cuba. The 
truth is that these Australia concerns were decidedly exaggerated. 
They were based on plausible but overdrawn inferences passed from 
the embassy in Washington, not on actual American threats or pres-
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sures. By the second half of 197 3, Australia began to realize that 
Washington had itself become less strident about Cuba, and Whitlam 
as Prime Minister had at long last paid a visit to America and in a 
fashion made peace with the Nixon administration. The episode 
showed that the new independently minded Lalxir government was 
not callous about its relations with the United States, though admit-
tedly the issue of a Cuban consulate was peripheral to Australia's 
basic foreign policy concerns. The fact that Whitlam t(H)k pains to dis-
cover Latin American feelings alxiut Cuba also illuminated a broader 
principle, namely his orientation towards regionalism as an inter-
national phenomenon. His interest in Latin American opinion was 
much more than a gesture of courtesy: it fitted his conceptions."" 
Labor's recognition of Peking was in a political class by itself It 
held topmost priority for the new government. There never was any 
question of continuing diplomatic links with Taiwan; it could not and 
would not be. The nomenclature of the Sino-Australian recognition 
agreement was accepted by Canberra without resistance, even though 
Australia "acknowledged " China's position that Taiwan was one of its 
provinces, rather than holding out for a softer, Canadian formula of 
"noting" China's claim.'" Affirming a natural diplomatic relationship 
with China was then, and remained, a source of considerable pride 
and pleasure for the ALP government, and for Whitlam personally, 
who had gambled but benefited handsomely from his 1971 visit to 
China. Normalization of relations with China was symbolically 
prominent as an exercise in party vindication. The nasty past lay 
behind, a goixl and sensible future ahead. At last, things had been set 
right. Whitlam's October-November 197) visit to China, now as 
Prime Minister, was a sentimental as well as diplomatic journey. As 
we have seen, Lalxir was convinced that, for many reasons, effective 
relations with China were central to building a structure of stability 
and regional co-operation, though the government realized that 
Australia had to guard against making relations with China the pivot 
of its foreign policy. The government underwrote its commitment to 
close and effective ties with China. It apixiinted as ambassador Dr 
Stephen FitzGerald, a Sinologist, expert in the language, personally 
known to the Chinese from his 1971 visit with the ALP delegation, 
and a person close to Whitlam himself The embassy was staffed with 
competent Chinese.-speaking personnel. The Australian commission 
in Hong Kong was retained, in part, to provide a supplementary 
source of 'China-watching" data and advice to the government. 
For some time, Austialia had to suffer some tiresome, even med-
dlesome Chinese behaviour. The Chinese press celebrated the pro-
Peking Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) and played 
up industrial disorders and economic weaknesses in Australia. The 
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Chinese complained to Canberra about misinterpretations by 
Australian journalists of the "anti-Confucian" ideological campaign 
being waged in China. The Foreign Affairs Department pointed out 
that the Australian press was free, not controlled as in China. The 
department was prepared to correct errors of fact, but regarded in-
terpretations as the right of individual journalists." The Chinese 
asked the Australian government to prevent the screening in 
Australia of a film on China regarded by Peking as libelous. The 
government refused to intercede with Australian Broadcasting Com-
mission decisions on screenings, or with private screenings in 
theatres. There had been intimations of reprisals against the ABC cor-
respondent In Peking should the ABC run the film." The govern-
ment's polite but firm reactions apparently paid off There eventually 
were fewer maligning articles in the Chinese press and no repetitions 
d la the anti-Confucian campaign and film screening complaints. In-
formed parties suggested two explanations for the earlier Chinese in-
trusions. Firstly, that they had been inspired by China's Canberra em-
bassy, perhaps by persons inexpreienced in the ways of Australian 
society and politics. Secondly, that there may have been an attempt to 
"test" Australia, as to how far Labor as a government was prepared to 
concede to China in its bid to preserve favourable working relations 
with Peking. 
More generally, how did Sino-Australian relations fare? According 
to the government, early and enthusiastic recognition, plus other 
gestures and the style of Australia's approach to China, helped to im-
prove trading relationships.'" We will look at this latter claim further 
on. The point here is that the government had seen some concrete 
commercial gain from a friendly diplomatic posture towards China, 
and then believed this had been brought about. In 1974, China's 
agreement to a cultural exchange package with Australia was the first 
of its kind negotiated since the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The 
Chinese invited a senior Australian diplomat to assist them in explor-
ing certain law-of-the-sea problems and took Australian specialist ad-
vice on the development of undersea oil deposits. The Labor govern-
ment welcomed such contacts. For the sake of diplomatic benefits, it 
seemed to treat China tenderly. Hence it walked a careful line on 
Chinese nuclear testing. It was hesitant to denounce Peking on such 
occasions as when China forcefully took over the Paracel Islands in 
the South China Sea from South Vietnam. It acceded to Chinese 
representations that Taiwanese visitors bearing official connections 
not be granted Australian visas, though Australia managed to protect 
its own position in the Pacific Area Travel Association by admitting 
Taiwanese delegates to the association's Sydney conference through 
some very delicate ftxitwork.'" 
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Whitlam, in particular, reiterated that Australia was not trying to 
cast itself in the role of China's advocate in the region. All the same, 
better understanding in the neighbourhood could be advanced by 
Australia: "I don't suggest that we should pose for ourselves any gran-
diose, pompous role as a 'bridge'. But It may well be that on certain is-
sues and on some occasions and at all times in a general way, we can 
be one honest broker among others."" As we saw earlier, a salient 
feature of this conception was the wish to make China more accep-
table to South-East Asian states. The quality of Australia's own rela-
tions with Peking would in turn serve as evidence of how a professed-
ly Western and aligned nation could get on with a communist China. 
The ultimate purpose, or vision, was a more stabilized regional en-
vironment and broadly cast linkages in an Asian-Pacific associational 
context. Though the regional impact was slight, as early as May 1973, 
Chou En-lai urged Cairns to use his contacts among Asian leaders to 
stress that China would not attempt to expand its influence among 
overseas Chinese communities.''* As seen, Australia's role may have 
affected Malaysia's recognition of China in 1974. By early 1975, there 
were signs that China was prepared to enter into initially confidential 
conversations with Australia about broad issues of disarmament. This 
was due in part to Australia's known interest in the subject and to its 
good relations with a variety of aligned and non-aligned govern-
ments. Still, as a number of people sensed, there was a danger of over-
stating and romanticizing Australia's Chinese connections. A serious 
turn for the worse between Canberra and Peking could create a major 
public and political let-down, and possibly cause precipitate overreac-
tion and otherwise unnecessary disillusionment. 
For the Labor government, relations with the Soviets were less 
critical and entailed less emotional involvement than did relations 
with China. All the same, Soviet-Australian relations were impor-
tant. There were considerations of trade. There was the overall re-
quirement of reasonable access to a super-power with considerable 
and world-wide interests. There was interest in the Soviet role in 
Australia's western seaboard exposure, the Indian Ocean. The Soviets 
themselves took an increasingly keen interest In Australia. Australia 
was assuming a particularly active role with various Asian states and 
was evolving a form of brokerage relationship among them, while 
reducing its earlier, heavily American-oriented dependence. 
Moreover Moscow's competition with Peking seemed to recommend 
a strong diplomatic presence in Australia, which could help to 
monitor and if needed countervail possible pro-Chinese, and therefore 
Soviet-resented, inclinations. The Soviets upgraded their diplomatic 
and consular staffs in Australia and, apparently, the KGB component. 
Whitlam's visit to the Soviet Union in January 1975 was a testament 
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of both sides' heightened interest in one another. On that occasion, 
the Soviet "interest" was extended to the electronic bugging and 
other forms of surveillance over the Australian visitors. At the 
diplomatic level, the visit produced agreement for sponsorship of a 
world-disarmament conference, as well as enhanced top-level 
bilateral contacts." 
The ALP government had some skirmishes with the Soviet Union 
that, though in and of themselves of no major substantive impor-
tance, were felt in many quarters to have been indicative of Labor's 
diplomatic style in relation to communist states. As a party of govern-
ment. Labor prided itself on its commitment to the rights of in-
dividuals and peoples. Willesee issued a statement in which he 
denounced the expulsion from the USSR of writer Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn as "contrary to all internationally accepted forms of 
judicial process and respect for human rights.'* When in the Soviet 
Union, Whitlam raised with Premier Kosygin issues such as Jewish 
migration from the Soviet Union and the treatment of political 
prisoners, only to be told that these were matters of domestic Soviet 
concern." At the United Nations, Australia promoted standards of 
generous political asylum. 
At home, however the L-CP and considerable sections of the press 
concluded that the government was behaving contrary to such senti-
ments, presumably to curry Soviet favour. The opposition revealed an 
otherwise unpublicized case of an East European diplomat who, for 
his family and himself had inquired about asylum in Australia 
through an Australian mission in a third country. Pressed, Immigra-
tion Minister Cameron conceded that the head of the Australian mis-
sion in the third country had recommended that entry be given, but 
that he, Cameron, had refused the request. The government declined 
to elaborate, leaving an impression that it had something to hide.*" 
Much more dramatized was the case of Georgi Ermolenko, a young 
Soviet violinist. In August 1974, in Perth, at the conclusion of a con-
cert tour of Australia, Ermolenko announced that he wished to re-
main in Australia. For several days there was confusion and public 
demonstration in Perth, and hectic activity in Perth and in Canberra. 
The upshot was that Ermolenko was said by Australian spokesmen to 
have changed his mind of his own free will, after conversations with 
Soviet officials. He was then spirited out of Australia on his way to 
the Soviet Union in an RAAF aircraft, to avoid restraining action by 
groups in Perth convinced Ermolenko was being intimidated into 
leaving. There was a widespread impression that, while Australia had 
a very nettlesome problem on its hands, it had bent over backwards 
to accommcxJate the Soviets, and perhaps had even colluded with the 
Soviets to get Ermolenko out. This was presented as a violation of 
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Labor's human rights professions as well as a cynical gesture to be 
pleasant to the Soviets, perhaps in anticipated exchange for some 
diplomatic or commercial favour or more broadly, simply to be 
tolerant of communist practices.*' In 1975, Ermolenko and his musi-
cian parents left the Soviet Union with exit visas for Israel, 
whereupon they announced they were migrating to Australia. The 
Labor government portrayed this as" vindication of its earlier 
procedures. Had Ermolenko not previously been permitted to leave 
Australia, he could not have brought his parents out of Russia.*^ 
Simultaneously, Cameron announced that two Czech seamen who 
had jumped ship in Australia, and who for months faced the prospiect 
of deportation, would be granted permanent residence.*' 
Another point in controversy was Labor's decision to recognize de 
jure Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and 
Estonia. These states had, under duress, been incorporated into the 
Soviet Union at the start of the Second World War. By mid-1974, 
when Australia took its step, most Western and in particular NATO 
states had not accorded de jure recognition. How and why did 
Australia take its step? On the basis of extensive inquiries, the author 
feels that a close approximation of an accurate answer can be made. 
The public record reads that Willesee personally ordered a Foreign 
Affairs Department review of the matter. He may have had a hand in 
It, but the inspiration apparently came from Whitlam himself. He had 
become aware of and was disturbed by the anomalous presence of an 
honorary Latvian consul in Melbourne, who purported to represent a 
"free Latvian" government. Whitlam shot a note to Foreign Affairs to 
examine the matter. Then, from New Zealand, came another incen-
tive for the government to delve into the issue. A New Zealand 
parliamentary delegation wished to visit the Baltic states, but the 
New Zealand government discovered this would be difficult, since 
Wellington had never granted dejure recognition of Soviet sovereignty 
over these states. In search of guidance. New Zealand contacted the 
Australian government. In Canberra, Foreign Affairs made a recom-
mendation that Australia recognize dejure Soviet sovereignty over the 
Baltic states. The submission went to Willesee, as Foreign Minister. 
Willesee was out of the country. His office asked that the submission 
be held over until his return. But the submission was then placed 
before Whitlam, in his capacity as acting Foreign Minister. Whitlam 
endorsed the department's favourable recommendation, without con-
sultation with Willesee or other Cabinet colleagues. No public an-
nouncement was issued. The decision came to light quite accidentally, 
when press reports picked up the fact that the Australian Ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union had paid a call in the Baltic region. 
Why was the decision taken? The British, US and other govern-
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ments were consulted and raised no objections. The department's 
brief was decidedly positive. Foreign Affairs largely construed the 
step as part of the government's "cleaning-up" effort to remove 
remaining diplomatic anomalies. However it is understood that the 
department's preparation of the submission was handled less diligent-
ly than it might have been and that some potential offshoot problems 
were simply overlooked; for instance, the effect on Japan, which for 
years had challenged Soviet occupation of its northern islands. The 
government's explanation of the decision was that it was a logical ex-
tension of recognizing realities. It was foolhardy and inimical to sensi-
ble East-West relations to encourage people to think that the Baltic 
states could somehow be recovered from the Soviet Union. Australia's 
gesture would also facilitate various consular relations relative to the 
Baltic states.*" 
These explanations, in the author's best judgement, were real, not 
specious, and they did generally complement Labor's overall thinking 
about recognition practices and about working with realities and 
towards useful relations with communist nations, rather than 
holding to nostalgic and divisive notions about what communist na-
tions perpetrated years before. Other motives, turning on its ostensi-
ble wish to please the Soviets, were imputed to the government. 
Labor was charged with trying to demonstrate to the USSR that 
Australia was not "over-tilting" towards China; with wishing to im-
prove its voice in Moscow over the Soviet naval build-up in the In-
dian Ocean; with wanting Soviet backing for Australia's UN General 
Assembly presidential candidacy; with looking for a cordial reception 
for Whitlam on his scheduled visit to the Soviet Union; with aiming 
to influence Soviet-Australian negotiations on the sale of beef from 
the depressed Australian industry. Most of these interpretations were 
plausible, but none, apparently, contributed to the decision. 
If indeed the government was not searching for any diplomatic or 
commercial pay-offs from Its decision, then it can be argued that its 
generalized motives were not worth the clamour that the decision 
precipitated. Australia gained next to nothing from a decision on a 
matter very marginal to its diplomatic concerns. Willesee said that he 
concurred in the decision, but there is some highly reliable internal 
evidence suggesting otherwise. He certainly felt that the step was 
precipitous and ill-timed politically, lacking the sort of gradual public 
conditioning that had preceded the recognition of North Korea. A 
number of people In the party, including ministers, were upset. Not 
only was it a poor decision, but It had been taken by Whitlam alone. 
The bypassing of caucus and Cabinet on foreign policy decisions had 
been routine procedure. In this case, however, it strengthened feeling 
that Labor parliamentarians were at large being improperly dis-
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regarded by the Prime Minister. The Baltic incident probably 
heightened caucus activity on the Timorese and PRG issues. 
There was, moreover a great hue and cry raised by the opposition, 
in much of the press and within the Baltic emigre community in 
Australia. The criticisms, taken together with attacks over Ermolenko 
and the East European diplomat who had sought asylum, caused the 
government acute political embarrassment. Critics generally believed 
that the government had impunged its own declarations about rights 
and self-determination for all peoples. Baltic people in the country 
felt betrayed. The opposition hammered the theme that the Whitlam 
government now stocxi exp(«ed. The government talked a smooth 
line about even-handedness, but was said to be patently uneven in its 
practices by fawning over Third World and communist states. It at-
tacked injustice in Rhodesia and South Africa. It gave aid to liberation 
movements. But it failed to distinguish between aggressor and victim 
in the Middle East, and now on the Baltic issue, Ermolenko. etc. This 
showed that the government was preoccupied with ingratiating itself 
with the Soviets. In broader terms, the Baltic decision was sketched 
out as evidence of an Australian drift into non-alignment.*' 
On the known evidence, the Ermolenko. East European diplomat 
and Baltic episodes did not justify a reasoned judgement that Labor 
was bending over backwards to be gracious towards the Soviets or 
communist nations generally. The government did not handle the Er-
molenko case as efficiently and clearly as it might have. Indeed, it 
may have erred in thinking that Ermolenko had had a fair chance to 
weigh his options before he was flown out of Perth. But the govern-
ment had to contend with an extraordinarily confused and sen-
sationalized problem, most of which was played out in Perth, where 
the government lacked adequate personnel. The author can personal-
ly testify that, when the Ermolenko affair crested, there was a frantic 
atmosphere in the Department of Foreign Affairs and in the Foreign 
Minister's office, a clutching of heads prompted by not quite knowing 
what was going on and how to react next. There is no information as 
to why Canberra overrtxle its own overseas Australian mission advice 
and refused to grant asylum to the inquiring East European diplomat. 
One can surmise that Cameron did not wish to let an apparent anti-
communist in or to create an untoward situation with a communist 
nation. But it can also be speculated that the reasons were quite dif-
ferent, with no bearing on ideology or politics. We simply do not 
know. We have suggested that the stated reasons for the Baltic states 
decision were probably true and the only ones. These reasons squared 
with Labor's overall international perceptions and had little if 
anything to do with tilting towards the Soviets. It was impression 
that led people to think otherwise. The step was quite unnecessary 
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and, like the asylum seeker's case, was, at least originally, kept under 
wraps, thereby arousing suspicions of some kind of perfidy. It was 
stylistically mismanaged, and above all showed a noticeable lapse of 
political foresight. It was in these resperts that the Labor government 
could be most tellingly faulted. 
We have discussed the pattern of Australia's relations with com-
munist states. Shortly we will appraise relations with the United 
States. In between, it is worthwhile to reassemble and extend a 
number of earlier points about Labor's general substantive and 
stylistic approach to international diplomacy, with emphasis on Asia. 
We have noticed the Whitlam government's professions of inter-
nationalism, a '*new nationalist" temper and a wish to discharge an 
independently concerned, constructive role in world councils. Labor 
saw separate yet interlocking reasons to spread Australia's diplomatic 
involvement widely—towards great powers, towards Third World 
states, towards states whose "middle power" status seemed to resem-
ble Australia's and towards the surrounding Asian-Pacific region in 
particular Establishing a far-flung network of diplomatic ties was one 
method of going about this. The dispatch of very senior ministers 
overseas, especially to areas previously understressed by L-CP govern-
ments, was another. A third method was accepting observer status at 
a variety of regional bodies, in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. 
The ALP as a party was bestirred. For instance, in 1974, for the first 
time it voted money for a fraternal socialist party, in this instance 
Portuguese socialists, and initiated steps for an Australian meeting 
site for jhe Bureau of the Socialist International.** Whitlam, we 
recall, saw the period of Labor's advent to power as most timely for 
an activist Australian role abroad, to make the most of opportunities 
previously lost over Indo-China, China, and so on. 
Relations with Japan were one sign of what the government set 
out to do. It saw Japan not only as a major trading partner but as a 
vital cog in the region, a contributor to regional economic develop-
ment, and as a potential and major member in a broad Asian-Pacific 
forum. Moreover, Whitlam was preoccupied with the need to "break 
the nexus", which he associated historically with great industrial 
powers, a nexus between economic strength and military strength 
and its use. Australia could not do this alone, but it could help. It 
could afford Japan access to raw materials and an overseas market. In 
addition to economic provisions, it could also make gestures of major 
symbolic and possibly diplomatic importance. A 1974 proposal from 
Ambassador Shann in Tokyo for a large-scale Japanese-Australian 
foundation was rejected in Canberra as premature and too grandiose, 
and was not supported by the Japanese themselves.*' Instead, a 
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Straightforward yet important cultural agreement was signed and in 
1975, a modified form of the Australian-Japan foundation idea was 
announced by the government. 
Under the L-CP, Japan's wish for a treaty of friendship, commerce 
and navigation had been rebuffed. Under Labor the Interdepartmen-
tal Committee on Japan again advised against. There were various 
economic objections, and objections dealing with suspicious reactions 
that might be aroused elsewhere in Asia. Whitlam turned down the 
advice and had the matter reassessed. A modified umbrella concept 
was adumbrated; in effect, a treaty of friendship and co-operation. 
Such a compact would spell out various economic relationships. It 
would be geared to meeting the promise of Australian materials and 
markets for Japan. It would also, in a unique step for both sides, for-
malize the Canberra-Tokyo relationship and hopefully serve as reas-
surance for Japan and neighbouring states. China, for one, was con-
sulted by Australia and raised no objections.** However, negotiations 
on the treaty proved long and difficult, as we will see when discussing 
Australia's international economic policies. 
Labor's reaction to a proposal for a more formalized New Zealand-
Australian relationship illuminated some of the government's 
diplomatic priorities and conceptions. Early in 1973, Kirk put to 
Whitlam the idea of a new institutionalized arrangement. Despite 
palpably close New Zealand-Australian ties and rapport between the 
two Labor Prime Ministers, Australia said no. In part, it was felt that 
existing mechanisms for consultations and exchanges were sufficient. 
More explicitly, Canberra wished to avoid requirements of what it 
regarded as constant pre-consultation, feeling this would constrain its 
freedom of manoeuvre, especially in a period when the new Whitlam 
government was undertaking so many foreign policy initiatives.*' 
Here and in other contexts we have noticed the wide span of ALP 
government activity. Some of this was conducted circumspertly, some 
of it with an air of drama and some in a plain-spoken Whitlam style. 
For instar^ce, Whitlam's original Asian-Pacific scheme proposal was 
probably overrushed, but his visits to China and Japan in the latter 
part of 1973 were models of careful preparation and execution. 
Whitlam's early remarks about Thailand becoming a second Vietnam 
because of the American military presence there, and about the need 
to urge Thailand into closer ties with China, were at the time taken in 
Bangkok more as mdeness than as candour. 
At the 1973 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in Ot-
tawa, Whitlam and Singapore's Lee Kuan-yew had very sharp ex-
changes, publicly as well as privatley, on a variety of topics. Whitlam 
claimed that Lee had started it all, but Whitlam was not averse to giv-
ing as much as he took. Whitlam referred to Lee as a "philosophical 
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hawk" and a man who was "very free with his advice, but Singapore 
has pursued a thoroughly selfish attitude in our region". Lee had 
become "too authoritarian" and "more and more like Cromwell."'" 
The government's handling of political and civil violations in 
various nations was. as a rule, composed. The major exceptions to the 
rule were the South African and Rhodesian regimes. This was sub-
stantially accounted for by a personal sense of revulsion against 
racialism. One less-glowing explanation, to which we alluded before, 
was that idealism and principle faded as distance to Australia 
shortened. What was meant was that South Africa, Rhodesia, and 
perhaps the Greek and Chilean military regimes, were easy targets. 
Little was lost and perhaps something gained, especially among Third 
World nations, by rouncJly condemning such regimes. But towards 
Asian countries, with whom Australia felt it needed friendly relations 
and where the thrust of its diplomacy was directed, criticism was 
more muted. 
The author feels that there is something to be said for this principle 
versus pragmatism interpretation, but that it should not be over-
stretched. Whitlam made some quite unflattering remarks about the 
Chilean military junta and quite pointedly said that there was much 
less freedom in Chile than in China." But, despite vocal radical pres-
sures and much unease among ALP parliamentarians, the govern-
ment had chosen to recognize the new Chilean regime. It dealt with 
it, and in so doing was able, by early 1975, to arrange the passage of a 
number of Chilean political "non-desirables" to Australia, in itself a 
concrete humanitarian gesture.'^ The government issued public con-
demnations of the treatment of noted Soviet authors and scientists, 
and Whitlam raised civil liberty questions with Kosygin, though there 
was no particular rancour in Australia's tone on such occasions. 
Political prisoner issues in Asia created the most controversy in 
Australia. There was a view that Australia should not countenance 
political oppression simply to maintain working relations with of-
fending regimes. Regimes changed and, in any event, some argued 
that Australia should try to associate itself with the more, not less, 
progressive tendencies within the Third World. The "pro-criticism" 
outlook, though concentrated on the left, drew cross-party support. 
For example, a multi-party "amnesty" group in Parliament, though 
only about fifteen strong in consistent working numbers, collected 
some eighty parliamentary signatures on a petition handed to 
Whitlam prior to his 1974 and 1975 Indonesian and Soviet visits, re-
questing that he raise political oppression issues with leaders in the 
two host nations. Indonesia came in for special attack by critics, since 
the government seemed so intent to stay on side with the leadership 
there. A different view was offered by Richard Woolcott, then Deputy 
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Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs. He cautioned against 
imposing Australian political values on others. The government 
should not fall into the trap of overreacting to the point of counter-
productivity. Sensitive regimes might become more repressive if over-
pressed and Australia could lose needed standing among them." 
Ministers of Whitlam's and Willesee's stature did in fact raise political 
repression with governments as diverse as South Vietnam (Thieu 
regime). Singapore. South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia. But 
they generally followed Woolcott's advice. They expressed concern, 
but without fanfare. When Whitlam refused the parliamentary peti-
tions pressed on him by the amnesty group, his explanation was not 
that the petitions were substantively improper, but that he alone, in 
an official capacity, would broach these matters. 
The government's approach to international groupings, and es-
pecially the United Nations, requires special mention. Attachment to 
the United Nations fitted Labor's temperament and objectives well. 
The United Nations was a near-universal membership body, as 
heterogeneous as could be. and a genuine gathering of the family of 
man. It stocxi for noble objectives such as peace and international 
gcxidwill. and was seen as devoted more to the avoidance than to the 
suppression of conflict. It provided a forum where smaller powers 
such as Australia could more easily be noticed, and possibly exert in-
fluence, than in ordinary bilateral situations. For Labor idealism and 
perceived national interest merged. In its lexicon, the United Nations 
was a decidedly gcxid thing. 
As a result. Labor used the United Nations energetically. It was op-
posed (for instance, on Cambodia) to procedural manoeuvres 
designed by others to block substantive deliberations. It undertcxik 
special issue area initiatives, as on diplomatic asylum and on the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. It proclaimed that "there was no area 
of actual or potential conflict anywhere in the world where loyalties, 
ideology or interest, should make Australian involvement... in peace-
keeping unacceptable or unwelcome.'" Australia expressed interest in 
supplying trcxips in this capacity for service in Cyprus and in the Mid-
dle East, and actually undertcxik training of units in peace-keeping 
roles with Canadian forces. 
Late in 1975, the government's position on peace-keeping became 
the basis of some misunderstanding: Roy Macartney, an Australian 
correspondent based in the United States, reported that the Labor 
government had demurred in the face of a United Nations query 
about Australian logistical trcxips being sent in support of the peace-
keeping force in the Sinai." The government acknowledged that as of 
late 1973, Australia had made known that it would give sympathetic 
consideration to a United Nations request for peace-keeping person-
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nel and that a list of potentially available resources had been 
pericxiically revised and made available to United Nations authorities. 
It denied, however that any sort of United Nations inquiry had been 
made in this particular case. Nor had Australia discouraged the 
United Nations from entering such a request.'* 
The author's inquiries indicate that the government's explanations 
were accurate. The Macartney stories were apparently inspired when 
Australia made some fairly routine queries to the United Nations 
about costing its ongoing contributions of an air transport In Kashmir 
and policemen in Cyprus. However, once the allegations about a pur-
ported United Nations request for troops had appeared, it seems that, 
internally, Australia began to question the feasibility of a troop con-
tribution to the Middle East ;/ it should be asked for one. The 
economics of such an effort were one consideration. Domestic politics 
in Australia were very likely another; there would have been reluc-
tance to re-ignite volatile opinion on the government's Middle East 
policy. Another suggested constraint—intruging, originating with a 
reputable source but unfortunately unconfirmed—was said to have 
been the need to husband Australian forces for contingency use in 
Portuguese Timor At any rate, it Is speculation as to how an actual 
United Nations request would have been received in Canberra in the 
closing months of Labor's tenure in office. 
Australia announced Willesee's candidacy for the presidency of the 
UN General Assembly's 30th (1975) session. The idea sprang up in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. Whitlam was more enthusiastic than 
was Willesee. No particularly conspicuous lobbying was carried out 
within the "West European and Other" group, to which Australia 
belonged and whose turn it would have been to provide an Assembly 
President. Still, it was an endearing thought in some Labor quarters 
that Australia would be the first nation ever to have been elected to 
the post twice, the first time having been in the 1940s, when Evatt 
presided. Willesee's candidacy was withdrawn in mid-1975. mostly 
because an equally senior person from a nation without previous 
presidency experience became available." Australia was pleased to 
find its way on to various UN committees and was active in related 
agencies. It strengthened its representation at the International 
Labour Organization headquarters in Geneva. In early 1975, it 
withdrew the country's previous substantive reservations to accep-
tance of compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. This was an indication of 
support for the Court's principles and objectives and was done 
because Labor felt it to be "in the interest of all States to act in accor-
dance with international law and to accept the resolution [of dis-
putes] by peaceful means.'* This was a clear example of Labor's 
propensities: idealism, faith in peaceful and collective means of 
settling differences and a tinge of legalism. 
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Apart from the United Nations and related bodies, there was the 
Commonwealth of Nations. Menzies had embraced it for its intimacy 
and its British qualities, but felt saddened as the Commonwealth 
became more diverse and multi-racial. What saddened Menzies 
gladened Whitlam. Under the ALP. the Commonwealth once again 
became a championed institution. 
Among other international venues, admission under observer 
status was sought to summit meetings of non-aligned nations. It 
started with a bid to attend a non-aligned nation conference in 
Algiers. Some precedent for such a step was seen in the Bandung con-
ference of 1954. In the event, Australia withdrew its bid, because it 
was not then, nor professed a wish to become, non-aligned. However, 
Whitlam continued to hope that observer status in non-aligned na-
tion settings would be possible, if only to share economic ideas." In 
August 1975, Labor got its wish, becoming a guest at the foreign 
ministers conference of non-aligned countries in Lima. The only other 
Western nations attending in this capacity were nations that 
belonged to no international security alliances, and Portugal, which 
although a member of NATO was at the time governed by a strongly 
radical regime. 
While not professing non-alignment, Whitlam did, for instance in 
Yugoslavia in 1975, say that his government supported many of the 
non-aligned world's causes.'"" The visit of President Julius Nyere of 
Tanzania in 1974 conveyed an impression that Australia under Labor 
had somehow been "accepted" by non-aligned states. Then there had 
been Whitlam's remark in New Delhi in 1973 that Australia's attitude 
towards UN issues would no longer be influenced mainly by consulta-
tions with America and Britain: 
On matters concerning our region—the Pacific, Asia and the Indian 
Ocean—We will want to consult more closely than Australia has in the 
past with our neighbours. 
Indeed, 
Never again are we going to be put in the position of finding ourselves 
siding with Britain. France. Portugal [pre-coup]. South Africa and the U.S. 
while all our neighbours are on the other side.'"' 
Opposition spokesmen and other critics thought they saw a pattern 
in Labor's diplomatic actions and pronouncements. The essence of 
their position can be distilled from Peacock's rejoinders. Labor's style 
was depicted as confusing motion with progress; a great deal of 
ministerial rushing about, a posturing at times tainted by in-
tmsiveness and rudeness. Labor"s metier was to grab for slogans, gim-
micks and formulas—Asian forums, zones of peace, aid to African 
revolutionaries, or whatever. ""This is an advertising man"s approach 
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to foreign policy—and only someone regarding Australia"s destiny as 
an accc:)unt to be handled could proceed in this way.""'"' Labor's al-
legedly tasteless style was depicted as a counterpart of its inability to 
discriminate between the lasting and the important, and the fleeting 
and the marginal. In its pursuit of ideological goals. Labor dissipated 
the nation's diplomatic resources; "With an ineptness bordering on 
genius it has managed to achieve the worst of both worlds, to be 
naive without idealism and opportunistic to no advantage."'"' Labor's 
thinking was not only dissheveled but dangerously airborne. Liberals, 
said Peacock, "do not accept the vague internationalism and the spirit 
of international brotherhood of socialists as espoused by this 
Government.""'^" It was in the context of such depreciations of ALP 
diplomacy that critics found special fault in the government's over-
Involvement with the Third World and with non-aligned causes, with 
a markedly concessionary approach to communist states and move-
ments and with a depressing cavalierism towards the United States. 
Challenge to the government's diplomatic approach to the United 
States rested on two related grounds. Firstly, it was claimed that 
Labor was pulling Australia away from its trusted and Immensely im-
portant friend and ally, while making very questionable sub-
stitutions."Mr Whitlam Is seeking to take Australia away from old 
and trusted friends, away from Britain and America." Eraser insisted, 
"and in exchange he takes Australia to the third world, to China and 
Russia. I doubt if the average Australian will regard that as a fair ex-
change."'"' There also was sharp reaction to Labor's diplomatic style, 
but with the caveat that the L-CP would not itself accept a subser-
vient relationship with Washington. Labor treated America rudely. 
This was unnecessary and gratuitous. It harmed Australia's reputa-
tion and standing: ""The Liberal and Country Parties see the United 
States and Australia as equal partners. Forthrightness on Australia's 
part does not in our view require Australia to be personally 
abusive."'"* 
The government tcK)k pains to explain its relationship with 
America in a quite different light. Australia's "aligned" status was 
often alluded to. as was the value of the US connection, through 
ANZUS and otherwise. Wider, more active and more constructive 
relationships with other nations were explained as having been 
gained without expense to traditional American ties, and these newer 
connections could actually assist Australia's chief ally in the realiza-
tion of global and regional objectives. Australia's diplomacy under the 
L-CP had been subservient and contrary not only to Canberra's but to 
Washington's best interests. Australia now sought a wider range of 
advice and consultation than in the past. The new tone of relationship 
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"will now rest on firmer foundations than it did In the past," 
Whitlam averred. "I believe that America respects and welcomes the 
less compliant and more independent though equally friendly, ap-
proach ... "'"' Australia and the United States were claimed not to 
disagree on basic matters. When disagreement arose, Australia made 
its views kno.wn, politely but candidly, and if possible privately. The 
end of the Indo-Chinese conflict was seen as opening even better op-
portunity for a sensible, relaxed relationship with Washington.'"* 
What follows in our narrative is an attempt to explain the actual 
temper of Australian-American relations, especially in the context of 
bilateral diplomatic interchanges. Much of the analysis is based on in-
terview material. It draws on discussions conducted in bcnh countries 
with numerous Australian and American respondents. 
Relations between the incoming Labor government and the United 
States almost immediately got off to a poor beginning. Cumulative 
events produced a shocked, angry reaction from Washington. 
Washington was not surprised that Labor had won the December 
1972 election: But disorientation resulted because an old and faithful 
ally, though admittedly previously led politically by parties other 
than Labor should now scold the United States in its time of travail, 
to "conspire" to organize international protest against American 
policy in Vietnam. There was resentment over personalized 
ministerial denunciations of the US President and administration, 
though American officials apparently failed to take into account the 
mechanics and dynamics of ALP ministerial election and the relative 
impunity with which caucus-elected ministers could speak their con-
victions. There also was distress over the union boycott of American 
shipping and some under-appreciation of what the Australian 
government could realistically do about it. These shocks were felt in 
the White House, in Henry Kissinger's National Secutiry Council and 
in the State Department. Numerous diplomatic discussions were held 
in Washington and Canberra. A year later, much of this classified 
material was obtained and published by an Australian journalist.'"' 
These disclosures showed considerable credit reflecting on the poise 
and restraint with which Australian officials conducted themselves 
under very difficult conditions. 
For the first half of 1973 there was a torturous guessing-game as to 
when and if Whitlam would be able to visit Nixon. Whitlam was 
eager to pay a call. He was, hc:)wever also eager to avoid leaving an 
impression that he would beg his way into the White House, and he 
otherwise wished to avoid the sychophantic style he attributed to his 
L-CP predecessors. 
There were obstacles to an early, easily arranged visit. The profes-
sionals in the State Department strongly encouraged a meeting, but 
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the President held a serious grudge about the events of December-
January. At all events, it was Kissinger's National Security Council, 
not the State Department, that at the time carried influence in the 
White House. There also was the matter of Whitlam's demeanour. We 
have seen that he on several occasions heaped praise on Nixon's Inter-
national statesmanship. He also, however, made some distinctly un-
flattering and de facto undiplomatic allusions. In Parliament, in May, 
he referred to the "parlous position" of the American presidency."" 
At a private but widely attended reception at the Prime Ministerial 
Lodge in April, he had described Nixon as a "barbarian" and as a man 
who had "monstered" Vietnam."' The explanation for this seemingly 
contradictory behaviour is that Whitlam believed that Nixon had 
made a vital international contribution, but nonetheless suffered 
from other defects. The critical remarks further hampered a White 
House invitation. About Whitlam the man, they revealed a lapse of 
diplomatic finesse, but a sense of honesty as well. 
Various factors eventually combined to produce an invitation for 
an informal Whitlam visit. Certain policy moves had a mollifying ef-
fect on Washington, for instance an Australian pledge to retain US 
defence installations. Visits to America by various Australian 
ministers went off smoothly. Officials on both sides struggled to make 
a visit possible. The two top people in the embassy in Washington, Sir 
James Plimsoll and Roy Fernandez, were well-known, well-liked and 
highly effective spokesmen for their country. Whitlam's principal per-
sonal aide, Peter Wilenski, paid a hurried call on Kissinger in May. 
Kissinger was mollified. In writing, he extended a personal promise 
to Wilenski that Whitlam could come. Various Australian opposition 
members, including Peacock during a trip to America, urged US of-
ficials and politicians to work for a Whitlam visit, since the stand-off 
increasingly appeared to be endangering long-term US-Australian 
relations. The new US Ambassador to Canberra. Marshall Green, ex-
erted himself to bring about a visit. His representations were probably 
decisive, though the other factors also counted. 
Whitlam eventually showed up in Washington in late July. 
Measured against the strained background of the previous months, 
the visit was a success. Contact with Nixon came off without incident. 
Whitlam saw a wide range of official and Congressional figures. He 
avoided captious remarks, and generally, in his speeches, interviews 
and the like, left a very favourable impression. But Whitlam ap-
parently did not lose his distaste for facets of Nixon the man. Shortly 
after leaving Washington, he remarked that Watergate had "purified 
and strengthened" America."^ It Is believed that, as the Watergate 
scandal's proportions grew, Whitlam would not have bothered to 
visit Nixon again, even if opportunity had arisen. Nixon himself 
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thought better of snubbing Whitlam. When Labor was returned to of-
fice in May 1974, Nixon prompfly sent warm congratulations. 
Whitlam and the new American President, Gerald Ford, struck an 
easy relationship. When in the United States in late 1974, Whitlam 
was accorded praise as well as courtesy. The US Ambassador to the 
United Nations, John Scali, called Whitlam's UN address "magnificent". 
The irony was remarked upon: "it was Nixon's departure in disgrace 
that made it possible for Mr Whitlam to have his nice week in the 
U.S. and to put Australian-American relations—at least on a personal 
basis—back to a moderately comfortable square one."'" 
A few basic points should be stressed before we continue our assess-
ment of Australian-American relations. One is that the connection 
was between two states that shared ain intimate interest In many inter-
national concerns. The Labor government's diplomacy emphasized In-
itiative and innovation. The United States remained a super-power. 
Therefore, their contacts were bound to be numerous. A second point 
was the extensive and intricate bilateral relationship in economic, 
diplomatic, defence and other areas. A third point to remember is 
that the two governments, by the admission and preference of both 
parties, sought to thrash out rather than blithely overlcxik their dif-
ferences of opinion. In other words, it would have been difficult to 
Imagine that the relationship could have proceeded casually and 
wholly undisturbed. 
At various times, each side expressed concern over what the other 
was or might be doing. Australia did not like the American Interdic-
tion of North Vietnam and tcxik exception to US naval and air facility 
upgrading in the Indian Ocean and to aspects of Washington's role in 
the 1973 Middle East hostilities. The United States for example, 
wanted a stronger Australian UN stand on Cambodia, resented 
Australia's sudden shift on the Korean resolution at the United Na-
tions in 1975, resisted Australian plans to vote South Africa 
out of the United Nations, disapproved of the prospect of a joint 
Soviet-Australian space-science installation in Australia (which 
Australia itself refused) and was unhappy about a possible PRG infor-
mation office in Australia before the incumbent Saigon regime col-
lapsed. On the other hand, often unnoticed, were areas of Australian 
policy not congruent with prevailing American policy where the 
United States expressed no opposition, or even assumed a benign 
posture. Included in this category were Australia's recognition of Pek-
ing and of Hanoi, recognition of de jure Soviet sovereignty over the 
Baltic states, the eventual decision to invite a Cuban consulate into 
Sydney and Australia's wish to reconstitute SEATO. 
When senior Australian ministers such as Cairns, or even Whitlam 
himself offered public remarks that went beyond standing Australian 
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policy or were openly derisive of US motives or policies, the 
Americans sought explanations. Such US reactions were, according to 
one very highly placed Australian official, not really "protests" but 
"mildly couched" representations. Indeed, it is understood that the 
Americans came to believe that, by calling attention, such representa-
tions eventually proved useful in reducing the number and force of 
ministerial "out of school" comments, thereby enhancing the overall 
climate of bilateral relations. The point is interesting, but most dif-
ficult to verify. 
American reaction to Australia was at times unmistakably firm, as 
on the controversy over US bombing in Vietnam, or the South African 
UN membership vote, on which the United States tried hard to limit 
Australia to an abstention. At other times it was restrained, but mis-
construed as being otherwise. It seems useful to reconstruct one such 
episode, namely the 1975 ALP conference decision to allow a PRG in-
formation office in Australia. Wide currency was given in the 
Australian press to what were described as strong American 
representations."" The impression given was of American heavy-
handedness, especially to be resented in Australia because this had 
been only a party not an official decision. As it was, US officials had 
scheduled a meeting with Ambassador Shaw on other matters. The 
PRG Issue was simply tacked on later to the agenda and represented a 
statement of US thinking, nothing more. The ambassador had not 
been "summoned" to receive anything approaching a "protest". The 
conversation would probably not even have been made public had an 
Australian correspondent in Washington not guessed that the PRG 
issue would be raised. When asked directly, US sources acknowledged 
that it had been. The US embassy in Canberra, with Ambassador 
Green being away at the time, "confirmed" that the matter had been 
broached in Washington. Inexplicably, however since it did so on an 
educated guess basis, not yet having been formally appraised of what, 
If anything, and in what form, had happened in Washington. This US 
embassy "admission" of some sort of American objection to a PRG of-
fice heightened an impression of American anger with Australia. A 
further irony was that the decision in Washington to approach Shaw 
was taken on a more senior level than the State Department's own 
ANZ desk or the US embassy in Canberra. It was more a response to 
worried inputs from "key" (read South-East Asian) US embassies. 
What emerged was more a conjunction of happenstance, misinforma-
tion and bureaucratic jumble than an advanced case of American 
heavy-handedness. 
The United States did take seriously Australian security lapses. At 
the opening of its term in office, probably out of some sense of "open 
government" practice, Whitlam's personal staff was not requireci to 
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undergo security clearances. The United States took a dim view, since 
this could have compromised the normal intelligence flow and 
further weakened what already were frayed US-Australian relations. 
The Labor government acceded.'" The United States is known to 
have expressed reservations about the advisability of releasing highly 
sensitive information to Calms, particularly after he had become 
Deputy Prime Minister and, at times, acting Prime Minsiter. But 
Cairns himself apparently never asked to be briefed on such matters 
as the role of the top-secret US facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar, 
and Whitlam did not see fit to encourage him to find out. What also 
worried the United States was a succession of major security breaches. 
The 1972-73 Vietnam issue transcripts of conversations and of cables 
were revealed a year after the fact. Shortly thereafter, details of con-
versations with Shaw regarding Whitlam's indiscreet remarks on the 
use of Thai bases for bombing North Vietnam were disclosed. So were 
details of Soviet approaches for a joint space-science station in 
Australia and the ensuing American objections. Both Washington and 
Canberra were deeply concerned, and Canberra was especially embar-
rassed. Security was tightened and investigations launched, but 
nothing definite came to light. The dominant speculation among 
Australians and Americans who were asked was that the leaks were 
not attributable to a single source. They did not represent a concerted 
effort to compromise US-Australian relations. They may have 
originated among ministerial staff members who passed information 
to journalists. Just prior to the sacking of Whitlam by the Governor-
General, a report appeared that the CIA had apparently undertaken, 
through ASIO, to inquire into security breaches by the Prime Minister 
himself"* 
Both sides seemed to share the blame for a breakdown in com-
munications when, during the Yom Kippur war Nixon declared a US 
armed forces alert. Being world-wide, the alert affected the North-
West Cape and other US facilities in Australia. US personnel were 
placed on the alert before the Australian government was notified. The 
incident brought a sharp rebuke from Whitlam, both for the lack of 
consulative propriety and because he felt the alert had been a Nixon 
gesture designed for American domestic consumption. Green advised 
the Australian government of the alert "moments" after the fart, as 
scx)n as he personally knew of it The United States tried to explain 
the oversight as best as it could. It tcx)k exceptionally serious umbrage 
at what it thought to be unfair and overreactive remarks from 
Whitlam at a time when, the author was reminded, America was in 
difficulties with its European allies over transit rights for US aircraft 
carrying arms to Israel. As the United States saw it, the European in-
jury was compounded by the Australian insult.'" 
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An inference to be drawn is that it was on those occasions when 
the United States felt Itself most internationally beleaguered-
Vietnam in 1972-73, the Middle East later in 1973—that it was the 
most unsparing in its retorts to adverse Australian criticism. Another 
precipitant was Indo-China at large, a consuming American interest 
that bred hypersensitivity, some of which spilled over on to 
Australia's Labor government. 
The historically close Australian-American relationship withstood 
the kinds of jostles we have noted. As will be shown in another con-
text, defence-related co-operation if anything improved under Labor 
Intelligence data continued to move in both directions and senior and 
experienced Australian officials noticed no serious omissions or 
"ccxiking" of data from the United States. America continued to 
maintain CIA and other intelligence personnel in Australia, known to 
the Australian government and who worked closely with JIO and 
other sectors of the Australian intelligence community. Relations 
between US and Australian officials continued at a very close and 
usually cordial level in both capitals. The felt sense of kinship was, if 
anything, more evident among Australian than American officials. 
Late in 1974, Foreign Affairs Secretary Renouf explained that 
Australia's relations with a host of foreign nations were "useful but 
not intimate", in contrast with Americans, Britons and Canadians. 
With these three national groups, and presumably with New 
Zealanders as well, "we can get policy-makers and policy people 
together and have a really intimate exchange of views"."" 
After Labor came to office, the ANZ desk at the State Department 
was expanded, though arguably still shorthanded. All the same, the 
embassy in Canberra was enlarged to provide for the care of more 
and more specialized functions and US reporting from state-based 
consulates was upgraded. By appointing Sir Patrick Shaw, the Labor 
government continued the practice of sending a very senior ambas-
sador to Washington. After years of sending to Canberra political ap-
pointees whose talents and style ranged from average to embarrass-
ing the United States sent Marshall Green, a seasoned professional. It 
was a sign that the United States was taking Australia less for granted 
than In the past. From the point of Green's departure in mid-1975 to 
the end of Labors period in office, the US ambassadorship remained 
vacant. Part of this delay was due to skirmishing in Washington over 
whether another career appointment should be made, a view 
favoured by the State Department. The lack of urgency to appoint a 
replacement also reflected the American opinion that relations with 
Australia had Improved noticeably since 1973. In the end, the ap-
pointment went to a non-career man, James Hargrove. To minimize 
any impressions of American partisanship, his name was submitted 
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for agremeni on the eve of the 13 December election, rather than after 
the election outcome was known. 
To some critics, the American presence in Australia, highlighted by 
the Green appointment, was ominous. In mid-1974. Victorian ALP 
Senator W. C. Brown made a number of remarks that condemned 
Green and his purpose in Australia. Green was alleged to have spent 
years as a diplomatic ""hatchetman"" and was said to have been a hirer 
of killers. His posting to Australia was within this tradition. He had 
been sent to protect at all costs American imperialist interests in the 
form of investments and defence facilities. He was aiming to subvert 
the Labor government and was working in tandem with such groups 
as the L-CP opposition, the Australian-American Educational Foun-
dation, the Ford Foundation, the US Chamber of Commerce and the 
CIA."' About this time, tcxi, but not necessarily connerted with 
Brown's allegations, charges appeared that the CIA was operating in 
Australia on a large scale. In part without Australia's knowledge and 
with imputed nefarious designs on Australia.'^" 
Brown never furnished hard evidence for his accusations. Several 
of the charges he levelled against Americans or Australians ostensibly 
Implicated in enterprises inimical to Australian interests were con-
fused and demonstrably inaccurate. His motives for having launched 
the anti-Green campaign were obscure. The dominant interpretations 
among Australians of various political persuasions, and among 
American officials, was that Brown was being used by a left-wing fac-
tion within his home Victorian Labor Party branch. The effects of his 
remarks seemed counter-productive. There were some anti-American 
demonstrations in capital cities on the Fourth of July, the peak of 
Brown's campaign, but such manifestations would probably have oc-
curred without the catalyst of the Senator's remarks. A number of 
known radical figures appeared embarrassed by Brown, since his 
charges carried so little substantiation that the radical cause sufTered 
some loss of credibility. With very few exceptions, Labor Party people 
turned against Brown, condemning him for rudeness as well as for 
fatuousness. Hawke, Barnard and Whitlam himself (without 
prompting from American officials) repudiated Brown. Whitlam 
referred to Brown's attack as unfounded in fact and "a miserable, in 
fact a cowardly thing."'^' The US embassy and American consulates 
were blanketed with calls, wires and letters fom ordinary persons, 
many of them self-identified ALP members, who felt it necessary to 
dissociate themselves, and Australians generally, from Brown. 
The CIA charge is more difficult to assess since, by definition, 
covert enterprises of this sort go unmentioned or are denied. CIA 
agents did and do operate in Australia, often in conjunction with JIO 
and other Australian intelligence and security bodies. By long-
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standing agreement, Australia is to be informed of the identity of US 
intelligence operatives and of their activities. Revelations such as the 
CIA's role in helping to "destabilize" the Allende regime in Chile cast 
some doubts in Australia as to whether the United States was fully 
honouring its agreement with Canberra and possibly lent some 
credence to allegations that some agents, possibly under deep cover 
were in the country to reverse "leftist" or otherwise anti-American 
interest tendencies. This is not impossible, but highly implausible. 
Cairns, for instance, a frequent critic of US policy and with good con-
nections in the radical movement, said he knew nothing of improper 
CIA behaviour in Australia.'" Victor Marchetti, a former CIA agent 
who exposed numerous other agency activities, denied that the CIA 
operateci in this manner in Australia: "the relationship is too good, 
too important. They just don't screw around with another guy's inter-
nal affairs."'" That would seem to have been the nub of the matter. 
The United States already had considerable access to Australian data 
and officials. It worked in an open not a closed society. Subversive or 
highly partisan behaviour would, if uncovered, have enormously han-
dicapped the American economic and defence stake in Australia. We 
will have more to say about alleged CIA interventions in Australian 
politics in a later context. In any event, the ALP as a party of govern-
ment could not be indicted for concerted anti-Americanism and 
therefore was not a natural target for American conspiracies. 
It became the public as well as private posture of the US govern-
ment that the ALP was not running an anti-American government. 
According to this view, Australia and the United States had con-
sistently agreed on the large issues. The difficulties in 1973 were not a 
welcome episode, but probably had a salutary effect. Relations 
became more mature. Differences were handled in a businesslike way, 
though in an atmosphere of genuine rapport. Green publicly criticized 
the earlier L-CP tendency towards wholehearted embrace of the 
United States and called it an embarrassment to Australia at that 
time and to subsequent Australian governments. For Green, "Too 
rigid relations can snap in the winds of controversy: if it's flexible, it 
bends with the wind. I think that this is a more resilient, healthy, en-
during relationship that we have today."'^" Furthermore, "Now all 
the parties—Labor Liberal, Country Party—are in favor of a 
nationalistic policy in Australia. We understand that and agree with 
it."'" All internal evidence points to this having been Green's actual, 
rather than a diplomatically sugar-coated, sentiment. 
Expressions such as these were remarkably harmonious with the 
Labor government's own conceptions of what was appropriate in the 
Canberra-Washington relationship. In practice, on both sides, there 
was backsliding from the high intent. When the style or substance of 
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one side's policies aggravated the other untoward incidents did oc-
cur. But, as we argued before, these were predictable facets of a 
relationship between two separate nations with numerous and com-
plex concerns in common. 
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External Policy: 
vQ) Economic Dimensions 
The present chapter concentrates on the economic dimensions of 
Australia's external relations. We will especially wish to appraise the 
relationship between economic policy formulation and outputs and 
broader foreign policy considerations. We will concentrate on exter-
nal assistance, foreign investment, resource policy and trade. 
The principle of Australian development aid has for many years en-
joyed bipartisan approval. The rationale behind such programmes has 
entailed a mixture of considerations. As we saw earlier Labor as a 
party was more emotionally attracted to foreign aid than the L-CP. It 
was more disposed to Interpret international events, and especially 
competition, as being guided by economic forces. It placed greater 
trust in non-military techniques of conflict avoidance. It was more 
reflexively inspired by a humanitarian wish to devise strategies to 
provide better, more decent lives for ordinary people. On its part, the 
L-CP tended to devote more attention to the instrumental values of 
foreign aid, i.e. the tangible benefits for Australia's own perceived 
diplomatic or economic Interests. After Labor came to office, these 
inter-party Inflections seemed to narrow and the debate was more 
over particulars, such as who should be getting how much aid and in 
what form. It was generally recognized on both sides, for instance, 
that as a wealthy nation involved in the affairs of the region, 
Australia needed to make a meaningful contribution. This became es-
pecially true as the United States retracted its own presence and scope 
of assistance. 
One rough index of Labor's performance in external development 
assistance was the amount and rate of change of spending. In the 
1975-6 budget, $378 million in official development aid was al-
located. This represented a 14.7 per cent increase on funds spent the 
previous financial year. However, between 1972-3 and 1973-4 the al-
location had increased by 21 per cent and between 1973-4 and 
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1974-5 by a substantial 31 per cent. Moreover, applying other indices, 
overseas aid spending under Labor was not uniformly impressive. 
Labor was on record as wishing to reach the UN target of "advanced" 
nation aid donations of 0.7 percent per annum of GNPas scK)n as pos-
sible, but no later than the close of the 1970s. In 1972-3, largely based 
on the L-CP's last budget, the Australian figure was 0.53 per cent. In 
1973-4, based on Labor's first budget, it was 0.52 per cent. For 
1974-5, it moved up to 0.55 per cent, but on the basis of the 1975-6 
budget projections, fell back to 0.53 per cent. Inflation reduced the 
value of aid dollars spent, as did the September 1974 devaluation of 
the Australian dollar Domestic economic conditions inspired overall 
spending constraint in the 1975-6 budget. International comparisons 
of aid as per cent of GNP showed Australia slipping somewhat from 
the very high position it occupied just before Labor entered office. Aid 
figure assessment in such terms is subject to various conceptual and 
statistical difficulties. All the same, in its early years in government, 
even though decidedly more dollars were spent, Labor failed to open 
a major gap between its own contribution level and that of its 
predecessors, as the L-CP did not hesitate to point out.' In partial 
mitigation, it should be remembered that, especially after 1973, In a 
pericxi of severe inflation, heavy demands were being imposed on 
budgets by a variety of ALP spending programmes. 
Who were the beneficiaries of Labor's aid programmes? Under-
standably, and as under L-CP governments, Australia's overwhelm-
ing concentration was on the Asia-Pacific region. Also, again in keep-
ing with established practice, most of the assistance was devoted to 
Papua New Guinea. Of the $378 million projected for 1975-6, $210 
million was earmarked for Papua New Guinea; In 1974, the govern-
ment pledged itself to some $500 million over a three-year period to a 
prospectively independent Papua New Guinea. With so much flowing 
to Papua New Guinea, funds remaining for other countries were, of 
course, relatively mcxiest. Of the $49 million overall aid increase plan-
ned for 1975-6, about $40 million of that figure was accounted for by 
money pledged to Papua New Guinea; even so, a fair proportion of 
the money for Papua New Guinea was actually payable to Australians 
serving there or otherwise not directly available for PNG develop-
ment.^ 
Apart from Papua New Guinea, the most heavily endowed 
recipient of Labor's aid programmes, compatible with previous prac-
tice, was Indonesia, which tcx)k about a tenth of Australia's official 
aid. We noticed in a number of earlier contexts why Australia as-
signed special importance to its large near-neighbour. The Indonesian 
aid emphasis was generally approved in Australia, but with some 
reservations. Left opinion was particularly disturbed by Indonesia's 
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closed politics, the presence of political prisoners and diplomatic 
postures such as Indonesia's interest in associating East Timor with 
itself In economic terms, this criticism was augmented by allegations 
of misspent and misdirected aid funds, especially as benefit was al-
leged to have accrued more to the Indonesian ^lite than to the broad 
public' 
Aid to Indonesia elicited only marginal political controversy, but 
the Labor government found itself sharply attacked from its left flank 
for its aid programmes towards South Vietnam and Cambodia before 
their rightist regimes fell in 1975. Labor's professed guideline was 
that "we would give generous aid to post-war [i.e. post-January 1973] 
reconstruction of the whole of Indo-China without regard to govern-
ments or their ideologies"." Some Australian aid projects were not in 
dispute, among them contributions to all of Indo-China (and in-
cluding Vietcong-held areas) through such agencies as UNICEF, the 
International Red Cross and the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees. The last of these programmes was given special official 
attention during the mass flight of South Vietnamese refugees in the 
Australian autumn of 1975 and the public was encouraged to make 
donations. In the 1975-6 budget, reconstruction aid for Indo-China 
was given special mention. In October 1975, the first shipment of 
direct, bilateral commodity aid to Communist-held South Vietnam, 
valued at $2.4 million, was announced. 
What was controversial was Australia's aid to the two Vietnams per 
se. Strong critics of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam were in princi-
ple uncomfortable about aiding it, since even non-military aid could 
be construed as helping to prop up that government. More specifical-
ly, the argument was that Australia's aid programme had de facto 
favoured South Vietnam over North Vietnam. In 1973-4, South Viet-
nam received $3.5 million in aid. North Vietnam only $600000, and 
the large disparity persisted into 1974-5. In 1974, particular warning 
was levelled in radical circles and among some Labor people against 
Australian involvement in international aid projects for South Viet-
nam under the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The 
claim was that such projects would constitute blatant bias in favour of 
South Vietnam and a propping up of its unwholesome regime.' The 
disparities in Australian aid to the two parts of Vietnam were in part 
due to the fact that, when Labor came to power, there already were 
ongoing aid programmes for the South, but not for the North. A more 
important reason related to North Vietnam itself. Australia was for 
some time unsure of what, exactly, Hanoi wanted in the form of aid. 
Funds earmarked for the North went unspent and considerable 
Australian effort was needed to clear the pipeline. By November 
1974, it finally was possible to announce a $2 million commodity gift 
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to North Vietnam. Another problem was Hanoi's resistance to most 
forms of multilateral assistance. The Australian government regretted 
Hanoi's attitude. But, outwardly in keeping with its own professions 
of even-handedness, with clamour from critics rising, it decided that 
it would be 
inappropriate to Join in a consultative group for South Vietnam so long as 
North Vietnam holds to ... [itsl attitude ... To do so would be to join in 
preferential treatment for the South, with Australia coming under pres-
sure to increase its contributions when, as an act of policy, we are trying to 
establish some balance in aid allocations between North and South." 
A year earlier as we have seen, the government had withdrawn from 
an economic stabilization consortium that was funnelling hard cur-
rency to Cambodia. With the collapse of the Thieu regime in 1975, the 
problem of how much and what sort of aid to extend to Saigon disap-
peared. 
The form and execution of Australia's foreign aid programmes also 
caused some difficulties. By the time Labor was elected to office, 
Australia was already underwriting a large and diverse aid program-
me. Reporting in early 1973 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, which examined Australia's overseas aid, noted 
various difficulties, such as inadequate aid project evaluation and a 
tangle of bureaucratic responsibilities.' An interdepartmental task 
force was set up to work on the whole issue of foreign aid administra-
tion. What emerged, first on a provisional and then on a permanent 
basis, was the Australian Development Assistance Agency (ADAA). 
Labor as a party had previously advocated an independent aid agency. 
ADAA became a full-fledged body with a permanent staff and head 
equivalent to a departmental secretary. It acquired a number of 
former Foreign Affairs officers and reported directly to the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. In the short run, at least, ADAA failed to satisfy 
the high aspirations that some had held for it. There were differences 
between former External Territories and Foreign Affairs members of 
ADAA as to how best to deal with Papua New Guinea, the single 
largest target of Australia's external aid. The Foreign Affairs Depart-
ment was uneasy about the evolving policy orientation of ADAA. It 
forcefully argued that ADAA would create, and to an extent already 
was creating, a nightmare of crossed and blurred responsibilities 
between itself and the department, thereby handicapping rather than 
facilitating planning and execution in overseas aid.* 
Some identified Foreign Affairs' complaints as another symptom of 
the department's "aggrandizing" designs to control all key levers of 
Australia's external relations. At all events, under Labor, Australia's 
overseas aid programme assumed more and more complex 
characteristics, placing a premium on an efficient system of foreign 
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aid administration. The range of aid programmes was very wide. 
There were project and equipment programmes, technical personnel 
projects, training programmes, food aid programmes, trade incentive 
schemes, and so on. Labor extended or initiated special forms of as-
sistance. For example, together with New Zealand, Australia made ef-
forts to sustain the work of a new South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
Co-operation. It joined the Ministerial Conference for Economic 
Development of South-East Asia. It began to make grants to ASEAN 
corporatively. It made payments to improve international air naviga-
tion in several Asian countries, without publicity, in part so as not to 
offend recipent nations' sensibilities about their ability to operate 
their own airways systems. Labor shifted some of the foreign aid 
programme's emphasis. More attention was to be given to social 
aspects of aid, an important aspect of which was to be the strengthen-
ing of rural sectors of developing economies.' Government and op-
position at times seemed to vie for innovative approaches to aid. The 
government somewhat stepped up official assistance to voluntary aid 
groups, administered in conjunction vvith the Australian Council for 
Overseas Aid. In the 1974 electoral campaign, the L-CP produced a 
plan for an Australian Aid Corps, a domestic programme modelled on 
the overseas related Community Aid Abroad scheme. The Whitlam 
government floated its wide-ranging Asian-Pacific proposal. The op-
position countered with its own "regional development strategy". 
Several other structural changes began to appear in Australia's aid 
programme and thereby partially alleviated some long-standing 
criticisms. The proportionately large increase in multilaterally framed 
aid for 1975-6 (by either 14 or 33 per cent, depending on the reading 
of the data) was not a sign that the traditional dominance of bilateral 
aid was about to disappear. But it reflected a greater flexibility and a 
recognition of the value of many consortially organized aid efforts. 
There was an extension of "programme" as opposed to the more 
familiar "project"" bilateral aid approach, which facilitated "forward" 
development planning. As of 1975, bilateral aid generally remained 
"tied", i.e. aid funds needed to be spent in Australia or on Australian 
products, but the objective, especially in consultation with other 
donors, was to move towards untying. An untying of the multilateral 
portions of Australian assistance had largely been completed. In 1975. 
for instance. Australia announced the untying of its contribution to 
the Asian Development Bank's multi-purpose special aid fund and of 
the local currency part of Australia's subscription to the bank's 
technical assistance special fund.'" Aid tying had long been defended 
as an instance of enlightened self-interest, defined as assisting 
development in needy nations while stimulating Australia's domestic 
economy. Several other forms of official commitment to the economic 
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enhancement of developing states were also, implicitly or explicitly, 
believed to serve Australia's own economic interests. We will ex-
amine them under the wider rubrics of foreign investment, resource 
policy and trade. 
The prominent overseas investment stake in Australia became con-
tentious. Sometimes overlooked, however, was Australia's own 
private investment activity abroad. Because of anxiety over balance of 
payments, investment abroad had been discouraged during many of 
the L-CP years. By 1970-1, new private Australian investment within 
developing countries was only about $40 million, most of it in Papua 
New Guinea. Between 1972-3 and 1973-4, the proportion of 
Australian investment in South-East Asia relative to total overseas in-
vestment actually dropped, from 64 per cent to 40 per cent. All the 
same, Australia's accumulated investments in the South Pacific 
already exceeded those of any other Western nation. The Labor 
government made a firm commitment to encourage investment in 
developing countries. Its guidelines were not unlike those it framed 
for overseas investment in Australia—the host government"s right to 
regulate investment, where investment would be welcome and 
useful, under conditions consistent with advanced labour relations 
and environmental policies, and if possible with considerable local 
equity included. Private overseas investment was \isualized as 
meeting several desirable objectives. It would serve as a complement 
to official developmental aid efforts, with assumed economic and 
humanitarian benefits. It would serve a wider foreign policy objective 
in embellishing the image of a caring Australian presence among 
developing and especially Asian-Pacific states. It would stimulate 
local Australian business. Some radical critics saw it somewhat dif-
ferently. Australian investment testified to Labor's implication in a 
"Pacific Rim" strategy, an Australian partnership with American and 
other international capitalist interests, the net effect of which would 
be the social dislocation and economic domination imposed upon 
developing states." 
Official encouragement for private overseas investment in develop-
ing states was accelerated. For instance, investment survey missions 
were organized. Pre-investment feasibility funds were made available 
to potential investors. Trade commissioner services were upgraded. 
Overseas investment coverage opportunities under the Export 
Finance Insurance Corporation (formerly Export Payments Insurance 
Corporation) were expanded. A bilateral agreement vvith Indonesia 
guaranteeing the security of private Australian funds was negotiated. 
There was rnarked response among both Australian-owned as well 
as Australian-based but largely foreign-owned conjpanies. Some in-
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vesting companies were small, others among the largest in Australia, 
for instance Broken Hill Proprietary and Conzinc Riotino of Australia. 
BHP undertook negotiations for a steel mill in Saudi Arabia and in 
minerals and oil exploration in the Philippines, CRA in energy pro-
jects in Indonesia. 
Not all went smoothly, however. Criticism simmered over the inor-
dinately high Australian investment stake in Fiji, three-quarters of 
whose business was in Australian hands and from which returns 
taken by Australian companies were exceptionally high. By 1974, CSR 
(formerly Colonial Sugar Refining) had its sugar-marketing conces-
sion withdrawn by the Fijian government, and there were other 
rumblings in Suva about the Australian presence.'^ In Papua New 
Guinea, where Australian investment was especially prominent, the 
Somare government undertook a stiff line with foreign investors and 
wrung a massively revised tax agreement from Bougainville Copper, 
a group controlled by Conzinc Riotinto. In this instance, the 
Australian government, despite appeals from the company, refused to 
be drawn in to support Bougainville/Conzinc Riotinto's negotiating 
position with the PNG authorities." 
The Australian government itself increasingly had to cope with 
some difficult foreign policy spin-offs of its foreign investment en-
couragment posture. There were difficulties relative to Australian in-
vestment in South Africa, as we saw earlier. There was a territorial 
jurisdiction dispute with Portugal, both before and after the 1974 
coup in Lisbon, over oil exploration in the Timor Sea, between Timor 
and Australia. Ironically, Woodside-Burmah, which was conducting 
explorations off Australia's North-West Shelf, had also been granted 
Timorese exploration concessions by Portugal. In 1974, BHP and Con-
zinc Riotinto of Australia were granted off-shore exploration leases by 
South Vietnam, a step that did not escape criticism from elements in 
the ALP. On its part, the PRG claimed that when it took control, oil-
exploration leases let by its predecessors in Saigon would be nullified. 
Moreover, China and Indonesia, two nations with which Canberra 
earnestly desired amicable relations, claimed jurisdiction over por-
tions of the seas in which the leases had been let.'" By the close of 
Labor's time in government, however. North Vietnamese authorities, 
acting as spokesmen for the PRG, were indicating South Vietnam"s In-
terest in reviving exploration activities." At the UN law-of-the-sea 
conferences. Australias own interests dictated a position that 
provided for an exclusive sea-bed resources area extending to a max-
imum of 322 kilometres off-shore, or to the edge of the continental 
margin, whichever was farther, except where a boundary could be 
negotiated bilaterally, as it was with Indonesia.'* 
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Once Labor came to office, one factor that induced Australian-owned 
or -based companies to search for overseas Investment opportunities 
was their concern about the viability of the investment climate 
within Australia. We now turn specifically to foreign investment in 
Australia, a subject that excited considerable political as well as. 
economic interest. 
Australia had for some years been identified as an excellent target 
for overseas investors. It had a growing population, a high standard 
of living and an increasingly diversified and sophisticated economy. 
Its political system was orderly. Its currency was strong and under: 
valued. Overseas investment was extended official encouragement 
under the L-CP and broadly welcomed by the public. Australia also 
possessed unusual natural riches and eventually ranked among the 
world's five main producers of bauxite, iron-ore, tin, nickel, silver, 
lead, zinc, manganese and uranium. In 1974. the world's largest high-
grade deposit of uranium oxide was discovered in the Northern Ter-
ritory. The peak of overseas investment inflow during the L-CP 
period was in 1970-1 ($1.5 billion) and dropped only slightly, to $1.4 
billion, in 1971-2. British investment had for long dominated, but by 
1974 the United States had caught up, with each country supplying 
about 45 per cent of Australia's total foreign investment. By 1973, 
American-owned companies in Australia were exporting well over 
$300 million in goods to Third World countries and Australia had 
become regional headquarters for 170 American firms. Several key 
sectors of the Australian economy, among them motor vehicles and 
industrial chemicals, fell under principal foreign ownership. A 
number of minerals were dominated by foreigners. Overall, in 
1972-3, the mining industry, exclusive of processing, was just under 
50 per cent foreign-owned and 57 per cent foreign-controlled; both 
figures represented a slight rise over 1971-2.''' 
L-CP governments had been persuaded that foreign investment 
was a most important contribution to the nation's economic growth. 
As a result, their foreign investment policies were extremely permis-
sive. Only in a very limited number of enterprises, such as Australian 
banks, broadcasting media, civil aviation and life insurance, was 
foreign ownership penetration restricted. Handsome tax concessions 
were extended to the mining industry, in which foreign investment 
was considerable. Official efforts to increase local equity were essen-
tially hortatory. In 1971, the Australian Industry Development Cor-
poration (AIDC) came into operation. One of its missions was to max-
imize local ownership and control in enterprises for which it 
provided finance, but its capital resources were limited. The principal 
measure of the L-CP pericxi was not brought forward until September 
1972, when the McMahon government introduced machinery to 
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forestall takeovers by foreign interests under specified circum-
stances.'* In spirit, at least, it had been Gorton mere than McMahon 
who had questioned an open-door investment policy. 
Labor entered government against this background. We will first 
assess its approach, disposition and intentions towards foreign invest-
ment generally and then its actual programmes. 
The ALP's view of foreign investment was a complex mixture of 
visceral reaction, ideological predisposition, politics and economic 
calculation. Moreover, the party's general principles were not con-
sistently presented and within its ranks there were decided dif-
ferences of emphasis. R.F.X. (Rex) Connor the Minister for Minerals 
and Energy during virtually the entire Labor period, took a nearly 
consistent hard line, and so did Clyde Cameron. Whitlam and some 
ministers with economically related portfolios, such as Cairns, 
Hayden and Crean were relatively "softer" on foreign investment. 
There was a noticeable emotive-ideological component in Labor's 
thinking. While a mixed economy rather than a straightforward 
socialist party, the ALP nevertheless harboured suspicions of big, 
powerful and wealthy business. Its suspicions were accentuated when 
that business was foreign-dominated. Foreign big business, especially 
in key sectors such as automobiles and minerals, implied foreign-
based decisions often made for parent company benefit and possibly 
were beyond Australia's ability to counter. Also foreign big business 
offended sensibilities about national Australian pride and in-
dependence as goals or symbols in and of themselves. Giant multi-
national companies were on both counts deserving of scrutiny, and 
reaction to them sharpened with reports of their alleged misdoings 
elsewhere; for instance, ITT's unsavoury role in attempting to unseat 
the Allende regime in Chile and disclosures of pay-offs to influential 
foreigners by various American companies. 
It was not uncommon for Labor ministers to take point-blank shots 
at foreign investors. Connor took pride that, under Labor, overseas 
"racketeers" in the extractive industry could no longer write their 
own tickets." Cameron denounced the "greed" of multi-nationals and 
forecast that their international activities would in time bring most 
Western economies to their knees.^^ When the 1974 electoral cam-
paign opened, Whitlam felt he had an emotional as well as winning 
issue to stress: multi-nationals. Connor was very plain ab)out this just 
before the double dissolution: "The major problem facing Australia, 
both in the forthcoming Federal Election, and also in its economic 
policy, is Who Owns Australia? How do we stem the tide? How do 
we turn it back?"'" There were various occasions on which Labor 
resentment spilled over and perhaps was seen in part as the good oil 
of politics. There was a pained outcry when an American was ap-
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pointed the new managing director of General Motors-Holden's. 
When in late 1974, General Motors-Holden's threatened to stand 
down several thousand employees because of severely depressed car 
sales, the company's announcement was denounced as a case of anti-
Australian dictation from Detroit: "The monstrous and intolerable 
situation in Australia is that General Motors' subsidiary there has at-
tempted to stand over the Australian Government," Whitlam 
charged: "I never thought even General Motors would have the gall 
to be so overt about it. These ugly American companies."" There 
were more imputations that multi-nationals as such bore heavy per-
sonal responsibility for Australia's high rate of inflation. Threats to 
combat multi-nationals by local or international artion were also, at 
various times, expressed by trade-union spokesmen. 
In Labor's view, there was a specific economic case to be made 
against aspects of foreign investment. L-CP governments were 
claimed to have created an unconscionably free climate for investors, 
who in turn exploited their opportunities to the hilt. For example, 
relying on the Fitzgerald Report on the mineral industry,'" the govern-
ment pointed to the way in which tax concessions, paltry royalty ar-
rangements and other factors had resulted in more money being 
awarded in assistance to mining companies by the government than 
they paid in taxes, while earning, and repatriating, great sums of in-
come. Another argument was that, in 1971 and 1972, the large 
amount of inflowing capital had not been translated into additional 
resources for consumption and investment within Australia but 
rather into massive overseas reserves, thereby inducing excessive 
domestic liquidity. Another argument, familiar to Connor was that 
the Australian economy had already been given the necessary boosts 
for economic growth. At all events, Australia generated an impressive 
80 per cent plus of its own capital requirements and was claimed by 
Connor to be able to generate all or most of the remainder if neces-
sary.^" 
Altogether,, however what were Labor's guiding principles 
towards foreign investment? Experience in office, worsening 
economic conditions in Australia, decline in the political mileage that 
could be earned from strictness towards foreign Investment and other 
factors had by the second half of 1974 brought mellowing; not con-
sistently, but enough so as to be identifiable. In an Illuminating 
November 1974 speech. Treasurer Frank Crean said that the stage had 
been set for a resumption of net capital inflow at moderate and 
digestible levels: "there has necessarily been some evolution In our 
policy towards overseas capital and this has been emphasized by the 
need to meet changing economic cirsumstances."" Australian 
remarks and submissions to the United Nations respecting the 
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development of a multi-national company code by that body were 
guarded and balanced, though admittedly the inputs were primarily 
from Foreign Affairs and Treasury, not from Minerals and Energy." 
Within a few months of its exit from office. Labor's outlook took an 
even more abruptly adaptive and permissive turn. Treasurer Hayden 
offered high praise for foreign investment, about which it was "silly 
and, in some cases, extreme irresponsibility, to argue that we can do 
without."" 
Approaches to the vital mineral sector also were modified, but 
nearly throughout Labor's tenure in office it was unclear which ver-
sion of the precepts expressed was authoritative or what could be ex-
pected next. The very broad outlines for the resource/extractive in-
dustry were stated early and remained as guide-posts: (i) satisfaction 
of the nation's own future energy and industrial requirements; (ii) an 
enlargement of the domestic Australian stake; (iii) more mineral 
processing within Australia; (iv) fair prices for resources on world 
markets; (v) consideration of the effects of mineral exploitation on 
Aboriginal land rights; and (vi) regard for environmental and conser-
vation considerations.^* It is unnecessary to reconstruct all the per-
mutations of Labor's position, but some illustration is needed. In 
1973, in Japan, Whitlam indicated that Australia wished to achieve 
the highest possible level of local ownership of its resources and in-
dustries, meaning "the highest Australian equity which can be 
achieved in negotiations, project by project, consistent with justice to 
all parties ... and ... consistent with Australia's limited capacity to 
provide capital for development"." Energy projects were originally 
made an exception to the rule that allowed an overseas investment 
content, but this exception was lifted in late 1974. Moreover, about 
that time, lingering confusion as to whether the government was 
primarily interested in checking majority foreign ownership as opposed 
to foreign control were ostensibly resolved, with control emerging as 
the key concern.'" 
But the big issues remained unsettled, as evidenced by the party's 
Terrigal conference and by ministerial remarks made in the months 
following. At Terrigal, Connor made a characteristically hard-line 
speech, claiming that "To talk of control without having ownership is 
crazy", and moved that "Labor will achieve and maintain full 
ownership and control of coal, oil, natural gas. uranium and all other 
fuel and energy resources." Cairns, then Treasurer defended foreign 
investment as essential to an Australian growth rate required by both 
workers and consumers. He asked that in areas such as oil, gas and 
coal, foreign investment be kept to a minimum, i.e. short of absent. The 
Connor position was unanimously endorsed." After Terrigal, 
Whitlam announced oil exploration guidelines that de facto retreated 
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from the Terrigal declaration. Foreign companies undertaking oil ex-
ploration no longer necessarily needed to seek local participation at 
the initial or grass-roots level.'^ In the meantime, Connor conveyed 
the impression that his talk of 100 per cent ownership gave him "suf-
ficiently wide an umbrella within which to get the highest degree of 
local ownership consistent with a profitable deal for each project as it 
comes up"." But, in August 1975, when asked which was his first 
priority, Australian ownership or development of Australian 
resources regardless of ownership, he did not hesitate to reply 
"Australian ownership comes first. It must."'" 
Labor's policy, responses to foreign investment broadly coincided 
with the party's economic and ideological dispositions. The policies 
reflected some of the tensions between more, and less, restrictionist 
views within the party. Overall, they tended to be tougher for the first 
eighteen months or so of the Labor government than thereafter." 
Even without new legislation, the government enjoyed effective 
command over investment flow through such means as its control 
over monetary policy and its ability to impose export controls. An ex-
ample was the variable deposit requirement (VDR). The government 
imposed a 25 per cent interest-free deposit requirement upon long-
term foreign borrowings and then raised the amount of the VDR to 
33| per cent. The net effert was to make investments more expensive 
and therefore less attractive. The VDR was mainly a liquidity control 
measure, but had the effect of discouraging overseas investment as 
such, fn 1974, when the Australian economy entered a tight liquidity 
stage, there was a softening on foreign investment. The VDR ratio 
was gradually lowered and then abolished. Moreover, an early 
government embargo on short-term foreign borrowings was even-
tually eased. 
Labor inherited from the McMahon government legislation on 
foreign takeovers. This provided for a review mechanism of proposed 
takeovers of Australian businesses should such proposed takeovers be 
found to violate various national interest criteria, economic and 
otherwise. Labor proceeded to strengthen its purview over takeovers, 
for instance by extending blocking authority beyond share to asset ac-
quisitions. In practice, takeovers were not treated with anything ap-
proaching unfailing severity. As of mid-1974, some 16 per cent of 
takeover notifications had been formally prohibited or withdrawn 
after detailed investigation, though some takeover bids were deterred 
by the very existence of the review procedures. In the thirteen-month 
period ending 31 July 1975, over 90 per cent of takeover notifications 
went unprohibited. Gradually, takeover bids were acted upon more 
on merit than on blanket opposition to takeover intrusion into cer-
tain sensitive areas. Financial institutions had been targeted as one 
190 Australian External Policy under Labor 
such area, but in early 1975, permission was given for acquisition of a 
major finance company by American interests. On the other hand, in 
the same year Labor introduced legislation to create a Government 
Insurance Corporation, in part to counter the heavy foreign stake in 
this lucrative field; the legislation was rejected in the Senate. 
Meanwhile, takeovers in the mineral industry remained among those 
most severely scrutinized. By mid-1974, a second interdepartmental 
committee had been established to screen, and upon which to send 
advice to the political level, foreign investments of a non-takeover 
character Eventually, plans were laid to combine the two into a 
Foreign Investment Advisory Committee. 
Labor in other ways reconstructed previous policies towards 
foreign investment. Under certain circumstances, Australian firms 
were to be extended preference in purchases made by the federal 
government. Income tax concessions on mining shares were done 
away with, as were subsidies paid to companies searching for oil. 
Ironically, the main adverse impact was not on large overseas com-
panies but on smaller Australian firms, for which special buffering 
was then promised. Indeed, even the highly conservative Queensland 
state government intruded itself to acquire higher royalties from min-
ing companies. By September 1975, however, as part of its overall 
reconsideration of minerals policy, the government introduced a two-
tier pricing arrangement for crude oil, providing special incentives for 
new exploration. 
One of the large issues faced by the government was the extent to 
which local equity would need to be offered by foreign interests. Here 
again the record is mixed. We saw that, by 1975, the government was 
saying that oil interests would not necessarily need to seek local par-
ticipation at early stages of exploration. In early 1974, the govern-
ment scotched the major foreign-dominated Alwest alumina project 
in Western Australia. One objection dealt with Australian equity. The 
consortium involved eventually agreed to substantial local equity ar-
rangements and the project was approved in Canberra. But the 
episode also dispelled suspicions that key sectors of the extractive in-
dustry might need to be wholly domestically owned. In 1974, Labor-
controlled South Australia became the first Australian state to set a 
future limit on foreign equity in mining operations—49 per cent. In' 
his major foreign investment policy statement of 24 September 1975, 
Whitlam announced a major concession on minerals other than 
uranium. Henceforth, foreign investment proposals would be 
presumed prima facie acceptable if foreign content did not exceed 50 
per cent, unless special circumstances warranted otherwise.'* 
The foremost exception to government leniency was in uranium. In 
part, this was because of the vast return that Australia experted for 
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itself from uranium sales, in light of the size of deposits and an-
ticipated world-market demands. In part, the government believed 
that it already possessed most formal entitlements over uranium. The 
great majority of Australian uranium was in the Northern Territory 
and was owned by the federal government. Pre-Whitlam government 
legislation had entitled the federal government to extract, process 
and even (apart from the Northern Territory deposits) to market 
uranium. Early in the Labor government's life, attempts by 
prospecting companies to sell to foreign interests part of the uranium 
deposits they had successfully explored were blocked. The govern-
ment desired uranium processing within Australia. It invited foreign 
nations to consider supplying capital and technology for uranium 
enrichment, but insisted that no foreign equity would be entertained. 
Indeed, payback would occur in the form of inexpensive enriched 
uranium supplies. By late 1974, official policy had evolved to read 
that while private companies would be permitted to continue 
uranium exploration under standing exploration licences, all new ex-
ploration within the Northern Territory would be undertaken by the 
Australian Atomic Energy Commission." Just before Labor left office, 
permission in principle was granted for an overseas uranium sale. 
This was a breach of standing practice, but came too late for a sale to 
be consummated during the Labor government, or for conclusions to 
be drawn as to how far with Connor no longer as minister. Labor 
would have proceeded in amending earlier uranium policy. 
Direct government involvement in ventures designed to limit or 
redirect foreign investment was most prominently to be placed in the 
care of two government instrumentalities, AIDC and the Petroleum 
and Minerals Authority (PMA). As we saw, AIDC had been started 
under the L-CP. One of its objectives was to supply finance to make 
possible greater Australian ownership and control in various 
manufarturing and mining development projects. Joint ventures in 
which foreign ownership predominated were not excluded. Under 
Labor underwriting of AIDC was increased and its functions and 
scope of financial operations broadened. Nationalization of non-
Australian enterprises, directly or "by stealth", was emphatically 
denied as an objective of AIDC. AIDC was to be a catalyst to invest-
ment, not an alternative to it. At best, AIDC's "buying back of 
Australia" role could be expected to be modest. One feature of AIDC's 
work was that the interdepartmental committee on foreign takeovers 
referred all important cases to the corporation, giving it first oppor-
tunity at local shares being offered to foreign investors. Another 
aspect of AIDC's work was its eagerness to develop government-to-
government investment arrangements, with particular emphasis as of 
1974 on petrodollar-rich Middle Eastern states. AIDC's "public" role 
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was expressed by offers to ordinary citizens to purchase its stock. Paid 
advertisements stressed benefits of high return, safe investment and 
finally helping Australia—"Congratulations, you're doing something 
for yourself and your country."'* 
The PMA was designed along more specialized lines than was 
AIDC. We will assess its evolution mostly from the vantage-point of 
petroleum, an energy resource the importance of which was acutely 
felt in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war. There also was the 
central consideration that Australia's own oil resources, themselves 
never completely adequate, were, on forecasts made in the mid-1970s, 
scheduled to be exhausted in ten to fifteen years. 
The government undertook to disallow farm-in proposals by 
petroleum consortia. Takeover regulations were applied to the 
petroleum industry. The government promised critical re-
examination of off-shore oil exploration leases that were scheduled to 
expire. Some would be renewed, some not. The government itself 
would for the first time insert itself into an active oil exploration 
role." 
Such steps foreshadowed the government's Petroleum and 
Minerals Authority. In Connor's words, the PMA would function "by 
partnership and farm-out in the case of off-shore oil and gas explora-
tion ... by a partnership between the national government providing 
natural resources and experienced explorers providing the risk 
capital, technology and expertise". Moreover, small Australian-based 
companies that otherwise required large-scale infusion of capital to 
start projects would be assisted by the PMA."° Labor's rationale for 
the PMA was to safeguard and fully exploit a precious resource asset, 
to insure appropriate guidelines for the' character intensity and 
"responsibility" of exploration and to include a more comprehensive 
local Australian stake. The PMA's first major action, in early 1975, 
was to sign an agreement to buy into the multimillion-dollar Cooper 
Basin oil and natural gas reserves from an American concern, to in-
sure aggregate Australian ownership in excess of 50 per cent. 
To Labor's distress, the PMA experienced considerable difficulty in 
getting established and then in maintaining itself Owing to Senate 
opposition, its enabling legislation was delayed by over a year Then 
came challenge from the states, several of which went to the High 
Court to contest the constitutionality not only of the PMA but of the 
1973 Seas and Submerged Lands Act's provisions of federal jurisdic-
tion over territorial (5 kilometres from shore) waters, the sea-bed and 
air space. The court challenge brought into sharp relief the multitude 
of factors that can affect policy outputs. At stake were among the 
more important of the Whitlam government's resource and foreign 
investment policies. The states, including Labor-governed South 
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Australia, were reluctant to undermine their own economic interests. 
Whitlam Insisted that the policies were not only right, but that their 
legislative underpinnings were constitutionally proper under federal 
power to regulate overseas and interstate trade and as derived from 
general powers for the defence of Australia."' More on the political 
and legal implications of these High Court challenges when we deal 
with the policy process features of external affairs. We need to men-
tion here that in 1975, the High Court overturned the PMA on a 
technicality, namely a flaw in the legislative procedures by which it 
had been handled in 1974. Its substantive validity remained juridical-
ly undetermined and the government moved to reintroduce it in 
Parliament."^ The Seas and Submerged Lands Act was upheld, but not 
until after Labor had been ousted from power. 
The state legal challenge was only one aspect of a widespread and 
diversified attack against the government's foreign investment 
policies. Some of the criticisms emanated from radical circles, where 
the inadequacy of official policies was deplored, mostly as a sell-out to 
the cause of capitalism. There even were imputations that an ultra-
radical group, the Worker-Student Alliance, had fomented Industrial 
sabotage within foreign-owned plants, notably in South Australia."' 
Far more prominent were criticisms from quite different quarters. 
We will wish to examine the tenor of those criticisms, their source 
and whatever counter-measures against government policies may 
have been launched by the critics themselves. 
When Labor was first elerted, there was some trepidation among 
foreign investment interests, but the feeling was by no means univer-
sal. There is some internal evidence suggesting that among US in-
terests there probably was more sentiment acceptive of the ALP than 
among Australian businessmen, who as a group were more conser-
vative. But the climate changed. It became clear that Labor's 
philosophy towards overseas investment was not shared by the bulk 
of investors, or indeed by the L-CP opposition. Specific policies aside, 
it became a dialogue between a highly nationalist-minded, state-
interventionist government and those more devoted to the private 
sector. Anthony's summation was that "The Liberal and Country par-
ties do not share Labor's xenophobia over overseas capital.""" In early 
1974, an American business magazine asked rhetorically whether 
Australia was a good place in which to invest. It wrote that "Power 
has gone to the government's head and prosperity to the trade un-
ions'. The answer to the investing question, therefore, must be: Not at 
the moment.""' 
It was argued that overseas investment, especially in resource ex-
ploration, required the vast amounts of high-risk capital and exper-
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tise lacked by Australia. Connor's boast that Australia already sup-
plied well over 80 per cent of its own capital requirements and could 
easily improve on this figure was dismissed as idle. The "missing" 
percentage was for types of ventures in which Australians would not 
or could not afford to invest. Hence in the low investment year of 
1973-74, mineral exploration, exclusive of petroleum, was still more 
than 90 per cent foreign-financed. As of 1975, it was estimated by the 
chairman of AIDC itself that Australia's mining and industrial needs 
would likely require $15 billion in foreign capital over the following 
decade.** It was further estimated that, from 1975 to 1996, $8 billion 
would have to be spent on exploration and development to give 
Australia any chance of approaching self-sufficiency in oil, assuming 
the deposits were there, to avert huge oil bills and the chance of being 
embargoed by foreign suppliers."' In th^ light of this, critics pointed 
to the scarcity of new major mining projects under Labor to a steep 
decline in oil exploration activity and to slowdown and even 
withdrawal of existing overseas ventures. Within a year of Labor's ap-
pearance in office, a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Australia (AMCHAM) showed a nearly across-the-board invest-
ment retraction by US firms in Australia and a sense of noticeable 
caution about the future."* 
Business and the opposition attributed some of the decline in 
overseas investment to broader economic movements, such as 
removal of some protertive tariffs from industry at large, currency 
realignment and industrial unrest. Some of it was attributed to the ef-
fects of specific policies, such as the originally high VDR on foreign 
borrowings, Icxal equity requirements, prohibitions on farm-outs and 
blockages imposed against proposed takeovers of mining companies. 
Another depressant was a deterioration in the climate of business 
confidence generally. Foreign investors were either uncertain as to 
where the next government policy steps were going to lead, or were 
confused by frequent shifts or contradictions in government 
guidelines, or were simply disheartened by what they construed as 
rather threatening gestures by Connor particularly. They were never 
quite certain when and how to separate government rhetoric from 
actual intent. They could not be sure whether the government was 
really as much concerned about ownership as about control, nor were 
they entirely clear as to the strictness that would be applied towards a 
foreign equity stake in energy resources. They knew that AIDC was in 
some degree going to be more active under Labor than it had been 
under the L-CP, and that the PMA's future was clouded. As long as 
the particular terms on which such agencies would operate remained 
unsettled, there was a reaction to hold back, to wait and see. 
In part, delays in clarifying what the government would do were 
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not of its own doing. For instance, opposition party obstruction in the 
Senate held up the PMA's legislative authorization for many months 
and state challenges before the High Court further obfuscated the 
government's known authority to implement its off-shore exploration 
policies. At all events, there was a feeling in some quarters that 
foreign investors had overreacted, perhaps for effect, to the ostensibly 
dark investment picture. Indeed, American officials concerned with 
the subject took a less-pessimistic view than did American investors 
as a whole, and some informed opinion argued that decline in US in-
vestment activity in Australia was as much due to the opening of at-
tractive investment prosperts elsewhere as to hostile Australian 
government policies. 
Those who denigrated Labor's approach to foreign investment 
found it advisable to offer something in return. The opposition's basic 
philosophical temperament was offended by what Labor said and did. 
The L-CP often, and tartly, ridiculed the government's policies as 
needless or counter-prcxiuctive. But its actual counter-projx)sals were 
not radically different from Labor's. The opjxisition did come to ap-
preciate the need for controls and sufiervision, both on the merits and 
as an acknowledgement of a broad public mcxid. For instance, a late-
1973 opinion survey found 33 per cent of respondents feeling that the 
government was doing about enough to control foreign ownership. 
44 per cent felt it was not doing enough and only I 1 yKt cent believed 
it was doing tcxi much. The proportion of "not doing enough" respon-
dents was greater among L-CP than among Labor voters."' 
Despite some variations between the Liberal and the Country Par-
ties, a discernible pattern in opposition thinking evolved. Included 
were propc^als for mandatory requirements for majority Australian 
ownership in key economic areas, sponsorship of joint ventures 
betv •^een foreign and Australian interests, oversight of mandatory 
guidelines for all cwerseas companies resperting information dis-
closure and their use of Australian senior management, and the 
obligation to control the flow of "hot" overseas investments. By Oc-
tober 1975, as part of their overall policy review, the coalition parties 
produced a foreign investment document that, in most substantive 
respects, did not diverge from the guidelines announced by the Labor 
government the preceding month. There was no real quarrel with 
AIDC. To be sure, the PMA was opposed. But a number of op^X1Sition 
members privately felt that they could live with the PMA, and the 
heart of the argument against it was that other less "statist" 
mechanisms could achieve sovereignty over the off-shore exploration 
industry and regulate its behaviour'" Basically, the L-CP was saying 
that it was better fitted than Labor to restore clarity and foreign in-
vestment confidence. It would deal with foreign investment more on 
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its "merits", but it was not prepared to be casually permissive. 
Foreign investors also replied. Apart from questioning policy 
features they found especially obnoxious, or deploring the policy in-
consistencies and the climate of investment uncertainty, they worked 
to build the best possible image for foreign investment in Australia. 
This effort was especially conspicuous within AMCHAM. A year after 
Labor's election, an AMCHAM survey among its own membership 
concluded that "although reartlon to multinationals is not generally 
considered serious at this stage, many respondents indicated that they 
felt such reaction was growing and could become a problem." Some 
companies had noticed adverse reaction among employees, a few 
among customers and several discerned prejudice at middle levels of 
the public service." There is some internal evidence that younger or 
more recently arrived, US investors were less agitated than their 
older colleagues, who had lived for years in a highly permissive 
foreign investment climate under the L-CP. 
Foreign investment's technological research and development, 
foreign reserve, job-generating natiorlal economic expansion and 
other contributions were publicized. It was stressed that, especially, 
US firms had cultivated a burgeoning export trade, thereby com-
plementing the economic and foreign policy objectives that the 
government itself felt should be sought through active commerce. 
Similarly, data were offered to show that those multi-nationals in 
Australia that were not given a free hand by parent companies to ex-
port were few and declining in number. Publicity was directed at 
demonstrating that foreign firms were rapidly increasing the ratio of 
local purchases to imports. The gates to Australian senior manage-
ment and executive board directorates were said to have swung 
noticeably more open. Incomes of foreign- and Australian-owned 
firms were said to be more or less comparable. Local equity was 
generally easily accepted by overseas investors." By 1974, the 
previously low-profile Australia-British Trade Association had joined 
AMCHAM in trying to counter adverse publicity respecting foreign 
investment. By 1975, the Australian Mining Industry Council was 
reported to be launching a publicity effort, possibly worth $ 100000,to 
win favourable public sentiment." 
Just how eager were foreign investment interests to rectify what 
they construed as wrong-headed Labor policies? As seen, there were 
intensified efforts within the resident overseas investment com-
munity to accentuate the positive. On a few occasions, however con-
cerned remarks by such groups as AMCHAM or by visiting business 
people were badly received in Australia. There even was a feeling 
among some American officials In Australia that the publication of 
AMCHAMs survey of its members was ill-timed and possible grist for 
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the mill of anti-investment and anti-American sentiment. Foreign in-
vestors maintained liaison with Australian ministers and public ser-
vants. Their reactions were that while Connor was seldom ap-
proachable, other ministers, particularly Cairns, as well as most 
public servants, were both accessible and constructive in their at-
titude. Senator Ken Wriedt, who in October 1975 replaced Connor in 
the Minerals and Energy portfolio, gave definite signs in his brief 
tenure that he would be far more accessible than his predecessor had 
been. 
Various charges were laid against foreign investment interests for 
undertakings characterized as sinister or otherwise improper. For ex-
ample. Senator Brown and others deplored the Australian foreign in-
vestment survey conducted by the Centre for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies at Georgetown University, in Washington. The 
centre was portrayed as a highly conservative, big-business supported 
American '"think-tank"". It was said to have tapped the opinions of 
American and Australian respondents, "'comprador academics" and 
others, in order to provide US foreign investors with data and advice 
on how to subvert Australia's legitimate economic nationalism in-
terests, and perhaps to undermine the perceived investment-hostile 
Labor government as well. It is true that parts of the survey question-
naire were awkwardly or overpointedly drawn and invited criticism 
of what the survey was all about. Howeverthe project was initiated 
before Labor came to office, and even before the McMahon govern-
ment had introduced its takeover legislation. Contributions to the sur-
vey were sought from persons representing a wide political spectrum. 
The survey was not couched in secrecy. Its preparation was known to 
Australian governments, L-CP and then Labor, and they raised no 
critical comment. At point of writing, the survey findings had not 
been published. But it is known that, at various stages of collation and 
disucssion, the opinions of participants reflected considerable under-
standing and even sympathy for Labor's keen interest in directing 
foreign investment and in aspects of the "new nationalism" temper."*" 
Another criticism of foreign-investment interests was that they 
helped to underwrite the L-CP and in so doing worked to undermine 
Labor. Labor government spokesmen themselves indulged in such im-
putations. The charge was literally correct, but perspective is needed 
to make sense of what happened. Prior to and then during the 1972, 
1974 and 1975 elections, federal legislation governing political con-
tributions and their uses was virtually non-existent. There was 
nothing illegal about even the largest business contributions to par-
ties, nor about their non-disclosure. Most business contributions, in-
cluding in 1972, 1974 and 1975, understandably went to the more 
conservative side of Australia's party system, the L-CP. Most political 
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contributions by business were, moreover solicited by parties rather 
than being independently volunteered. Strongly inferential evidence 
suggests that the bulk of business donations to the L-CP was from 
Australian rather than foreign-owned enterprises. Both major party 
groups had rules about accepting political donations from overseas. 
When multi-nationals contributed, they did so from their Australian 
branches rather than from parent companies. There is reason to 
believe that, even though they had grown restive under Labor 
between December 1972 and May 1974, foreign investors were reluc-
tant to contribute lavishly to the L-CP, if only to avoid the obvious 
charge and possible backlash effects of political interference. In 1972, 
Labor was able to attract a measure of business financial support, but 
less so In 1974. Like the L-CP, Labor preferred not to publicize the 
business donation sources, or those firms, locally or foreign-owned, 
whom it solicited. In late 1974, Federal ALP Secretary David Combe 
visited the United States. While there he asked American firms with 
Australian subsidiaries if they would contribute towards the building 
of Labor's new Canberra headquarters, Curtin House. He was advised 
to ask the subsidiaries themselves, advice which the ALP eventually 
followed. The episode underscored the "business and 
politics" o r if one prefers, the "international business and politics" 
connection in Australia, from which neither major party group was 
exempt" We might also mention, however, that in a 1975 series 
of investigative articles in the Australian Financial Review, based 
on both Australian and US sources of information, foreign and es-
pecially American arms and equipment companies were acquitted 
not only of having made donations to political parties but of having 
engaged in corrupt pay-off practices to individuals." Well into 1976, 
there were no known documented instances of malprartices of this 
character. 
Another accusation was that foreign-investment interests, especial-
ly American, worked hand-in-hand with their national governments 
to exert pressure on the Labor government. This is a theme the author 
pursued closely with Australian officials, American officials and with 
spokesmen of the US business community in Australia. AMCHAM es-
tablished liaison with Ambassador Green and other persons in the US 
official establishment in Australia. There is no question that US of-
ficials knew of the businessmen's cares and worries. All the same, 
close checking in Australia and the United States suggested that US 
officialdom almost consistently was less troubled about foreign in-
vestment impediments under Labor than were corporate US invest-
ment interests themselves. It is plain that, at least throughout the first 
two years or so of Labor's rule, the United States never made any of-
ficial "representations" on behalf of the business community or on the 
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US government's own behalf Conversations did occur but they were 
largely a search for policy clarification by US participants. Apparently 
at no time was Australia threatened with American commercial or 
other reprisals if Canberra failed to corrert its foreign investment 
policies. An unusually well-placed Australian source illustrated the 
relative mildness of the American official position by recalling that 
the US Treasury Department had regarded Labor's VDR impositions 
as a "sensible" step. By the close of 1974, US investors continued to be 
apprehensive. But Green personally arranged an American visit for 
Cairns so that the then Deputy Prime Minister could discuss 
Australia's investment opportunities with interested private and of-
ficial parties. By that time. Green and the US administration had 
come to the conclusion that the Australian foreign investment 
climate had brightened." It is a fair surmise that the US government's 
low-profile stance on foreign investment may have hastened the 
repair of Canberra-Washington relations generally, after the troubled 
months of early 1973. 
As an example of government-to-government relations in the 
foreign investment sphere, the United States and Australia were bet-
ter off than were Japan and Australia. The value of Japan's Invest-
ments in Australia was very low, about $260 million in 1973, com-
pared to the many billions in US and British hands. The Japanese 
were not eager to compete in the US-UK class, but they did have a 
great stake in their continuing access to Australia's mineral resources. 
These they did riot wish to control, but generally preferred minority 
equity in the minerals and their processing, as protection for 
themselves. As we will see, the exceptional nature of 
Japanese-Australian economic links led to special complications in 
the playing out of Canberra's resource and trading policies. But it had 
spin-off effects upon the question of Japanese investments as well, es-
pecially in the key and closely guarded mineral resources area. 
There were protracted negotiations, moments of real distress in 
both capitals, some well-publicized turns of Japanese capital to other 
resource markets and delicate problems in writing mutually accep-
table language for the long-awaited treaty of friendship and co-
operation, the treaty of NARA.'* The treaty was under negotiation 
since late 1973. By early 1975, most terms had been approved by both 
sides. The remaining clauses were dismissed for the record by 
Australian spokesmen as minor and technical. Some press reports 
were less sanguine. Indicating that one major sticking-point was 
Japan's insistence that its foreign investment stake under any future 
Australian government not be treated any less leniently than the in-
vestment stakes of any other nations." The author understands that 
Australia received this Japanese demand with utmost concern. One 
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intimately placed Australian described it as a Japanese demand for 
preferential treatment, "more preferred" than available to others, 
and comparable to the freedom enjoyed by US investors in the hal-
cyon years of the 1950s and 1960s. This was not only resisted by 
Australia, but resented. 
Having reviewed the role of overseas investment in Australia's 
economy and in the policy debate, we pass to the rationales and 
policies that guided the distribution of the nation's economic 
resources. We will deal first with resource policy and then with 
overseas trade. 
The notion of resource policy, or "diplomacy", emphasizes not only 
a presumably integrated approach to the management of resource dis-
tribution but its international politics dimensions as well. Labor 
ascended to power in an era associated with international develop-
ments, such as the energy crisis, that placed a premium on the 
development of a coherent •national approach to resources. There 
were additional stimuli, peculiar to the ALP. As we have pointed out. 
Labor as a party was especially struck by the salience of the economic 
dimensions of interstate relations. Whitlam personally tcxik a very 
broadly conceived view of Australia's international role. A specially 
designed /4MXfr(j/w«-oriented resource policy/diplomacy was consis-
tent with new nationalism professions. The idea of a highly co-
ordinated resource programme complemented Labor's preference for 
palnning and state direction. Finally, Australia's very considerable 
natural wealth, and the already established requirements of resource-
short nations for this wealth, made it more natural to proceed on an 
increasingly co-ordinated basis. 
Whitlam argued that patterns of global resource consumption in-
troduced new complexity into Australia's strategic thinking and into 
various bilateral connections. As Australia became the object of 
others' resource strategies, it needed to respond. The national 
Australian interest would be taken into account; for Instance, in rela-
tion to the country's own resource requirements, and appropriate 
Australian (Ownership of them, and equitable price returns. But he ab-
jured-the idea of resource transactions between producers and con-
sumers as a test of strength, of Australia's "possession of natural 
wealth as some sort of economic, political or diplomatic weapon or 
that we should sit selfishly on that wealth or that we should gang up 
with the producers against the users."*" 
Our analysis of Australia's resource policy will first consider 
bilateral relations, particularly with Japan. Japan was Australia's best 
customer. In 1974, it tcx)k about 55 per cent of Australia's mineral ex-
ports, including 46 per cent of all the iron-ore and black coal required 
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by Japan's steel industry. Officially, on a number of occasions, 
Australia spokesmen reassured Japan that its mineral supplies would 
be maintained. Australia did not wish to tempt Japan to rearm, 
should it become desperate for resources. It wanted to draw Japan 
into closer and more economically productive links with the rest of 
Asia. Australia's own international reputation, in Japan and at large, 
could depend on the trustworthiness and reliability it displayed.*' 
The federal Labor government rearted with outrage when someone 
else tried to squeeze the Japanese. At the turn of 1974-75, 
Queensland government authorities declared that they would con-
sider denying coal-mining leases in their state unless Japan made 
purchases from Queensland's depressed beef industry. Not only the 
Whitlam government but the federal opposition and the press reacted 
unsympathetically. Federal government spokesmen claimed that 
Queensland's action could wreck the entire carefully fitted structure 
of trade relations between Australia and Japan. It could lead to 
Japanese retaliation against a recenfly signed sugar contract and at 
minimum, generate confusion and uncertainty in Tokyo." 
What was federal Labor's own record? It was lauded by some, 
denounced by others. Imputations were raised of hard bargaining in 
resources bordering on blackmail. Resentment appeared in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs against Connor and his Department of 
Minerals and Energy for what was Interpreted as narrowness and ir-
responsibility. The Japanese themselves were in fart often confused 
and annoyed. 
One important step taken by Connor was to compel a series of 
renegotiations of standing iron-ore and coal contracts with Japan, 
with the Australian side operating on a joint government/industry 
rather than industry alone or individual company bargaining basis. In 
effect, Connor told the Japanese to put up or shut up; no price adjust-
ments, no minerals. He knew that the Japanese were gradually diver-
sifying their iron-ore purchases by buying in Brazil, but was per-
suaded that their Australian dependency would remain intact for the 
foreseeable future. Japan's industry faced soaring oil costs and a shor-
tage of coal supplies, so the Australian market was needed. Signifi-
cant upward price renegotiations were obtained. Australian 
producers were pleased, especially since mining contracts, written in 
US dollars, had meant losses for them when Labor originally up-
valued the Australian dollar. In 1975, Connor's intervention made 
possible the signing of an enormous coal contract with Japan, worth 
about $7 billion over five years, with assurance of Japanese purchases 
built in.*' 
In Australia, questions were raised as to where the fine line 
between astute resource policy and blackmail lay. If the Japanese con-
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strued it as blackmail, warned the Australian Financial Review, "this 
could have ramifications for the Australian economy far wider than 
the price interests of iron-ore products."*" The Japanese on most occa-
sions only grudgingly gave in to the mineral price revisions. They in-
terpreted much of what was happening as one-sided, to Australia's 
advantage. They pictured themselves as very substantial and long-
term buyers and therefore deserving of some price consideration. 
Unhappy experiences with forced price revisions of mineral contracts 
also helped to delay complicated NARA treaty negotiations. Based on 
their experiences with Connor the Japanese wanted mineral price 
stipulations predicated on free competition, rather than on Canber-
ra's preference for allowing official intervention. Not for several 
months into 1975 did the Japanese agree to abandon a supply and de-
mand price position.*' 
The Jat^anese were also perplexed by what exactly Australia's posi-
tion was on resource criteria other than prices. They found Australian 
ministers saying first one thing and then another about levels of 
Australian equity required for energy resources. They could not be 
sure just how strict Canberra was prepared to be about requiring the 
co-oi")eration of consumer nations in creating domestic processing 
facilities for Australian resources. Not until late 1974 did Japan 
receive reasonable assurances of continuing Australian coal and 
uranium supplies, but upon Japan's promise to provide funds for a 
coal hydrogenation project and a uranium enrichment plant. 
Before we return to Japan, and to uranium, something should be 
said of the ALP government's resource policy vis-d-vis the Middle East. 
High-level exchanges took place between Australian and Arab nation 
and Iranian officials in 1974 and 1975. In 1974. the Shah of Iran paid 
a state visit to Australia. Some asjiects of the negotiations were un-
remarkable. What was somewhat special was Australias wish to 
create two-way economic arrangements and to link trade and Invest-
ment programmes. Australia was not really fearful that it could 
become a special target of a Middle Eastern oil embargo, but all the 
same there was no harm in cultivating close and interdependent 
economic relations with oil-producing states. Moreover Australia 
was interested in getting its share of petrodollar Investments or loans. 
Some Canberra circles seemed to perceive that the Shah saw 
Australia as a fellow Indian Ocean region country, somewhat in a 
mediating role and endowed with abundant but not fully developed 
economic potential. When a mission led by Cairns visited Bahrain. 
Kuwait and Iran In 1975. no demands were placed on Australia 
regarding Its Middle Eastern diplomatic policy. Plans were laid lor 
upgrading Australian exports to the Middle East. The commodities 
would be varied, for instance to include meat and grain, as well as 
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technology and minerals. Here was to be resource diplc-)macy in ac-
tion. In exchange for minerals, the recipient states were to invest in 
Australia, especially In the mineral resource field. It was to be done in 
assorted combinations, but with stress on the role of a public 
Australian presence, especially through AIDC.** 
In mid-1975, however, Australian politics were rocked by revela-
tions that the government, through Connor's and Cairns' efforts, had 
sought enormous niultibillion sums in Arab petrodollar loans. More 
on this later What matters here is that the government's intention 
was to raise these funds to finance a number of energy projects, in 
keeping with development policy and with strengthening local 
Australian control. The opposition and much of the press condemned 
the loan-raising efforts as alternatively unnecessary, overly expensive 
to finance and as having been undertaken with deplorable 
secretiveness and fragile authority. Connor was unrepentant. In the 
House, opening a defence of his artions. he exclaimed that 
The same international forces and their Opposition puppets which 
fmstrated the early birth of the Industry Development Corporation and 
which destroyed Prime Minister Gorton now turn their malice, their 
spleen and their venom on an Australian Government which stands in 
their path as they seek to enlarge further their grip on Australia's 
resources of minerals and energy.*' 
One of the minerals broached for possible sale to Iran was 
uranium, and herein lies an interesting facet of Labor's resource 
policy. When Labor came to office, Connor allowed existing uranium 
contract arrangements to continue, but banned new ones. One reason 
for this temporizing policy was to allow the price of uranium to ap-
preciate before further contracts were let. The same rationale in-
fluenced disposition towards eventually selling not crude uranium 
oxide (yellowcake) but enriched uranium, i.e. uranium with a con-
siderably higher price- tag. Connor's zest for capturing price advan-
tages was expressed in another way. There were intimations to the 
Japanese that uranium contracts let during the closing months of the 
McMahon government might not be allowed to proceed until 
Australia's desired price in iron-ore renegotiations was met. By the 
close of 1974. with general assurances of supplies extended to the 
Japanese, the Australian position seemed reasonably clear. Uranium 
would Involve a combination of Japanese capital, Australian 
ownership and suitable third-party—probably European—technology 
relative to uranium enrichment.** Whitlam's December 1974-
January 1975 visit to Europe was partially a testing of interest in get-
ting technological investment in return for enriched uranium for 
European nations.*' As 1975 went on, the Japanese chose to keep 
their options open and were cautious about committing themselves to 
a major uranium deal with Australia. 
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On the Australian government's part, however uranium policy 
remained unclear in some significant respects. Depending on whose 
language was most current, Whitlam's or Connor's, it was unclear 
whether in a triangular uranium project Australia would require 
"maximum" or "100 per cent" ownership, or indeed whether there 
was an understanding between the two ministers on the con-
trol-ownership distinction. Another unclear point was whether 
uranium sales would be tied to some kind of further quid pro quo. In 
December 1974, in prepared remarks in Brussels, Whitlam intimated 
that the availability of Australia's energy resources could not be 
divorced from the larger picture of entry opportunities for other 
Australian commodities.'" 
Another unclarity related to broader foreign policy considerations. 
One argument favouring uranium processing in Australia was that 
enrichment could be held below levels suitable for nuclear weapon 
development. In keeping with its condemnation of nuclear testing 
and proliferation. Labor refused in principle to consider sales of 
uranium to France and other non-NPT signatories. The selling of 
uranium to Iran was not, even notionally, easily received in Labor cir-
cles. Iran was an NPT signatory, but was undertaking a massive con-
ventional military build-up and was suspected of wishing to keep its 
nuclear options open." At a Paris press conference in January 1975, 
Whitlam persistently darted around questions that asked how 
uranium deals with France might be affected by France's continued 
non-adherance to the NPT or by its decision to move its nuclear tests 
from the atmosphere to underground.'^ In 1975, Germany provided 
Brazil with extensive nuclear technology in return for access to 
uranium supplies. The deal was frowned upon in various capitals, in-
cluding Canberra and Washington, because of conceivable potential 
by Brazil, a non-NPT signatory, to apply the German nuclear 
technology towards military purposes. There were intimations from 
German sources that Bonn's decision to enter the deal was, ironically, 
contributed to by Australia's reluctance to part with the uranium in 
its own ground.' 
Australia's approach to the multilateral management of resources 
was less haphazard than it was in bilateral relations. Australia 
became affiliated with international bodies representing producers of 
minerals in whose production Australia itself was prominent, for in-
stance bauxite and iron-ore. The government's first foray into the 
area of prcxiucer-nation commcxiity policy was both tentative and 
short-lived. Whitlam visited Mexico in July 1973. There he broached 
the idea that Australia and other producers might co-ordinate their 
mineral selling and pricing policies. The idea was general and ex-
ploratory. It found little favourable reception in Mexico City and 
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brought critical reaction at home. Whitlam made efforts to soften the 
impression that he had been urging a sellers' cartel.'" One un-
charitable interpretation of the Mexico City "initiative" was 
"Whitlamesque impulsiveness stimulated by lack of substantial mat-
ters to discuss with the President of Mexico, apart from the state of 
the local ruins"." 
Thereafter Australian policy toward producers' organizations was 
cautious. To be sure, at the Ottawa Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference, shortly following his Mexican visit. Whitlam was a 
strong advocate of international producers' groups. Subsequently. 
Labor ministers expressed hope for a fair and orderly production and 
trade, and for a reasonable price return for producers, but emphatical-
ly rejected any notion of cartels and of efforts to manipulate supplies 
and to exploit mineral consumers through the drastic raising of 
mineral prices. When Australia joined the new Association of Iron 
Ore Exporting Countries, it was dissappointed that its proposal for in-
cluding iron consumers had been overriden. When it joined the Inter-
national Bauxite Association, one of its rationales was that it, as the 
world's single largest bauxite producer could more effertively exert a 
tempering influence as a full member than as an observer or as a non-
member. 
There were a number of reasons behind Australia's cautious ap-
proach. One was the realization that producers' organizations could 
not comprehensively impose their writ. Not all major producers 
necessarily belonged to such bodies, Canada's reluctance to par-
ticipate in producer-exclusive groups being a strong example. Within 
the groups, there was no necessary identity of interests or long-term 
ability to hang together. Secondly, it was recognized that producers 
were also consumers, no nation being self-sufficient. A form of 
resource warfare inspired by producers' blocs could easily unhinge the 
world economy and profit few, if any, nations. As we saw earlier 
Labor also appreciated that highly resource-dependent nations such 
as Japan could, if Inordinately squeezed, attempt to secure their 
economic objectives by non-pacific means. The Arab oil boycott and 
the subsequent radically upward push of petroleum prices by 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) had a sobering effect on Canberra. The event seemed to show 
how resource power could be abused and that a super-power such as 
the United States could, however remotely, consider military in-
tervention if threatened with strangulation. International producers' 
bodies could be very useful to the poorer less-developed states. Aim-
ing at reasonable resource returns could accelerate their growth 
potential. At all events. Labor's foreign policy theme of artive col-
laboration with such nations would be advanced through multilateral 
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producers' venues. But the ALP government was unwilling to sub-
scribe to a tough-minded producers' cartel proposal, even when it was 
being importuned by some less-developed nations, as at the 1975 
Cc^mmonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in Kingston, Jamaica.'* 
The internal politics of multilateral resource policy also affected the 
government's attitude. Among protagonists of the cautious position 
were such key ministers as Whitlam, Willesee and Cairns. Despite 
holding the Minerals and Energy portfolio, Connor took relatively lit-
tle interest in this aspect of resource policy, preferring to concentrate 
on the bilateral side of the terms on which Australian resources could 
be exploited and sold. Connor's general detachment from the mul-
tilateral side helped to minimize the back-and-forth, often conflirting 
tendencies that characterized other features of Australia's resource 
policy. Moreover, with ministers such as Whitlam, Willesee and, for a 
time. Cairns carrying much of the responsibility for multilateral 
aspects of resource policy, it was more natural that a noticeable 
foreign policy, rather than a more narrowly nationalist-economic, 
content should have animated multilateral approaches. 
Indeed, the Labor government was admonished on all sides not to 
translate resource policy into exploitation of consumer nations. The 
United States took pains to explain, at both political and official 
levels, its concerns for consumer nations and its apprehensions about 
hard-lining, price-lifting, producers' cartels. But it did not oppose 
Australian membership in multilateral producers' bodies. If anything, 
it encouraged Australia, on the belief that Australia would exert a 
restraining influence. 
Within Australia, the Foreign Affairs Department strongly sup-
ported the government's temperate position on producers' com-
modity bodies. Both the public literature and internal evidence 
demonstrated the department's concern over international political 
and economic reverberations that could be occasioned by a hard-line 
posture. This concern was itself a reflection of the department's dis-
position to think that the important international issues were in-
creasingly economic rather than "security" based. This concern car-
ried other consequences. As will be discussed in another context, 
when we give explicit attention to the Australian external policy 
process, the department became antagonized by the Connor/Minerals 
and Energy Department views on resource policy and tried to in-
crease its voice in such matters by asking for general supervisory 
privileges over Australia's external relations, among them economic. 
The L-CP was critical of a number of the government'?^ country-to-
country features of resource policy. It alleged rash and/or confused 
fi)reign investment ground rules, the bullying of overseas customers, 
unrealistic delays on uranium exploitation, etc. Otherwise, much of 
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its rhetoric was a recognition of international economic in-
terdependence and of Australia's role as a reliable, even generous, 
supplier of resources and technology. There was a clear aversion ex-
pressed towards producers' price cartels, to a point not shared by 
Labor; for Instance, that Australia should take diplomatic initiatives 
to break down the more flagrantly behaving resource cartels. OPEC in 
particular. 
Criticism was launched from the flanks. One tangent was basically 
political, representing an attack on Labor's credibility. Resource 
policy was said to expose the ALP's basic incoherence. Resource policy 
had 
sometimes been discussed in the rhetoric of strident nationalism, 
sometimes in the rhetoric of Third World havenots, sometimes in the 
rhetoric of responsible partnership with the industrial countries. Who, in 
the end, knows what our resources policy is—if indeed there is any polic7 
beneath these layers of rhetoric?" 
A second line of attack was more substantive. The basic message was 
that in its naive quest for distinctive posturing policies, Australia 
under Labor had done itself a disservice. Contrary to its own profes-
sions, the government had forgotten the interweave of economic, 
security, diplomatic and other international factors. For instance, it 
had overlcx)ked that an "independently" formulated resource policy 
could not permit a mn-down of defence forces to the point where the 
country was actually more dependent on others.'* Or, as Eraser ex-
pressed it in one of his early major speeches after becoming Liberal 
leader Australia and Middle Eastern countries alike had applied the 
resource diplomacy Instrument in a way that "challenged economic 
stability around the world ... When nations start to export their 
economic ills to their trading partners, they head the world towards 
greater difficulty." Thereby, Labor's comfortable vision of detente was 
said to have become further degraded." 
We have left the foreign trade facet of Australia's international 
economic behaviour to the last. It is a subject that closely interfaces 
with such earlier themes as foreign aid, investment and resource 
policy. It is well to remind ourselves of the exceptional position oc-
cupied by foreign trade in Australia's economy. By 1974-75. the total 
value of Australia's imports and exports had reached about $16 bil-
lion, a virtual doubling since Labor took office and a figure by no 
means fully offset by inflationary trends. Export of goods and services 
in 1974-75 constituted about 16 per cent of Australia's gross domestic 
pmduct, versus comparative 1973 figures of 7.3 per cent for Japan 
and 10.8 per cent for the United States. Moreover by the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the character of Australia's exports had become con-
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siderably diversified, with far more emphasis on minerals and 
manufactured goods than in the past, when primary agricultural 
commodities had been pre-eminent. The scope and variety of 
Australla"s external trade strongly influenced the nation"s economic 
development. The traditional dominant pattern of trade with Britain 
had under the L-CP been replaced by a concentration on Japan and 
other Pacific Basin nations, the region in which Australia's principal 
external interests rested. 
There were various incentives for Labor to give attention to trade 
with less-developed nations. It was thought desirable to diversify 
trading c^utlets. By 1975, about 65 per cent of Australia's trade was 
with Japan, North America and the European Economic Community 
nations. Yet market opportunities in these industrialized nations were 
not expected to rise at the rate they once had. Their own growth rates 
had slowed and energy and other costs were eroding their overseas 
payments position. When Labor took office, Australia's exports to the 
developing countries had, in absolute terms, been climbing steadily, 
but had shown little change as a proportion (about a quarter) of total 
exports. Among the areas not previously well represented but 
targeted by Labor for heavier trade-market emphasis were South-East 
Asia, the Middle East and nations with centrally planned economies. 
There were foreseen Australian economic benefits in pressing trade in 
these areas. For instance, the vast oil-income wealth of Middle 
Eastern countries had given them incentive to buy goods and 
technology from the West on an expanded scale. There also were 
broader considerations. Whiflam asserted that "increasingly our 
foreign policy in South East Asia will be related to our efforts to 
develop mutually advantageous trade."*" Like the L-CP, Labor 
visualized trade as an important base for promoting economic 
development among trading partners and as a dimension of external 
aid, i.e. as part of general foreign policy. The tying of various forms of 
Australian foreign aid to purchases of Australian goods, though 
downgraded under Labor, could still complement and enhance the 
trade drive. And, as a Liberal document argued, "Expansion of our 
manufactured exports [in the Asian region] could bring to Australia 
the benefits of economies of expanded scale of operations, thereby in-
creasing domestic productivity and providing greater scope for the 
rationalisation of our industrial base."*' 
As a facet of external assistance, trade was intended to expand and 
improve Australia's visibility and influence among developing states. 
But, with exceptions to be noted later the government in principle 
acknowledged that commerce was a two-way proposition. Australia 
had perennially enjoyed a substantial balance of payments advantage 
in its trade with developing states, including South-East Asian. 
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Economic sense dictated that further market opportunities ought to 
be opened for these nations within Australia. Superimposed were cer-
tain ALP ideals about how the world was, or ought to be, ordered: 
"We believe that the world needs some redress of the balance of 
power of the developed countries and their multinational oligopoly in 
relation to the much less organised economies of the developing 
states," Crean observed.*^ 
Labor proceeded with various policies designed to promote two-
way trade with developing nations. Some of this was an extension of 
earlier L-CP practices and some was new. The movement of 
Australian trade missions to far-flung places was accelerated and 
trade-commission posts were increased. In 1973-4, provision was 
made for developing countries to purchase Australian wheat on 
specially extended credit terms. Apart from business undertaken by 
the Export Payments Insurance Corporation on its own account, the 
government assumed large contingent liabilities on behalf of credit 
sales to developing nations. The corporation's own efforts in insuring 
overseas sales were extended. In 1974, two-thirds of the value of in-
sured shipments were destined for developing nations, 38 per cent to 
South and South-East Asia. In early 1975, the Export Payments In-
surance Corporation was reconstituted as the Export Finance and In-
surance Corporation, with powers to operate as an export-financing 
institution as well as a credit and investment insurer and guarantor. 
The Labor government laid plans for an overseas trading corporation 
to supplement, but not to supplant or to take preference over private 
trading efforts vis-d-vis centrally planned economies and with develop-
ing countries. To encourage the seeking out and cultivation of 
overseas markets generally, an export market development grants 
scheme was introduced. Labor continued the "Devisa Kredit" 
(formerly bonus export) scheme for Indonesia. Introduced under the 
L-CP, this programme was tailored to conserve Indonesia's foreign 
exchange reserves, to channel rupiah funds from the private sector 
into the country's development budget. In effert, it involved the 
purchase of Australian goods by Indonesia in rupiahs and the com-
pensation of Australian sellers with Australian currency. The 
programme decidedly stimulated Australian sales to Indonesia, 
though eventually Indonesia's increased oil revenues were felt by 
Labor to have obviated the need for an extension of the programme 
beyond 1976. 
Labor also undertook various measures to facilitate the sale of 
developing-nation goods to Australia. A special export-promotion 
facility within the Department of Overseas Trade was created to assist 
such nations in exploiting the Australiar* market. An earlier L-CP-
initiated scheme of tariff preferences for a wide range of goods enter-
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ing Australia from developing countries was enlarged and improved 
upon. On top of this, in 1973, the Labor government undertook an 
across-the-board 25 per cent reduction in tariffs on goods imported 
from all sources. With the approach of Papua New Guinea's in-
dependence, Canberra provisionally pledged a continuation of ex-
isting duty-free and low-tariff entry for goods entering Australia. 
Such measures did have a positive effect upon developing-nation 
exports to Australia. In 1972-3, their share of Australia's total im-
ports rose to 9.1 per cent, in 1973-4 to 12.4 per cent, and for the first 
half of 1974-5 It was running at a respectable 18 per cent rate. 
Nevertheless, import promotion endeavours were neither free of 
criticism not consistently pursued. The Devisa Kredit scheme was 
queried in some quarters for disproportionately siphoning develop-
ment gocxJs to Indonesia's urban sector. Sales by countries eligible 
under the tariff preference scheme had never equalled the value of 
gcx)ds under what for most of the programme's life was the available 
quota. The 12 per cent devaluation of the Australian dollar in the 
second half of 1974 reduced the value of earnings for nations selling 
to Australia. 
Moreover, by 1974, Australia's deteriorating employment situation 
brought demands for relief from a variety of labour-intensive 
Australian industries producing goods that were entering the 
Australian market from developing nations. The number of 
Australians actually thrown out of work by such foreign competition 
was relatively small, but the arguments for official relief were insis-
tent. For instance, between 1972-3 and 1973-4, the value of imported 
basic textiles rose by 67 per cent and the value of clothing and acces-
sories by 97 per cent. Australian textile production declined 30 per 
cent between 1973-4 and 1974-5. Export licence controls were 
peremptorily imposed on textile gcxids originating in Taiwan, which 
did not belong to GATT. the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Textile quota restraints were negotiated with China. India. Hong 
Kong and. very belatedly, with South Korea. Penalty tariffs on textile 
goods followed, and then came negotiated apparel import quotas 
with Hong Kong and Macao. By mid-1975, further voluntary restraint 
arrangements became increasingly difficult to obtain. Import quotas 
were therefore imposed on knitted garments from Singapore, 
Thailand and the Philippines, and upon textiles from China, itself not 
a party to GATT. Import quotas were imposed on other goods, such as 
footwear. The government was worried about the economy and sen-
sitive to trade-union protests. It did not conceal the protectionist 
features of its policies, but Cairns found them "not incompatible with 
expanding world trade. The expansion of world trade requires a 
world of expanding domestic economies. The solution to our 
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problems will come from a combined policy of internally induced ex-
pansion and international co-operation."*' Some observers were not 
so sanguine. They acknowledged that some ministers, such as Senator 
James McClelland. Minister for Manufarturing Industry, held serious 
reservations about strong protectionism. But in the evolving practices 
they noticed, they deplored what they felt to be an overreactive 
protectionist trend, or a subversion of the government's professions 
about appropriate economic and foreign policy strategies towards 
developing countries, or both.*" 
Much of Labor's approach to trade with developing countries 
reflected an "enlightened self-interest'" quality. It also appeared that, 
faced with difficult options, the government chose to come down on 
the side of domestic economic practicalities by heeding the appeals of 
vocal interests. As we continue, our interest lies in uncovering the ex-
tent and manner in which Labor may have applied a pragmatic hand 
to Australia"s trading relationships more generally, and with what 
results. 
We have already noticed Labor"s reaction to South Africa. Despite 
moral revulsion among ministers and a wish to promote Australia"s 
anti-racialist image abroad, only gradual and essentailly inconsequen-
tial barriers to a normal trading relationship were imposed. The size 
of Australia"s economic stake in the South African economy took 
precedence. In the South African case, even heavy lobbying by a 
variety of critics failed to force a policy turnabout. Chile represented 
another instance of the foreign policy/trade interest group nexus. 
After the overthrow of the Allende regime, a ban on shipment to 
Chile was imposed by most Australian maritime unions. In early 
1975, with wheat stocks abundant in Australia, the Wheat Board had 
an opportunity to make a fairly substantial sale to Chile, traditionally 
one of Australia's better wheat customers. The Minister for 
Agriculture, Senator Wriedt. advised (but did not order) the Wheat 
Board to withhold the sale, since obstruction was expected. The 
ACTU was unable to resolve the matter and the issue remained 
suspended for some time. The Labor government resented the post-
Allende, Chilean military junta, but its ""advice"" to the board was 
largely taken to avert turmoil and to avert being placed in the posi-
tion of either backing down in the face of union defiance or of sanc-
tioning force to move the grain. It was. however, a welcome political 
wedge for Fraser then shadow Minister for Labor. Wriedt, the 
reputed farmers" friend, Fraser charged, had betrayed the farmer to 
mollify sections of the trade-union movement. Who ran Australia— 
the government or the unions? Was this not more evidence of Labor"s 
siding with leftists in the party and the unions to court Third World 
and communist nations?*' 
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Labor carried out vigorous trade promotion towards communist 
nations and results were generally grafifying. As was experted, early 
in its life the Labor government lifted remaining special export con-
trols on goods destined for communist countries. Trade treaties were 
signed with the Soviet Union and some East European states. Some 
notable sales contracts were negotiated, especially with East Germany 
(minerals, grain and wool) and with the Soviets. Trade diversification 
was an early and major commitment of the Whitlam government and 
the agency devised to deal with centrally controlled economies was a 
practical expression of this intent. The government probably was 
pleased, politically, with commercial success in communist capitals, 
seeing them as a complement to diplomatic relations. However, there 
is no evidence that sales terms were adjusted just to placate com-
munist nations. Indeed, in 1974, after Canberra"s recognition of 
Moscow"s dejure sovereignty over the Baltic states, the Soviets refused 
an Australian offer of beef at the time a considerably depressed com-
modity in Australia. Instead, they bought less-expensive Argentine 
beef Only later did they resume buying Australian beef What 
probably did help to spark trade with Berlin was that normal 
diplomatic relations had been established, though that step had been 
in the works when the L-CP left office.** Australia was interested in 
raising its trade with North Korea, but before formal diplomatic rela-
tions were established, the Labor government demurred in the crea-
tion of a North Korean trade office in Australia on Pyongyang's terms 
and admitted that this refusal would delay bilateral trade expan-
sion.*' When the diplomatic breach with North Korea occurred late 
in 1975, bilateral trade had made little progress. Indeed, the North 
Koreans were in arears on their Australian purchases. 
Australian trade with North Vietnam and China should be con-
sidered separately, because of special political considerations. By the 
close of 1974, Australia had signed a trade agreement with Hanoi. For 
Cairns, then Minister for Overseas Trade, and others in the govern-
ment, this step had special meaning. The agreement, together with 
earlier diplomatic recognition of Hanoi, symbolized Labor's policy 
turn-around from a time when Australian troops were engaged in 
Vietnam. In a way, the agreement, quite generously written by 
Australia, was a kind of restitution for wrongs committed. It was to 
be a token of new friendly relations, as well as a spur for assisting the 
war-damaged North Vietnamese economy.** 
Trade with China at least as explicitly, reflerted special Labor 
government perceptions. This is not to belittle straightforward 
economic considerations. China for some years under the L-CP had 
been an excellent customer, especially in wheat, and it was desirable 
to revive, enlafge and diversify sales now that Labor was in office. 
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Also it was believed to be in Australia's interests somewhat to lessen 
its dependence on its two largest export markets. Japan and the 
United States. However the Labor Party felt a special need to es-
tablish close and broadly gauged relations with China. Senior 
ministers such as Whitlam and Cairns had personal, even emotional 
reasons for moving in this dirertion. There was disdain for the L-CP's 
previous antagonism towards China and recollertion of the years 
when, because they disapproved of L-CP foreign policy, the Chinese 
had refused to buy Australian wheat. Whitlam had made his 
breakthrough and personally rewarding visit to China in 1971, and 
Cairns had long been sympathetic towards aspects of the Chinese 
social experiment. In any event, as we saw in other contexts. Labor 
was very eager to be on excellent terms with China, in part to bring 
influence to bear on a mc)re accommodative climate in Asia. 
Labor almost immediately extended diplomatic recognition to 
China. By May 1973, Cairns had led an impressive official and 
business trade mission to China. Then and thereafter Cairns stressed 
that Labor's diplomatic and other friendly gestures towards China 
were responsible for realizing an enhanced trading relationship 
between the two countries. This cause and effert relationship Is not 
easy to demonstrate, but there is inferential support for.it. In July 
1973, an important agreement was signed, providing the framework 
for much of subsequent trade between China and Australia. Its terms 
included encouragement for China's long-term contract purchases of 
various Australian commcxiities, specification of reciprocal, most 
favoured nation treatment and arrangements for extensive trade 
promotion activity bv both sides.*' When the preceding May trade 
tour was made known, 2000 Australian businessmen reportedly ap-
plied to go along. Those who did go were highly commendatory of 
Cairns' professional, sensitive performance. New contacts sparked the 
formation of an Australia-China Business Co-Operation Committee 
and of a joint Sino-Australian trade committee. For the first time, 
Australian businessmen could deal dirertly with Chinese corporations 
and their regional branches without relying on the semi-annual 
Canton fairs, though these continued to be useful venues. Movement 
between the two countries of private and official persons on commer-
cial business became easier and more frequent. The trade value of 
these developments aside. Cairns saw them as a breaking down of 
Australian suspicions of China: "He has forced a significant cross-
section of top Australian businessmen to look at China as it is and not 
as they are told it is. The results have been encouraging."'" 
The 1973 trade agreement was not easily achieved. The Chinese 
had traditionally resisted long-term commercial agreements with 
foreign countries, and Cairns had difficulty in persuading them to ac-
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cept this one. He averred, however, that the Chinese had limited it to 
three years "so that. In the event of a change of government in 
Australia, the position could be re-examined"." In other words, good 
relations with the ALP government probably helped to gain a long-
term agreement, and its time limitation indicated Chinese uncer-
tainty as to whether an L-CP government could, or should, be dealt 
with in the same manner Important long-term agreements were sub-
sequently signed, primarily in sugar and wheat. In 1973-4, for the 
first time ever two-way trade exceeded $200 million, reflecting an in-
crease of over 100 per cent from the 1972-3 figure. By 1974-5, the 
value of Australian sales to China had risen to $257 million, while 
purchases from China were worth $81 million. 
The trading relationship was not, however, free from criticism, or 
some nagging problems. The long-term agreements called for annual 
price negotiations. This somewhat weakened the Australian bargain-
ing position and left uncertainty as to how much, exartly, to expect in 
income. Questions were raised as to whether Australia had quietly, 
for political reasons, promised low concessionary prices to China. This 
was publicly denied and Is not definitely resolvable.'^ Nor were 
Australian officials and businessmen overly optimistic about the 
Chinese market. They recognized China's drive for self-sufficiency in 
various goods and its reluctance to tolerate serious long-term balance 
of payments deficit with trading partners. Quietly but firmly, the 
Australians were told of China's concern over the wide export-im-
port gap. This concern was hardly relieved by the 1974 imposition of 
restraints on Chinese textile goods shipments to Australia and the im-
position of import quotas on apparel in 1975." In early 1975, 
however. China offered to sell crude oil to Australia, In part to help 
reduce the more than two-to-one favourable Australian trade 
balance. 
The prospect of obtaining some Chinese oil was encouraging. If 
only because Australia wished to insulate itself against possible inter-
rupticms of Its traditional sources of overseas supply. We suggested 
earlier that, during and after the October 1973 Middle East war the 
Labor government was very eager to insure the shipment of goods to 
Middle Eastern countries, to forestall political fall-out. which im-
aginably could have affected oil shipments from the region. Efforts in 
1974 and onwards to reach investment and trade agreements with 
Arab states and Iran also were attached to this consideration. The 
Cairns mission to the region in early 1975 returned with high hojies 
for new trade and investment arrangements, as well as with general 
assurances of continuing Australian access to oil. There was relief in 
Canberra when, after the refusal in January 1975 of visas to a PLO 
delegation, suspicions that Middle Eastern states might retaliate at 
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the commercial level proved groundless. At all events, persons as-
sociated with the PLO were later allowed to visit Australia. 
Special political considerations aside. Australia found much incen-
tive to pursue Middle Eastern markets. States in the region had con-
siderable funds on hand, a point underlined by 1975 disclosures of 
ministerial inquiries about raising billions in petrodollar loans. There 
were connections between investment projects and the extension of 
trade. Australia could make special contributions to the region's 
requirements—in grains, meats, sugar dry agriculture technology 
and, possibly, even uranium. Impetus for dealing with the region 
came not only from Canberra but from Australian states. Non-Labor 
states such as Western Australia and New South Wales had no reser-
vaticms about dealing with the politically left, radical regime in Libya. 
At the national level, the growing relationship was symbolized by a 
major long-term trade contract with Iran. A joint Iranian-Australian 
trading venture, "Austirian". was launched. On the Australian side, 
the consortium included an AIDC component as well as a con-
siderable private stake. Overall, the commercial pay-off from Middle 
Eastern connections was heartening. By early 1975. an observer noted 
that ""Middle East countries are now buying Australian products so 
fast that suddenly the region is reaching parity with Britain as a 
major export market.'"'" 
In various degrees, wide international economic and foreign policy 
considerations, not just a simple search for commercial outlets, af-
fected Australia"s trade drive in the Middle East. Wider considera-
tions also appeared in Australia's trading relationship with more es-
tablished, industrially developed partners. 
While in Europe at the turn of 1 974-5, Whitlam gave very positive 
encouragement to the EEC. But he did not hesitate to lecture the EEC 
countries, Japan and the United States—Australia's best trading 
partners—for behaving "reprehensibly" in their bans or limitations 
on Australian beef exports. Australia was in the process of restricting 
various products from Japan and other less-develof)ed Asian 
countries, to protect its home industries. But Whitlam reproached af-
fluent countries for setting a "bad example" because they were 
animated by domestic politics, while "Australia tries, even at the cost 
of some hardship to herself and her people, to have good trading rela-
tions. We would expect other countries, bigger ones in most cases, to 
be no less principled and pnigressive in matters of trade.""" We 
noticed earlier Whitlam"s intimation that the availability of 
Australla"s energy resources could not be separated from oppor-
tunities for entry into Europe of other Australian commodities. We 
have also commented on Japan"s dejiendence on Australian mineral 
resources, official Australian intervention to renegotiate upwards 
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coal and iron-ore contracts with Japan and the various conditions 
Australia developed in connection with prospective uranium sales. 
Australia benefited greafly from Japan, its single best customer. In 
1974-5, exports to Japan were valued at $2.4 billion, or 28 per cent of 
Australia's total export market, though imports from Japan were 
valued at only $1.4 billion. The Japanese export market was not only 
large but diverse. For instance, in 1975, Japan signed the biggest 
single contract ever negotiated for Australian sugar, and later in the 
year came the giant coal contract. 
The Labor government insisted that it would never impose 
resource blackmail in order to gain trade advantages and denounced 
Bjelke-Petersen's threats to curtail mineral sales to Japan unless 
Queensland beef was bought. But the beef issue proved to be a serious 
point of Australian-Japanese frirtion. Japan imposed a ban on 
Australian beef in early 1974, partialfy in response to its own 
domestic meat lobby. The ban came at an especially regrettable time, 
since EEC nations then cut off Australian beef and the United States 
pressed for a reduction through a voluntary beef import quota. Un-
questionably, the Australian beef industry was badly bruised. 
Australia undertook a vigorous campaign to induce Tokyo to lift its 
beef ban. At one point, Japanese officials were reported to have 
claimed that Australia had threatened cuts in other areas of Japan's 
trade unelss the ban was removed.'* The Japanese themselves had 
grounds for complaint. The trade balance was lop-sidedly in 
Australia's favour Yet in 1974 and 1975, Australia imposed import 
restrictions on various Japanese goods, including textiles, motor cars, 
electric products and steel bearings, and Japan wished to have these 
curbs easedor rescinded. Eventually, in 1975, the Japanese allowed a 
modest quota for Australian beef Also, with misgivings, the Japanese 
consented to the idea of a joint Japanese-Australian small-car 
manufacturing consortium in Australia (in which AIDC was then 
scheduled to hold a stake), though they still wished to export vehicles 
to Australia. In the short run at least, Australian trade bargaining 
with Japan had won out. The Australians had proved themselves to 
be hard, even obstinate negotiators, not sentimentalists. In a number 
of areas, they extracted demonstrable concessions, but stopped short 
of causing a rupture between themselves and the Japanese. Some 
observers were not overly impressed. They foresaw disturbing com-
mercial strains in the bilateral relationship that official words of reas-
surance would not be able to assuage." 
Japan illustrated Australia's relationship with a large, economical-
ly powerful, yet highly raw-material dependent nation. Perhaps 
equally elucidating were Australia's relations with two other nations. 
New Zealand and the United States, both very closely joined to 
Australia in many ways, including commercially. 
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By 1974-5. the total value of trans-Tasman trade had reached over 
$700 million, a considerable amount for two nations whose combined 
populations numbered only about 16 million. New Zealand had 
become Australia's fourth-best export market and sixth-ranking 
source of imports. Each country was the other's main market for 
manufactured exports. The near quintupling of total trade since 1966 
was considerably attributable to the institution of the New Zealand-
Australian Free Trade Agreement. Overall, both nations benefited 
from NAFTA, which as revised, contained schedules for asperts of 
trade that were entirely tariff free, free in one dirertion or the other 
or partially tariff free. 
It was generally understood In both capitals that a near balance of 
trade was not possible, but it was hoped that NAFTA arrangements 
would help to stimulate some economic rationalization within both 
countries. Such hopes largely went unrealized. For instance, Australia 
refused to allow the products of its inefficient but politically influen-
tial dairy industry to come under the part. Criticisms on both sides 
were to be expected, but by 1975, New Zealand opinion had become 
openly disconcerted. The country faced a general and massive trade 
deficit and slumping retail sales at home. Trade between the two 
countries was nearly three to one in Australia's favour and rising. 
Moreover worried about its unemployment problem and the health 
of some of its domestic industries, Australia was beginning to press 
for a voluntary reduction in some of New Zealand's manufactured im-
ports. High-level official discussions in early 1975 failed to resolve 
much, apart from extending existing arrangements for a twelve-
month period. Discussions later in 1975 were also disappointing to 
New Zealand. 
There seemed to be a larger lesson in this than two nations un-
dergoing cycles in their trading relationship, with one enjoying more 
advantage than the other. Much of New Zealand's foreign policy is 
dominated by international economic movements. For New Zealand, 
Australia's image has long been that of a kind of friendly giant, at 
times prone to patronizing and taking the New Zealanders for 
granted, even when the two countries are governed by parties of 
similar political complexion. A New Zealand observer was quite cor-
rect that "actual and imagined shared defence Interests have been 
overused as an excuse for enforced co-operation in economic and other 
fields where the community of interest was much less certain".'* 
When in 1975, New Zealand's trade picture with Australia became 
disturbing, there was ill-disguised reaction that Australia was not 
only being unhelpful but downright nasty. Australia might think it 
held most of the cards, but one New Zealand commentator was 
moved to suggest: "Let us have action in the form of economic retalia-
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tion until the Australians are prepared to trade on a two-way basis so 
that we can sell where we buy."" In turn, trading disputes such as 
this prompted Wellington to do things in foreign and defence policy 
areas a bit more independenUy of Canberra. One or two of these in-
stances have already been noted. Others will be covered in our suc-
ceeding chapter. 
Trade relations with the United States, another major Australian 
trading partner, were also instructive. In 1973-4, though enjoying a 
nearly two to one trade advantage, the United States was Australia's 
second-best customer It bought $750 million worth of goods, about 
half of this amount in meat, of which the vast majority was beef 
Australia had come to supply over half of all of America's beef im-
ports. But the history of beef sales to the United States was checkered. 
Restrictions on access to the US market had been imposed between 
1968 and mid-1972. The restrictions were suspended and Australia 
responded to Washington's call for more meat imports. Then, in 1974, 
under pressure from the cattlemen's lobby and some Congressional 
sources, the United States again moved to restrirt beef imports. 
Washington was looking for a reduction in beef imports, not a shut-
down. Australia voluntarily reduced its beef imports in 1974. A quota 
for 1975 was negotiated by the two parties and then slightly enlarged 
by the United States later that year. Through an Australian initiative, 
an International Meat Consulative Group was formed within the 
framework of GATT in early 1975. But the American move to restrict 
beef imports had come at a particularly inauspicious time, for Japan 
and the EEC countries were halting their purchases. Crean found fault 
in America's beef import restrictions. To him, they seemed to flaunt 
American wishes for freer international trade, represented a dis-
concerting retreat from the 1972 encouragement given to beef im-
ports and showed lack of sensitivity to the plight of the Australian 
beef industry.'"" 
US officials might have replied that, in a time of world beef sur-
pluses, the American beef industry deserved tender treatment no less 
than its Australian counterpart, and that in 1974 and 1975, Australia, 
more than the United States, was backsliding on its earlier positive 
steps towards liberalizing the entry of goods from abroad. What 
seemed more interesting, however, were the background fartors af-
fecting US-Australian trade relations. Particularly after the May 1974 
Australian election, Washington-Canberra relations improved. On its 
part, the United States approached its relations with the Labor 
government in a more relaxed, mature manner. It would have been 
regarded as counter-productive to shout down or brashly threaten 
Australia when trade differences, such as over beef then arose. It 
would also have been counter-productive to attempt retaliation 
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against Australia if on a matter such as trade or the treatment of 
foreign Investment, Australian policy ran across stated American in-
terests. Careful checking by the author failed to uncover any instance 
of punitive US measures against Australia. Indeed, regarding trade 
differences, the United States was circumspert and tried to minimize 
damage to Australia. Washington seemed to understand that asperts 
of the most vital American stakes in Australia, such as the defence 
facilities, depended on large doses of mutual gocxiwill. 
There also was evidence that, on its part, Australia could afford to 
be selective in its trade with America. In a late 1974 interview, 
Renouf drew an illuminating example. Australia would soon need to 
decide on a wide-body civilian aircraft. The options were between US 
models and the multi-nationally built European airbus. Australia 
should buy the airbus, Renouf said, for "good diplomatic and political 
reasons". Australia's relations with the United States were strong 
enough to withstand Australian rejection of American aircraft; "It is 
in our interests that we should be looking after the Euroi^eans. In any 
case, this is the sort of line Foreign Affairs will be taking to the 
Government"'"' 
The record seemed to indicate that, under Labor overseas trade 
was carried out with a conspicuously pragmatic hand, and with good 
results. There was some evidence of combining a drive for export 
markets with a reluctance to reciprocate with ample opportunities 
for imports, but this occurred without visible counter-produrtive con-
sequences. Where foreign policy considerations intruded on trade, 
their effect, at least in the short to middle term, appeared to range 
from neutral to positive. Of the three pillars of international 
economic policy—foreign investment, resource management and 
trade—it was trade that seemed to be most coherently, and success-
fully, pursued. 
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External Policy: 
Defence Dimensions 
We now turn to defence, our final policy area theme. We will first as-
sess a basic instrument of the defence policy, the military establish-
ment. Our attention will then turn to Australia"s role in security al-
liances, and lastly to regional and Australian-based approaches to 
nuclear affairs, arms control and neutralization. 
We begin by inquiring into the assigned role of Australia"s armed 
forces: what they were supposed to do and why. We will then be bet-
ter placed to evaluate their capabilities, measured by such criteria as 
numbers, organization, training and equipment, industrial and 
economic back-up, and the like. 
Much of the perspective needed tor our present subject was set out 
in Chapter 3, where we reviewed the external policy assumptions of 
the Labor government, and of the opposition and other critics. We 
noticed that Labor did not anticipate a serious threat to Australia in 
the foreseeable future. The ALP had a general aversion to military 
"solutions" to international problems. It repudiated the "forward" 
defence strategy subscribed to by its predecessors. It wished to be less 
reliant on traditional defence partners such as the United States. 
Above all. Labor was persuaded that foreign policy considerations 
had to dictate defence policy, not vice versa. 
In principle. Labor as a party did not disavow the need for a 
defence capability. Article XX of the party's platform stipulated that 
"a strong and valid defence must be maintained. This defence inten-
tion must be so effective as to demonstrate beyond all doubt 
Australia's intention to defend itself and her vital interests." Once 
Labor had translated itself from opposition to government, and in 
light of international developments after December 1972, the role of 
Australia's armed forces had to be spelled out in considerably more 
detail. A perceived low-threat climate did not require massive forces. 
Changes in the climate were unlikely to be sudden, allowing Australia 
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lead time to adjust its defence planning. Hence, as the 1974 Defence 
Report argued, Australia's forces needed to be maintained "to be able 
to cope with forseeable [i.e. mostly low-level threat] tasks; to provide 
backing for a more independent political posture; to sustain and prac-
tice an adequate range of military skills, and to provide an evident 
basis for expansion if this should be required."' Barnard, Morrison 
and other government spokesmen emphasized "continentalism". The 
concentration was to be on proterting Australia itself, not an out-
spread environment, from attack or other forms of duress. 
As we saw earlier the L-CP and others objected that the govern-
ment's views on world conditions, on detente, and on the prospert of 
threats posed by tensions exclusive of great-power confrontation, 
were far too sanguine and dangerous. They felt that defence planning 
ought not to shrug off "contingencies"^quite so lightly, or to impose 
an interdict, in principle, upon the use of armed forces in sole or sup-
portive roles outside Australia and its immediate neighbourhood. 
They did not necessarily dismiss Labor's assertion that an active and 
constructive diplomacy could reduce the prospert of security dangers. 
But they often turned the argument around, claiming that an in-
dependent foreign policy lacked credibility if based on a weak or mis-
placed defence policy. The essence of the opposition's strategic think-
ing was to provide a core of forces "which can be expanded to meet a 
major threat in a time less than the likely warning time associated 
with the threat", as well as to develop "ready-reaction forces to meet 
low-level contingencies at very short notice anywhere within 
Australia and her territories".^ 
Into what specific roles were the armed forces placed, or projected 
for under the Labor government? Some roles were not strictly 
military as such, or were only peripherally military. For instance, at-
tention was given to utilizing troops during natural emergencies at 
home. This was done both because the services could make significant 
contributions and to inspire a more positive image of the military. 
Troops assisted during flood and other disasters in several states. In 
1974, a National Disasters Organization was created, with a retired 
senior army officer as its first director The NDO relied very heavily 
on help from all three armed services in the aftermath of the 
Christmas Day, 1974 cyclone that devastated Darwin. Another role, 
basically of a police nature, performed primarily by the RAN, was in 
trying to chase away or apprehend Indonesian and Taiwanese 
fishermen and poachers off Australian shores. Moreover it might be 
recalled that in Australia's experience, troops had occasionally been 
called out to deal with civil disturbances. One such case was in 1949, 
when the Chifley Labor government brought troops to coal mines 
closed by industrial action. Under the Whitlam government, a 
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spokesman indicated that while members of the army were not given 
riot or internal security training, "A number of training courses for 
officers include some lectures and instruction in the theoretical 
aspects of assistance by the Defence Force to the civil authorities."' 
Parenthetically, it should be said that, when industrial unrest became 
aggravated, a number of middle-grade officers were privately in-
dicating their concern that more was not being done to train troopis 
to cope with civil disorder. 
What of armed forces roles outside Australia and its territorial 
waters? There were occasions when the services were called upon to 
perform essentially humanitarian duties. These included RAAF ship-
ments of medical supplies to flood-stricken areas of Thailand, and the 
transport to Australia of Vietnamese orphans and refugees and of 
persons caught up in the strife that gripped Portuguese Timor later in 
1975. We have already noticed the government's commitment in 
principle to contribute troops to UN-sponsored peace-keeping opera-
tions and the actual training of some Australian troops in Canada to 
learn from Canada's experience in this area. In 1975, an RAAF air-
craft and crew were provided in support of the UN's Military 
Observer Group in India and Pakistan. Australian policemen had 
been serving in Cyprus since L-CP days. Willingness to place troops at 
UN disposal was a reflection of Labor's commitment to the United Na-
tions and to the orderly settlement of international disputes. It also in 
part was an effort by the government to demonstrate to its own party 
sceptics that the armed forces had constructive "healing" funrtions to 
discharge. It also served to arrange more interesting career outlets for 
servicemen. From the beginning of the Second World War Australia 
had stationed at least a battalion of troops abroad. With Labor's ap-
pearance in office and the withdrawal of combat troops from 
Singapore, the tradition vvas ended. 
However the shut-down of overseas troop garrisoning concerned 
only a combat troop presence overseas. Under Labor numerous per-
sonnel from all services remained on foreign postings. A principal 
role for them was the training of military personnel from neighbour-
ing countries. It was a reminder that the government did not dis-
parage the value of armed forces' contributions to national self-
defence or to the maintenance of civil order Indeed, a complemen-
tary rationale was that if South-East Asian and Pacific nations had 
reasonably effective defence forces, this would lessen prospects of 
future summons from them for outside help, as for instance from 
Australia. Moreover, the Labor government saw a potentially impor-
tant civil development role for such military establishments. It also 
found it valuable to enjoy overseas training sites for its own forces, for 
receiving Australian naval and air units and for joint military exer-
cises profitable both to hosts and guests. 
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A few illustrations will underscore the extent of the Australian 
military's overseas roles. From late 1972 to early 1975, an RAAF ad-
visory unit assisted Indonesians to fly and maintain Sabre fighter air-
craft donated by Australia. When the unit's basic task was ended, 
some RAAF personnel remained behind to advise on engineering and 
equipment problems. Australia withdrew its combat troops and the 
DSD monitoring unit from Singapore by the beginning of 1974. But at 
least 1500 personnel of all services were still to be found in 
Malaysia/Singapore at any one time. About 150 men remained in 
Singapore to provide technical assistance and to help maintain an 
Australian frigate and submarine stationed in neighbouring waters. 
The remainder were in Malaysia, primarily in connection with the 
two squadrons of Australian Mirage aircraft based at Butterworth. 
The Mirages were to remain as a contribution to Malaysia's air 
defence and training until such time a? the Malaysians determined 
that the aircraft were no longer required. Furthermore, Australia 
rotated an infantry company through the Butterworth base. 
Technically, this was not "stationing" but a "training and exercise" 
role. A final example comes from Papua New Guinea. A sizable 
Australian military presence was maintained there, primarily to train 
the PNG Defence Force in preparation for independence. But even 
after independence, training roles and service in technical fields such 
as logistics and signals were maintained, involving several hundred 
Australian servicemen."' 
What, however, of Labor's disclaimer to sending combat troops 
overseas, apart from the very special case of peace-keeping under UN 
aegis or In response to a direct military threat to Australia? The ques-
tion is hypothetical and may never be put to a test, though the L-CP 
made its point that it would not preclude an overseas intervention. 
There are some instructive observations that can be made resperting 
Papua New Guinea. Papua New Guinea's perceived security value to 
Australia declined considerably after the mid-1960s. The prospect 
that an independent Papua New Guinea would be attacked or 
militarily harassed by another nation was believed slight, though 
with Indonesia being the most likely candidate within this calculus of 
improbabilities. Australian and PNG authorities agreed that Australia 
should make no commitments to assist Papua New Guinea, either in 
international hostilities or if internal order broke down; for instance, 
through secessionist activity and should the PNG Defence Force of 
3500 prove insufficient. Sir Albert Maori Kiki, Papua New Guinea's 
Minister for Defence and Foreign Relations, remarked that "These are 
things which we should be able to cope with ourselves. We do not 
want to be left with no alternative but to invite, or permit, foreign 
forces to come in and deal with the situation."' On its part, Australia 
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was hardly eager to be pulled in, especially with its own service per-
sonnel scheduled to play a key role in Papua New Guinea's defence es-
tablishment for the forseeable future. 
At least hypothetically, however, that apparently was not where 
the Australian government and its advisers felt that the matter 
rested. Simply stated, the Labor government appeared not to preclude 
the possibility of an Australian military intervention in the event of a 
major security emergency in Papua New Guinea, whether externally 
or domestically inspired. The combination of internal and public 
evidence supporting this conclusion is reasonably impressive. The in-
temal evidence, based on questions put to a number of key persons, 
was consistently reinforcing. One interviewee remarked that 
Australia had not asked for a formal defence commitment with 
Papua New Guinea because it had wished to stay "on side" with Asian 
countries, before which it had publicized its non-interventionalist 
credentials. Another person pointed out that Labor's platform ob-
jected to the garrisoning of troops overseas, a piohibition that would 
not preclude an intervention as such. At all events, whether or not these 
particular interpretations were inherently correct, the consensus was 
that intervention was not excluded as an option. 
The public evidence is decidedly more inferential, but nonetheless 
compatible with the conclusion. For instance, Barnard averred that, 
in the absence of a formal Australian-PNG defence commitment, 
"there can no longer by any thought of automatic involvement of 
Australian forces in Papua New Guinea.' The point seemed to be 
Australia's reluctance to be automatically involved rather than a flat 
proscription of an interventionist role. At the ALP's 1975 party con-
ference, Whitlam successfully argued against removal from the plat-
form of support for treaties of non-aggression and of mutual defence 
arrangements. In his remarks, on two occasions, he specifically men-
tioned Papua New Guinea as possibly carrying relevance for mutual 
defence arrangements.'' A final piece of substantiation, reinforced by 
internal evidence, comes from the experience of the Priorities Review 
Staff a kind of far-looking "think-tank" unit created by the incoming 
Labor government. In a draft that preceded its public interim report 
in late 1973, the PRS criticized the government for having developed 
technical/operational plans to intervene in Papua New Guinea in the 
event of domestic turmoil, but for having failed to develop con-
tingency plans for when, and in what circumstances, intervention 
would be justified. The draft leaked out. Partially because the govern-
ment wished to avoid indelicate material in a public document, the 
PRS excluded all mention of Papua New Guinea in the foreign policy 
section of its report. In any event, the government was unhappy not 
only because the PRS had raised a sensitive issue, but because it saw 
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the PRS's criticism as unfounded; there were contingency plans for a 
military intervention of one sort or another in addition to technical 
preparations.* 
We have examined the actual and projerted roles of Australia's armed 
forces. Now we turn to the resources Labor made available to them 
and their capabilities. Financial resources represented one rough 
index of the government's commitment to the armed forces establish-
ment. The index is crude because it presents some difficulties in iden-
tifying the most salient data and poses problems of data com-
parability. Moreover, partisan discussion of defence expenditure fell 
victim to exchanges of political debating points and at times was 
depressingly unedifying. Basically, the government insisted that it 
was making a proper, even generous financial contribution to 
defence, while the L-CP disagreed. 
In dollar terms, defence expenditure under Labor rose steadily. In 
1973-74, it was up by $127 million over the last L-CP year. Then, in 
1974-75, actual defence' spending rose by $303 million. In the 
1975-76 budget estimates, submitted in August 1975, defence 
spending was scheduled to rise by an additional $172 million, to a 
grand total of $1.8 billion. As a percentage of the federal budget, the 
projected defence allocation for 1975-76 was 8.2 per cent—down 
sharply from 1974-75 and roughly back to the figure for 1973-74. 
Opposition and other critics insisted that claims of steady improve-
ment in defence spending, or of the adequacy of money budgeted or 
spent, were deceptive. For instance, both in the 1974-75 and 1975-76 
budget estimates, the rise in defence expenditure represented the 
smallest proportional increase among any major budget items. 
Furthermore, It was pointed out that inflation had seriously eroded 
the value of the dollar, thereby invalidating government boasts of ag-
gregate spending increases—the "less bang for the buck" argument. 
Hence although defence spending was scheduled to rise by nearly 11 
per cent in 1975—76, it could actually be interpreted as a decline in 
what could be bought for the money, since it needed to be seen 
against a real Increase of 17 per cent in the rate of inflation. 
Enter the dispute over the proportionality of defence spending. In 
the last years of the L-CP, the annual amount spent on defence's 
share of national Income had slipped from 4.8 per cent to 3.4 per cent 
and of gross domestic prcxiuct from 4.3 per cent to 3.1 per cent. Under 
Labor this decline continued, and then only in the most marginal 
terms was reversed. The national income propwrtions were 2.8 per 
cent in 1973-74 and 2.9 per cent in 1974-75; the estimate for 
1975-76 was for no more than 3 per cent. Hence while the L-CP 
could not deny ;hat it had allowed a relative "deterioration" in 
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defence spending, it could claim that Labor had allowed even more 
deterioration. Defence spending as a proportion of national income 
was not much different than Germany's, and well above Canada's and 
New Zealand's—the latter two being, like Australia, Western 
"middle" powers. Labor had promised in the 1972 electoral campaign 
that it would not reduce relative spending below the level it inherited 
from the L-CP, so the opposition later argued that Labor had 
defaulted on its promise. The government of course claimed that, 
given its own national security calculations, and in light of other 
priorities, what was being spent on defence was adequate. In 1973, 
Barnard and Whitlam agreed that, over a five-year peiod. efforts 
would be made to increase defence spending by I to 2 per cent in real 
terms. An example of failure to match the promise with performance 
was the 1975-76 defence allocation—under 11 per cent projerted rise 
in dollar spending, against a background of 17 per cent inflation. 
From time to time, the opposition's criticism of Labor carried the 
strong implication that, if returned to office, the L-CP would rectify 
Labor's financial neglect of defence. But in the midst of the 1974 elec-
toral campaign, the opposition stressed financial austerity as a means 
of combating inflation. In an interview, Anthony allowed that, 
because of financial constraints and the not altogether unfavourable 
international situation, "We just cannot spend any more money at the 
moment."' Snedden then followed by saying that, if in office to 
prepare the 1974-75 budget, the L-CP would increase defence expen-
diture by about $200 million.'" Labor's budgeted increase for 1974-75 
came to $166 million, and actual spending by the close of 1974-75 
represented an increase over 1973-74 of just over $300 million. Later 
in 1974, the L-CP defence spokesman, Dr Forbes, said that it was 
"imperative" for an L-CP government "to substantially increase the 
resources going to defence"." But in early 1975, he was saying that 
this would only come about "in a few years''.'^ In his reply to the 
government's 1975-76 budget statement, Fraser himself a "strong 
defence" man, attacked Labor for not trimming expenditures enough 
to combat inflation and recommended an overall cut of a billion dol-
lars in the government's overall planned outlays. The opposition's Oc-
tober 1975 statement on defence policy was equivocal. Promise was 
made to restore defence expenditure to "appropriate and realistic 
levels", but the coalition parties explicitly refused to commit 
themselves to any absolute or proportionate estimates of what they 
would spend." A variety of evidence, public and internal, suggested 
that the L-CP was not, indeed, prepared to insure a quantum leap in 
defence spending certainly not in the short run. Such inconsistencies 
within the opposition's position made it easier for the government to 
justify its own defence spending effort. When Anthony made his 
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remarks, Barnard was quick off the mark. He "welcomed" Anthony's 
"endorsement" of the government's current level of defence expen-
diture and his "acceptance" of Labor's strategic assessment.'" 
The net conclusion to be drawn seemed to be that while Labor had 
de facto decreased financial resources available for defence, the opposi-
tion was unprepared to do much more. 
We now need to ask on what the money was being spent, and we 
start with the size of the military establishment. Labor inherited an 
establishment that at mid-1972 had stood at 80900 regular forces, in-
cluding conscripts serving in the army; the post-Second World War 
peak of about 86000 had been reached in 1970. The new Labor 
government abolished National Service and allowed conscript 
soldiers to resign. It still, however had to deal with the questions of 
what was appropriate service strength. There was no longer an 
Australian military presence in Vietnam, the battalion in Singapore 
was to be withdrawn and future overseas commitments were to be 
avoided. The strategic assumption was for litfle prospert of 
foreseeable threat to Australia. Labor at large was not well-disposed 
towards a sizable establishment, and its domestic priorities likewise 
imposed constraints. On the other hand, there was recognition of the 
need to maintain reasonable force levels to deal with contingencies 
and to provide a base for expansion in case of serious emergency. 
Under Labor regular armed forces strength first declined quite sharp-
ly, then underwent gradual increase. Numbers stood at 69 100 as of 
mid-1975. They had been scheduled to rise to 73 000 in 1975, essen-
tially through increases in army strength, but this promise was 
rescinded in the 1975-76 budget projections. Government spokesmen 
were quick to accentuate the positive. Even a 69000-strong establish-
ment was the same size as the number of volunteers serving when the 
L-CP left office. Under Labor the services were much larger—by a 
third—than they had been in 1964. before conscription was in-
troduced, before the services generally were expanded and before a 
combat commitment in Vietnam had been undertaken. The services 
in 1975 were only about 9000 fewer than in Canada and far above 
ANZUS partner New Zealand"s, whose personnel numbered under 
13 000. even though New Zealand continued to garrison combat 
troops in Singapore longer than Australia. 
Among the services, RAN and RAAF strength was kept fairly con-
sistent with levels reached in the late 1960s: about 16 100 for the 
RAN, 21 500 for the RAAF. It was the strength of the army that un-
derwent the greatest fluctuations and therefore drew the heaviest 
criticism. Service advice under the Liberals was that a 40000 figure 
was needed. When Labor came to office, this was scaled down to 
38000. Barnard, originally considered building up to a 36000 figure. 
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but settled for 34 000, to be reached in 1976. Some Labor ministers 
wanted to set the ceiling even lower, but were overriden. A move in 
caucus to revise to 31000 was defeated by 18 for and 59 against." 
However by mid-1975, army strength had inched up to only 31 500 
and, as we have seen, was not scheduled for an increase in 1975-76. 
Barnard devoted considerable effort to promoting service strength, 
efficiency and satisfaction. Service pay and amenities were rapidly 
and very generously improved. The office of a services ombudsman 
was created. Sympathetic reartion was expressed to the idea of a ser-
vicemen"s union, should servicemen themselves wish one. Results 
from expensive recruitment campaigns were generally acceptable. Of-
ficer resignations became worrisome for a time, but that subject we 
leave for another context. The Millar Report had pointed up deteriora-
tion in numbers and capabilities of the Citizen Military Forces. Steps 
were undertaken to up-grade what was to become an Army Reserve 
and to merge it more effectively with roles performed by the regular 
army. It was recognized that, since for Labor conscription was repug-
nant and otherwise politically impracticable in Australia, special at-
tention had to be devoted to back-up forces."' Moreover, despite cut-
backs from its pre-1973 strength level, the army was about to claim a 
favourable manpower intensive ratio of field force to support person-
nel. By mid-1975, there were 1 1 800 in the former category and 19 700 
in the latter 
Where, then, lay the criticisms? There was a fair amount of bluster 
within the L-CP and, when it was in Parliament, among DLP 
senators. For instance,, urgency motions were moved in the non-
Labor-controlled'Senate to discuss what was alleged to have been the 
appalling state of Australia"s defence capacity and capability, in man-
power terms and otherwise. One specific criticism, and on which 
senior service advice was overriden by the government, was over the 
compression of the army"s structure from nine battalions to six. The 
government argued that this move would make battalion units more 
sturdy and effective. Critics rejoined that a nine-battalion structure 
was needed if a major overseas commitment had to be made and also 
to mitigate strains if army strength expansion were undertaken. It 
was also felt that, although the army was theoretically organized 
around a divisional structure, such a structure was not capable of 
being operationalized, regardless of battalion structure." At bottom, 
manpower was at issue. Internal evidence indicated considerable 
Defence Department disquiet over the adequacy of manpower levels 
(and equipment) to fulfil a continental defence role properly. 
In practical terms, the L-CP did not have much to offer. It made it 
clear that conscription would not be reintroduced, short of a real and 
direct threat to Australia. What of the preferred size of a volunteer 
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army? The L-CP seemed to have scaled its sights down to about 
36000, only 2000 short of Labor"s original 1976 target of 34000, but 
5500 higher than the 31 500 figure at which the army was to be held 
into 1976. But internal evidence suggested that only the most 
marginal, if any, expansion of the forces would be launched by a L-CP 
government. No real political advantage was foreseen in pushing fora 
major expansion of the forces at a time when the public was preoc-
cupied with bread-and-butter concerns and no threat to Australia was 
imminent. Paying for a larger establishment would, as we saw, upset 
the creed of economy in government. The L-CP's main promise 
seemed to be that it would restore a "sense of purpose" into the ser-
vices.'" 
No proper evaluation of armed services capability is possible 
without reference to how the forces were armed and equipped. It is in 
this area that the opposition was especially contemptuous of Labor's 
performance. J.D. Killen, Forbes' successor as L-CP shadow Defence 
Minister applied his familiar rhetorical flair to the subject. He 
claimed that the government had forgotten the admonition that "You 
cannot wage war with a map."" Australia's defence equipment situa-
tion was not critical, not grave; it was "plainly desperate".^" 
A continental and sea and air approach defence dortrine was 
adopted by the government and presumably would be reflected in 
equipment procurement policy. Apart from financial constraints, the 
government felt that equipment purchases needed to provide for a 
"mcxiest military capacity for operations at short notice" and enough 
hardware on hand to maintain the state of the art, so as to "expand 
our capability more quickly than a threat, relevant to that capability, 
can develop". It was inadvisable to try to anticipate the changes con-
stantly occurring in weapons technology or to place orders for equip-
ment that, given the size and mission of the armed forces, would be 
indigestible.^' Within this context the gcwernment asserted that 
Australia's forces were, and would continue to be, very well armed 
and equipped. 
Criticisms of the government's equipment policy emanated from 
the opposition, from a number of retired, and even serving senior of-
ficers and were found in Defence Department circles. Some of the 
criticism followed from a rejection of a continentalist strategic 
doctrine as such and thereby proceeded to accuse the government of 
not having done enough to equip the forces for roles that, on its part, 
the government did not envision. But there also were criticisms that, 
given the government's own continentalist assumptions, and apart 
from whether Labor might have been overly sanguine in anticipating 
threats, the equipment picture was unsatisfactory. It was said that, if 
as claimed, Australia was to become more militarily self-reliant and 
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had to anticipate, detect and, if needed, repel incursions upon itself or 
its immediate air and sea environment, it required exceptional rather 
than unexceptional equipment for the job." 
As of the 1975-76 budget projections, Australia had, or was intent 
on acquiring, some very sophisticated equipment. Acquisitions ar-
ranged by L-CP governments included twenty-four American F-111 
strike aircraft. Australia had in service four conventionally powered 
but highly advanced British-made Oberon-class submarines and two 
additional boats were under construction. Also from Britain, the 
Labor government had ordered ten advanced-design Sea King anti-
submarine helicopters. Labor also ordered eight Orion maritime 
patrol aircraft from the United States. During Barnard's ministry, 
fifty-three Leopard main-battle tanks were scheduled for acquisition 
from Germany and an additional thirty-four were pledged by Mor-
rison. All the same, a number of critics saw these acquisitions as in-
adequate, in numbers or otherwise. Much of Australia was ideal 
"tank country", but even eighty-seven Leopards could do little more 
than literally keep the "state of the art" alive. Some felt that a 
meaningful number would be double what Labor had in mind. Only 
eight Orions were ordered, an alleged shortfall of at least 50 per cent, 
in the light of Australia's exceptional 19000-kilometre coastline. The 
government also contracted for two American patrol (later renamed 
guided-missile) frigates. Not only were only two frigates deemed a 
small gesture, but their cruising capacity, single-screw character and 
armaments were claimed to be inadequate, especially in comparison 
with larger destroyer vessels that could have been selected. The 
frigates were chosen because, it was often charged, they were the 
cheapest. 
Other equipment already in the inventory was also brought under 
criticism for being outdated or insufficient in quantity. As of 1975, 
field artillery was vintage and anti-aircraft equipment scarce, despite 
a pledge in the 1975-76 budget to look to artillery replacements and 
to acquire some Rapier surface-to-air guided missiles. Many vessels 
were approaching the end of their useful service and there were no 
plans to replace the aging carrier Melbourne, the RAN's flagship. There 
were exceptional delays in moving towards a replacement of 
Australia's aging Mirage fighters, though this project was given 
priority for 1975-76. Indeed, in the interests of economy, a Mirage 
squadron was stood down, leaving a single operational fighter 
squadron based in AustraPa. Under Barnard, flying time for aircraft 
and steaming time for vessels had been reduced. Morrison authorized 
more steaming time and mileage for tanks and other fighting vehi-
cles, but not increased flying time. 
Transport capabilities came under criticism. Because of Australia's 
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vastness and absence of adequate surface-transport facilities in many 
regions, and a small army, which had to rely on rapid mobile trans-
port, airlift capacity was termed sorely inadequate. When the ser-
vices undertook to supply cyclone-stricken Darwin and to evacuate 
displaced persons, critics pointed to the lack of big cargo aircraft, such 
as the American Galaxy, which could have facilitated such a civilian 
relief task, as well as enhancing the nation's military posture. At the 
time of the Darwin disaster mention was also made of the absence 
from the relief fleet of a combat supply ship." Such a vessel was, 
however, promised in the 1975-76 budget. So were new transport 
aircraft, but not of the range or airlift capacity of the Galaxy. Western 
Australia's coastline was also brought up. Despite considerable great 
power naval activity in the Indian Ocean, and the state's enormous 
(and alle:?edly inviting) natural riches, the RAN was virtually absent 
from the area and construction at the Cockburn ScTund naval facility 
had been slowed by the Labor government. In fart, Indonesian and 
Taiwanese poachers off the West Australian coast more often than 
not went undetected. The RAN's patrol vessel fleet was small and 
became even smaller with the gift of some vessels of this ("Attack") 
class to Papua New Guinea and to Indonesia." Coastal surveillance 
was stepped up in 1975, especially during Morrison's ministry and— 
very belatedly and ambiguously, critics mantained—plans were set in 
1975 "eventually" to replace the remaining Australian patrol-boats. 
The government was correct that equipment contracts and expen-
ditures usually were long-term and that a re-equipment programme 
would not necessarily be reflected in a given year's budget. Moreover 
the government bargained long and well to obtain good terms for its 
overseas capital equipment purchases. It failed to scale down remain-
ing payments on the exhorbitantly expensive F-111 aircraft, but won 
explicit protections against comparable cost overruns on the patrol 
frigate contract.^' AH the same, with the possible exception of the 
1975-76 budget allocations, capital expenditures suffered under the 
ALP. In April 1974, Cabinet agreed to a long- term $330 million 
capital-spending programme. The project enjoyed Barnard's personal 
endorsement. But it is plain that the timing .of the announcement, 
and Cabinet endorsement as such, were encouraged by the impending 
election. In the last three L-CP financial years, capital expenditure as' 
a percentage of defence expenditure had averaged about 12 per cent. 
Under Labor in 1973-74. it was 7.2 per cent and in 1974-75, 6.7 per 
cent. It was projected to reach 10 per cent in 1975-76; an improve-
ment oa earlier Labor years, but still behind what the Liberals had 
been doing. Only in part, however was this the result of any overt 
"neglect" of equipment. Because Labor made a very substantial con-
tribution to the pay and benefits of service personnel, less remained 
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for capital expenditures." To have done well for both personnel and 
their equipment would have necessitated a substantially greater out-
lay of funds. The proportionate increase in capital expenditures for 
1975-76 was accomplished only by keeping manpower numbers con-
stant and by introducing other economies. When in government, the 
L-CP had expressed its intention to raise the proportion spent on new 
equipment to 20 per cent by the close of a five-year rolling defence 
programme. By the mid-1970s, however, neither the government nor 
the opposition could credibly promise anything approaching that 
scale. Neither side was willing to reduce personnel, or to cut back on 
employment perquisites, or appreciably to raise annual defence 
spending. 
It is also helpful to comment on the scientific/industrial back-up 
available to Australia's defence forces. This kind of capability can 
mean equipment especially suited to Australia and its allies. It can 
help to insulate Australia from interruptic:)ns in outside sources of 
supply and provide a basis for expansion in case of emergency. It can 
produce various benefits to civilian industry and to the national 
economy at large. 
Under Labor, existing advisory groups such as the Defence (In-
dustrial) Committee and the Defence Science Board were continued 
or embellished. This provided ongoing liasion between industry and 
government in matters of defence-related research, development and 
production, as well as forward mobilization planning. Members from 
industry and commerce were able to attend industry mobilization 
courses sponsored by the Department of Defence. In mid-1974, a 
variety of government research and development establishments, 
employing some I(X)0 scientists and engineers and costing about $60 
million per year were brought together under the Defence Depart-
ment's wing. All the same. Labor allowed a number of research and 
development (R 6- D) activities to run down, in part because of 
decline of work. Among these were the Aeronautical Research 
Laboratories, the Woomera rocket range and missile-testing range 
and associated research at the Weapons Research Establishment at 
Salisbury, South Australia. The industrial R & D proportion of the 
Australian gross national product had always been low by Western 
nation standards and continued to be so under Labor. This was so 
despite the fact that 75 to 80 per cent of the value of the country's 
military supplies that were domestically produced were "obtained 
from private industry. As of early 1975, the government was not 
providing any financial support for defence-related R & D program-
mes in the non-government area. Subcontracts to industry for scien-
tific research and development tasks in 1974-75 were only about $1 
million." In the 1975-76 budget, the "defence science and technology 
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establishments" sector of the defence budget was $84.7 million, a 
relative increase on the previous year's spending of only 5.1 per cent, 
half of the proportionate increase in the defence budget at large. 
Despite various constraints before and during Labor Australia 
made important defence-related contributions. Part of this was due to 
quality skills and to enterprise. Part of it was to the special Australian 
defence requirements, especially in the air and sea context of a nation 
continent. Part of it flowed from defence science-project sharing and 
information exchanges with larger nations, such as Brttain and the 
United States. Australian research helped to develop the F-Ill air-
craft, which Australia purchased from the United States. Australia 
produced the highly successful Jendivik and Turana pilotless target 
aircraft, the Ikara anti-submarine weapon system, the Mulloka sonar 
and Jindalee over-horizon radar and the Barra sonics system, which 
was to be incorporated into the new Orion maritime patrol aircraft. 
It produced the outstanding short take-off and landing (STOL) 
Nomad utility aircraft.^* 
The Nomad was an example of Australian inventiveness, but also 
illustrated some of the shortcomings and dilemmas of the Australian 
defence production industry. Designed at the Government Aircraft 
Factories in Melbourne, the Nomad first flew in 1972. Delays and 
need for remodelling had been compounded by run-down in expertise 
at the GAF. The aircraft was redesigned. Its price rose, but cost over-
runs were difficult to absorb by a small enterprise. Its domestic 
market was limited. Its overseas market was potentially good, but 
was reduced by political decisions under Labor not to sell it to certain 
nations that could refit it for military use; for instance, Portugal at 
one time and some Middle Eastern governments. By mid-1975, 
Nomads had been sold to or ordered by countries as diverse as In-
donesia, the Philippines, Kenya and Peru. Overall firm orders, 
however remained about two-thirds short of the Nomad's financial 
break-even point. Trade unionists insisted that the aircraft be 
manufactured entirely in Australia and the plane in measure became 
a device for employing workers who would otherwise have been 
threatened with redundancy." 
When Labor came to office, it wished to economize on defence 
spending. Savings were sought in what often were under-economical 
defence factories. No major equipment resupply projects were en-
visioned. In general, it was felt that quality equipment, often at lower 
prices than at home, could be had from abroad. But this would have 
endangered jobs in Australia. Hawke and other union spokesmen in-
terceded. Union bans on servicing naval vessels were threatened or 
actually carried out. The government reacted in patchwork fashion, 
which is probably all it could have done. Some foreign purchases, or 
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refittings, were to be reconsidered. Defence fartories were encouraged 
to diversify their work. Special retraining for redundant workers was 
provided. Some measures were not altogether in step with highest 
standards of efficiency or economy. Ironically, because of the Labor 
government's sensitivity to trade-union leverage, the Australian 
defence industry was given a transfusion. Also there is strong inferen-
tial evidence that the very size of the Labor government's defence 
budgets, and thereby military capability, were improved because of 
trade-union pressures. Labor ministers and caucus members were un-
derstandably happier about defence expenditures if Australian 
worker interests were thereby being advanced.'" A corollary was 
vigorous and often successful ALP government efforts to maximize 
production-offset opportunities when buying equipment overseas. In 
a 1973 agreement, the United States, for the first time with any na-
tion, undertook to use its "best endeavours" to provide Australia with 
production rights to military equipment for US forces to the value of 
25 per cent of any equipment purchase from American manufac-
turers. The patrol frigate contract, originally resisted by unionists 
because ships were to be bought overseas, incorporated explicit terms 
for Australian industry participation." 
We have examined the Australian armed forces capabilities in 
terms of financial resources committed to them, their numbers, their 
equipment and the scientific and industrial supports available to 
them. We finally need to comment on the state of satisfartion, or 
morale, within the officer corps. Under Labor officer resignations 
rose sharply. During Labor's first two years in office, over 10 per cent 
of officers tendered their resignations. Among them were general-
grade officers and large numbers from key middle ranks, major or 
lieutenant-colonel or the equivalent. One Australian close to the 
scene told the author that 75 per cent of the resigned officers were 
persons the Defence Department was not especially keen to keep 
anyway. Perhaps so. Moreover, a number of the early retirement 
resignations were prompted less by inherent dissatisfaction than by 
attractive retirement plans introduced by the Labor government. By 
1975, the resignation rate had slowed. All the same, a number of of-
ficers, both recently retired or who were still in the service, spoke up 
about their concerns, which in one respect or another reflected on 
Labor's policies. There was some general dissatisfaction with the low-
threat, allegedly over-optimistic, strategic assessments and other 
features of assumptions and doctrine. More particularly, the target 
was the state of the armed forces, and also there was resentment over 
reorganizational changes planned for the Department of Deferice.'^ 
Steps towards Defence Department reorganization began shortly 
after Labor entered office and were capped by the introduction of the 
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Defence Forces Reorganization Bill two and a half years later. The 
government's basic intentions were to unify the three services under 
explicit Defence Department control and to reconstitute and 
streamline the structure of advice and responsibility within the 
department. A number of officers found fault in these changes. There 
already was a disposition to feel that, under Labor the armed ser-
vices' capabilities had been allowed to deteriorate. In gist, charges 
now arose that, in a revamped Department of Defence, there would 
be insufficient uniformed services policy input or access to the 
Minister for Defence. There were other specific doubts about ad-
ministrative efficiency under the new system. These imputations 
were, of course, denied by political and Defence Department 
spokesmen." Of the various points on which the opposition took 
Labor's armed forces/defence capability policy to task. Defence 
Department reorganization was one place where the L-CP could in 
fact have followed a critical course, without getting stuck on the issue 
of expenditures. Yet the opposition was itself committed to Defence 
Department unification. Its protest was therefore that Labor was 
moving too quickly, and too radically, in reconstituting the Depart-
ment. It seized on officer resignations and complaints as signs that 
Labor was bypassing the opinions of informed professionals, not just 
of the L-CP. The particulars of Defence Department reorganization 
were portrayed as more of the same: a shunting aside of military ad-
vice and a further demoralization of the armed forces.'"* 
The Australian debate over military preparedness was over real not 
specious Issues—men, materiel, morale. Its major drawback was that 
For ideological, electoral, economic and other reasons neither party 
group was in a position to depart significantly from what was in fart 
done. It was mainly on the doctrine of the uses of armed forces that 
the two sides seemed to be at variance. We now turn to how, in the 
context of alliance systems, security considerations were treated by 
Labor and its opponents. 
When Labor entered office, Australia was involved in three mul-
tilateral regional security arrangements. These were the Five Power 
Agreement and its supportive ANZUK force, SEATO and ANZUS, and 
we will examine them in that order. The Five Power Agreement 
bound Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Singapore and Malaysia to 
consult in the event of actual or threatened attack on Singapore or 
Malaysia and to assist these two nations with training and equip-
ment. ANZUK, comprising Britain, Australia and New Zealand, was 
an integrated military force stationed at Singapore, supplementing 
but not required by the Five Power Agreement. As Australia's con-
tribution to ANZUK. the L-CP government had provided an infantrv 
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battalion, an artillery battery and various support troops. The Labor 
government withdrew the combat elements by the turn of 1973-74 
and, apart from a few training and facility servicing personnel, took 
out the remaining personnel a year later. 
Labor did not repudiate the Five Power Agreement, but its decision 
to end the ground presence in Singapore had been foreseen. The party 
was on record as opposing overseas stationing of combat troops. The 
Vietnam involvement was in the immediate background. Withdrawal 
from ANZUK would make concrete Labor's wish to portray Australia 
as a nation looking less to military measures than it had in the past. 
As preceding governments, Labor was somewhat uneasy about the 
possibility of its ANZUK troops becoming caught up in internal dis-
putes, ft was not much impressed by any forecasts that Malaysia or 
Singapore faced foreseeable externally induced security threats, and 
saw Malaysia and Singapore as becoming increasingly self-sufficient 
in providing for their own defence. In other words, Malaysia and 
Singapore simply were not believed to need a shielding Australian 
garrison any more." 
It is instructive to reconstruct the process followed in disengaging 
the troops and the reartions produced on various sides. The new 
government quickly (and without first seeking a submission from the 
Department of Defence) pledged to remove the combat garrison from 
Singapore, but indicated the desirability of retaining several hundred 
support and logistical troops. In early February 1973, an article ap-
peared in which it was revealed that Australia had for some time 
been maintaining a DSD radio-monitoring and code-breaking unit in 
Singapore.'* Whitlam then called a non-attributable "background" 
briefing for selected media people and there admitted the presence of 
the DSD unit. The briefing was a public relations fiasco. Whitlam had 
almost certainly decided to admit the unit's existence without the 
knowledge (and to the befuddlement) of the Defence Department, 
Defence Minister Barnard and his own personal aides. 
The importance of the matter however, lies in what Whitlam 
wished to accomplish and why. The new government had been told 
of the DSD unit's operations and was persuaded by Defence Depart-
ment officials that the unit was performing valuable work, not only 
for Australia but in what could be shared with allies. Contrary to 
some speculation, the view that the DSD unit was operating without 
the Singapore government's knowledge should be discounted. 
Whitlam's public explanation for repatriating the unit to Australia 
was that "We do not believe that we should operate a defence unit in 
another country unless that other country shares in the management 
of it. This was an Australian unit." In an/event, the Gorton govern-
ment had itself initiated plans to transfer the operation, but the pro-
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ject had stalled." It would not seem critical whether Whitlam's of-
ficial reason was especially convincing, since the unit was not after all 
being liquidated, only moved. 
When the government decided to retain the DSD unit long enough 
to arrange alternative facilities in Darwin, it decided to mask their 
presence in Singapore by retaining a "cover" force of several hundred 
men. But when the government announced that several hundred per-
sonnel would be retained in Singapore for "logistical" and other tasks, 
there were serious reverberations within the ALP. The council of the 
Victorian ALP branch roundly condemned plans to retain logistical 
personnel and Cairns personally endorsed the Victorian resolution.'* 
Whitlam wished to avoid an open battle within the party so early in 
the life of the new government. He felt there were more important is-
sues on which, if needed, he might wish to confront party critics; for 
instance, the American defence facilities in Australia. Since the ex-
istence of the DSD unit had eventually been leaked anyway, 
Whitlam's announcement of it in the background briefing was 
designed to ease the rationale for eventually declaring that the 
"masking force"—the logistical personnel—would, in addition to 
combat trcxjps, be withdrawn. Party criticism against retaining sup-
port troops continued. In early July 1973, on the eve of Labor's 
Surfers Paradise Federal Conference, Barnard explicitly announced 
that, after an interval, logistical personnel would follow combat 
troops out of Singapore." 
While the evidence points to the logistical troops having been con-
ceived of as camouflage for the DSD unit until it could be removed to 
Australia, there is also an intimation that the government thought of 
them as performing inherently useful service for the remaining 
British and New Zealand partners in the ANZUK force. Both before 
and after the DSD unit revelations, Barnard seemed to be putting this 
view, and indeed apparently had held it even before Labor had won 
the election and before he had become aware of the monitoring unit's 
existence.''" It is quite true that logistical personnel were not 
withdrawn until some two years after Labor entered office. But to the 
extent that Barnard and others had believed them to serve an intrin-
sically useful function, other than screening the DSD unit, this seemed 
to suggest the weight of intra-party constraints on the government's 
defence policy judgement to return them to Australia. 
What of the more explicit foreign and defence policy asperts of 
Labor's handling of the Singapore troop issue? Firstly, we consider 
relations with ANZUK partners Britain and New Zealand. Labor 
decided to pull its troops out against British and New Zealand advice. 
London and Wellington were somewhat concerned about the decline 
in ANZUK strength if Australian combat troops were withdrawn, but 
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were more concerned if support troops left, since Australian person-
nel were assigned prime logistical responsibility on behalf of the in-
tegrated ANZUK brigade. The structure that had slowly and with 
some difficulty been built up would now be dismantled, or would re-
quire extensive rebuilding."' 
In 1973, Britain continued to be under a Conservative government, 
but Labour was by then governing in New Zealand. Despite all the 
rhetoric about mutuality of trans-Tasman interests, Australia and 
New Zealand went separate ways on stationing troops in Singapore. 
Interpretations offered by New Zealanders and Australians illuminate 
the nuance of approach and of one nation's perceptions of the other. 
One New Zealand explanation, heard twice, was that the personable 
Norman Kirk was able to get on far better with Lee Kuan-yew than 
was the headstrong Gough Whitlam, who cared little for the 
Singapore Prime Minister's ideas, including Lee's wish that 
Australian troops remain. Another New Zealand interpretation, more 
plausible than the first, was that the New Zealand Labour Party was 
not as burdened by a need to repudiate the past or to honour explicit 
party doctrine on overseas troop commitments as was its counterpart 
in Australia. After his early 1973 swing through South-East Asia, New 
Zealand Defence Minister Faulkner reported to Wellington that the 
countries in the region preferred ANZUK to remain intact. This 
helped to persuade New Zealand. But, according to New Zealanders, 
when the Australians had this view imparted to them, they seemed to 
take a "couldn't care less" attitude. Australian sources pictured the 
conversations differently. The New Zealanders were said to have been 
"gratuitous" in presenting their case. On the Singapore troop issue, 
the New Zealanders were said to have been eager to appear "dif-
ferent" from Australia—a case of little brother asserting his in-
dependence, of trying to make plain his attachment to South-East 
Asian problems in a way unnecessary for the more seasoned 
Australians. Actually, apart from taking Asian reartions to a troop 
withdrawal more to heart than Canberra, the government in Wel-
lington was eventually not all that unhappy about fending more for 
itself in Singapore. New Zealand's 1974 Defence Repon stated that 
"New Zealand thus now has a nationally identifiable force based on 
Singapore. This will facilitate implementation of the Government's 
policy of strengthening and extending New Zealand's bilateral 
relationships in this area.""^ The author was unable to follow up on 
Australian opinion that New Zealand had been told by Britain that 
keeping troops in Singapore would be a sound investment in obtain-
ing trade concessions from the EEC, which by then Britain had joined 
and in whose councils it enjoyed influence. 
At all events, as Faulkner testified, 1973 opinion in South-East 
244 Australian External Policy under Ubor 
Asian capitals, and especially in Singapore, favoured the retention of 
Australian troops and of the ANZUK force generally. The ANZUK 
force was not really thought of as a trip-wire in case of attack. It was a 
less-tangible, yet meaningful expression of confidence and reas-
surance in what still was a fluid region. Also, to Lee at least, ANZUK 
filled a power vacuum in the region, which the great powers would 
otherwise reach to exploit."' These conceptions were not shared in 
Canberra. For Whitlam, Lee was a "theoretical" hawk in his percep-
tions of the security picture. 
The L-CP strenuously attacked the government's Singapore troop 
position; for reneging on ANZUK, for flaunting South-East Asian opi-
nion, for underestimating dangers in the region, for being hostage to 
left-wing elements in the ALP, and so on. On 1 March 1973, the op-
position launched its first motion of censure against the new 
government; it was based on criticism of Singapore policy. In the 
Senate, non-Labor forces brought this issue forward as a motion of 
urgency. Snedden called Barnard's July 1973 promise of troop 
withdrawal an act of- "sickening irresponsibility"."" Increasingly, 
however, the L-CP's options to reverse government policy shrank and 
then virtually disappeared. By late 1973 and well into 1974, the op-
position's position was that it would be willing to send the troops 
back to rejoin other ANZUK forces, but of course this would take 
place only after consultations with concerned parties, notably 
Singapore."' By the latter part of 1974, quite compelling internal 
evidence indicated the L-CP felt the likelihood of Australian troops 
returning to Singapore would be very slight. Lee himself had recon-
ciled himself to the withdrawal of Australian troops and did not wish 
the issue to become a football in Australian politics. By 1974 and then 
more directly into 1975, the ASEAN states were by and large 
searching for ways to reach a modus vivendi with China and to adjust to 
the communist victories in Indo-Chinese countries. With Australia's 
pull-out, at the opening of 1975 the three-nation ANZUK force in 
Singapore ceased to exist. Moreover, the Wilson Labour government 
in Britain, for reasons of economy and because of its Eurojaean con-
centration, had just announced its intention to withdraw the great 
majority of its troops from Singapore. That would have left the New 
Zealanders as the only remaining ground force. In May 1975, New 
Zealand announced that its troops would undertake a phased 
withdrawal from Singapore, a step to which Lee had not voiced objec-
tion."*' The ANZUK idea was gone. Time and circumstances had 
pushed the Liberals to a "no change" policy. Indeed, the Labor 
government had not only never repudiated the Five Power Agree-
ment as such but had often spoken of its value, a value that was fore-
seen to continue until the South-East Asian region underwent 
"neutralization"."' 
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When in Singapore in early 1974. Whitlam remarked that "Some 
components of Australian forces are going home, but Australia is not 
going away.""" In part, his meaning was that his government was 
prepared to continue defence co-operation aid to Malaysia/ 
Singapore, and indeed to other nations in the region as 
well. This was an aspect of defence policy that enjoyed bipartisan sup-
port in Parliament. The rationale for such assistance was that it was a 
logical extension of Australia's own defence effort. It promoted self-
reliance among recipient nations to resist external threats, consistent 
with Labor's perceptions of reducing reliance on great powers and 
their involvement in the region's affairs, and in turn strengthening 
regional impulses. Also defence aid was viewed as an adjunct of 
civilian assistance programmes."' For 1975-76, Australia budgeted 
$39.2 million for defence co-operation. The fact that this figure was 
less than half of what had been spent in 1974-75 was deceptive, since 
a very large and exceptional defence co-operation grant had been 
made to Papua New Guinea in 1974-75. For Indonesia (the single 
largest recipient apart from Papua New Guinea), Malaysia, Singapore 
and some other countries, the defence aid budgeted for 1975-76 was 
essentially the same as spent in the preceding year The defence as-
sistance programme was diverse. It included the training of Asian 
and Pacific military personnel in their own countries and in 
Australia. Most of this, including the RAAF's instructional defence 
presence at Butterworth, was conventional training. But It included 
instruction for Asian police security forces at the Australian Army 
Intelligence Centre (originally located at Woodside, South Australia), 
and in Melbourne under ASIO direction and Foreign Affairs funding. 
Criticism of such training came from persons who already were un-
comfortable about the treatment of political dissidents in countries 
such as Indonesia. Nor did especially close defence co-operation with 
Indonesia escape the attention of those who saw Indonesia as a na-
tion coveting East Timor Arms and equipment were given under 
military aid programmes, including aircraft and small naval and 
patrol vessels. The Indonesian air force commander reported that In-
donesians were receiving missile training in Australia.'" The govern-
ment eventually came to believe that the focus should fall more on 
training and technology than on provision of hardware." 
The government made much point of enirouraging joint defence ex-
ercises, in and away from Australia, between Australian and Asian 
nations. This was in keeping with its concept of regional co-
operation.'^ It did not, however forego the familiar war-game exer-
cises with traditional Western allies. We now more explicitly ex-
antine defence co-operation through the older security systems, 
SEATO and ANZUS. 
246 Australian External Policy under Ubor 
The ALP's approach to SEATO exemplified its outlook on Asia, its 
foreign policy priorities and, as its stand on the Five Power Agree-
ment and defence aid indicated, its general willingness to be adaptive 
rather than iconoclastic in matters of defence policy. Labor had for 
years disapproved of SEATO, and continued to do so when elerted to 
office. The party interpreted SEATO as an anachronism at best, and at 
worst, repugnant. SEATO had been formed to contain China, but now 
China was being courted rather than confronted by SEATO members 
themselves. The intervention in Vietnam had been encouraged by the 
Chinese containment doctrine, and Vietnam had proved the error of 
plunging into Asian civil conflicts, which had been falsely advertised 
as stemming from Chinese aggressive designs." At all events, the 
Labor government wished to prompt China into a more responsible 
regional role, as well as to reassure South-East Asian states that China 
was not an ogre. An association such as SEATO only provoked China 
and extended the day when Asia's regional relations could be nor-
malized. Under the L-CP, Australia and New Zealand had been the 
only SEATO members to have established in their own national 
budgets specific SEATO aid funds. An Australian major-general 
served in SEATO's military planning office. There had been military 
planning operations and joint air and naval exercises, directly or in-
directly pointed at China. For Australian Labor such contributions to 
SEATO were discardable, the sooner the better. 
What did Labor plan to do about Australia's membership in 
SEATO? When in opposition, Whitlam and other party spokesmen 
had continuously reproved SEATO as "moribund", while the party 
was on record favouring SEATO's reconstruction along socio-cultural 
lines. Interviewed before the 1972 election, Whitlam stated that labor 
would not drop out of SEATO, but would give it little notice.'" All the 
same, in many minds it was an open question whether a Labor 
government would actually terminate SEATO membership. On the 
left of the party, that was the preferred course. There are various in-
dications that, from very early in its term of office, the government 
was not in principle prepared to pull Australia out. However, it 
probably was prepared to pull out, or at least to suspend contacts 
with the organization, unless SEATO underwent basic reforms. This 
essentially meant that Australia favoured "a less militant and less 
ideologically-oriented posture on the part of the Organisation, and 
major changes in its institutions and activities, including the elimina-
tion of the elaborate, but unrealistic, military planning artivity"." In 
the interim, it meant pressing against the continuation of South Viet-
nam's observer status at SEATO Council meetings. It also meant 
refusal to participate in SEATO naval exercises that, in particular 
could be offensive to China. One such exercise was planned for late in 
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1973. Planning had reached an advanced stage and Barnard had per-
sonally approved of it. But Whitlam's personal advisers caught the 
matter and brought it to his notice. Whitlam promptly cancelled 
Australia's participation. He could not countenance such an exercise 
in the South China Sea and at a time when he was scheduled to visit 
China. Imputations that Whitlam took this step to pacify his party, 
which was about to meet in federal conference, are largely discoun-
table. If the decision had that effect, if was fortuitous.'*' 
Australia's willingness to remain in SEATO was reinforced by 
representations from its two ANZUS partners. The evidence from 
Wellington suggests that Kirk had originally been more inclined than 
Whitlam to leave SEATO. But Kirk and his government shifted their 
thinking. On various occasions, in definite terms, the New Zealand 
government expressed its wish to remain in SEATO, but wished that 
the organization could be revised. A number of Asian countries, both 
in and outside of SEATO, had urged New Zealand not to withdraw or 
otherwise to precipitate its collapse. SEATO was regarded as a 
stabilizing influence. New Zealand also may have been taken 
somewhat aback by the cool reception given to the Asian-Pacific 
forum idea Kirk and Whitlam had developed and was aware that 
miKh of South-East Asian official opinion objected to Australia's deci-
sion to pull troops out of Singapore." The US argument concentrated 
on Thailand. Thailand was beginning to reassess its own foreign 
policy, including towards China. But it required some form of security 
guarantee and some basis for a bargaining position while its policies 
were In transition. Apart from the Manila Pact, Thailand only had 
SEATO rather than special bilateral guarantees from the United 
States and others. Moreover the United States argued that the al-
liance systems in the region were interlocked and there could be some 
denigration of ANZUS, for instance, if SEATO went un-
ceremoniously.'* 
The Australian government stayed in SEATO, which was in fart 
reconstituted. Military planning was scaled down. Military/naval ex-
ercises were to be strictly limited and no longer direrted at China or 
at North Vietnam. SEATO was to acquire a predominantly economic 
developmental role. Had Australia been pushed into remaining in 
SEATO? It was presented with arguments, but that apparently was 
all. Reliable Australian and New Zealand sources cross-confirmed that 
Washington had not engaged in "arm twisting", as for instance 
threatening that ANZUS wc:)uld be reconsidered if SEATO collapsed. 
The United States apparently was itself a prime instigator of a 
remodeled SEATO, in part to make it more palatable to Canberra and 
.Wellington, and it was the Thais who helped draft the organization's 
revised terms. The Whitlam government liked the idea of a security 
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group realigning itself in socio-economic directions. After the poor 
South-East Asian reception of its Singapore troop withdrawal deci-
sion, it was more receptive to arguments that Asians themselves did 
not wish to have all the psychological security props knocked out. 
Labor did not object to the Manila treaty and its security pledge 
clauses as such, as distinct from SEATO's military overtones. Whitlam 
said it succinctly: "underpin confidence, yes, underwrite contain-
ment, no."" Of course, in the event of trouble in the area, Australia 
would impose its own judgement as to how to proceed. In mid-1975, 
both the Thai and the Philippine governments expressed a wish that 
SEATO be phased out entirely, though Thailand wished to preserve 
the Manila treaty. The wars in Indo-China were over and the tempo 
of accommcxiation with China was rising. Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States raised no objection and plans were set in mo-
tion to close SEATO down.'" 
There is parallelism between the Labor government's decisions on 
Singapore and on SEATO. In both instances, the more conspicuous 
military features were objected to and rescinded, but some military 
cwertones remained. Additionally, the gpvernment was quite willing 
to maintain its approval of collertive consultation and perhaps 
response of some order as contained in the Five Power Agreement 
and SEATO once it had been reconstructed, or for that matter to the 
Manila Pact. It did not attempt to upset the Five Power Agreement 
and was not the moving force behind the 1975 agreement that 
SEATO should be stood down completely. After SEATO was by 
mutual consent of its members refurbished, and then especially when 
its membership decided to disband the organization, L-CP oppor-
tunities to criticize Labor's approach to SEATO were lost. Australia 
had moved with, not against, the grain of American policy. 
We now turn to ANZUS, Australia's oldest and in a way most in-
timate security alliance. Government spokesmen often referred to the 
need to place ANZUS in perspective. They objected to what they saw as 
an L-CP habit of invoking ANZUS as the corner-stone of a very special 
relationship with America. Labor claimed that ANZUS was "not the 
be-all and end-all" of ties with the United States and it denied that 
ties with the United States were the only significant fartor in 
Australia's foreign relations." Such descriptions were fully consistent 
with the government's wish to diversify its principal foreign policy 
contact points, as well as with its refusal to be overawed by the 
American connection. This latter sense underscored the government's 
efforts to project a more "independent" foreign policy line. Some of 
this was symbolic, some substantive. For instance, Australia's ANZUS 
connection did not preclude the Whitlam message to Nixon over Viet-
nam, or other openly stated differences of opinion with Washington. 
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These shadings aside, the Whitlam government not only stayed in 
ANZUS, but often and with scafce reserve defended it. Yet in a mid-
1975 special report on Australia, Time magazine's Pacific edition 
wrote that "Whitlam feels that the ANZUS treaty is anachronistic and 
useful essentially only as a piece of paper to reassure some Australians 
about threats that no longer exist."" In the present author's opinion, 
this conclusion was unwarranted, and seriously misleading. 
In one negative sense, ANZUS was approved because it was unob-
jectionable. It had no standing force of its own, did not call upon 
Australia to maintain overseas garrisons and was not actually pointed 
at China. It was regionally Pacific rather than greater Asian in its ap-
plication. Its language spoke of insuring the integrity of its members 
and their armed forces, not of defending someone else. To a minor ex-
tent, a Labor government may have been attracted to ANZUS because 
its mutual defence provisions made less urgent the maintenance of 
powerful Australian armed forces. ANZUS's elaborate technical co-
operation and exchange features continued to allow Australia's intel-
ligence and defence science investments to be kept within acceptable 
bounds. 
So far as ANZUS might over the years have contributed to 
promoting a peaceful climate in the Pacific, with favourable implica-
tions for Asia, that too was good. It was good because peace was bet-
ter than conflict. It had thereby enlarged opportunities for a Labor-
led Australia to enhance its room for manoeuvre and influence in the 
greater Asian-Pacific region. Symbolically at least, ANZUS 
demonstrated some movement towards "change" in a direction at-
tractive to Labor. At the February 1974 ANZUS Council meeting, par-
ticular attention was accorded to Asian-Pacific economic problems. 
Economic themes were again given some attention at the April 1975 
Council meeting. However ANZUS's central concern, and its day-to-
day co-ordinative work, remained tied to security/military subjects as 
such."' At the 1975 Council meeting, the New Zealanders pushed for 
ANZUS to co-ordinate economic programmes in South-East Asia. The 
Americans objected. They argueci that there probably wasn't money 
to be had from Congress, new ANZUS administrative layers were un-
desirable and ANZUS should not be diverted from its principal 
security task. The Australians remained largely passive. They may 
have seen some theoretical virtue in the New Zealand position, but 
basically accepted the American argument and were unwilling to 
engage in boat-rocking. 
At bottom, ANZUS's premier justification remained its security 
value. The organization gave access to American thinking, intel-
ligence and defence technology. It improved Australia's ability to 
bring influence to bear on American defence conceptions and policies. 
250 Australian External Policy under Ubor 
The key ANZUS clauses (Articles IV and V) stipulated that an armed 
attack on any party or its armed forces in the Pacific area would bring 
about action in accordance with the constitutional processes of each 
signatory. Especially in an era of intense resource competition, 
ANZUS thus provided a measure of extra reassurance in the event, 
however unlikely, of non-general military conflirts.'" Also Whitlam 
acknowledged that "in the ultimate circumstances Australia's 
security is tied with America. In the case of a world war there is no 
question where Australia's interest would lie."*' True, Whitlam also 
remarked that "ANZUS should not be debased into a general cover-all 
for any military projert that the scientists or soldiers of any of the 
signatories might choose to dream up."" All the same. Labor believed 
that the world nuclear balance was a contribution to reducing great-
power tensions and to ditente as such, and that ANZUS was connected 
to this circumstance. This was not so much because of the expressed 
common resolve of the signatories, but because, as will be explained 
in more detail later Australia was the site of various US defence in-
stallations, which served this end. Australia's continued acceptance of 
these facilities was viewed as an expression of its ANZUS bona fides. 
When in early 1974, there was an amicable resolution of Australia's 
wish for a larger share in the North-West Cape communication sta-
tion from which signals were sent to nuclearly armed submarines, an 
instructive clause was included in the joint communique. Barnard 
and US Defence Secretary Schlesinger "noted the status of the station 
as a bilateral arrangement in the framework of the ANZUS Treaty. 
They reaffirmed their support for that Treaty and their recognition of 
the continuity of the important common interests that sustained the 
Treaty."*' Similarly, the opening paragraphs of the 1974 and 1975 
Defence Reports stated that, in the ANZUS context, one of the salient 
evidences of the Australian-US defence relationship related to the 
"global balance".'* 
The Labor government's allegiance to ANZUS did not go un-
answered. Some persons in the party who leaned towards non-
alignment and greater Australian diplomatic freedom would have 
been happier without ANZUS, or at least a denatured ANZUS, es-
pecially when they considered the connection between ANZUS and 
the American defence installations. Others, whether they agreed with 
this position or not, felt that the government had tcx? readily assumed 
that the United States would spring to Australia's defence, by conven-
tional or by nuclear means." It is possible, but not definite, that the 
government's mild interest in "stretching" ANZUS's socio-economic 
concerns was partially inspired by a wish to make the organization 
som.ewhat more palatable to its detractors. 
On its part, the United States consistently reaffirmed its attach-
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ment to ANZUS and to its commitment to defend Australia. Whitlam 
accepted such assurances, but noted that, in the climate of post-
Vietnam American politics, congressional as well as presidential sup-
port would need to be realized.'" As seen, the surprise American 
military alert in 1973 ruffled Canberra's feelings and created some un-
ease as to whether the intimate consultations experted under ANZUS 
had been honoured. But reassurances of improvement in future in-
tergovernmental communication were exchanged and apparently ac-
cepted by Labor as genuine, and the normal ANZUS relationship con-
tinued, even prospered. There were joint training exercises and ex-
changes of visits among senior ANZUS military officers. The 
intelligence-take exchanges and defence science co-operation were 
uninterrupted. The author's impression is that Australia remained the 
only country to receive regular detailed data about the movement of 
US surface vessels in the Indian Ocean. With the winding-down of 
SEATO's military functions, some military personnel sensed that 
ANZUS's own military co-operation/planning activities had artually 
been stepped up. US naval vessels continued to have access to 
Cockburn Sound and US aircraft to the Cocos Islands. American 
defence facilities in Australia remained in place. 
We now focus on nuclear arms control and neutralization issues. 
Labor's opposition to the spread of nuclear armaments was generally 
clear and consistent. The government unequivocally renounced 
Australian development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. It quickly 
signed the NPT and adhered to inspection safeguard arrangements 
under the International Atomic Energy Agency. The L-CP opposi-
tion's view was short of categorical. A nuclear option for Australia 
was neither foreseen nor welcomed. But spokesmen such as Fraser 
and Killen left open the theoretical prospert that Australia might 
have to reassess its position if nuclear weapons became very 
widespread among other nations." 
We have seen that Labor opposed nuclear testing by other nations. 
Above-ground tests contaminated the environment. Tests in general 
encouraged proliferation. Among the great powers further testing 
meant a spiralling of deadly military preparations. This could upset 
the already delicate nuclear balance and further inhibit disarmament 
prospects. There was adverse official reaction to French and Chinese 
and Indian above-surface tests, and even to underground tests by es-
tablished nuclear powers. Some of Australia's neighbours, such as In-
donesia, were urged to refrain from considering a nuclear capability 
and to subscribe to the NPT. At the United Nations, Australia assumed 
various initiatives, including urging a comprehensive nuclear-weapon 
test-ban treaty and the strengthening of inspertion procedures. Inter-
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national disarmament forums were encouraged and actively par-
ticipated in.'^ 
We argued earlier that while Labor disapproved of nuclear arms 
both on emotional and practical grounds, the Soviet-Amertcan 
nuclear equipoise was admitted to carry redeeming features. Move-
ment towards ditente was a good thing in many ways and the super-
power nuclear stand-off in its way upheld dtente: "Because of various 
factors, but above all the compelling restraints of the nuclear balance, 
the long-term prospert for global stability and avoidance of conflicts 
remains favourable."" 
The ALP needed to adjust its displeasure with arms build-ups, and 
with nuclear arms more specifically, with what it itself conceived to 
be the security requirements/realities around Australia. Hence the 
government welcomed ASEAN's subscription to the 1971 Kuala Lum-
pur declaration, which had called for a South-East Asian zone of 
peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any manner of interference 
from outside powers. If fulfilled, such a concept would benefit not 
only the states in the region but would advance dhente, were the great 
powers able to consent not to use the region as a field for destructive 
rivalry. But Labor understood the South-East Asian peace zone idea to 
be far from realization. It saw the region as containing security-
conscious states and as a place which in fart remained unsettled. It 
therefore did not unilaterally press the United States to abandon its 
military facilities in the Philippines or to scale down its military 
presence in Thailand. In mid-1975, after the United States had used 
military force to recover the merchant-ship Mayaguez, which had been 
seized by Cambodia, it is understocxl to have explicitly urged the 
United States to retain a military presence in Thailand. The Labor 
government was assuming these positions about the time that 
Thailand and the Philippines were themselves recognizing Peking, 
reconsidering the status of American defence facilities on their soil, 
crystallizing their thoughts about phasing out SEATO and speaking 
more openly about eventual neutralization in the region.'* While it 
pulled troops out of Singapore, Labor maintained a military as-
sistance and training programme for Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and others, and continued to station Mirages at Butterworth. While 
the concept of a zone of peace was valid, the provision of security 
measures could itself stimulate conditions conducive to making 
neutralization a more generally acceptable proposition." 
In principle, Australia also endorsed the idea of nuclear-free zones. 
They were not construed as a substitute for comprehensive disarma-
ment, or for an effective NPT, but nonetheless a potential contribu-
tion to reducing tensions and enhancing stability." Again, however 
the ALP government adjusted long-term objectives to short- and 
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middle-range circumstances, as it saw them. In the first half of 1975, 
in various contexts. New Zealand suggested the idea of a nuclear-free 
zone in the Pacific area. The Australians were unprepared to take 
direct public issue with New Zealand. But they did little more than to 
endorse the concept's ultimate desirability. They broadly subscribed 
to Washington's objection that such an arrangement would deny pas-
sage and porting/landing rights to American nuclear-armed forces, 
which themselves were, for the time being, serving a usefully deter-
rent nuclear-balance function." Shortly before leaving office, the 
government had committed itself to vote at the United Nations for a 
proposal, initiated by New Zealand and co-sponsored by Papua New 
Guinea and Fiji, endorsing the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone in 
the South Pacific. In its form, this was not a dramatic proposal. It was 
subject to later study of its scope and content. Australia was not even 
a co-sponsor with countries that otherwise were its very close as-
sociates, and it continued to be ambivalent about the idea generally. 
A somewhat more detailed assessment of Australia's approach to 
the Indian Ocean region is in order. The government was disturbed 
by the US and Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean, which had 
been relatively free from the great-power competition such as had 
earlier intruded into the North Atlantic and the Western Pacific, and 
into the Mediterranean. While Australia recognized that the Indian 
Ocean was an international byway where anyone could sail, it did not 
wish it to be the scene of great-power rivalry and military and naval 
escalation. In short, Canberra wanted the Indian Ocean to be 
declared a zone of peace. Australian efforts at seeking support for this 
principle were widespread. They included backing for a UN resolution 
to make the area a zone of peace and Australian membership on the 
United Nation's ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean. Efforts were 
made to solicit supportive declarations from other littoral states, such 
as India and Iran. The government recognized American and Soviet 
difficulties associated with altering their Indian Ocean deployment 
independent of their other global strategic commitments. 
Nevertheless, beginning in early 1974, Australian representations 
were made to the US and Soviet governments, urging them to enter 
into serious dialogue between themselves about mutual restraint and 
step-by-step force redurtions.'* 
The government's objertives faced considerable obstacles. India 
and Iran both endorsed the zone of peace idea, but the Indian nuclear 
test and Iran's heavy military build-up were hardly regarded as 
positive contributions. The Soviets and the Americans were also, in 
principle, opposed to escalation, but of course blamed one another for 
forcing the pace of build-up and for destabilizing the military balance 
there. Both Moscow and Washington listened politely to what 
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Australia urged, but neither took much heed. The internal evidence is 
quite plain. By mid-1975, Australia had raised the matter of Soviet 
facilities in the Indian Ocean (whose presence Moscow publicly 
denied) in other littoral state capitals, and the Soviets apparently 
replied with a reminder of the presence of the US naval communica-
tion station at the North-West Cape. When asked by Australia to press 
the Soviet Union on naval limitations, India was told by the Soviets 
that they objected to the matter having being raised at all. It is evi-
dent that the Americans thought the Australian initiative to be quite 
superflous, since Washington had adequate access to Soviet officials 
and could talk about Indian Ocean issues at its convenience. Well-
placed Australians on both the political and the official side remarked 
that the Australian "bringing together" or "intermediary" role could 
not be taken very seriously. It was remarked that the government felt 
such efforts had to be undertaken, but the description offered was 
of ornamentation. Phrases such as "image building" and even 
"posturing" were used. At least one Australian minister thought that 
the United States may, however have given some credence to 
Australia's appeal for restraint as such. Returning from an American 
visit in August 1975, Morrison remarked that the United States had 
taken Australia's concern seriously. "I've been told America would 
have Increased ... [its] activities in the Indian Ocean if our concern 
had not been expressed."" The Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace" 
was, all the same, seen as resting in the distant future. The opposition 
saw some danger in Australia's promotional effort as such. The idea 
of a zone of peace was not disparaged, but "To take such worthy 
aspirations and concepts as immediate objectives is to run the risk of 
misjudgement and distortion in policy making."*" 
What of the specifics of Australia's reaction to great-power activity 
in the Indian Ocean? On balance, the record indicates a reluctance to 
offer serious resistance to an American military presence. American 
military aircraft continued to enjoy the use of the Cocos Islands as an 
occasional staging-point for air supply and surveillance in the Indian 
Ocean. American ships called in Western Australia from time to time, 
though the issue of porting privileges did not arise. 
The key was Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia was a group of British-
owned, virtually uninhabited islands in the middle of the Indian 
Ocean, where the United States already enjoyed some air and naval 
privileges. The US government wished to up-grade these facilities, as a 
reaction to the Soviet presence in the ocean, to display the flag more 
prominently and conceivably to gain better access to the Middle East. 
However some American opinion, including within the CIA, felt that 
the up-grading venture would only spiral the Soviet naval presence."' 
The United States sought permission from Britain for the required im-
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provements. The Wilson Labour government acceded to the request 
in May 1974, allowing "modest" refurbishing. About the same time, a 
special expert group appointed by the United Nation's ad hoc commit-
tee on the Indian Ocean filed a report on the military situation there. 
It claimed that up-grading plans for Diego Garcia were ambitious and 
could serve B-52 and other strategic weapons systems. It also claimed, 
similar to CIA testimony, that up-grading would evoke an equal if not 
stronger Soviet response. Many nations, the Soviet Union and the 
United States included, were patently unhappy about portions of the 
report. A revised version was drawn up. This version was less 
dramatic about the Diego Garcia proposal and drew no conclusions 
about a Soviet riposte.*^ 
A number of the government's critics insisted that it needed to en-
dorse the Diego Garcia project. There was objective need to counter 
the Soviet build-up, Australia itself had almost no naval capability in 
the Indian Ocean and the spirit (and desired results from) ANZUS re-
quired it.*' The Chinese themselves, concerned about Soviet power in 
the area, supported up-grading at Diego Garcia as a counterweight. 
The government's reartion to Diego Garcia can be reconstructed 
with reasonable accuracy. By the second half of 1973, the government 
had persuaded itself that the Diego Garcia idea was on balance 
wrong: it would set back plans for Indian Ocean pacification. This 
judgement (and its communication to the United States) was in the 
author's understanding almost certainly reached without a prior re-
quest for a submission from the Department of Defence, just as 
Defence had not been consulted before the Singapore troop 
withdrawal was announced. The prevailing judgement in Defence, 
and perhaps to only a slighfly less explicit degree in Foreign Affairs, 
was that improvement of Diego Garcia should proceed.*" In 
December 1974, Wilson personally reassured Whitlam that the build-
up would be modest and essentially for resupplying rather than 
operational base purposes. That helped to moderate Canberra's posi-
tion, as apparently did intelligence reports of growing Soviet facilities 
in the region, especially at Berbera, in Somalia. Prior to mid-1975, at 
least, the United States had not for some months received any expres-
sions of Australian disquiet over Diego Garcia. By then, the 
Australians were telling the Americans that the Australian^overwwem 
was not overly perturbed about Diego Garcia, though in principle 
Australia remained opposed. When Whitlam visited Washington in 
May 1975, he apparently did not find it objectionable that develop-
ment at Diego Garcia was to proceed prior to further Soviet-American 
consultations on the Indian Ocean. Morrison made his first visit to 
the United States as Defence Minister in August 1975. He seemed to 
express a somewhat more concerned view about Diego Garcia than 
256 Australian External Policy under Ubor 
had Barnard.*' This may well have indicated a few degrees' turn in 
thinking, but could also be read as a Morrison reminder or illustra-
tion, that Australia was unhappy about Indian Ocean escalation 
generally, by either party. It is also quite likely that Morrison, at the 
time very new to his portfolio, was exceeding his brief in the tone and 
vigour of his remarks about Diego Garcia. 
The Diego Garcia issue was instrurtive in several resperts. It sug-
gested a familiar though in this instance fairiy minor Labor govern-
ment tension: between its principles and longer objectives, and its 
relative amenability to a variant on the strategic balance concept. It 
suggested a measure of trartability in government thinking, though 
we should grant that the issue was not in itself of overriding impor-
tance. The government's tempered criticism, at times approaching 
begrudging acquiescence in the projert, may have been influenced by 
official advice. It was not surprising, however that in its initiative-
minded first year in office, the government should have reached a 
judgement without having called for a departmental brief. Australia 
was originally not averse to stepping in with criticism of Diego Garcia 
in part, because it knew that there were divisions within official 
Washington itself; that is, Diego Garcia was an open, debatable ques-
tion. But US officials were rather nettled, since they regarded an 
Australian expression of view under such circumstances as intrusion 
into American politics. 
A tangent of the Diego Garcia issue was whether the government 
could sensibly be critical of Diego Garcia while preserving the 
American naval communication station at North-West Cape in 
Western Australia. The facility, run by the US Navy, had been 
negotiated in 1963 for a 25-year period. Its principal objective was 
communication with submarines, including with nuclearly armed 
boats operating in the Indian Ocean. The station's messages could 
range from the mundane to, theoretically, a "fire" signal as part of a 
general war No secret was made of the station's funrtion, though 
Australia was barred from access to message content and codes, and 
lacked potential veto power over message transmission. 
However the Labor Party had officially declared itself "opposed to 
the existence of foreign-owned, -controlled or -operated bases anci 
facilities in Australian territory, especially if such bases involve a 
derogation of Australian sovereignty."*' In other words, the party op-
posed installations such as the North-West Cape station, but not 
categorically. Whitlam, Barnard and others could not overlook the 
party position. As will be shown later there were important forces in 
the ALP whose preference was to dispense with the signal-station en-
tirely, as well as with other US defence-related installations. Ministers 
indicated that an agreement such as governed the North-West Cape 
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would not have been approved by a Labor government and that, at 
minimum North-West Cape would have to come under Australian 
control, should be joint in nature and should otherwise protect 
Australian interests.*' As matters stood, while Australia was able to 
use the station for occasional communication with its own sub-
marines, the "control" and "sovereignty" criteria were decidedly not 
being met. Moreover Whitlam's annoyance over the October 1973 
US military alert was heightened by the fart that the North-West 
Cape facility, without Canberra's knowledge, had been affected as 
well. 
Australia made it quite clear early in Labor's term of office that it 
wished to renegotiate the terms of the North-West Cape agreement. 
The American view was set. Washington was quite willing to 
renegotiate various features of the station's use and administration. It 
was willing to negotiate at Australia's preferred pace. To forestall 
adverse Labor Party criticism, especially on the eve of the 1973 
Federal Conference, it was eager that the visit of an Australian 
technical team should show progress. What the United States 
declared to be absolutely non-negotiable was the heart of the station's 
work. There could be no Australian access to message content and no 
Australain message veto rights. This was placed virtually on a "take it 
or leave it" basis to Canberra. What eventuated in the Bar-
nard-Schlesinger agreement of early 1974 was that the United States 
protected its non-negotiable terms, but provided a number of 
sweeteners to Australia, such as an Australian deputy commander 
more Australian personnel at the installation, an adjoining Australian 
signal facility and promise of improved future consultations. In 1975, 
some changes in administrative procedures for the running of the 
North-West Cape facility were arranged by Morrison, but the sub-
stance of American prerogatives remained intact. For the Labor 
government, honour had been redeemed and the United States not 
pushed against the wall. The 1974 agreement also was a symbolic 
statement of the more mature, pragmatic yet close relationship 
between the two nations. Explicitly rather than tacitly, it also was an 
affirmation by the Whitlam government that the North-West Cape, 
be it as a corollary of the ANZUS alliance or otherwise, contributed to 
the nuclear balance in the region, and therefore to Labor's broad ob-
jectives.** 
The revision of the North-West Cape agreement had other results. 
Politically, opposition criticism of Labor's relations with Washington 
was to a degree disarmed. More substantively, two American nuclear 
monitoring stations in Australia were to be fully turned over to 
Australia. Also, as part of the promise of improved consultation, 
Australia was given even more access than in the past to America's 
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global strategic policy orientations. At a Washington meeting later in 
1974, Australian officials were fully briefed on the implications of 
Schlesinger's "counterforce" nuclear concept Every indication 
pointed to Australia having been reassured on this matter, even 
though critics at home felt that the counterforce doctrine could more 
quickly draw Australia into a nuclear conflict. 
Two other American defence installations in Australia posed tough 
problems for the Labor government. These were the Joint Defence 
Space Research Facility at Pine Gap and the Joint Defence Space Com-
munications Station at Nurrungar. As we will shortly see, they, and 
the North-West Cape station as well, brought out intricate debate and 
manoeuvre in and around the Labor Party. For now, we concentrate 
on government policy and its justification. 
The actual functions of Pine Gap and Nurrungar continued to be 
highly classified. When Labor entered government, Whitlam and 
some of his key colleagues were given detailed briefings and for the 
first time learned of the uses of the two facilities. From that point 
onwards, ministers who knew about the facilities defended them. 
Ministers often declared that the two fecilities had no war-making 
capability, nor could they involve Australia in warlike operations. 
They denied that the facilities had been used for any irregular pur-
pose, such as in connertion with guiding US operations in Vietnam. 
They also repeated that from the outset the facilities had been jointly 
maintained. Australia knew what was going on there and could, if it 
wished, halt what was happening. After the Barnard-Schlesinger 
agreement on the North-West Cape, the flow of US data from the 
facilities to the Australian Defence Department was apparently ex-
tended.*' in addition, apart from saying that data gathered by the 
facilities were useful to Australia as well as to the United States, 
ministers were notably silent on what positive purpose was being 
served. Whitlam perhaps came closest to an explanation, early in 
1973: "They help to see that the great powers do not have the ig-
norance and suspicion of each other that leads to war."'" His 
reference at the time presumably was to the nuclear test and firing 
monitoring/processing/early warning funrtions of the facilities. 
Educated surmise plus considerable questioning of Australian figures 
close to the scene suggested three government reasons, all har-
monious with what we already have said about its dispositions, for 
supporting the facilities. One was that surveillance of communist na-
tions and weapons systems contributed strategic arms limitation/ 
arms control objectives. Another was that the information 
gathered was valuable to maintaining the nuclear balance. A final, 
more amorphous, but not necessarily less important reason was to 
provide tangible support for ANZUS and the American connection's 
perceived benefits generally. 
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Further clarification of the government's priorities could be read 
into the handling of the Soviet request fora joint space-science facility 
in Australia, raised by the Soviets less than two months before the 
1974 double dissolution. The offer was rejerted, for three reasons. The 
government did not, in principle, wish to introduce any more foreign 
installations that carried any sort of even remotely military connota-
tion. What in part would have given the facility a military overtone 
related to the second reason why the offer was rejected. The United 
States objected vigorously to the proposal, on grounds that it could 
impair the confidentiality and effectiveness of its own defence instal-
lations in Australia and thereby prejudice the value Australia itself as-
signed to them. Thirdly, it is quite plain that the government needed 
to reject the Soviet offer before the forthcoming election, to avoid 
political damage from the opposition. Willesee, who personally lob-
bied against the Soviet installation, had said that it would need to be 
examined "from a scientific point of view, from a political point of 
view and in the context of the Indian Ocean"." 
It is also instructive that the government emphasized the retention 
of the American facilities, and the protection of their classified func-
tions, as an expression of honouring Australia's word. The "respect of 
pledge" theme was recurrent in Labor's external policy presentations 
generally: honouring of exploration and overseas sales contracts 
drawn up under the L-CP, honouring of the Five Power Agreement, 
honouring of the American installation agreements. Part of this can 
be interpreted as gcxjd politics, as reassurance at home that Labor was 
not a capricious, irresponsible government. Part of it was a signal to 
outsiders that Australia was a trustworthy nation. In the instance of 
American facilities, it had a bearing on keeping the United States per-
suaded that, apart from various Australian-American disagreements, 
as over Vietnam, Australia was quite solicitous of the ANZUS alliance 
and what it implied. Hence earlier Whitlam expressions about the 
Australian public's "right to know" about the US installations were 
reversed once in office. Australia did not reveal "other people's 
secrets" and, at any rate, Whitlam had concluded that "to state the 
general purpose of the satellites involved in the communications of 
these bases would render the operation of them quite futile".'^ Steps 
were taken to insure maximum security of information. Very few of-
ficials were identified as having a "right to know"; apparently only 
two in the entire Department of Foreign Affairs were fully briefed, as 
of eariy 1975. Five ministers had been briefed—Whitlam, Willesee, 
Barnard, Morrison and Bishop. Cairns was not briefed, even after he 
became Deputy Prime Minister in mid-1974. Cairns did not press to 
be informed, to the relief of his colleagues. Moreover the United 
States had made known its anxiety about such classified data 
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reaching Cairns, and the anxiety did not go unshared in Canberra. 
The government had decided to protect the presence and integrity 
of the installations. But for how long? Pine Gap and Nurrungar had 
originally been transacted for ten-year periods. They were to continue 
beyond, unless repudiated by one of the contracting parties, with one 
year of notice required. For Pine Gap, the ten years was to expire in 
1976; for Nurrungar in 1979. In April 1974, responding in the House 
to a question without notice^ Whitlam averred that "We do not 
favour the extension or prolongation of any of those existing [instal-
lations] ... The agreements stand but there will not be extensions or 
proliferations."" It is not clear whether at that time Whitlam meant 
what his words appeared to convey. Probably not, or at least he 
quickly regretted having spoken in thisway. In the months following, 
a variety of Australian and American official and political persons 
conveyed the view that extension would be allowed. Whitlam ap-
parently personally expressed this to Green. No specific step was, of 
course, needed to extend. Inaction meant continuation. Finally, at 
Terrigal in February 1975, Whitlam made it explicit. A non-renewal 
notice could be given on Pine Gap by the end of the year but "I would 
give no such notice."'" 
In the Australian spring of 1975, however, the journalist Andrew 
Clark wrote that, because of the state of Australian politics at that 
time and uncertainties about the future, the United States was ex-
amining the option of removing its interior facilities from Australia." 
The author's own inquiries suggested a variant on this theme. The in-
timation was that such an option was indeed broached, though in a 
general a^ nd quite tentative way. It was recognized that shifting the 
facilities would be extremely expensive and would entail some loss of 
capability. The incentive for raising the subject apparently was a 
lingering uncertainty whether the Labor government would allow 
ihe facilities to remain and some uneasiness that sooner or later some 
Labor government might choose to remove them. By this account, 
however the Americans were largely put at ease when Whitlam con-
veyed unequivocal assurances in September 1975. This account 
therefore fails to agree with Clark's view that it was the October-
November political crisis that caused re-examination in Washington. 
Opposition to all or some aspects of US defence installations in 
Australia was expressed in various quarters. It was found among 
members of the academic community, among both the "old" and the 
"new" left, within the small but articulate Australia Party, within im-
portant (and by no means only in conventionally "left") sections of 
the ALP. A "Campaign Against Foreign Military Bases in Australia" 
was formed and in May 1974, a long protest march to the North-West 
Cape was staged. Cairns became President of the Melbourne-based 
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Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament, whose 
programme included the removal of American defence facilities from 
the Asian region, as well as from Australia as such. 
The facilities were criticized on diverse grounds and from various 
vantage-points. It is helpful to summarize these complaints, in part to 
show how opposition was able to become widespread. Intra-party 
criticism was heightened by what many believed to be gcwernment 
contravention of authoritative party directives. This criticism stressed 
that Labor was "opposed" to the existence of foreign-owned, 
-controlled or -operated bases and facilities in Australia. The Whitlam 
government's attempt to circumvent this proscription was seen as un-
founded and devious. So was the government's insistence, in violation 
of a 1971 party conference edict, that the general purpose of the in-
terior facilities could not be revealed. It left an impression that the 
government may have been trying to camouflage some sinister uses of 
the installations and that it was "covering up" no less than the L-CP 
had. The promise of "open government" under Labor had lost 
credibility. Suspicion of government disingenuousness was spurred by 
its moderate, allegedly party platform violating, approach to leaving 
service personnel in Malaysia and Singapore. Party and other critics 
also believed that the continuation of the American facilities con-
flicted with certain desirable Australian foreign policy objectives, 
such as de-emphasis on militarily related programmes, international 
disarmament, intimacy with the Third World and, to some, a move 
towards neutralism. In some quarters, the installations were dis-
tasteful because they were an obvious manifestation of American 
over-influence in the country—cultural, economic, diplomatic and 
military. Some of this reaction was outright anti-Americanism; a 
gcx5d deal of it was more reasoned and selective." 
In addition, various substantive objections were raised against the 
installations; against their purported funrtion or, on the basis of 
scenarios, on account of their potential danger to Australia. These 
arguments were at times broached in rigorous, highly researched 
terms and in themselves became a contribution to the serious 
literature on strategic and nuclear questions. Only a bare synopsis can 
be rendered here. In any event, no authoritative rejoinders were 
available to critics' imputations of what the installations did or did 
not do, and retorts to conclusions about dangers to Australia's safety 
were difficult to marshal, because of the shroud of secrecy sur-
rounding the interior facilities. 
We can begin with the North-West Cape station. Technically, Hartley 
was correct that,in the last resort, the amended North-West Cape 
agreement was mostly decorative: "Australia still has no guarantee of 
a voice in the vital decisions which could mean war or peace."" The 
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United States could order a nuclear strike order to submarines 
without Australia's knowledge or consent. Such orders, as well as 
signals allegedly transmitted in relation to the mining of North Viet-
namese ports and the bombing of Cambodian targets, were said to be 
facilitated by the Pine Gap installation, through its control of satellite 
surveillance. Indeed, Pine Gap was said to have acquired a new 
dimension: from checking on nuclear tests and shots to directing 
American nuclear shots, information then relayable through the 
North-West Cape station. This meant that Australia was the site of a 
US offensive or retaliatory strike capability. As an integral part of the 
American strategic nuclear system, the facilities were-a target for 
hostile action, either as part of a "nuclear blackmail" scheme to force 
Australia's capitulation or as an actual bombardment target. 
Secretary Schlesinger's "counterforce" doctrine was thought to be 
equally disturbing. If the United States embarked on a metropolis sav-
ing, limited nuclear response, designed at most to exchange remote 
targets, US facilities in Australia would become attrartive enemy 
targets. In sum, the facilities made Australia a hostage to American 
strategic decisions and logically susceptible to attack that might not 
otherwise occur if Australia did not host the installations.'* 
It was therefore no surprise that the installations caused anguish 
and infighting within the ALP. By early March 1973, a number of 
Labor parliamentarians were disturbed about the government's 
refusal to explain what the facilities did, and some simply wanted the 
facilities out, explanation or not. The government's refusal to disclose 
the facilities' mission was challenged in caucus. A motion to recom-
mit the government's position to cabinet was carried by 39 to 26, ten 
ministers voting with the majority. Only on a technicality, i.e. the 
jack of an absolute majority of all caucus members (rather than of 
those attending), was the motion declared lost. Very likely, a majority 
of the then ninety-three caucus members would have been found 
ranged against the government. Some party moderates were as un-
happy with the government's "guard the secrets" position as were 
those on the left side. Heavy pressure by Whitlam persuaded caucus 
to approve a proposed government pariiamentary statement on the 
subject. When the statement came, it disappointed the critics, given 
its vague references to renegotiations and its absence of any real hint 
as to what Pine Gap and Nurrungar were about." 
The party was scheduled to convene in federal conference in July. 
Eager to forestall a cc:)nference defeat on the installations, Whitlam 
lobbied among various state branches, and even managed temporari-
ly to conciliate the hard-line Victorians. Faced by dissent in state 
branches. In caucus, even among his ministers, Whitlam invoked a 
variety of appeals. There were the merits of the issue as he saw them. 
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There was a need to be faithful to other people's secrets. The L-CP 
should bear the onus for having imposed the installations, in their ex-
isting form, on Australia. The party platform, in Whitlam's in-
terpretation, was consistent with government policy. Whitlam also 
wished to avert the familiar, politically damaging charge that a Labor 
government would be controlled by "outside" party interests and 
wished to assert his personal authority in the formative stage of the 
new administration. He even evolved a special thesis of elertoral 
mandate. Constitutional propriety prohibited the government from 
undertaking major policies not promised at the previous general elec-
tion. Since disbanding the facilities or revealing Pine Gap and Nur-
rungar secrets had not been promised, even authoritative party 
resolutions could not be implemented in the life of the current Pariia-
ment. Whitlam probably believed in this principle, but it also was a 
very considerable political convenience to him. That certainly was the 
opinion of persons close to the Prime Minister. The author is not 
aware of any context in which Whitlam publicly invoked the man-
date doctrine, apart from the US defence installation issue.'"" 
At the 1973 Federal Conference, Whitlam again succeeded in 
diverting party opposition to the installations. A resolution urging 
Labor to seek to end the presence of military forces in countries other 
than their own was moved by Whitlam himself, and passed. Whitlam 
did not, however construe this as a dirertive to harness the govern-
ment's energies to phase out the installations. Pine Gap and Nur-
rungar were not even "renegotiated". The North-West Cape station 
was. This renegotiation provided some substantive and symbolic 
value for Australia, but of course crucial American control was left 
undisturbed. The renegotiation effort was, in part, a government 
gesture to the party; a pacifier as it were. A number of people in the 
ALP were not-impressed. Some party members openly supported the 
May 1974 protest march to the North-West Cape. The inspiration 
behind Senator Brown's series of attacks on Green, and on what 
Brown felt to be an excessive and nefarious American presence in 
Australia, included the presence of the defence facilities. At the Ter-
rigal conference, a motion urging that foreign bases be allowed only if 
they were under Australian control and involved no derogation of 
sovereignty was defeated. Whitlam argued that control already ex-
isted and that no derogation of sovereignty was at issue, and repeated 
that the facilities carried no war-making potential. He also polished 
up the electoral mandate argument. At Surfers Paradise, in July 1973, 
Labor had been basking in its new status as a party of government, 
and Whitlam personally had made virtory in 1972 possible. There 
was some reluctance to tear this spirit awa^ with an angry confronta-
tion over the installations. At Terrigal, in February 1975, Labor's elec-
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toral stock was badly depressed. There was then a chance the opposi-
tion might force another eariy election. The ALP was bitteriy divided 
over a PLO visit. A premium was therefore placed on painting Ter-
rigal in the image of a "unity" conference. For political reasons, it was 
sensed that a confrontation over the installations could have been 
seriously injurious. Things were bad enough at Terrigal with the an-
ticipated (and eventually raucous) battle over recognizing the PRG. 
The controversy surrounding American defence installations in 
Australia produced instructive by-product effects, not the least of 
which concerned Omega. Omega is a globally distributed, all-weather 
navigational system for vessels and aircraft, developed by the United 
States. It relies on a chain of eventually eight stations, located in 
various countries. An Australian station was to have completed the 
network. Relatively inexpensive receiving equipment on ships and 
aircraft could receive signals and considerably enhance the fixing of 
positions. All aspects of the Omega technology were unclassified and 
receivers were commercially available. Ships and aircraft of all na-
tions could use the system. The stations themselves were completely 
operated by host countries and transmission could, if desired, be inter-
rupted at any time. In 1972, negotiations to install an Omega station 
in Australia were at an advanced stage when the L-CP lost office and 
the question of what to do about the facility fell to the new Labor 
government. The virtues of Omega were touted in various quarters, 
among them local and overseas shipping companies operating in 
Australia, the RAN and the RAAF, the Department of Transport 
(under whose authority Omega would be placed) and the Transport 
Minister himself, Charles Jones.'"' 
The propriety of establishing an Omega facility in Australia became 
contentious. Some of the substantive objertions were not unlike those 
raised against the North-West Cape and the interior defence 
facilities—improper military applications and potentially treacherous 
consequences for Australia's safety. Supporters of Omega 
acknowledged that, like most navigational aides (such as lighthouses), 
it did have value for military ships and aircraft, but that this was a 
secondary by-product value of its essentially civilian role. While 
military craft could be equipped with Omega receivers, the system 
was insufficiently exact for nuclearly armed submarines and would 
not be installed on them. Critics retorted that Omega's military ap-
plications were definite all the same (for instance, as an aide to 
huntej- killer submarines), and they even doubted whether Omega 
would be tmly irrelevant to an American nuclear-strike capability. 
While all nations could benefit equally from Omega's civilian (or 
military) applications, some critics feared that, in a confrontational 
setting, the Soviets might well find the regional Omega station in 
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Australia disadvantageous to their interests and could thereby 
threaten to or actually "take it out" with a nuclear strike. Moscow 
and Peking had for years offered no complaints about Omega stations 
going up around the world, but eventually the Soviets denounced the 
network as a fixture in America's global strategic system. Hence, ran 
the argument, whether the Soviets were inherently right or wrong, 
what seemed to. matter was what they felt; their objection could 
thereby be interpreted as making Australia more vulnerable. The 
emplacement of Omega would add an Increment of danger to that 
already posed by the presence of explicitly defence-related US 
facilities in Australia.'"^ 
Substantive objectives were fuelled by other situational and 
political factors. When in the late 1960s, the United States first ex-
pressed an interest in locating an Omega station in the South-West 
Pacific region, it explored both New Zealand and Australia as sites. 
There has been speculation that New Zealand was rejected by the 
United States for technical reasons. To an extent, that appeared to be 
true. However in the author's judgement, the most reliable evidence 
is that, faced with considerable anti-Omega public antipathy, Wel-
lington advised the United States that it would be unwise to selert a 
site in New Zealand.'"' For us, the main importance of the matter is 
that m'any protest/left-group people in Australia themselves believed 
that New Zealand critics had succeeded in blocking Omega there. In-
spiration was therefore added to resisting Omega in Australia. The 
United States first approached Canberra about a possible Australian 
Omega site in 1967. Five years later there still was no final go-ahead 
decision. Part of the delay was due to site evaluation and terms of 
cost-sharing and administration negotiations. During this lengthy 
period, a number of comments were offered by L-CP spokesmen. 
Taken together, they were received by critics as evasive, contradictory 
and even dissembling, especially in regard to Omega's military im-
plications.'"" L-CP government comments may well have left that im-
pression. Ironically, there is fairly sound evidence that the inordinate 
delay was contributed to by the government's wish to assure itself, 
and thereby to defuse criticism, that an Omega facility would not have 
prominent military functions and would not increase Australia's 
susceptibility as a nuclear target. 
•Opposition to Omega after Labor entered office was hardened by 
special considerations. A number of people in and outside the Labor 
Party were dumbfounded by the government's policy on the North-
West Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar They thought the policy wrong 
in substance, violative of standing Labor policy, unnecessarily 
secretive and enforced by overbearing tactics by Whitlam and his as-
sociates. In this sense, the Labor government's credibility was 
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lowered. Who could then be trusted to tell the truth about Omega 
itself? What deals had been worked out with Washington? Could not 
Omega be interpreted as another mischievous factor in Australia's 
already massive dependence on the United States? 
While Omega was broadly felt to be less inherently obnoxious than 
the established US defence facilities, steady challenges to it could be 
expected, for the simple reason that it was pending, not an es-
tablished fact. It was, at any rate, clear Labor policy to oppose any new 
defence-related installations in Australia. 
Once they had entered government, the Whitlam-Barnard-
Willesee ministerial group became persuaded that Omega was 
desirable in itself, not a danger to the country, and that, probably, its 
rejection would be exploited by the opposition to Labor's disadvan-
tage. The conduct of these ministers was, however, conspicuously sub-
dued. They made no speeches in support of Omega and turned queries 
aside, referring them to Transport Minister Jones. Jones was a strong 
protagonist of Omega and he gave his views considerable publicity. 
He at one point is believed to have phoned his New Zealand counter-
part to request a submission about Omega's navigational value for 
presentation to the parliamentary committee that studied the subject 
But Jones was no heavyweight in Cabinet and in the party, and could 
not hope to exert real leverage if the Prime Minister and others stood 
aside. Whitlam and other ministers who favoured Omega felt that the 
intra-party climate was such that they had to tread cautiously. In late 
March 1973, Whitlam considered bringing a pro-Omega brief from 
Jones befor Cabinet, but reconsidered. It is doubtful that a favourable 
Cabinet majority could then have been mobilized. Instead Whitlam 
promised to assign the Omega subject to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committteee on Foreign Affairs and Defence.'"' It was a stalliing 
manoeuvre, to stretch and in degreee neutralize the issue within the 
party. Also, Whitlam probably hoped for a favourable recommenda-
tion from the committee, based on Omega supporters from among 
opposition members of the committee and some, perhaps a majority 
of. Labor members. 
Some difficulties intervened. Within a week, the ALP caucus 
elected as the committee's chairman Senator John Wheeldon, an 
Omega critic. Omega came up at the July Federal Conference at 
Surfers Paradise. With Whitlam's approval, after jockeying on various 
motions, a compromise of a sort was worked out and passed. The 
party went on record opposing Omega unless it—the Labor Party as 
distinct from the Labor government—were fully assured that the 
system could not be used for hostile acts without Australia's consent. 
Throughout, Whitlam claimed that it was premature for the party to 
judge Omega, since the parliamentary committee had the subject 
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under advisement. Wheeldon was perfectly correct in claiming that, 
whatever recommendation issued from his committee, that could in 
no way be constured as equivalent to a ;?flrry judgement.'"' Whitlam 
had never precisely said it could be, but he hoped that, somehow. pro-
Omega advice from the committee would improve chances for a 
favourable, and not overly party-straining, government decision. 
Following Surfers Paradise, anti-Omega sentiment was sporadical-
ly expressed. Some took the form of a "Stop Omega" campaign, being 
conducted primarily within radical circles. There also were admoni-
tions from Hartley that if Omega were approved, unions might black-
ban the facility's site.'"' The issue was dropped at Terrigal, since 
Wheeldon's committee report was not yet available. The committee 
tcxik a very long time producing its findings. By accounts from both 
government and opposition committee members, committee sessions 
were carried out in a fair and unemotional manner Some members 
thought the subject rather too technical and possibly not appropriate 
for a "foreign affairs and defence" committee. Also, by general con-
sensus, the quality of submissions was higher on the "pro-" than on 
the "anti-" Omega side. What emerged In May 1975 was a report 
favouring Omega's installation in Australia. The majority consisted of 
all opposition members, but the majority of Labor members, 
Wheeldon included, attached a dissenting report. Essentially, the dis-
senting members objected to Omaga's military applications, to possi-
ble dangers posed to Australia in the event of great-power conflict 
and to some of its technical value for Australia if sited within the 
country. The majority report had indicated that internationalization 
of an Omega facility in Australia would be desirable. The dissenters 
felt internationalization should be a prerequisite to the building of 
any Omega station in Australia.'"* 
Whitlam and other pro-Omega ministers could not reasonably say 
that the test of a party clean bill of health for Omega had been 
granted. Not only was the committee a parliamentary rather than a 
party body, but mc«t of its Labor members had dissented, though 
their reservations did not represent a recommendation of a flat rejec-
tion of Omega under any and all circumstances. Some other 
mechanism would need to be found to justify a conclusion that the 
party was in favour. The United States plainly wanted a favourable 
decision. But the United States was not willing to overpress its case, 
recognizing that the ALP would be hyper-sensitive to being leaned on 
heavily by Washington. If political realities dictated a choice, the 
United States preferred to abandon Omega in Australia in favour of 
not having the boat rocked on the established defence facilities. Short-
ly before Terrigal, Green repeated America's strong preference for an 
early pro-Omega decision to Willesee. After that, despite some US 
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Navy notions that stronger representations should be made, the 
United States assumed a fairly relaxed posture. All the same, official 
rejection of Omega would be potential ammunition for the opposi-
tion. As leader Fraser had sharpened the L-CP's tone of foreign and 
defence policy criticism, including accusations against Labor of 
narrow-minded anti-Americanism. For the rest of its time in office, 
the Labor government simply kept a decision about Omega in 
abeyance and barely raised the subject in public settings. Omega, an 
ostensibly civilian navigational system, illuminated many of the com-
plexities of defence policy conduct under the Labor government and 
the range of critical opinion capable of being generated. 
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Q) The External Policy Process 
In the present chapter we sharpen our focus on the policy process.' 
Borrowing in part from material previously introduced, we cast our 
analysis in terms of the variables within the Australian political 
system that shaped external policy outputs and presentation. What 
was the jurisdictional distribution of decision-making power? What 
was the relative influence of various office-holders or structures? In 
what ways were decision-makers, and their judgements, affected by 
advisers, by organized interests and by Labor as a party? In the final 
chapter we will consider the related theme of the interplay between 
electoral politics and the making and presentation of external policy. 
We begin with the basic generalization that the Australian federal 
government is pre-eminent in external policy.^ It achieves this 
dominance through constitutionally granted monopoly over such 
areas as defence, external affairs and overseas trade. However, there 
always have been some constraints on Canberra's freedom to pursue 
external policy objectives at will, largely but not exclusively because 
of Australia's federal structure. Constitutional, practical and political 
constraints all can be inhibiting upon federal authority. The several 
states are jealous of their prerogatives and often are led by powerful 
political figures. Political considerations can impel the states to resist 
federal initiatives and can dissuade governments in Canberra from 
relentless pursuit of their desired policies. In some respects, however, 
federal-state co-operation has proved indispensable. The High Court 
has ruled that, under Section 92 of the Constitution. Canberra may 
engage in interstate trade, but not so as to enjoy a monopoly over the 
interstate movement of goods. Hence the Wheat Board's de facto 
monopoly over overseas wheat marketing, a very important compo-
nent of Australia's overseas trade, is predicated on the sufferance of 
periodically amended, complementary federal and state legislation. 
Friction between federal Labor and the states was heightened by 
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two considerations. The first was that for most of Labor's time in of-
fice, four of the six states, among them the largest and most impor-
tant, were under non-labor administration. The second reason was 
that, as a particularly active, innovative, reformist and indeed 
centralist government. Labor generated more circumstances for con-
flict with the states than ordinarily might have been expected under a 
less-experimental L-CP government. 
Some of the federal-state tensions that arose were not strictly con-
stitutional in nature, but all the same affected the federal govern-
ment's policy judgements or the effectiveness of policies taken. All 
state governments, including the ALP governments of South 
Australia and Tasmania, criticized the prospect of a PLO delegation 
visit to Australia. They threatened to impose an official boycott on 
any PLO visitors who might come and to refuse to register offices of 
any PLO mission.' This state outcry, coupled with intra-party and 
other criticisms, encouraged the Cabinet decision in late January 1975 
to reject a PLO visit for the time being. When a PLO visitor did come 
later hostility expressed by the states was hardly welcomed by a 
federal government wishing to attract goodwill among Arab states. In 
another episode, we noticed the legal and political difficulties that 
snarled the federal government's efforts to liquidate the Rhodesian 
Information Centre in Sydney and thereby frustrated federal Labor's 
efforts to sustain its anti-racialist objectives. In another instance, the 
Labor government wished to appoint Mr Justice Hope of the NSW 
judiciary to conduct an inquiry into Australia's security and intel-
ligence services. NSW's Liberal Premier, Sir Robert Askin, had reser-
vations about the inquiry and about losing still another valued state 
judge to a federal assignment. Askin eventually acceded. But, as one 
commentator noticed, "The fate of the Federal inquiry—on which en-
tire ALP policy on and integrity of ASIO, ASIS, JIO and other 
security-intelligence operations stands—seems to rely on the ac-
quiescence of the hostile NSW Government." 
On several occasions, state-federal conflicts threatened to, or ac-
tually did, become entangled in even more substantial policy areas. 
We recall that Queensland Premier Bjelke-Petersen complicated 
Canberra's wish to rearrange the international boundary-line 
between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Bjelke-Petersen also in-
sisted that Japan resume buying Queensland beef before his govern-
ment would ratify future coking-coal projects in the state. While the 
federal government enjoyed undoubted powers over exports, the 
states retained a voice in granting on-shore mining leases. The 
Japanese did resume buying Australian beef But, if executed, Bjelke-
Petersen's threat could have severely disrupted Australia's resource 
policy towards Japan, and Canberra-Tokyo .relations generally. 
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Several states threatened to withhold ore-mining leases in instances 
where they felt that the new PMA would be improperiy intervening.' 
Early in 1974, West Australia had a change of government, from 
Labor to L-CP. Both the state Labor and L-CP governments vigorous-
ly protested the federal government's reluctance to approve the 
multimillion-dollar Alwest Aluminium project. The state ALP even 
felt that Its defeat at the polls had been hastened by the position of 
the federal Labor government. Liberal Premier Sir Charies Court per-
sonally assumed negotiations with Canberra; eventually, an ap-
propriate formula was found for the project.' In late 1975, Canberra 
liberalized its foreign investment guidelines and Connor was replaced 
in the Minerals and Energy portfolio by the far more tractable 
Wriedt. All the same, the state mines ministers drafted a statement 
that argued that "the administration of foreign investment in the 
mineral industry would continue to involve conflirt between the 
States and the Commonwealth in the control of the mining in-
dustry."' 
We have seen that, through state legal intervention, the federal 
government faced fundamental challenges to its resource and invest-
ment programme. All six states went before the High Court to chal-
lenge the Seas and Submerged Lands Act. Much of the argument 
turned on whether by extension, the federal government's control 
over external affairs entitled it to proceed with establishing 
sovereignty in territorial waters for exploration, exploitation and 
conservation purposes. When the High Court validatecl the Act, it ac-
cepted the applicability of the external affairs power, but as we have 
seen, its judgement postdated Labor's period in office. The Petroleum 
and Mineral Authority Act also ran afoul of state challenge. We recall 
that the PMA was designed for such purposes as government involve-
ment in direct equity investment, loans to Australian companies and 
farm-outs. Its critics felt it was neither economically necessary nor 
desirable and urged the High Court to declare it ultra vires under the 
Constitution. In June 1975, the High Court invalidated the Petroleum 
and Mineral Authority Act. The judgement was on technical grounds, 
relating to the manner in which the measure had been legislatively 
handled. Temporarily, the question of its inherent constitutionality 
was left unanswered and the government moved to reintroduce it in 
Parliament, though in amended form. In the interim, the government 
felt it could still achieve many of its objectives through an ancillary 
agency, the Petroleum and Minerals Company of Australia, incor-
porated in the ACT and thereby out of state reach, which it had 
created some months earlier Even this agency and its work were, 
however a matter of legal contention.* Whatever the eventual 
judicial renderings on the Seas and Submerged Lands and PMA Acts, 
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the states felt confident that they could variously thwart the govern-
ment by exercising their own on-shore powers. 
Another area of difficulty for the Whitlam government was in its 
efforts to ratify a number of international conventions, especially 
under the International Labour Organization (ILO), and to have them 
implemented as law in Australia. As we saw earlier the subject-
matter of these conventions was wide. The government was not only 
eager to insure what it thcwght to be better and more humane condi-
tions in Australia but to demonstrate its attractive credentials abroad, 
for instance in the area of anti-discrimination. Whitlam felt that 
earlier governments had been very remiss In accepting obligations 
under international conventions and that the states were themselves 
to blame for being unresponsive. We are reminded of his 1970 remark 
that "In international relations, for which the Federal Government 
bears responsibility—for example the International Labour Organisa-
tion, maritime and human rights conventions—the States stagnate 
and obstruct."' As Bruce Juddery relates, Whitlam indicated that he 
would prefer to follow earlier procedural precedents in such matters. 
Where an international convention seemed to require domestic im-
plementation, he would seek agreement of the states and of the 
federal Parliament. "But he need not do so—if Section 51 (xxix) 
[federal power in external affairs] meets his government's expec-
tations."'" Said Lionel Murphy, when he was Attorney-General: 
While judgments of the High Court have made it clear that the Australian 
Parliament cannot, by mere agreement with another country, take to 
itself the power to legislate on the subject matter of the agreement, I ven-
ture to say it is inconceivable that the High Court would call into question 
the bona fides of successive Governments in voting for ratifying and im-
plementing the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights."" 
The states did in fact show some skittishness about consenting to 
such proposals put before them. Deputy Liberal leader Phillip Lynch 
summarized one side of the argument. The L-CP did not believe that 
conventions should be ratified unless all states had formally agreed. 
Moreover, "a convention should not be ratified if any point of conflict 
exists between the law and practice, in any jurisdiction, of the provi-
sions of the convention". The liberal use of the external affairs power 
to circumvent normal federal-state jurisdictional boundaries was im-
permissible.'^ 
Again, as with the Seas and Submerged Lands and PMA legislation, 
the argument about international conventions underscored some of 
the obstacles facing a Labor government intent on pursuing indicated 
external policy objectives. Political considerations, differences in sub-
s.tantlve philosophy, differing versions of what was or was not a 
proper level of centralist direction in Australia and divergent con-
stitutional emphases intruded. 
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We now need to identify the structural sources of decision-making 
within the federal government. We begin with a negative: The prin-
cipal source of decision-making is not Parliament. McMahon expres-
sed it well: 
The conduct of foreign policy is essentially a function of the Executive. It is 
the Government which must be responsible for formulating policy and for 
carrying it through on a day to day basis. This is a responsibility which the 
Executive cannot and should not abdicate. To have an erosion of the Ex-
ecutive's responsibility for foreign policy would be to abandon an ap-
proach which has been accepted in the past by governments of all parties 
and which is a tried and tested part of our constitutional practice." 
Furthermore, "Executive control over external policy has been 
strengthened in Australia by a general tradition of cabinet domina-
tion, and by decades of national development during which foreign-
policy questions were quite remote to the community at large, and 
received slight official attention."''' To this can be added such fartors 
as the relatively small number of members in the two chambers of 
Parliament, the relatively low interest in the subject on the part of 
most parliamentarians, and the small number of parliamentary sit-
ting days and the very minor part of Parliament's business occupied 
by legislation bearing on external affairs. Treaties and other inter-
national agreements are an executive prerogative and Parliament 
need not even be consulted, though Parliament must approve non-
self-implementing treaties. 
What contributions to external policy-making did Parliament 
provide during Labor's term of office? Formally, it did a gocxi deal. It 
gave legislative approval to the budgetary requirements of various 
departments, such as Foreign Affairs and Defence, and passed various 
Bills, such as those that implemented international conventions and 
provided for an increased federal role in resource management and 
exploitation. Apart from occasional amendments it chose to accept, 
the government's measures had no difficulty in being approved in the 
ALP-controIled House. The Senate, however was a different matter 
since at no time did Labor enjoy a majority there and the opposition 
in the House was often able to rely on the Senate to distract the 
government's policies. The government's situation was especially 
troublesome until mid-1974, because of the presence of five DLP 
senators, whose party was extremely critical of government external 
policy. While an adverse vote in the Senate could not topple the 
government. It could delay or defeat government legislation. The Seas 
and Submerged Lands legislation passed Parliament, but in con-
spicuously amended form. The PMA legislation passed the House, but 
was defeated in the Senate. It became one of the hooks on which the 
government hung its rationale for calling a double dissolution and 
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contributed to the convening of a joint sitting of Parliament at which 
the PMA Bill and other stalled government measures were finally ap-
proved. With the High Court's invalidation of the PMA Act, on 
grounds of its faulty legislative handling, the government proceeded 
to resubmit a PMA Bill to Parliament. First, however the govern-
ment rewrote the PMA legislation, to meet some of the criticisms 
levelled against it by the opposition and by the mining industry. 
Senate opposition thereby affected the PMA legislation in three ways. 
Firstly, it considerably delayed its passage. Secondly, the fact that the 
government had committed a technical error because it used Senate 
obstruction as a reason for calling a double dissolution and then a 
joint sitting, brought on High Court invalidation. Thirdly, delays in 
getting the PMA legislatively and constitutionally secured, and a wish 
to make it more palatable to the parliamentary opposition, caused the 
government to amend some of its more contentious features. The 
Labor government was dismissed by the Governor-General shortly 
after the amended version of the PMA legislation was introduced in 
Parliament. 
The government's displeasure with the Senate was not, of course, 
limited to that chamber's intrusions into external policy subjects. In a 
rather special way, however, the government resorted to a "foreign 
policy instrument" by creating a vacancy in the Senate, in the hope of 
having a loyal Labor senator step in. This was the celebrated Gair af-
fair. To general astonishment, Whitlam appointed Queensland DLP 
senator Vincent Gair to be Ambassador to Ireland, and Gair accepted. 
Victorian DLP senator Frank McManus insisted that he had been 
previously approached by a Laboi minister Morrison, with an un-
mistakable, authoritative offer of the ambassadorship to the Vatican 
if he. McManus, would resign from the Senate. McManus held to his 
story, despite government denials." At any rate, the Gair appoint-
ment infuriated the opposition, and Snedden in particular. He 
described it as "the most shameful act ever perpetrated by an 
Australian Government","' and his anger with the Whitlam govern-
ment probably had a bearing on his willingness to force a parliamen-
tary impasse from which a double dissolution could (and did) arise. 
Even when the House of the Senate were ncn in a position to force 
changes in government external policy, the non-Labor parties were 
able to use the parliamentary forum to berate the government. This is 
a common function of parliamentary oppositions. In theory, at least, 
opposition spokesmanship is presumed to serve a public expositional 
and educational role, to arouse attention and possibly to gain elec-
toral sympathy. Skilfully executed, such spokesmanship could also 
cause a government to decide that excessively adverse publicity re-
quired some policy adaptation. It Is likely, for instance, that frequent 
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and sharp opposition criticism entered into government calculations 
on various defence policy decisions. For instance, shortly before the 
1974 double dissolution, it refused the Soviet request for a space-
science facility in Australia and hurried along announcement of new 
capital defence expenditures. 
The opposition carried out its pariiamentary attacks in various con-
texts. Some were familiar such as seizing opportunity during foreign 
and defence policy debates, at question time and during adjourn-
ments. As we saw, the opposition's first motion of censure against the 
new government was based on a criticism of its defence policy move-
ments. Moreover as time went on, Snedden and Peacock in par-
ticular began to resort to a technique Whitlam himself had developed 
while in opposition. Numerous, often searching questions on external 
policy subjects were placed on notice, the replies provided ammuni-
tion with which to attack, for instance on the Baltic states recognition 
issue. When Fraser became Liberal leader the tempo of attack inten-
sified. Fraser not only challenged the merit of government policies 
but seemed especially eager to portray Whitlam and some of his col-
leagues as having offended Australia's parliamentary and other In-
stitutions. One instance was over the alleged irregularities sur-
rounding Connor's and Cairns' efforts to obtain petrodollar loans for 
resource projects. Another was during the 1975 controversy over 
cables and letters sent to the two Vietnams. On that occasion, Fraser 
opened his remarks on a censure motion by charging that Whitlam 
had "misled the Parliament knowingly and deliberately. He took this 
course because he was not prepared to speak plainly to the Australian 
people of, his policies and his bias towards communist North Viet-
nam."" In the Senate, opposition parties frequently used their 
numbers to assail aspects of government defence under-prepa redness, 
of flirtations with wrong-headed causes, and the like. 
To an extent. Parliament also served as a base from which the 
government's own supporters, or collections of parliamentarians, 
were able to bring pressure or criticism upon the government. We 
will reserve until later an assessment of the ALP pariiamentary 
caucus as an influence on policy outputs. But it should be noticed here 
that Labor members formed Icxjse groups that urged some course of 
action upon the gcwernment. Petitions were signed, urging the 
gcwernment to withhold diplomatic recognition of the post-Allende 
regime in Chile, to consider a tougher line against South Africa, to 
take a more direct hand in helping to stabilize conditions in strife-
torn East Timor in 1975 and at large to support closer relations with 
the PRG in Vietnam before the Thieu regime fell. There also was a 
"Friends of Israel" group within caucus, which overall was more ex-
plicitly well-disposed towards the Israeli cause in the Middle Eastern 
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conflict than it believed the government to be, and some quite sharp 
questions were put to Whitlam'in the House by some of his own party 
followers. There also were bipartisan collections of parliamentarians 
who were concerned about such matters as Portuguese Timor. The 
amnesty group, as we saw. extracted a pledge from Whitlam to raise 
the issue of political rights in countries he would be visiting, such as 
Indonesia and the Soviet Union. Perhaps the urging was unnecessary, 
but it likely strengthened Whitlam's resolve to put the matter clearly 
in his conversations with foreign leaders. 
Parliament also had an institutionalized mechanism to deal with 
external policy, namely parliamentary committees. When the L-CP 
left office, there was a Joint (House and Senate) Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and of much more recent vintage, in the Senate, a 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and a Select 
Committee on Foreign Ownership and Control. The new government 
widened the scope of the joint committee to "Foreign Affairs and 
Defence" and, for instance, increased its ability to call witnesses and 
papers and to draw upon necessary research staff and facilities.'* 
Whitlam seemed genuinely interested in having this committee serve 
a useful educational function for its parliamentary members, as well 
as providing competent reports from time to time. Understandably, 
however, like his predecessors, he could not countenance a role for 
the joint committee, or for any parliamentary committee, that would 
undermine the government's own prerogatives. For nearly two years, 
the joint committee was preoccupied with the Omega study. As we 
saw. the government's reference of this subject to the joint committee 
was heavily political in inspiration. It was a gambit to temporize on 
Omega, to forestall piarty efforts to proscribe the installation while 
the committee had Omega under advisement. Of course, once the 
committee had reported, the government still had the problem of 
reconciling a favourable committee report (though with most Labor 
members indicating dissent) with a need to satisfy the party as such 
that Omega could properly be endorsed. 
On the Senate side, the Select Committee on Foreign Ownership 
and Control was disbanded and in 1975, replaced by a new Standing 
Committee on National Development and Ownership and Control of 
Australian Resources. The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs and Defence proceeded to move into a number of sensitive areas, 
such as the role of Australia and the United Nations in the affairs of 
Australian territories, with special focus on the Cocos Islands. Then, 
quite suddenly, before the committee had completed its investiga-
tions, the government announced its intention to assert Australian 
authority in the Cocos more emphatically, through a move such as 
"buying up" the islands from the Clunies-Ross family. Indeed, it is a 
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step that only a few months before had been rejected by officials as an 
option. The government's treatment of the committee was construed 
as cavalier, even contemptuous," though the committee shortly 
thereafter came to essentially the 'same conclusion as had the 
government.^" This committee also conducted an inquiry into the 
capabilities of the Australian Army. T. B. Millar wrote as follows: 
Not having control of the Senate, the Government felt that the Standing 
Committee there was deliberately trying to embarrass it; the first 
reference was on the role and capacity of the Army. The Government 
therefore prevented the Senate Committee from getting access to the clas-
sified information that would have enabled it to produce a more convinc-
ing report. 
Moreover regarding both the joint and Senate committees, Millar 
observed that under Labor they had fallen on hard times: 
Most A.L.P. members interested in foreign affairs were in the Ministry. 
The Government had its own experts on foreign affairs and defence, and 
saw no mileage in increasing the capacity of its own backbenchers or the 
Opposition to propose initiatives or ask embarrassing questions."^ ' 
Only in a most remote sense could it be said that, because of their 
weight and value, parliamentary committee reports influenced policy 
outputs under the Labor government. 
The effective external policy locus of decision-making rested with 
the executive—the government. But Cabinet collectively was not the 
prime mover That honour belonged to the Prime Minister. 
Australian political and international circumstances, and Whitlam's 
own qualities, were responsible. 
Whitlam's interests had consistently been pointed at foreign rather 
than domestic affairs. He had been his party's foreign policy 
spokesman when in opposition. When elected to government. 
Whitlam already possessed a wealth of overseas experience and per-
sonal contacts, sharpened by historical learning, a retentive and agile 
mind and a gift for expression. His decision to assume the Foreign Af-
fairs portfolio personally was inspired by several considerations, 
other than interest in the field. He had concluded that, under L-CP 
governments, the "superficiality" of foreign policy decisions had in 
part arisen "from the separation of the de facto External Affairs 
Minister—that is, the Prime Minister—from the professional ad-
visers".''^ Since it was desirable for the Prime Minister to wield a com-
manding role in foreign policy, Whitlam's answer was to merge the 
two functions. A second consideration was the state of his party. The 
ALP had a disputatious tradition. When in opposition, first as deputy 
leader and then as leader Whitlam had experienced strife with ele-
ments within the ALP, often over his foreign policy views. To 
foreclose the possibility of conflict between himself as Prime Minister 
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and a separate Foreign Minister, to keep control over a frartious 
party, to insure that his conceptions of foreign policy would prevail, 
he found merit in assuming the portfolio himself Labor entered office 
determined to chart new and important courses in foreign policy 
after years in frustrating opposition. Direct control over Australia's 
foreign policy, which was seen to involve a creative rather than a 
largely managerial role, was especially vital. 
Whitlam surrendered the Foreign Affairs portfolio to Willesee less 
than a year after Labor's election. Willesee was a trusted, dependable 
and hard-working colleague and much of the detail in the portfolio 
could be taken off Whitlam's shoulders. Willesee could not be clas-
sified as a "yes man", and as Foreign Minister, he did take many deci-
sions alone. But by force of his interest and temperament it was possi-
ble for Whitlam to remain the overarching figure. His foreign policy 
role was accentuated by his style. He flourished on high-level 
diplomacy: numerous overseas trips, visits with heads of government, 
painting with broad strokes. His forays into such diplomacy, much 
remarked upon, perhaps were "a representation of what Gough 
Whitlam believes international affairs are all about—relations and co-
operations. It is capital R relations and capital C co-operation."^' Ac-
tivism, personal diplomacy and big ideas could be interpreted as not 
only putting Australia on the map more prominently but as means 
towards expounding Its interests and principles directly and forceful-
ly. Others saw it less as statesmanship than as a substitution of style 
for substance, and even as pursuit of ego gratification. Critics carped 
at Whitlam's flair for foreign travel as wasteful and as a distortion of 
priorities. Peacock complained in February 1975 that in two years of 
office, Whitlam had made eleven overseas journeys. He had spent at 
least 130 days outside the country, while Parliament during this 
period had sat for only approximately 143 days." The Sydney Morning 
Heralds own acid comment was that "If Mr Whitlam really is plann-
ing more absences, he is elevating self-indulgence into an almost 
Shakesperean self-destructive flaw."" 
There is no doubt that Whitlam left a substantial stamp on Labor's 
foreign policy. The strengths and the weaknesses of that foreign 
policy could in a way be traced to the dualism in Whitlam's own ap-
proach to the subject: "He is a realist who wants to be seen as an 
idealist; a pragmatist who decks himself out in principles."" The big 
decisions were made either on his own initiative or with his personal 
concurrence. Some decisions, such as on the Baltic states, were taken 
independently. Others, such as on South Africa's membership in the 
United Nations, were taken in the face of serious misgivings on the 
part of senior colleagues. Most were taken without prior Cabinet con-
sultation. 
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An important reason why the Whitlam system worked reasonably 
well was that most of the Prime Minister's immediate colleagues, 
such as Willesee and Barnard, shared Whitlam's views about the 
general directions and the more specific features of Australia's exter-
nal policies. As a group, Connor apart, they were more cautious than 
Whitlam. Even Cairns, in the handling of his specific portfolio respon-
sibilities, was in degree less taken by idealism than Whitlam. Cairns 
was more committed to protectionism and, as Overseas Trade 
Minister, less eager to pursue trade sanctions against South Africa. 
Ministers such as Willesee, Barnard and Morrison, while having 
minds of their own.'fitted well the roles of lieutenants rather than co-
captains. The main exception to the rule of Whitlam's pre-eminence 
in external policy was Connor. Connor was a tough and determined 
man, knowledgeable in the resources field, and he commanded con-
siderable admiration within the party. We have seen that he was 
much more interested in what Australia could in practice achieve for 
itself in minerals and energy than in global resource diplomacy ques-
tions. Whitlam was not very interested in the detail of this quite 
technical subject, but by temperament approached it from an inter-
national/foreign policy standpoint. Hence it was possible for the two 
men to coexist and at times to reflect seemingly different viewpoints. 
The merits of the positions aside, it was understandable that, on the 
resources aspects of external policy, political critics and the business 
community complained about what they saw as the government's in-
consistency. 
Connor's domination over resource policy eventually receded and 
then ended. In mid-Ortober 1975, Whitlam forced Connor's resigna-
tion as Minister for Minerals and Energy, on grounds that Connor 
had earlier not fully apprised Parliament of his role in the search for 
massive overseas loans. Decline in Connor's influence had been evi-
dent earlier. His overall reputation and his standing in the party had 
slipped. This was due to his persistent inflexibility and his failure to 
provide detailed answers to questions and more detailed guidelines 
for his policies. Nor did his involvement in the loans affair enhance 
his standing with his colleagues. In August, a resources committee 
was created within Cabinet. It was composed of the Prime Minister 
the Deputy Prime Minister, the Treasurer the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Connor as Minister for Minerals and Energy. Within the 
committee, Whitlam, Crean, Hayden and Willesee all took a more 
flexible view than Connor. Hayden, as Treasurer was given respon-
sibility over foreign investment policy. The various liberalized foreign 
investment steps in the last few months of Labor's time in office grew 
out of resource committee deliberations, with Connor being con-
sistently cwerriden. Although these decisions were essentially col-
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legiate, they represented a correction of what previously had often 
been (in the form of an entrenched Connor) a voice dissident to 
Whiflam." 
Whitlam's relations with minsiters who spoke or acted out of turn 
on matters unrelated to their portfolios were another matter. When 
Nixon resumed the bombing of North Vietnam very shortly after 
Labor was elected, Whitlam decided not to comment publicly, but 
Cairns, Cameron and Uren proceeded to make rude and barbed com-
ments. Whitlam was plainly displeased and made it known that there 
would be no more statements on foreign policy except from himself 
as Foreign Minister. But extramural remarks by ministers, often in 
clash with or in cwerstatement of government policy, did not stop. 
Cairns was the most persistent offender but there were others as 
well. For instance. Health Minister Dr Doug Everingham urged a 
boycott of French imports in protest against nuclear testing, while En-
vironment Minister Dr Moss Cass urged the recognition of the PRG.^ * 
Cairns, as we have seen, in 1974 became President of the Congress for 
International Co-operation and Disarmament, whose platform in-
cluded a non-aligned Australian foreign policy, removal of all foreign 
bases from Australia and recognition of the PRG. 
With one notable exception, Whitlam's efforts to contain out-
spoken ministers were not overly successful. At the April 1974 
Cabinet meeting, Whitlam was very firm. At least for the duration of 
the forthcoming electoral campaign, ministers were to adhere strictly 
to the subject of their respective portfolios. Labor's continuation in of-
fice was at stake. The party had to speak with a single authoritative 
voice, especially in external affairs. The appeal worked. Indepiendent 
ministerial expressions did carry effects. It took longer and became 
more difficult for Washington and the new government in Canberra 
to adjust to one another and raised unease in some South-East Asian 
capitals; not just in Saigon or Pnom Penh. It spurred the opposition 
and other critics to Incriminate the government in two ways: that it 
was divided and unable to operate coherently, and that it contained 
extremist elements whose influence over policy could not be dis-
counted. It was even claimed that some extramural ministerial state-
ments were privately countenanced by Whitlam, who wanted to turn 
left, to set the climate for a leftward turn, but who politically was un-
able to overexpose himself in this way. Hence the News Weekly's charge 
that 
Mr Whitlam appointed Dr Cairns Minister of Overseas Trade but permit-
ted him effectively to write and execute the Whitlam government's 
foreign policy, indistinguishable from that of any Communist state— 
except in the shifts of timing and emphasis, which are necessary in a 
country which must occasionally go to elections." 
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Even allowing for editorial hyperbole, a claim such as this was insup-
portable. Cairns' outspokenness on foreign policy issues did give in-
spiration to the left, in and outside of the ALP. Perhaps on occasion, 
though indirectly, it caused more moderate ministers such as 
Whitlam to graduate their policies. In truth, we need to recall the 
large amount of pluralism in the ALP, the sense of principled commit-
ment on the part of many of its members and the weak tradition of 
collective responsibility in Australian Cabinets, as illustrated by 
Liberal and Country Party ministerial disagreements during non-
Labor administration federally, and in state practice as well. Labor's 
practice of electing Cabinet members prevented Whitlam from pick-
ing and choosing (or dismissing) ministers at will. Even had he had 
the power he still would have needed to take party caucus feelings 
and shadings of opinion into account in constructing a government. 
When Labor came to power Cairns topped the ministerial election 
poll in caucus. Indeed, Cairns' 1974 elertion by caucus to the deputy 
leadership in preference to Barnard did not dominantly turn on a 
left-right alignment. It was reaction by left and moderate caucus 
members alike against what was viewed as Whitlam's overbearing, 
over-independent manner as Prime Minister and as party leader on 
both foreign and domestic issues. Cairns was seen as a partial 
counterweight to Whitlam, sufficiently independent and wedded to 
party principles and collegiality. When in 1975, Whitlam removed 
Cairns from the ministry for the latter's presentation of his involve-
ment in the petrodollar search. Cairns did not submit gracefully. His 
removal had to be confirmed by caucus and, although he fell short. 
Cairns polled well in caucus in his bid to gain re-election as a 
minister. Had he succeeded, Whitlam's political position would have 
been exceedingly difficult. 
An inference to be drawn from what has been said so far is that 
Cabinet collectively did not meaningfully contribute to external 
policy decision-making. Without exception, this view was reinforced 
by every minister interviewed by the author Lloyd and Reid observed 
that 
Foreign affairs policy was almost completely outside the scrutiny of 
Cabinet. Some minor administrative items were referred to Cabinet ... 
Otherwise, the convention that foreign affairs was the exclusive preserve 
of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister was strictly followed. 
Cabinet was not even given the regular "tour d'horizon" by the Foreign 
Minister—a procedure common in other Westminster-emulating Cabinet 
systems ... Major statements on foreign affairs by the Prime Minister... 
were usually heard by Cabinet Ministers for the first time when they were 
delivered to the Parliament.'" 
The present author feels that while Lloyd and Read corrertly 
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downgraded the role of Cabinet, they somewhat overstated the posi-
tion, especially if defence is included under "foreign affairs". For in-
stance, in mid-1973, Cabinet succeeded in setting the proposed 
defence vote lower than Barnard would have wished. In 1974, it con-
sidered the impending announcement of new defence equipment out-
lays. In 1975, it dealt with, and by majority vote ruled against, per-
mission to allow a PLO delegation into Australia, and later that year 
it discussed and approved slightly stronger Australian trade-related 
measures against South Africa. What stands out is the circumstances in 
which Cabinet reviewed external policy. When Cabinet did discuss 
the subject, the usual circumstance was that it was taking note of 
what the Prime Minister and/or the Foreign Minister were doing or 
were about to do. This was more a ratifying than a "decision-making" 
function. One minister interviewed by the author said that when 
Cabinet did address itself to foreign affairs, most of the time was 
devoted to congratulating or querying a minister on a decision 
already taken. When on a rare occasion the preferred position of the 
responsible minister was altered or defeated, one of two considera-
tions applied. One was when an external policy decision entailed the 
commitment of substantial funds that Cabinet members felt could 
more appropriately be spent on domestic priorities. This was il-
lustrated by the 1973 decision on defence spending. The other fartor 
involved issues of direct, even acute political concern to the party. 
This was explicitly illustrated by the January 1975 decision on the 
PLO. Cabinet was closely divided and in this case the pro-admission 
position of Whitlam, Willesee and Cameron was overriden. Granted, 
among Cabinet ministers there were some strong feelings about the 
substantive merits of allowing or disallowing a PLO visit. But among 
the majority for disallowing there also was sentiment that, on the eve 
of Terrigal, already deep party divisions on the issue would be further 
exacerbated if PLO people were allowed to come. Potentially grave 
political consequences could follow." In any event, a few months 
later Whitlam personally decided to allow a visit by a PLO member. 
This at minimum contravened the spirit of the earlier Cabinet 
decision; furthermore, as Hawke suggested, it is unlikely that 
Whitlam's personal decision would have been sustained had Cabinet 
been consulted and allowed to decide freely. It is also tempting to 
speculate on whether had it been consulted and allowed to decide. 
Cabinet as a whole would have countenanced the Connor and Cairns 
ventures to obtain huge petrodollar loans. As it was, authorization for 
these efforts was given without publicity by a very small knot of 
ministers. When these activities came to light, there was criticism in 
various quarters, including among Labor ministers and backbenchers, 
of their secrecy and the highly exclusive nature of authorization, in 
addition to their substantive dubiousness. 
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There were understandable reasons for Cabinet's general ineffec-
tiveness in shaping external policy. One was the relative lack of in-
terest among Cabinet members at large, compounded by the un-
wieldy character of Cabinet itself—twenty-seven members and the 
lack of a more workable inner ministry. A second, perhaps dominant 
reason was Whitlam's own personalized style of conducting foreign 
policy. This not only referred to his indifference about careful Cabinet 
consultation but to his aversion to facing potentially discordant opi-
nion, especially from those situated more to the left than he stood, or 
from those who objected to what they thought to be his circumven-
tion of standing party policy. 
The Prime Minister gave early signs of his approach to the uses (or 
non-uses) of Cabinet on the US defence installations issue. When 
Labor was elected, Whitlam created several Cabinet committees, one 
of which was on foreign affairs and defence, and which he personally 
chaired. The committee was to be a sort of screening mechanism for 
items later sent up to Cabinet at large. The committee met in late 
February 1973 to consider the draft of a statement on the US facilities, 
which Barnard, with Whitlam's approval, planned to announce 
publicly. Party feeling about the facilities, and especially the continu-
ing secrecy that cloaked them, was rising. Contrary to previously set 
procedures, non-committee members of Cabinet were not advised of 
the meeting and therefore not given an opportunity to attend. We 
have seen that when the Barnard proposal came before caucus, there 
was widespread dissatisfaction. A caucus motion to refer the state-
ment to Cabinet was supported by no less than ten Cabinet ministers, 
and some other ministers not in attendance would no doubt have 
backed it as well. The motion was endorsed by a majority of caucus 
members present, but technically failed. Whitlam was not interested 
in regarding the motion as having passed at least in spirit, remarking 
shortly afterwards that "I think there are more pressing matters for 
Cabinet to consider at this stage, as you'll see."'^ 
The Cabinet committee on foreign and defence affairs did examine 
some matters of importance, but rarely, and essentially, in a forensic 
capacity. Two years after Labor's election, the author asked a senior 
minister, who had consistently been a member of the committee, 
about its work. To his recollection, he said, the committee had met 
only once, to discuss the North-west Cape renegotiation terms before 
the Barnard-Schlesinger agreement was executed. He remarked that 
committee members were very busy people. At any rate, the broad 
outlines of party policy were generally known, and honoured, by 
those ministers directly in charge of foreign and defence policy. There 
is no reason to believe the minister was being evasive in his replies. 
He could recall only one committee meeting. There in fact had been 
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more, but they plainly had not been of sufficient importance to stick 
in his memory. The minister's explanations hardly added up to a 
characterization of the committee as a serious element in the external 
policy decision-making process. It was symptomatic of rising party, 
and Cabinet, concern about over-exclusive decision-making that, after 
the Connor and Cairns loan imbroglios, a special Cabinet committee 
on resources was established. 
The external policy decisions taken by Australia's political elites were 
and are affected by the advice and pressures directed towards them. 
We will Icxik at three basic sources of input: the bureaucracy, interest 
groups and the Labor Party itself In our search for patterns, we will 
need to be mindful of the considerable difficulties associated with try-
ing to draw causal connections between inputs and policy outcomes. 
Formally, advice tendered to a government by officials is just that, 
namely advisory, but it nonetheless can be decisive in influencing 
ministerial judgements. It carries the weight of ostensibly non-
partisan detachment, combined with high-level professionalism and 
often persuasive, knowledgeable argument. We will examine the ade-
quacy of information available to external policy officialdom, the 
temper and commitments of the official/bureaucratic establishment, 
areas of intra-official tension and the means by which advice is trans-
mitted to ministers. Finally, we will appraise the impact of official 
advice on decisions and their presentation. 
How adequate were the informational and interpretative inputs 
available to those in the Canberra bureaucracy who counselled the 
Labor government? Firstly, a note on numbers. Within the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs, personnel rose from I 100 in 1962 to 2 200 in 
1969 to 3 000 in 1972 to 4700 in late 1974. The expansion was caused 
in part by the diversification of Australia's foreign policy involve-
ments. For instance, greater attention was paid to the economic 
features of external policy. In part, it was brought on by an expansion 
of overseas missions and/or the scope of work performed within 
overseas establishments. Labor's considerable expansion of overseas 
missions placed some strain on adequate staffing of overseas posts 
and in some cases meant that only very small missions could be dis-
patched, or that heads of mission might need to carry double accredi-
tion. Hence the Ambassador to China was also accredited to North 
Korea and the Ambassador to Sweden was additionally accredited to 
Finland and Norway. Indeed, personnel requirements for overseas 
postings continued to raise misgivings about the depletion of the 
home establishment (less than a quarter of all Foreign Affairs person-
nel) and its capacity to perform its own work. 
The quality of Foreign Affairs officers.posted overseas was general-
290 Australian External Policy under Ubor 
ly high, reflecting the highly selective procedures used for recruiting 
people into the department. There were some problems. For example, 
while there was considerable Chinese language capability among 
those posted to Peking (including Ambassador FitzGerald), there was 
a shortage of Japanese language competence within the mission in 
Tokyo. Also, because of the rapid expansion of the department in the 
late 1960s and beyond, there was some shortage of experienced of-
ficers in the middle and upper ranges. The Labor government ap-
pointed some of the very best people available as heads of mission in 
the most important postings. This was illustrated by Richard 
Woolcott in Jakarta, K. C. O. Shann in Tokyo, Sir Patrick Shaw in 
Washington, Sir James Plimsoll in Moscow and Stephen FitzGerald in 
Peking. 
We are led to ask to what extent the-Labor government may have 
reached beyond the career Foreign Affairs service for diplomatic head 
of mission appointments. L-CP governments had made some political 
ambassadorial and high commissioner appointments. When Labor 
entered office, former Liberal ministers were serving as heads of mis-
sions in London, Tokyo and Wellington. All sooner or later stepped 
down, but were not pushed out by Labor. Perhaps the most successful 
of these Liberal appointees was Dame Annabelle Rankin, High Com-
missioner to New Zealand. It was under Labor incidentally, that 
Australia acquired its first non-political, female head of mission-
Ruth Dobson, appointed to Copenhagen. Labor made its own appoint-
ments from outside the career foreign service. The most blatant was 
Gair's, to Dublin. It was wholly political in inspiration. Gair lacked 
basic experience for an ambassadorial position. He prematurely 
replaced a highly respected career ambassador. Once on the job, his 
style and his overall performance left something to be desired. Sir 
Alexander Downer's replacement in London was a Labor politician, J. 
I. Armstrong. This was a patronage appointment, though that step 
was in keeping with long-standing Australian practice. Armstrong's 
replacement. Sir John Bunting, did not originate in Foreign Affairs. 
He was, however, an experienced and very senior public servant. Bar-
nard's appointment to Stockholm was of course that of a non-career 
man, and a political reward. But it was not possible to quarrel with 
Barnard's qualifications, acquired in the Defence portfolio. Nor could 
there be much quarrel on these grounds with the appointment to 
New Delhi of the former academic and highly regarded journalist 
Bruce Grant. Indeed, despite many misgivings at the time within the 
Department of Foreign Affairs hierarchy, it was hard to fault the 
FitzGerald appointment. FitzGerald had at one time been an officer in 
the department. He was a respected academic Sinologist with an ex-
cellent grasp of Chinese. He had been to China with the Whitlam 
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party in 1971. Quite rightly, Whitlam believed that the inaugural ap-
pointment to Peking was something special: not just a competent 
person was needed, but one whose thinking about China Whitlam 
knew and generally shared. In late 1974, the government and the 
Foreign Affairs Department agreed that, henceforth, much more 
emphasis would be placed on the appointment of career officers as 
consuls and consuls-general." 
Under the ALP, efforts were carried forward to widen the ambit of 
Australia's own independently acquired sources of information and 
assessment. Elaborate contacts with foreign, and especially American, 
intelligence services were maintained, both in Australia and overseas, 
and the flow of intelligence data from allied nations did not slacken. 
Australia had for some time enjoyed a considerable communications 
interception and decoding capability. When the DSD detachment was 
removed from Singapore, it was not disbanded but rehoused in 
Australia. ASIS, despite the extreme secretiveness surrounding it, had 
always been a small-scale operation, over whose value Australian 
professionals themselves disagreed. JIO was an intelligence-analysis 
rather than an intelligence-gathering agency. It was administratively 
under Defence, but successively had had senior Foreign Affairs of-
ficers as directors. It co-ordinated efforts of other (such as service-
based) intelligence agencies and reported its assessments to various 
interested line departments and to ministers. In the present context, 
we need to point out that JIO's staff of some 400 was varied. It in-
cluded service as well as civilian personnel, a score of economists and 
an occasional academic on secondment to it. Not only through intel-
ligence channels but through increased and more effertively used, 
regular overseas-posted personnel, Australia under Labor undertook 
to widen its own independent sources of information. This was 
designed to provide additional and if necessary corrective perspec-
tives on what for so long had been conspicuous reliance on foreign, 
and especially US and British, inputs. It also, as the government ad-
mitted, had a political/ideological component: to compensate for 
what were felt to have been distorting infatuations with cold-war 
preconceptions of the international order.'" In fart, Australia con-
tinued to be in a position to influence other governments. Part of this 
was in sharing its own data and assessments with friends and allies. 
Part of it was through influences absorbed by South-East Asian, 
Pacific, African and Caribbean diplomatic trainees. Part of it was 
through dealings with foreign service officers of other countries, 
notably New Zealanders, on secondment to Foreign Affairs in Canber-
ra. All of this, of course, was apart from the ordinary network of of-
ficial and political-level contacts in Australia and abroad. 
It is equally helpful to look inside the major external affairs-related 
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departments. Labor inherited a corps of public servants, most of 
whom had never known any political master save L-CP govern-
ments. The adjustment to a new Labor government was, however 
achieved without undue difficulty. Some contingency plans had been 
drawn up before December 1972, to implement policies expected of a 
Labor gcwernment. For instance, the Defence Department made 
preparations for the doing away with conscription. When the initial 
two-man Whitlam-Barnard government made a host of decisions. 
Defence and Foreign Affairs proved helpfully responsive. Even before 
Labor came on. there had been considerable sentiment in Foreign Af-
fairs that some foreign policy reorientations, such as recognition of 
China, were very much overdue. Collectively, the Department of 
Foreign Affairs under Labor could probably be best chararterized as 
reasonably attuned to a Whitlam-Wiltesee reformist approach, but 
scornfuj of over-anxious or "radical" policies. One informant, while 
agreeing that the department's adjustment to the transition of 
government was generally carried off well, illustrated how traces of 
older habits die hard. His illustration was that departmental submis-
sions for some time continued to speak in such terms as "China is no 
longer aggressive," rather than simply, "China is not aggressive." The 
department in many ways remained very well-disposed towards the 
United States and was eager that relations between the two countries 
not be allowed to suffer from untoward incidents." 
Within Defence, there also was considerable feeling about staying 
close to the US alliance, for example in keeping ANZUS viable and 
protecting the integrity of American defence facilities and generally 
about avpiding abrasive behaviour towards Washington." The 
"forward defence" doctrine of Labor's predecessors had lost very con-
siderable ground by 1975 and insinuations of a split on this subject 
between civilians and uniformed officers were seriously exaggerated. 
The strategic assessment prepared in the department in 1973 was 
somewhat more guarded in dealing with foreseeable threats to 
Australia than the tone of Barnard's speeches suggested, but the 
assessment had taken into account the new government's known 
predispositions about security issues. It is not true that Barnard had 
literally misrepresented the findings contained in the assessment. The 
preparation of the 1975 strategic assessment did occasion a measure 
of heartburn within the department. Independent checking broadly 
substantiated one commentator's allegations that Tange applied some 
influence to insure that the new report continue to project fairiy 
favourable security conditions over a long span of years." Much of 
the opinion within Defence was not, however, at all satisfied with the 
level of government commitment to authorized service personnel or 
with equipment, especially if the military had to regear to a continen-
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tal defence doctrine. Morrison's 1975-76 budget promises of new 
capital equipment programmes were received as a welcome improve-
ment. 
Within major departments, the secretaries were men of strong will, 
but in general closely attached to their ministers. In Minerals and 
Energy, Sir Lenox Hewitt became intimately associated with Connor's 
prescriptions about foreign investment, mineral price negotiations, 
and government's role in resource search and exploitation, and so on. 
In Defence, Tange carried over from pre-Labor days. Especially on the 
reorganization of the department, he became an early and vigorous 
advocate of Barnard's objectives. Within his department, he was 
known for his definite, assertive manner. After Barnard stepped 
down in mid-1975. there was speculation that Tange and the new 
minister. Morrison, might not be able to get on estiecially well. On 
most indications, however, such anxieties seemed unfounded. 
Renoufs appointment to Foreign Affairs was rather special. Sir 
Keith Waller's retirement a year after Labor tcxik office had been en-
tirely normal and voluntary. Renouf was a senior diplomat, personal-
ly selected for the job by Whitlam. Renouf was attractive because he 
suited Whitlam's notion that a more free-wheeling atmosphere was 
needed. Renouf had spent most of his career outside Canberra. He had 
executed assignments well, such as negotiating the recognition of 
Peking, and was known as a good "ideas" man. But it is not true that 
Renouf was chosen because he was thought to be some sort of 
apologist for Labor's preferred policies. The author understands that a 
generally favourable article he published on Evatt early in 1973 may 
actually have been a minus in Whitlam's eyes, since the Prime 
Minister genuinely desired an open-minded Foreign Affairs 
secretary.'" 
Once in charge. Renouf acquired a reputation for outspokenness. 
As we will see, he was not averse to chastizing other departments. He 
submitted himself to public interviews. He declared that Labor had 
properly freed Itself of outworn stereotypes and that, if returned to of-
fice, the L-CP would probably retain 90 per cent of what Labor had 
done in foreign policy." In April 1975, he publicly rebuked the op-
position for holding to antiquated cold-war views and for having al-
leged that Australia under Labor had not done enough in playing a 
constructive role in the closing phases of the Vietnamese conflict. 
Fraser, in turn, rebuked Renouf for having violated canons of public 
service impartiality. 
Renoufs justification of his remarks could, in context, be attributed 
to three factors: his own penchant for outspokenness, officially relax-
ed rules governing public servant utterancesand the fact that he was 
restating the government's own known position, not a conflicting 
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one. At all events, Renoufs critidsm of the opposition was believed to 
enjoy wide support within Foreign Afl"airs."" Renoufs conception of a 
departmental secretary's role buttressed his candour He said he 
believed In avoiding partisanship, but not political awareness. There 
was a danger that public servants could raise objectivity to a dogma 
and in so doing sacrifice ultimate effertiveness: "the Permanent Head 
must be capable of giving advice to his Minister and to the Govern-
ment of a kind which demonstrates his recognition and appreciation 
of the political realities.""' 
Renouf in other ways demonstrated a flair for being something of a 
mover and a shaker While he felt that lateral recruitment into the 
department was generally unwise, he favoured the introduction of 
some specialists in fields such as economics and law. This was in keep-
ing with his view that the department should devote more attention 
to functional themes such as international and regional organizations, 
international economics and legal questions arising out of the law of 
the sea and other concerns. The department's structure was 
revamped to provide more functionally oriented divisions. A pair of 
academics and a journalist were brought in on secondment and 
business figures were desired as well. Young career officers were sent 
overseas on academic study-leave. The department's executive 
secretariat, whose origins lay in the L-CP period, was gingered up. 
Lying outside the normal structure, it was to provide forward plan-
ning, gadfly writing and rapid movement to assist individual sertions 
with urgent problems."^ 
Renoufs c:)utspokenness, and his drive to envigourate his depart-
ment, leads us to consider interdepartmental relations. It is unexcep-
tional to bureaucratic establishments that different departments, 
with different traditions, subject emphases and political clienteles, 
should at times hold differing perspectives, and indeed offer con-
flicting advice to ministers. This can be interpreted as desirable in the 
important sense that a kind of creative tension occurs, and the range 
of policy options available to governments will have been more 
critically assessed and enriched. 
Simply because of its generality of concerns about Australia's 
overseas interests, it is not surprising that on a number of occasions 
Foreign Affairs should have urged a "bigger view" orientation than 
did more specialized departments. While not urging strong economic 
measures against South Africa, Foreign Affairs nonetheless did not, 
unlike Overseas Trade while Cairns was its minister focus its think-
ing on Australia's profitable commercial ties with South Africa. 
Wherein Manufacturing Industry was eager to ply the Nomad on the 
international market. Foreign Affairs was more careful about sales to 
governments that could employ the aircraft for counter-guerrilla or 
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sensitive war-theatre roles. Although it apparently did not file a for-
mal submission on the subject, Defence in late 1974 and early 1975 
seemed especially uneasy about the security implications of Por-
tuguese Timor's political evolution. Foreign Affairs at first was more 
concerned about repercussions for the region and Australia's 
diplomatic image. Hence it was displeased when Whitlam originally 
appeared to place Timor's association with Indonesia ahead of the 
self-determination requirement and concentrated on pulling him 
back from his overstated, pro-Indonesian position. Increasingly, 
however, at least in its private counsel to the government. Foreign Af-
fairs became emphatic about its preference for an Indonesian solution 
to the problem. 
In some policy areas. Foreign Affairs' differences with other depart-
ments, or agencies, had jurisdictional as well as substantive overtones. 
We are particulariy reminded of two conflict points, immigration and 
resource management. Foreign Affairs felt that Immigration (later 
Labour and Immigration) personnel were cautious, stuffy and above 
all at fault in providing proper opportunity for non-European migra-
tion to Australia. This was seen as flaunting the government's own 
anti-racialist commitments, we well as undermining Australia's 
credibility abroad, especially in Afro-Asia. In other words, this was 
seen as a foreign policy as much as an immigration issue. Foreign Affairs 
therefore wished to take over most visa-issuing responsibilities. 
Labour and Immigration resisted. It was willing to correct malprac-
tices but not to relinquish its administrative prerogatives. An in-
terdepartmental committee (IDC) tried, but failed, to resolve the dis-
pute. The matter then went up to the Public Service Board, and even-
tually to Whitlam. Foreign Affairs was given control over passports. 
Labour and Immigration was to retain visa control, but a written 
agreement stipulated that in time it was to lose some of this to 
Foreign Affairs."' 
The dispute over the content and management of resource policy 
was more critical. It involved a clash between Renouf, Connor and 
Hewitt of a quite fundamental character. Foreign Affairs objected to 
the Minerals and Energy approach on three grounds. There were sub-
stantive, foreign economic and diplomatic objections to what was 
seen as excessive economic nationalism. There was anxiety over the 
jostling of foreign government sensibilities by the Connor style of 
doing business. There was an allegedly over-independent, even 
secretive Connor and Hewitt style. This, it was said, bred disorganiza-
tion and confusion and made it impossible for Foreign Affairs to 
know, and to explain to others, what really was happening in 
resource policy; Australia could not afford two resource policies. The 
unpublicized, abortive Connor quest for billions in petrodollar loans 
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exacerbated conditions and brought Treasury into increased conflirt 
with Minerals and Energy. One academic critic's illustration of 
problems included the following: Minerals and Energy's failure to 
consult Foreign Affairs on a decision not to allow Australia to par-
ticipate in certain Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development energy deliberations; Minerals and Energy's refusal to 
supply adequate briefing materials to Cairns and Wriedt before their 
1975 journey to the Middle East; Minerals and Energy's obstinacy In 
providing information on uranium and nuclear energy questions to 
JIO."" It is difficult to exaggerate the state of tension that existed 
between Foreign Affairs and Minerals and Energy. At one point, 
Renoufs sharply critical remarks of Connor over his uranium policy 
had to be papered ewer by a nominal apology. Key departments in 
Canberra were reacting not only in sorrow but in barely disguised 
anger. Communications between Foreign Affairs and Minerals and 
Energy for a time were virtually at a standstill. While Whitlam large-
ly came around to the Renouf-Foreign Affairs version of much of 
resource policy, Connor for some time enjoyed a firm base. Differing 
departmental views in this area resulted less in creative tension than 
in mess. The merits of the positions aside, the spectacle of two depart-
ments and often separate ministers saying and doing different things 
about resource policy did Australia's interests little good."' 
Was the system capable of accommodating sharply drawn in-
terdepartmental disputes? To some extent, structural reform of in-
terdepartmental relations was unnecessary, or simply beyond 
reasonable reach. For instance, because it had for so long been nearly 
moribund, the external relations and defence division of the Depart-
ment of the Prime Minister and Cabinet did not have to be taken into 
serious account as a competitive force. When a new Secretary was 
brought in to the Prime Minister's Department, personal assurance 
was given to Foreign Affairs that no usurpation of its functions would 
take place. This pledge was generally honoured. However, when in 
1975. the government announced its intention to create an 
Australia-Japan Foundation, in the face of apparently continuing 
misgivings within Foreign Affairs, administrative respcmsibility for it 
was lodged in the Prime Minister's Department, not Foreign Affairs 
itself Although not a department. JIO provided inputs into the 
system, both to regular departments and at times directly to 
ministers. The prevailing view in Foreign Affairs of JIO's contribu-
tions was somewhere between neutral and mildly negative. JIO was 
thought to be a bit tcx) abstract, insufficiently aimed at real and press-
ing concerns. It was even remarked in Foreign Affairs that material 
that it originally passed to JIO would sometimes return only slightly 
retouched by JIO. In other words. Foreign Affairs felt that in many 
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respects it was best placed to prepare assessments in the form it liked 
them. Among other economically related departments, JIO was not 
taken very seriously, and even held suspect, because of its a/filiation 
with the Department of Defence. Foreign Affairs was also displeased 
with the over-independent position enjoyed by ASIS over which i t -
Foreign Affairs—maintained nominal responsibility. Little structural 
tinkering was likely to disabuse one sertion of the bureaucratic es-
tablishment of biases about others. 
A familiar mechanism for bringing departments together and for 
evolving collective viewpoints was the interdepartmental committee, 
or IDC. IDCs were generally convened on an fl<//ioc basis, the principal 
exception in the external area being the standing IDC on Japan, 
created in 1970. An IDC concept was no panacea for Interdepartmen-
tal problems. One witness before the Royal Commission on 
Australian Government Administration recounted Foreign Affairs' ef 
forts in early 1974 to establish a foreign economic policy committee 
to help co-ordinate and implement government policy in this realm. 
It was to draw expertise from Overseas Trade, Minerals and Energy, 
and Treasury. "Regrettably [these] other departments and their 
ministers saw this as a takeover bid and refused to co-operate."' 
Testimony before the Royal Commission by Hewitt and Renouf mir-
rored the gulf separating their reactions to IDCs. Hewitt took excep-
tion to the way in which some departments, such as Foreign Affairs, 
used IDCs to intrude on the prerogatives of others. Renouf took excep-
tion to the way in which IDCs produced reports that simply reflected 
the lowest common denominator of agreement.*' Members of various 
departments would have agreed with Renoufs conclusion that in-
terdepartmental dialogue was handicapped "by entrenched attitudes 
which are ... out of date and which create a situation tending to 
weaken the Government's effectiveness".** 
Despite feeling that IDCs had only limited value, Renouf argued 
that Foreign Affairs should at least have the right to convene, chair 
and service IDCs whenever a need to co-ordinate policies with a 
major foreign affairs content arose. He aJso wanted Foreign Affairs to 
be consulted when any IDC within the bureaucracy was considering a 
subject with some international implications. His most controversial 
proposal was that Foreign Affairs be given the central role of co-
ordinating and controlling Australia's foreign relations, a theme 
spelled out in some detail in his department's submission to the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government and Administration.*' As ex-
pected, this proposal was widely scorned in other departments, on 
grounds of its lack of necessity, its impracticality, or because it was 
seen as unvarnished aggrandizement by Foreign Affairs. By the se-
cond half of 1975, however Foreign Affairs could take comfort from a 
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few developments. A special Cabinet committee on resources was es-
tablished. While this was a ministerial rather than an official body, its 
function of co-ordinating priorities in the minerals and energy area 
was in part designed to provide an open channel for departmental in-
puts, among the more important being from Foreign Affairs.'" 
Secondly, displeasure in ministerial circles with Hewitt's handling of 
Minerals and Energy's relations with other departments, and other 
considerations, may have prompted his replacement as Secretary by a 
person of superior consensual skills, James Scully, previously Deputy 
Secretary of Overseas Trade. 
We now examine the links between official sources of advice and 
political ministers. There is no cut-and-dried model of how and when 
official advice was brought to ministerial attention. In some In-
stances, and especially in Labor's earlier months, governmental deci-
sions were taken without a prior departmental input. For instance, 
there was no submission from Defence before the combat-trcxip pul-
lout from Singapore was announced. On those occasions when there 
were advisory inputs, they did not necessarily entail a formal brief or 
submission, but perhaps only conversation between a minister and 
the departmental secretary. Officially prepared papers supplied to 
ministers could vary from what essentially were inventories of the 
variables and the pros and cons related to particular policy options to 
overview assessments of some wider topic, such as JIO contributed 
from time to time, or the strategic basis reports. At one time. Foreign 
Affairs considered issuing "green papers", basically informal think-
pieces about what policies might be considered and why. This was re-
jected by Willesee, on grounds that it would be a breach of what 
otherwise would be confidential advice. It could lead to misunder-
standings over the differences between speculations about what 
might be policy and what policy was actually becoming or actually 
was." 
The initiative for providing advisory inputs at times lay with a 
department or one of its senior members, and at times was at the re-
quest of ministers. Examples of the former practice were the idea that 
Australia seek observer status at conferences of non-aligned nations, 
the idea for putting forward Willesee's candidacy for the Presidency 
of the UN General Assembly and the Idea that Whitlam's Vietnam, 
message to Nixon include mention of organizing Indonesia and Jaf»an 
to oppose American bombing. 
The manner in which Foreign Affairs submissions were channelled 
was itself instructive, since it underscored the department's recogni-
tion of Whitlam's ongoing interest and role in foreign affairs. After 
Willesee became Foreign Minister his office received all Foreign Af-
fairs submissions. On key matters, the submission was also sent to 
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Whitlam, or the submission to Willesee contained a note suggesting 
that Whitlam be kept advised, or Whitlam's personal advisers were 
informally briefed on what was going to Willesee. Moreover, Foreign 
Affairs would occasionally "store up" papers for Whitlam, an-
ticipating those periods when he, in Willesee's absence, would serve 
as acting Foreign Minister. Another form of Foreign Affairs "sen-
sitivity" related to its Interest in the political repercussions of external 
policy movements. Prior to mid-1974, the typical form of Foreign Af-
fairs advice to ministers disregarded the domestic political dimension, 
though Waller had at one time apparently undertaken some minor 
experimentation. In any event, the Baltic states decision in mid-1974, 
its substantive value aside, imposed serious political embarrassment 
on the government. After that. Foreign Affairs concluded that while 
Willesee and Whitlam had their own sources of political advice, the 
department would on its part do a bit more in this area. Formal sub-
missions still essentially overlooked political calculations, but the 
department took on some informal responsibility for flagging 
politically sensitive Issues vis-d-vis ministers or their aides. 
Ministers did not necessarily receive external policy advice from 
cinly one department or agency, or indeed solely from public servants 
as such. Two points in particular should be made. One is that Foreign 
Affairs enjoyed a certain procedurally institutionalized increment of 
influence with Whitlam not shared by other substantive departments. 
Prior to question time in the House, Whitlam underwent briefings. 
Foreign Affairs handled foreign policy subjects and the Prime 
Minister's Department all other subjects. 
Secondly, we need to notice the role of personal ministerial ad-
visers serving with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the 
Defence Minister. As a group, these aides were bright, young and 
politically alert, often coming from backgrounds in departments such 
as Foreign Affairs and Defence. In part, they were gatekeepers, placed 
between the departments and their respective ministers. They would 
read and screen departmental submissions for their ministers, 
provide their own comments to ministers and otherwise perform 
various facilitating and liaison tasks. The author's inquiries indicated 
that within departments, these aides were not resented for shielding 
ministers from departmental advice, nor accused of trying to play the 
role of grey eminences. There was some departmental feeling that 
personal advisers could, however, have been more eftective in supply-
ing clearer feedback to departments. At any rate, with perhaps one or 
two individual adviser exceptions, personal aides as a group did not 
actually shape external policy outputs. Advisers drafted speeches, 
alerted ministers to possible inconsistencies between professed goals 
and pending policy movements and offered advice as such, but on 
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specifics rather than on general policy. Their concern with an-
ticipating the party political or electoral implications of external 
policy appeared to have been sporadic. Occasionally, after a policy 
step had been taken (e.g. the Baltic states) or when a messy situation 
was in progress (e.g. Ermolenko), some of them became involved in 
trying to limit adverse public opinion fall-out. We saw earlier that, 
when a personal adviser alerted him to what was happening, 
Whitlam cancelled Australia's participation in a forthcoming SEATO 
naval exercise, since some broad diplomatic considerations were at 
stake. Against Foreign Affairs advice, Whitlam, in 1973, met with 
Cambcxlian Prince Sihanouk in Peking. His principal adviser Peter 
Wilenski, had urged him to have the meeting. But so had Ambassador 
FitzGerald, and it is unlikely that Whitlam would have moved against 
the advice of both the department and FitzGerald, apart from what 
Wilenski might have recommended. 
Finally, we need to raise the difficult question of actual official in-
fluence on external policy outputs and presentation. Ministers under-
take policies for many reasons, which often cannot be isolated one 
from another. They react to official advice, but that advice, as we 
have emphasized, is not always consistent. They are susceptible to 
media criticism, to interest group appeals, to pressures from within 
their party, to the entreaties of fellow ministers and to electoral con-
siderations. They approach decision-making choices with particular 
sets of predispositions. They not only make rational, so-called cost-
benefit calculations, but are also susceptible to intuitive and gut-
reaction judgements. 
It is unexceptional that Labor ministers, like L-CP ministers before 
them and ministers in other political systems, over time both ac-
cepted and rejected official advice. Whitlam's guiding views on 
resource diplomacy were reinforced by Foreign Affairs advice. 
Whitlam and Willesee, in 1974 and early 1975, agreed with Foreign 
Affairs advice not to recognize the PRG. Whitlam and Barnard ac-
cepted the Defence and JIO view that the integrity of American 
defence installations should be preserved. Whitlam and Willesee fol-
lowed Foreign Affairs' thinking favouring admission of a PLO delega-
tion, but were overriden by Cabinet, and in this sense departmental 
advice at least temporarily was not translated into policy. When in 
September 1974, Whitlam left the distinct impression with the In-
donesians that Australia would prefer that East Timor come under 
their aegis, he apparently went against JIO warnings, or perhaps 
those warnings had not reached him. At all events, he then gradually, 
in line with Foreign Affairs advice, softened his public position. Then, 
again with Foreign Affairs encouragement, his position became more 
firmly committed to countenancing an Indonesian takeover. 
The External Policy Process 3 01 
Whitlam, in 1973, rejected an IDC recommendation against under-
taking a treaty with Japan. The following year he was entirely dis-
satisfied with a "no recommendation" Foreign Affairs submission on 
South Africa's membership in the United Nations and made up his 
own mind—to change Australia's traditional posture. 
The foregoing listing is obviously only illustrative, and no pretence 
of comprehensive knowledge of the character of departmental advice, 
ministerially accepted or rejected, is being made. All the same, it may 
be helpful to conjecture about patterns, if any. Overall, key ministers 
and their departments were generally operating on similar frequen-
cies and ministers and their departmental secretaries were generally 
on close terms—Whitlam/Willesee and Renouf, Barnard and Tange, 
Connor and Hewitt. This general harmony was partially attributable 
to recognition within these departments of what at large a new Labor 
government, or its ministers, were disposed towards. The major con-
tours of Labor's external policy objectives were not resisted, nor were 
patently unacceptable major foreign policy options pressed upon 
ministers. In terms of tone, both Foreign Affairs and Defence were 
prepared to adapt to changes from earlier L-CP practices, but the 
emphasis was on adaptiveness rather than a wish for radical turn-
abouts. Both departments, we have seea continued to be closely at-
tached to the American connertion and valued their contacts with 
American officials. 
On balance, perhaps Barnard was more susceptible to Tange's ad-
vice than Whitlam and Willesee were to Renoufs, but this in part 
may be because there were more, and more varied, substantive 
"foreign policy" than "defence' issues to be tackled. Others would say 
that Barnard was relatively susceptible to his department because he 
was easier to cultivate than were Whitlam or Willesee. One criticism, 
quickly raised on the left of the ALP early in the government's life, 
was—in Hartley's words—that Tange was running Australia's defence 
policy and Barnard "in a sense is too much a client of the Defence 
Department".'^ In another context, argument was made that Defence 
was able to drag its feet with impunity in producing appropriate im-
plementing proposals following on the continental defence dortrine 
embodied in the 1973 strategic basis assessment. From this example 
and others, one academic commentator concluded that "By the end of 
Mr Barnard's tenure. Sir Arthur's [Tange's] dominance wasabsolute."" 
Another academic observer writing from a quite different vantage-
point, faulted the proposed defence reorganization scheme for divorc-
ing the Defence Minister from ongoing intradepartmental policy 
debates. The reorganization plan, essentially put together in the 
department and endorsed by Barnard, was interpreted as an admis-
sion of ministerial weakness.'* At least by inference, imputations of 
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Barnard's "weakness" vis-d-vis the Defence Department would not be 
inconsistent with an impression that Barnard, more than Whitlam or 
Willesee, was reliant on personal aide advice. 
Analytically, the bureaucracy could be defined as a source or sources 
of interest expression impinging on the decision-making process. We 
turn now to essentially non-institutionalized but overt sources of in-
terest expression. The familiar view is that group interests in 
Australia have had relatively little impact on external policy outputs. 
The executive enjoyed consicierable autonomy in foreign affairs. Party 
discipline in Parliament was cohesive. The public ascribed relatively 
low salience to external affairs. On particular issues, the activity of a 
particular group interest would often be countervailed by another 
group seeking different outcomes. The influence of some groups was 
circumscribed by the image in which they had been painted by their 
detractors—cranks, fanatics, troglodytes, subversives, and the like." 
With Labor in office, the level of public and specialized group in-
terest in external affairs was both stimulated and constrained. The 
previous extended debate over Vietnam, conscription and threats to 
Australia's security had spurred public consciousness, organized 
protest and counter-argument. However, the removal of Vietnam and 
conscription as deeply contentious issues, and government claims that 
threats to Australia were unlikely, could be interpreted as depressants 
of interest and of controversy. But Labor prided itself on being an ac-
tivist and reformist government and thereby kindled interest in the 
new policy directions it undertook. As a government representing a 
party with broad, idealistic and often organizationally prescribed ob-
jectives and policies, it laid itself open to especially close scrutiny by 
those who wished to insure that ALP commitments were being 
honoured. We will wish to identify some major categories of interest 
groups, to appraise their methods and to speculate on their impact on 
external policy outputs and presentation. 
We first glance at ethnic groups as a source of group expression. 
Overall, "ethnic" politics have not been a significant foreign policy 
factor in Australia. This had been due to Australia's relative 
homogeneity, even after the influx of non-Anglo-Saxon migrants after 
the Second World War, and to the fact that most external issues do 
not directly lend themselves to ethnic controversy as such. Under 
Labor however there were two major exceptions to this rule and 
perhaps were harbingers of more conspicuous ethnic overtones in the 
country's external policy debate. 
One instance related to the government's de jure recognition c:)f 
Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic states. Prior to the decision, 
spokesmen of the ethnic Baltic community tried to dissuade Whitlam 
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from any such step, and they thought they had succeeded. When the 
admission of the step came, the Baltic community was shocked and 
galvanized into action. The decision was believed wrong on its merits 
and to have been a repudiation of promises given. The incensed Baltic 
community condemned the decision in newspaper advertisements, 
parliamentarians were petitioned and protest marches and 
demonstrations were staged.'" When in New York later in 1974. 
Whitlam was picketed by Americans of Baltic extraction who had 
taken cues from their Australian brethren. The government did not 
change its policy. Indeed, the policy was virtually beyond reach, since 
the complaints were lodged after the fact. But the Baltic protest was 
not entirely without effect. There were about 25 000 Latvians, mostly 
migrants, in Australia, and a smaller number of Lithuanians and Esto-
nians. That was small as an electoral bloc, and most who were 
enfranchised were L-CP voters anyway. But there is evidence that 
many Australians of Baltic origin then moved a step beyond being 
L-CP-voting supporters, to volunteering themselves as workers for 
the L-CP cause. Moreover, the after-the-fact Baltic agitation con-
tributed to intra-Labor criticism of Whitlam. The policy was wrong, 
being a denial of principles of self-determination, and it had been 
taken in such a private, even secretive way. This riled party members 
who believed in open and collective government. Indirectly, the 
strenuous Baltic community protest probably stimulated the ALP, as a 
party, to take more of its own initiatives to anticipate and if possible 
influence future government policy decisions, such as on Portuguese 
Timor. PRG recognition and the Middle East. Within the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, as we noticed, political fall-out from the Baltic 
states decision encouraged more attention to alerting ministers of 
potential political ramifications of foreign policy decisions. 
The other ethnic group seriously offended by Labor government 
policies was Australian Jews. The Australian Jewish community 
numbers about 75 000. Typically, Jews have voted Labor. But in the 
present instance, most were offended by what they thought was 
Labor's uneven-handed approach to Middle Eastern affairs generally, 
and then, more specifically, they opposed the entry of PLO Sfxikesmen 
into Australia. Their leadership sought, and received, interviews with 
Whitlam. Like the Baltic people, they used advertisements and letters 
to newspapers to explain their position. Their ability to keep their 
position publicly visible and to gather non-Jewish supporters was 
considerable. Unlike the Baltic issue, the Middle Eastern question was 
long-term and multifaceted. Middle Eastern developments were quite 
important to Australia's interests, while the Baltic states were 
marginal. The Middle East issue also had considerable emotive con-
tent, in view of the Jews' plight under the Nazis and the vision of 
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Israel attempting to survive as a Jewish homeland state amidst 
hostile Arab neighbours. There were some articulate Jews within the 
ALP, including in Parliament. There were many non-Jews in the 
party, Hawke among the most notable, who weie vociferously pro-
Israeli. It therefore was not difficult for Australian Jews to enlist non-
Jews as allies in substantial lobbying efforts. For instance, an 
Australian Council of Concern was formed by prominent Australians 
to promote the cause of Jews in Arab countries. Massive advertise-
ments with captions such as "Keep the P.L.O. Terrorists Out" were 
purchased, and often included a remarkable array of signatories who 
on most foreign policy issues were deeply divided among 
themselves." A number of ALP caucus members associated 
themselves with the Friends of Israel group. 
In the 1974 election. Labor lost some of the money traditionally 
donated to it by the Jewish community, but lost relatively few Jewish 
votes. The Jewish campaign on behalf of particular policy orienta-
tions was at best partially successful. The government's "even-
handed" Middle Eastern diplomacy was not changed and the original 
ban on PLO visitors was quickly rescinded. But, especially in the way 
Jewish publicity fortified the resolve of ALP members who were 
positively disposed, there were effects. Relatedly, added incentive was 
given to the government to follow and to explain at considerable 
length policies that it hoped would not be misconstrued as leaning 
against Israel. It is arguable that the very close January 1975 Cabinet 
decision not to invite a PLO delegation—a most rare manifestation of 
collective Cabinet decision-making—may well have been tilted by the 
Jewish community's own efforts. 
Another category of group expression related to the exposition of 
humanitarian interests and causes. Some of these manifestations 
were of long standing and had counterparts in a number of other 
countires; for example, campaigns designed to encourage government 
efforts towards relief of world hunger. Some were more explicitly 
oriented towards particular aspects of Australian external policy. Oc-
casionally, church and lay groups threw themselves into campaigns to 
readjust policies regarded as morally untenable. Here we can par-
ticularly mention the efforts of the Australian Council of Churches 
and the Roman Catholic Church's Justice and Peace Commission to 
attack racialism in South Africa and Rhodesia. Obviously, numbers of 
individual Protestant and Catholic laymen and clergymen either 
cared little about this issue or took a different programmatic position. 
To some extent, religiously based bodies such as these did common 
cause with secular even politically radical groups that also wished for 
more vigorous Australian action, such as cutting air services, discon-
tinuing all trade-commission activities and even shutting off trade 
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with South Africa. It was extremely difficult for the government to 
disregard lobbying efforts by church-based bodies. Their patina of 
respectability made it hard to dismiss them as cranky malcontents. A 
number of clerics had cut their political teeth in the earlier Vietnam 
and conscription resistance movements, issues on which their views 
had coincided with those of the Labor Party. By attacking immorality 
and racialism, the church bodies could figuratively be said to have 
been on the side of the angels, and also on the side of ALP idealism, in 
these matters. Their representations were heard, and their campaign, 
together with that of lay-group lobbies, helped, by steps, to move the 
government towards tightening its posture, as for instance expressed 
by Willesee's letter of advice to Australian companies operating in 
South Africa, curtailment of trade-commissioner services in South 
Africa and the imposition of closer surveillance of travel agency and 
airline behaviour regarding the facilitation of travel to Rhodesia.'* 
We now consider the radical movement as an interest category in 
its own right. As we suggested earlier, the movement was 
heterogeneous in membership, issue emphasis and tactics. Some of its 
principal leadership elements were concerned that followers tended 
to be of two types: old-line veteran radicals, many over fifty years of 
age, and young people, often persons at universities or some 
somewhat older who had worked in Vietnam moratorium campaigns 
and the like. Rapport between these two generational groups was at 
times fragile and it was admitted that the disappearance of really 
emotional controversies such as Vietnam and conscription made it 
more difficult to keep people consistently interested in peace and 
reform causes. To counteract such problems, efforts were launched to 
promote involvement of people in radical movement causes through 
locally based community mechanisms. Effort was also made to 
enhance co-ordination among separate radical organizations through 
what was named the National Peace Liaison Committee and to give 
radical action more focus. Among targets selected were under-
development, political and social liberation, anti-racialism and the 
struggle against the arms race." 
A composite analysis of radical/peace movement influence on 
Labor policy needs to take several ingredients into account. Perhaps 
the most significant is that the causes or policies espoused by the 
movement were being directed at a party of government that, overall, 
was considerably more attracted to reformist objectives than the 
L-CP had been. There is no evidence that L-CP government policies 
on Vietnam had been attenuated by the protest movement. If 
anything, L-CP governments exploited the movement by characteriz-
ing it as simplistic and unpatriotic. They triedto win political capital 
by linking it with the ALP, especially when demonstrations, and con-
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frontations with the authorities, were involved. During Labor's term 
in office, a number of party figures, both organizational and 
parliamentary, were not only sympathetic to the radical movement 
but associated themselves with it in one form or another. Cairns, for 
one. was convenor of the National Peace Liaison Committee and 
became President of CIDC. Other things being equal, the 
protest/radical movement's influence on a Labor government was 
predictably greater than over L-CP governments. 
The radical movement was not. moreover, really isolated in its ad-
vocacy of various causes. For instance, its complaints against continu-
ing links with South Africa were paralleled within some church 
groups that otherwise were not associated with most of the familiar 
radical causes. The radical movement's advocacy of self-
determination in Portuguese Timor was, albeit from a different 
perspective, shared by a host of people on both sides of Parliament 
and within the community. In addition, on some controversies, such 
as oppositicm to established American defence facilities in Australia, 
or to the construction of an Omega station, a body of serious 
academic and technical literature served to buttress the movement's 
arguments. 
The radical movement, or at least some of its adherents acting in-
dependently, resorted to a wide range of tactics—some crude, some 
highly stylized and sophisticated. Shortage of funds and an underlying 
suspicion of conventional media outlets limited large-scale advertis-
ing publicity. But the general public, and occasional political elite 
viewers, could not. for instance, escape graffiti work. The leadership 
of the Australian Union of Students promoted various protest causes 
and, as we noticed earlier the content of university student news-
papers was disproportionately left/radical in orientation. There 
were occasional street demonstrations, marches and the May 1974 
pilgrimage fnim eastern states to the North-West-Cape signal-station. 
Some radical group members opted for more colourful action, such as 
public burnings of American flags and the display of Eureka flags as a 
symbol of revolt. We saw earlier that one esoteric faction, centred on 
South Australia, was suspected of having fomented industrial 
sabotage within foreign-owned plants. On balance, the publicity cam-
paigns of the mcwement probably carried some substantive effect, 
beyond inspiring believers and outraging disbelievers. Some converts 
were won to the side of programmes or causes being advocated, for 
instance among tertiary students, but even there mass student opi-
nion was not especially tractable and from roughly mid-1974 
onwards, a more explicit, conservative impulse began to coalesce at 
universities and colleges of advanced education. In 1974. AUS-
sponsored resolutions that denounced Israel and endorsed the PalestI-
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nian cause were widely repudiated In campus referenda."" Still, it was 
on an AUS invitation of persons from the General Union of Palesti-
nian Students that, in 1975. PLO-related persons first began to visit 
Australia. 
More specifically, however, what of policy imparts? The radical 
movement's campaigns may have carried effects in two ways. Much 
of the promotion was not just in terms of being for or against par-
ticular policies, but was unhesitatingly critical of the Whitlam 
government for its alleged betrayal of progressive principles and of 
authoritative party policy itself The message was heard in party cir-
cles and for some party members served to reinforce their criticism of 
the government line. Relatedly, the radical movement undertook 
some successful lobbying among ALP parliamentarians. On Viet-
namese issues, and especially relative to Australia's attitude towards 
the PRG. it helped to bring Labor parliamentarians together and 
presented them with considerable data and arguments. Recent 
visitors to PRG-controlled areas of South Vietnam made themselves 
available. A petition supporting a number of PRG proposals for settle-
ment in Vietnam and attacking the Thieu regime was eventually 
signed by a clear majority of caucus members. This in turn helped to 
Inspire ALP conference delegates at Terrigal to support a resolution 
that urged diplomatic recognition of the PRG. We recall that such a 
resolution actually passed, but in the course of procedural confusion 
was ruled to have been superseded by a compromise resolution that 
invited the PRG to seek an information office in Australia. Whitlam 
and Willesee felt compelled to accept the compromise. They would 
have preferred no party strictures at all to the ministerial leadership 
on this subject. Radical movement exploitation of the Labor govern-
ment's "arrogance" and the movement's assistance in pulling Labor 
parliamentarians together on Vietnamese issues probably affected 
what happened later at Terrigal."' 
Bodies representing a particular set of identifiable Interests or 
causes represent our final category of group-interest expression. There 
were a great many of such groups, differing greatly in size, visibility, 
access to decision-makers or those around them and, of course, in 
degree of influence. For instance, environmentalists tried to persuade 
unions to impose a ban on the mining and processing of uranium, 
pending a full-scale assessment of the environmental impact of 
uranium exploitation. Commercial interests, on the other hand, 
sought through general publicity and contacts with official and 
political figures to obtain a relaxation of government policy in the 
energy and minerals field. As we saw earlier efforts were mounted to 
counter anti-foreign investment sentiment* The Returned Services 
League (RSL) was pleased with Labor's improvement of service per-
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sonnel conditions, but not with defence policy and the nation's 
preparedness. The RSL found Barnard fully accessible, but not sym-
pathetic to criticisms of defence policy."^ The RSL was stunned when 
Morrison told it that it had indulged in scaremongering and in wild 
and irresponsible outbursts."' Various other groups interested in 
strengthening Australia's defences took up missionary work in this 
field. In mid-1975, for example, a group of civilians and retired senior 
military officers founded a sort of defence think-tank body, the 
Australian Defence Conference."" 
In the interest of focus, we will stress the trade-union impact on 
Labor's policies and behaviour in external affairs. We of course can-
not assume that the expressions or actions of particular unions or 
their leaders were always, or even often, representative of the 
generality of unions or of the rank-and-file. Nor can we assume that 
trade-union behaviour would necessarily have been markedly dif-
ferent under a L-CP government. All the same, we cannot overlook 
the special ALP/trade-unlon relationship, as expressed in the party's 
organizational network, its reliance on a strong trade-union vote and 
its general sympathy for trade-union and unionists' causes. 
Much of the access to the Labor government, and the potential for 
influence ewer gcwernment policy, lay in the closeness of party-union 
ties and in the considerable overlap in membership and leadership. 
This was so even when party-union Elites spoke for themselves rather 
than for unions. Hartley and Hawke were unionists as well as 
members of the ALP Federal Executive. Hartley was a Federal 
Conference delegate, while Hawke, who was both ACTU and Party 
President, in his latter capacity presided ewer Federal Conferences. 
The relative stature and influence of both was thereby enhanced. 
While the two often disagreed, neither could be disregarded. Hawke 
was fervently pro-Israeli and firmly opposed a PLO visit. He openly 
attacked what the government chose to describe as an even-handed 
Middle Eastern policy and at one time considered resigning his party 
presidency over these differences. Hartley deeply angered Whitlam by 
moving on his own initiative to arrange a PLO delegation visit, since 
Whitlam would have preferred to have proceeded in the manner and 
timing of his own choosing. Hartley then exacerbated the picture by 
intimating that failure to bring PLO people in could strain Australia's 
commercial relations with Arab states. The ensuing national and 
intra-party furore brought about the sharply divided Cabinet decision 
not to Invite PLO visitors at that time. 
The party-union nexus was demonstrated with special prominence 
when the government's externally related policies touched on worker 
interests. Hawke Indicated that on some issues such as tariffs and im-
migration policy, in which both government and the unions had a 
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considerable interest, his personal understanding of Labor's thinking 
"has made it easier to get a broad understanding and some degree of 
acceptance within the industrial movement of important government 
decisions in these areas"."' All the same, we have seen that the ACTU 
complicated the government's efforts to bring in Filipino automobile 
workers. We also noticed the very stiff trade-union criticisms of 
government tariff policy, criticisms that had an effect on the series of 
protectionist measures imposed by the government, especially on 
gcxids from Asian countries. We also noticed the trade-union outcry 
against the domestic employment implications of the government's 
defence procurement practices. Stern trade-union representations 
were directed towards Barnard and others. The matter reached 
Cabinet. A joint government-union committee was formed to explore 
ways to avoid retrenchments. The government's objective of achiev-
ing maximum economies in the defence field was somewhat eroded, 
for various expedients were introduced to keep Australians working 
on defence-related projects."" These union pressures also had the ef-
fect of stimulating government efforts to obtain the best possible off-
set agreements when foreign equipment-purchase contracts were 
negotiated. Indirectly, such pressures helped to sustain a local defence 
production capability. The unions' arguments about defence produc-
tion and employment apparently contributed to Barnard's ability to 
persuade Cabinet colleagues to accept an increased defence budget in 
1974. 
Because of their pervasiveness within the nation's commercial and 
industrial life, the unions' resort to industrial action in pursuit of 
policy objectives could not be lightly dismissed. In some instances, 
threats were made. In others, they were carried out. 
One instance of a union threat related to Omega. Even before the 
Wheeldon Committee's report, a "Stop Omega" campaign had lob-
bied unions, asking them to threaten, or if needed carry out, black 
bans against the construction of such a facility."'' Some union leaders 
who opposed Omega were independently disposed to urge such bans. 
The government's own very cautious, delaying approach to Omega 
could well have been influenced by such prospects. 
In late 1973, a ban on most shipments to Chile was imposed by 
politically militant maritime unions. Then, in early 1975, the unions 
resisted what promised to be a lucrative wheat sale to Chile. Wheat 
farmers were furious, and the opposition vvas delighted to exploit any 
Labor "capitulation" of its governmental responsibilities to outside, 
and especially radical, interests. The government would have pre-
ferred the sale to proceed, but, as we have seen, advised the Wheat 
Board that attempts to ship the wheat could lead to industrial dis-
putes on the waterfront. It felt that a potentially ugly confrontation 
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with unions was inadvisable and its leverage for arguing the case for 
consummating the deal was weakened by the international circum-
stances surrounding the issue. The "humanitarianism" implicit in a 
sale of fcx)d grain had to be balanced against the Labor government's 
professed disdain for repressive, "anti-humanitarian" regimes, as 
ruled in post-Allende Chile."* 
More dramatic, and contentious, were bans imposed against the 
United States and France. When US interdiction against North Viet-
nam was resumed shortly after Labor came to office, resentful 
maritime unions declared a ban on American shipping and expressed 
threats of further retaliation against American companies, goods and 
airlines. Whitlam appreciated the sentiment behind the ban, but not 
the tactics or the foreseeable consequences. He did not feel the ban 
would force a change of policy in Washington. He was concerned 
about counter-productive economic results for Australia, especially 
since a counter-ban on Australian shipping was started by American 
unions. He felt the union action could jeopardize his government's ef-
forts to adjust Australia's foreign policy without estranging the 
Americans. He was not oblivious to the political damage the L-CP 
could inflict if his government could not or would not successfully in-
tervene. He was aware that the ban was backed by only a fraction of 
the industrial movement and that the ACTU as such opposed it. But 
he was reluctant to risk an open confrontation with the militant un-
ions and to stake his own prestige, or that of his government, on what 
could have been an unsuccessful intervention. Also it was difficult for 
him to challenge the unions without coming down hard on three of 
his highly outspoken, newly appointed ministers, without risking a 
major intra-party row. Instead, it was Hawke who interceded with 
the unions. His intervention, plus the cessation of American bombing, 
helped to lift the ban."' The episcxje was an example of union ability 
to defy and to embarrass the Labor government. It also was an exam-
ple of how union leaders could help to bail out the government. 
While Hawke opposed the boycott, his negative views on US bombing 
policy were unquestioned. This, plus his combined party and union 
status, facilitated his intermediary role and the dispute's settlement. 
Later in 1973. the ACTU imposed a ban on French goods and com-
munications, in protest against France's nuclear-testing programme 
in the Pacific. Whitlam was opposed to the ban at large, feeling that it 
would be ineffective and could rebound against Australia's commer-
cial interests. He was especially eager to avoid postal and telecom-
munications bans, since they would contravene Australia's inter-
national commitments and could prejudice Australia's legal case 
before the International Court of Justice. On this issue. Whitlam and 
Hawke found themselves on opposite sides. A personal meeting 
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between the two men resolved nothing. The ACTU leadership was 
fully committed to a comprehensive boycott, and Hawke indicated 
that the unions were not tools of the government. Although the 
boycott was by no means air-tight, it dragged on for some months. 
When it vvas suspended later in 1973. it was less through any govern-
ment pleas than because of the ACTU's view that circumstances had 
changed, among them the end of the current series of French tests 
and the prospect of subsequent tests being conducted underground. 
Moreover, as argued by the President of the International Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions, whose collective policy had been to boycott 
France, the boycotts had not had any influence on policy taken in 
Paris.'" In late October 1975, the principal maritime and waterfront 
unions launched a ban against Indonesian shipping, in protest against 
Jakarta's Portuguese Timor policy. The Whitlam government was de 
facto following a different line; its removal from office cxcurred before 
government-union frictions had a chance to become worrisome. 
Our narrative of interest-group activity suggests several conclu-
sions. Firstly, much of the influence of group pressure was quite in-
direct, largely in the form of generating publicity for particular causes 
and conditioning the climate in which government policy was for-
mulated and presented. Secondly, group influence stood a better 
chance of affecting policy outputs, or at least the style and tempo of 
policy presentation, if it represented courses or objectives towards 
which there already wis a temperamental or political disposition 
within the government. Thirdly, influence was enhanced to the 
degree that a particular mcwement or group interest enjoyed access to 
the government or to the ALP. rather than simply working around 
the margins. Finally, as indicated by the trade-union example, a mass-
based structure within the political system, with independent means 
of exerting leverage, was exceptionally well placed to assert itself on 
external policy issues. At times, the party-union connection 
promoted the course of action preferred by the government. At other 
times, the connection helped little, or indeed hampered the govern-
ment. We need to stress that many of the interest-group activities pur-
sued during Labor's tenure would probably have taken place under a 
L-CP gcwernment. But official responsiveness would have differed, as 
would have the partisan atmosphere in which government reactions 
to interest-group expressions were received in the political market-
place. 
We turn finally to the contributions of Labor as a party to the external 
policy-making process. There were forces that buffered the gcrvern-
ment from party intrusion, and those which worked opposite. 
Government immunity from effective party intrusion was 
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strengthened by the traditions of executive authority in external af-
fairs. It was strengthened by the fact that the Prime Minister himself 
not only involved himself deeply in external affairs but that he leaned 
towards a personal, authority-concentrating role. Men such as Wil-
lesee and Barnard, and to a degree Morrison, were in turn close to 
Whitlam, rather than enjoying independent party-power bases. 
Moreover Whitlam and his close ministerial associates were aware of 
the electoral damage that ostensible government over-indulgence of 
party whims and pressures could carry. We should also remember 
that even within ^lite Labor Party structures, foreign affairs were not 
held in consistent and high interest. 
On the other side of the coin, the key factor was that, by explicit 
direction of its constitution, the final and authoritative source of 
Labor policy was the party conference. The Federal Executive was 
authorized to interpret and otherwise supervise policy between con-
ferences. The federal pariiamentary caucus was entitled to determine 
policy not covered by conference decisions and to deal with 
parliamentary tactics. Because of the system of caucus election of 
ministers and various practical considerations, it was very difficult for 
a Labor Prime Minister to discipline ministerial colleagues. Many 
party members were deeply imbued with the tradition of 
authoritative, collectively taken ALP decision. If ministers in a Labor 
gcwernment were believed to be seriously flaunting party policy, or to 
be circumventing conventional guidelines of party collegiality, a 
strong reaction could be expected. Within a party strongly influenced 
by idealism and by a measure of ideological commitment, criticism 
and attempts at correction of allegedly diluted or overiy "pragmatic" 
ministerial policies could likewise be expected. And, as a Labor 
minister himself once remarked, "The thing to note about Labour 
Party foreign policy, and indeed about any aspect of the Party's policy, 
is that it is an endless, open debate."" This process of ongoing 
dialogue has implied that party policy has seldom been neatly settled 
or has been reasonably comfortable for Labor's various wings and per-
suasions. By no means were all intra-party differences over external 
policy divisible into "left" and "right" categories. Many, however did 
have that inflection, and it usually was the group supporting the more 
adventurous or "left" persuasion that was most vocal and eager to im-
pose itself on the government, when it found the government too 
timid or too devious to its liking. 
We have noted a number of examples when party figures attacked 
the government and tcx)k views dissimilar to it. While they may have 
earned rebukes from Whitlam or others, there were few practical 
means by which the leadership could neutralize them. We recall 
Cairns' unauthorized remarks about foreign policy and Senator 
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Brown's attack on Green and the American presence in Australia. 
Hartley, in early 1973, accused Barnard of being under Tange's thumb 
and of swallowing American strategic attitudes. ALP Federal Presi-
dent T. J. Burns wired Hartley. He warned that such attacks on the 
government were causing grave concern and urged that if any 
criticisms were to be expressed, they should fall "within the confines 
of the party organization you represent". Hartley's reply was a gesture 
to abide, but he denounced efforts at stifling opposing points of 
view." Thereafter, both in and outside party organs. Hartley con-
tinued to berate the goveriiment on a wide range of Issues. 
Some of the sharpest exchanges in party circles were over Middle 
Eastern policy and much of the debate was carried out in the form of 
personal spokesmanship. Hartley was sympathetic to the Palestinian 
cause and drew Whitlam's ire for his allegedly personal diplomacy in 
trying to get a PLO delegation into Australia. Hawke was stoutly pro-
Israeli and openly decried what he believed to be the government's 
MMeven-handed diplomacy. He said that he was not really challenging 
government policy, since neither Cabinet nor caucus had dealt with 
it, and Labor's platform called for even-handedness—which was 
Hawke's professed wish. In fact. Hartley's and Hawke's stature and 
visibility in the party made their voices count for a great deal and 
compounded the government's problems in dealing with delicate 
Middle Eastern affairs in what it defined to be a sensible way. 
Under the Labor government, the Federal Executive led a fairly 
placid existence; the action was in conference. It was on the Middle 
East that the executive almost, but not quite, was brought into promi-
nent play. In early 1974, Hawke wished to bring Middle Eastern 
policy before the executive, to discuss what he felt to be the govern-
ment's uneven-handed (and therefore in breach of party policy) ap-
proach. Some executive members wanted the controversy ventilated 
and if possible settled in the executive. Others were afraid of running 
it into formal party channels. In the event, on the motion to consider 
the Middle East, the executive deadlocked 8 to 8 and the motion was 
lost. One commentator wrote that the tied vote "prevented the Mid-
dle East issue from becoming a greater source of party controversy by 
leaving both Mr Whitlam and Mr Hawke able to continue espousing 
their respective policies"." Against this stood the interpretation that 
nothing was settled, and salvos from different sides did not abate. 
The ALP caucus only very rarely, in its corporate capacity, under-
took initiatives on foreign and defence policy. The first time was in 
early 1973. Then, we recall, caucus members of various persuasions 
were annoyed by government secretiveness over the American 
defence facilities and caucus directed that the entire issue be placed 
before Cabinet for further consideration. The motion was declared 
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lost on a technicality. Whitlam refused to go to Cabinet and govern-
ment policy remained unaffected. Later in the year a group of nearly 
sixty caucus members eventually signed a petition asking the govern-
ment to withhold recognition of the new Chilean regime. But the 
government had just managed to beat the caucus signatories to the 
punch by announcing that it would extend recognition. Caucus gave 
post hoc approval to the decision, 45 to 24. It was faced by an ac-
complished fact. Some who resented the decision voted to support the 
Prime Minister because of his reported appeal that a caucus rebuff 
would damage his international standing and the party's standing 
within Australia.'* A 1975 caucus appeal to ministers to examine 
more stringent measures against South Africa conceivably helped to 
bring about the decision to close one consulate. But this step was in 
itself extremely marginal. In any event, senior ministers had 
themselves been edging towards additional measures and probably 
needed no prompting from caucus. Later in the year in the midst of 
commotion in Portuguese Timor, caucus adopted a motion urging 
Whitlam not to sanction Indonesian intervention. This motion had 
no effect on Whitlam's substantive position, though it may in some 
degree have made him more cautious in his public pronouncements. 
The infrequency with which caucus became involved in trying to 
give a foreign policy lead to the government, or indeed with which it 
registered any success, was partially attributable to the government's 
own style of behaviour and partially to factors symptomatic of caucus' 
own condition. In external policy, the government simply preferred 
to operate with minimum caucus involvement. That protected its 
policies from unwanted challenge and possible change, and pur-
portedly avoided the embarrassing public washing of party linen. The 
gcwernment also invoked claims of executive independence in foreign 
affairs. The government was helped by standing party rules, which 
referred to ministers themselves bringing an agenda before caucus; 
most agenda items pertained to legislation, not executive actions, one 
of the domains of which was external affairs. Thus when external af-
fairs subjects were brought before caucus, it usually was in a rap-
porteurial, after-the-fact context. 
The author's inquiries disclosed that caucus members themselves 
ascribed little viability to the institution. Terms such as "fragile" and 
"impotent" were applied to the caucus' role in external affairs. Most 
party parliamentarians were more interested In domestic than in 
foreign affairs, and they perceived domestic affairs as far more critical 
electorally. To an extent, there was deference to a government led by 
an imposing and persuasive man. There also was almost no input to 
caucus from its own foreign affairs and defence committee. It met 
very rarely, usually suffered from sparse attendance and contributed 
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next to nothing by way of reports for caucus at large to deliberate 
upon. In March 1975, some caucus committee members visited Por-
tuguese Timor and then carried back their impressions. But this was a 
most exceptional event, and in the last resort, with little if any impart 
on policy. The Friends of Israel group in caucus was an informal col-
lection, not caucus by another name. While it took an interest in Mid-
dle Eastern affairs and in Israel's cause, its influence on the govern-
ment was nominal. To the government's pro-Israeli critics, policy was 
somewhat less than even-handed, and the ultimate decision to admit 
a PLO visitor regrettable. Rather it was individual parliamentarians 
who, through questions in Parliament or through other channels, oc-
casionally placed ministers on the defensive. This fell short of causing 
shifts in policy, though it extracted elaborate justifications. 
As of mid-1974, however there was somewhat more movement in 
caucus, though the evidence is mild and in respects inferential. 
Starting in late 1974, individual caucus members took a closer look at 
the East Timor situation. A year later, arting on what was the unusual 
occurrence of advice rendered by its foreign affairs and defence com-
mittee, caucus petitioned Whitlam to follow a more positive and in 
particular Indonesian restraining posture relative to Timor." Also, 
and outwardly impressively, 66 of the then 96 caucus members, in-
cluding 14 ministers, Barnard and Morrison among them, signed a 
petition that condemned the Thieu regime in South Vietnam and in 
effect supported the legitimate status of the PRG. This, however was 
an action of a majority of caucus members, not a corporate caucus ac-
tion per se. It was not directly addressed to the Australian govern-
ment, asking it to do this or that. Moreover the bringing together of 
the signatories had not really so much been a spontaneous caucus 
move as a response to organizing efforts mounted by Australian 
radical groups. 
Their personal convictions aside, it can also be argued that this 
kind of activity among caucus members also grew out of frustration 
with the government's closed and often unpopular way of doing 
business, in external affairs and otherwise. Most caucus members had 
been shaken by the Gair appointment. Later many were shaken by 
the Baltic states decision, both in its substance and in the way it was 
done, then by the Ermolenko incident, and then by Whitlam's expres-
sions on Indonesia's role in East Timor. The election of Cairns in mid-
1974 as deputy leader was, as we suggested before, less a case of ap-
plause for leftist sentiment than a wish to have a deputy leader who 
would be more sensitive about caucus feelings and who presumably 
would more vocally safeguard the party platform. Wheeldon's elec-
tion at that time to a Cabinet vacancy can in degree also be so con-
stmed." Admiration for someone willing to stand up to senior 
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ministers may have played a part in Berinson's elertion to the 
vacancy opened by Cairns' removal in July 1975. Crean's election to 
the deputy leadership at that time was of a man widely popular in the 
party who, less than a year before, had humiliatingly been sacked as 
Treasurer by Whitlam. The Berinson and Crean elections came in the 
aftermath of the Connor and Cairns loan-raising controversy. At Ter-
rigal, Berinson had defied Connor's ideas and methods. On his elec-
tion as deputy leajier, Crean criticized Connor's efforts to raise huge 
loans for mineral and energy projects and urged more collective 
decision-making in Cabinet and in caucus." In other words, caucus 
appeared to be groping for some corrective to its relative impotence 
under a powerful Prime Minister. Its complaints about being slighted 
were varied, but they included government actions in the field of 
foreign policy. 
Government external policy received far more challenge in con-
ference than it did in caucus. Conference was, after all, the 
authoritative policy body. It was composed of delegates propor-
tionately more concerned about external affairs than was caucus, and 
conference contained proportionately more people of party stature 
and of outspokenness. While it included both backbench and 
ministerial parliamentarians, as a body it was not as politically 
obligated or subject to manipulation by government ministers. There 
was a certain amount of situational restraint imposed on the 1973 
and 1975 conferences. In 1973, there still was an aura of good feeling 
that carried over from the sweet victory of a few months earlier, a 
victory prominently attributed to Whitlam's efforts. In 1975, there 
was a measure of unease that another election might soon be forced 
by the opposition, and the government's already low fortunes could 
be aggravated in the event of a devisive conference. All the same, 
both at Surfers Paradise and at Terrigal, there was an undercurrent of 
dissatisfaction with government external policy. Some of it typified a 
wish that policy be carried out differently, more dramatically or 
radically. Some of it was displeasure over what was felt to be im-
proper circumvention of party positions. The people objecting were, 
after all, those authorizeci to frame party policy. 
At both conferences, Whitlam invoked the mandate thesis in 
defence of gcwernment policy on the US installations. His argument 
was that, on major issues, the party could not impose its will on the 
government unless an equivalent policy pledge had been extended in 
the preceding general election. Some delegates were persuaded, while 
others believed the mandate thesis to be a subterfuge. At both con-
ferences, Whitlam was able to blunt attacks on the US installations, 
but at Surfers Paradise, found it necessary to accede to a resolution 
that required party endorsement before Omega could be built. At 
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Surfers Paradise, a pro-PRG resolution was lost. At Terrigal, however 
a resolution urging recognition of the PRG actually was passed, 
against Whitlam's opposition. It was superseded by another motion 
only because of the procedural confusion then prevailing on the con-
ference floor. The motion adopted was not intrinsically to Whitlam's 
liking, but it was the best deal he could hope for and he accepted it, 
opening the prospect of a PRG information office in Australia. 
Conference was one, albeit one of the more imisortant, of many 
sources of pressure and influence operating on the making, execution 
and presentation of external policy under the Labor government. The 
government also needed to weigh the electoral consequences of its 
behaviour in external policy. So did the opposition, both in how it at-
tacked the government and in the alternatives it offered. This is the 
subject of our final chapter. 
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Electoral Politics and 
External Policy 
The previous chapter considered the contributions of various in-
stitutional and group influences on the shaping, content and presen-
tation of external policy. We now concentrate on the interplay 
between electoral politics and external policy. After a brief introduc-
tion, our analysis will be divided into broadly chronological 
sections—before, during and after the 1974 electoral campaign.' 
Following Labor's victory in December 1972, the L-CP had to adjust 
itself to an unfamiliar opposition status. In a variety of policy areas, 
including foreign affairs and defence, it had to evolve a style of 
spokesmanship that could provide meaningful counterpoint to 
Labor's policies, elicit popular sympathy and, if possible, contribute to 
early retrieval of office. 
Part of an opposition's problem, especially in external affairs, is 
adequate access to information. In some instances, an opposition s ac-
cess to sensitive and otherwise classified material can help to avoid 
uninformed public debate capable of compromising national in-
terests. Access to a range of data and informed interpretations from 
knowledgeable and expert sources can sharpen the thrust of opposi-
tion criticisms of government policy and improve the soundness and 
persuasiveness of its own alternative positions. Such access can, in 
turn, enhance the electoral credibility of an opposition. 
As we suggested earlier nearly all of the top external policy 
spokesmen on the opposition side were men who not only had a dis-
tinct personal interest in the subject but who had enjoyed ministerial 
experience. For the Liberals, this included Bowen and then Peacock, 
Forbes and then Killen, and certainly Fraser. Snedden was perhaps 
the least-versed in the area, though he made serious efforts to educate 
himself On the Country Party side, Anthony had long been expert in 
matters of overseas trade, while Sinclair had kept up a close, ongoing 
interest in defence questions particularly. 
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Shortly after the change of government, Snedden accepted an in-
vitation to be briefed on the nature of the American defence installa-
tions. And, as Barnard explained later in 1973, "in contrast to the dif-
ficulties that I laboured under in opposition, I have made sure that 
the Shadow Minister for Defence, Dr Forbes, has access to intelligence 
material on which the strategic assessments are based. I don't want 
an alternative Government to base its policies on false premises."^ 
Moreover, the Labor government did not discourage the access of op-
position spokesmen, or of opposition caucus committees, to officials 
for purpose of background briefings and the like.' While Labor's 
policy on information to the opposition was more generous than the 
L-CP had followed when in government, it nonetheless fell short of 
what it might have been in a more trust-oriented political party 
system, especially where external policy differences were less sharply 
drawn and debated. In New Zealand, for example. National Party op-
position leaders Marshall and Muldoon had the option to read cables 
if they chose, an option unavailable to the Australian opposition. 
In Australia, opposition external affairs spokesmen consulted with 
departmental officials and, by and large, were satisifed with what 
they were given. Their access was only in part attributable to the 
government's formal acquiescence in this practice. It also related to 
the ability of opposition spokesmen to cultivate the personal contacts 
they had developed over time, especially when they served in govern-
ment. A particularly good example was Forbes, who had served as 
Minister for the Army, and whose contacts among serving officers 
were especially close. In 1975, the opposition was visibly upset with 
Renouf after he had publicly chided the opposition for unfounded 
criticism of the government's Indo-China policy. On good evidence, 
however it appears that after this incident, opposition access to 
Renouf, or to his department, did not suffer From time to time, 
through various leaks, opposition spokesmen came into possession of 
non-public or classified information that normally would not have 
been available to them. Because of such revelations, the opposition 
more acutely placed the government on the defensive and may have 
scored some political points. One incident, in 1974, referred to the 
government's refusal to grant asylum to an East European diplomat. 
Another in 1975, referred to the implications of differently worded 
messages destined for Hanoi and Saigon. 
Nevertheless, both before and after Snedden's fall, opposition 
foreign affairs and defence spokesmen lacked adequate personal staff 
support. John Knight, a personal aide to Snedden who concentrated 
on foreign policy and who maintained close liaison with Peacock, cor-
rected for this somewhat. It was in recognition of the relative 
weakness of adequate professionally based inputs that, in mid-1974, 
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occasional closed seminars with international relations specialists 
were initiated by opposition external affairs spokesmen. After Fraser 
became leader, two academics were engaged in an honourary 
capacity as advisers on foreign policy. Opposition spokesmen also 
made increased use of the foreign affairs legislative research service 
personnel in the Parliamentary Library. During the first Whitlam 
government, the two opposition parties had maintained separate 
parliamentary committees devoted to external affairs. The creation of 
a joint capstone committee in 1974 may have had some effert on im-
proving inter-party liaison and serving as an educational and 
consensus-building mechanism. But opposition pariiamentary com-
mittees were not effective in providing meaningful input to leaders 
and spokesmen. Some useful input and political ammunition was 
available to opposition members of the several pariiamentary 
standing and select committees that dealt with external subjects. In 
political terms, for example, it was possible for opposition spokesmen 
to point to the misgivings expressed about the state of the Australian 
Army by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence. This added an element of respectability to L-CP criticisms of 
government defence policy. 
Between the 1972 and 1974 elertions, the opposition parties began to 
show signs that they were appreciative of the new political circum-
stances in which they found themselves. Some of the analysis raised 
earlier in Chapter 3 is in point here. The new spokesmen—Snedden, 
Forbes and, as of the latter part of 1973, Peacock—sought answers to 
what might have been faulty in traditional L-CP policy and to make 
adjustments that would be rational, politically palatable and, if possi-
ble, electorally viable. Indeed, as individuals, Snedden, Peacock and 
Forbes, and especially the former two, were on balance program-
matically more pliable than their respective predecessors-McMahon, 
Bowen and Fairbairn. 
A second element in the Liberal equation was that the Labor 
government was undertaking foreign and defence policy decisions 
that, in varying degrees, the Liberals regarded as desirable, or difficult 
or impossible to reverse, or electorally popular For all three reasons, 
for example, the Liberals were unprepared to promise reintroduction 
of conscription except under extraordinary circumstances, though 
they had waged the 1972 campaign on the promise of having it 
foreseeably retained. During this pericxi, at appropriately spaced in-
tervals, Snedden announced his support for some key Labor decisions, 
such as recognition of China and the reconstitution of SEATO. 
Thirdly, what emerged as formal opposition foreign policy, but 
somewhat less so in defence pxjlicy, was not a hodge-podge of ideas 
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hastily slapped together under electoral pressure. After Bowen's 
departure and for nearly half a year before the double dissolution, 
systematic attention was given to a new external policy platform. 
This was done under the aegis of the Liberal Joint Standing Commit-
tee on Federal Policy, and especially through its subcommittee on 
defence and foreign affairs. The subcommittee, chaired by Peacock, 
included political, organizational and expert/academic personnel, 
who as a group reflected reasonably progressive and realistic senti-
ments. For electoral as well as other reasons, the group was per-
suaded that the party would need to projert a positive, not just a reac-
tive or negative image. It was agreed that "(a) statements on foreign 
policy should not put the Party in the position of always opposing the 
Government, and (b) equally statements should not "paint the 
Party into a policy corner" at this stage."* 
What seemed to be the opposition's electorally promising external 
affairs targets during the first Whiflam government? There was a 
good deal of rhetoric and motion. We have"seen that, in part to give 
publicity to its anti-government criticisms, the opposition's first cen-
sure motion in the newly assembled House was over defence policy. 
In the Senate, partially through DLP efforts, motions of urgency on 
foreign and defence topics were happily joined by Liberal and 
Country Party senators. A large number of press releases came off the 
presses of opposition spokesmen. There of course was substantive 
criticism of specific Labor policies. On the other hand, a number of 
Labor's decisions were either popular with the public (e.g. the ending 
of conscription), or seemed to be part of a general international trend 
(e.g. recognition of China), or complemented L-CP pxjlicy (e.g. 
maintenance of ANZUS and the preservation of American defence 
facilities). Although the opposition hardly operated as a smooth, well-
integrated force of criticism, there were some patterns of attack that 
began to settle into place. At large, they were focused more on the 
mood and style of Labor than on specific policy judgements. 
Liberal Party strategists had by the end of 1973 identified several 
areas in which criticism was being or should continue to be made. 
One was misdirection, meaning that tried and valued connections were 
being frayed at the expense of new, untried and possibly dangerous 
flirtations. Another was irresponsibility, meaning failure to honour 
pledges, allegedly as in the case of the Singapore troop commitment. 
Another criticism was over contempt for the conventions of diplomacy, 
meaning Whitlam's allegedly over-personalized, bumptious style of 
conducting international business. A further complaint was over dou-
ble standards, meaning that solemn professions of even-handedness 
were flawed in practice; for instance, in Middle Eastern policy, or on 
the different reactions to French ^nd Chinese nuclear testing. 
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Another was uncertainty, meaning that Labor faltered and sputtered 
rather than being direct, as on the confusion over retaining logistical 
troops in Singapore, and also meaning that party and union pressures 
were forcing the government into backing and filling. A final 
criticism was over lack of nerve in controlling intemperate ministers, a 
number of whom, Cairns in particular, were with relative impunity 
able to make personal and embarrassing remarks on external sub-
jects. The imputation was that in some respects Whitlam was leading 
a rabble, not a disciplined government.' 
The opposition was able to take some comfort from public-opinion 
surveys conducted during the first Whitlam government. By the close 
of that period, a large majority of voters agreed that there had been 
noticeable changes in external policy under Labor On specifics, 
however the public mood was guarded. An early poll showed that 
stronger ties with China and Japan were endorsed, but there was dis-
quiet that this was being achieved at the cost of more traditional 
friendships." In late 1973, the public was about evenly divided on 
whether Australia had become too friendly with China.' In 1974, vir-
tually on campaign eve, a majority of the public desired closer rela-
tions with the United States and Britain than had transpired under 
Labor and 41 per cent desired an improvement of relations with 
South Africa.* French nuclear testing in the Pacific was roundly 
denounced, but so were union boycotts of French firms,' something 
Whitlam had been unable to prevent. When it was disclosed that the 
Soviets wanted a space-science facility in Australia, the public was 
more than 2 to 1 opposed.'" Moreover shortly before the double dis-
solution, the political situation in Western Australia seemed especial-
ly inauspicious for the Labor government. Not only had the state 
Labor government just lost office, but state government ALP figures 
in Western Australia insisted that the Whitlam government's restric-
tive resource and foreign investment policies had helped to bring 
about the defeat." 
Most of the first Whitlam government's external orientations and 
major policy steps had been foreshadowed when Labor was still in op-
position and in the 1972 campaign debate. Much of what it did in of-
fice was more than a perfunctory honouring of promises; it was a 
matter of conviction. It is therefore unlikely that, at least in calendar 
year 1973, Labor's major policy steps were noticeably influenced by 
calculations of electoral gain or loss. Although the Senate was 
throughout Labor's term of office in non-Labor hands, it was not until 
late in 1973 that serious thought w^s given to the prospect that 
Senate obstruction of government programmes would precipitate a 
double dissolution and a very early election. With no early election in 
clear sight. Labor's incentive to calculate the electoral repercussions 
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of its policies was relatively low. If however, there was an exception 
to the mie that Labor was not much affected by electoral considera-
tions, that may have been its policy towards the American alliance, 
and the defence installations in particular. This is not to say that 
ministers such as Whitlam and Barnard did not actually favour the 
positions they assumed. It is to say that they probably also were per-
suaded that policies the opposition could neatly portray as anti-
American wc:)uld have deep, long-term and electorally damaging con-
sequences for the ALP. Critics on Whitlam's left were often less gentle 
in their assessments. One critic identified two major domestic objec-
tives of the government's foreign policy: 
On the one hand, it must please a broadly conservative population and 
meet the demands of dominant economic interests. It does this by pursu-
ing essentially conservative policies. On the other hand, a Labor govern-
ment has to give satisfaction to some of the more radical elements within 
the A.L.P., and this is achieved by the cultivation of a highly personalized 
and assertive style in the conduct of foreign policy.'^  
At all events, before the 1974 campaign actually got under way, 
three sets of favourable developments appeared to have crystallized, 
all indicating Labor's ability to withstand electoral damage from op-
position criticism of its external policies. One dealt with movements 
on the international scene. The second related to the government's 
own capacity to build insulation around itself The third referred to 
the comparative spokesmanship abilities of the two major party 
leaders. 
By April-May 1974, various developments in international politics 
had dampened the opposition's political opportunities to exploit ex-
ternal affairs. Overall, relations with Asian countries, aligned and 
non-aligned, were probably better than they had been at any point 
under the Whitlam government. There were no more dramatic, 
argumentative scenes such as Whitlam had had with Lee in 1973. 
Australia's status prompted Labor spokesmen to cultivate the image 
of a nation standing ten feet tall: "The Australian flag now flies 
higher in Asia and around the Pacific than it ever has previously," 
leaving the opposition, and its criticisms, "completely out of touch 
with -international affairs"." The Prime Minister's previous con-
trcwersial remarks about the desirability of "bringing down" racist 
regimes in Africa, about condoning revolutionary movements and his 
characterization of Rhodesian and South African leaders as being as 
bad as Hitler were largely set aside. The controversy was also partially 
deactivated by the success of the anti-rightist coup in Portugal in late 
April 1974. 
The government's vulnerability to electoral castigation was. even 
more conspicuously, reduced by the course of artual Canberra-
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Washington relations. For instance, by the latter part of 1973, all 
SEATO members, including the United States, acceded to the 
organization's reconstruction along Australia's preferred, largely non-
military lines. It was no longer necessary for Labor to condemn 
SEATO as "moribund", or "irrelevant" or "provocative", or to spar 
with Washington over presumed obligations owed to Thailand's 
defence. The opposition complained that Labor was vitiating the US 
alliance through its misgivings over American facilities at Diego Gar-
cia. The government's appeal to Moscow, as well as to Washington, to 
observe restraint in the Indian Ocean slightly overcame this criticism. 
During the campaign. Labor's position was cushioned by the British 
Labour government's reassessment of defence policy and by lack of 
great enthusiasm about the Diego Garcia project. Even in America, 
the project was under close scrutiny and counsels were divided. 
Controversy over the status of the North-West Cape signal-station was 
amicably resolved at the opening of 1974 with Barnard's visit to 
Washington. America kept what it wanted. Barnard went home with 
a package of symbolically important concessions in his pocket, as well 
as promises of better consultations and of the transfer of two 
American monitoring stations to Australia. From a domestic politics 
standpoint, the Barnard mission was a great success. Claims were 
made that the alliance had not only been protected but even 
enhanced. Overall, to the unnerving of opposition spokesmen, the 
government could advertise that "There is a basic accord in outlook 
between Americans and Australians which makes possible a working 
relationship on this [mutual respect] basis".'* 
So too in other matters, large and small, the Labor government pic-
tured itself as a responsible international actor operating parallel to, 
or at least not in conflict with, American policy. Australia's professed 
even-handedness in dealing with the 1973 Middle Eastern conflict, 
which included avoiding offence to Arab states, was pictured as hav-
ing spared the nation from an oil boycott and as having com-
plemented Washington's efforts at preserving detente between the 
super-powers." While the international oil squeeze was still in 
progress. Transport Minister Jones continued to urge acceptance of 
Omega, a project desired by the United States. One of his arguments 
was that the facility would result in considerable savings of bunkering 
fuel to ships in Australia's regular trade.'" Detente, Labor spokesmen 
increasingly stressed, was the American way and the Australian 
government's way. Borrowing an old L-CP* device. Labor cloaked 
itself in pro-Americanism. We are reminded of Willesee's remarks, 
make in April 1974, that "The reason we have been able to retreat 
from the cold war situation is that the intelligent people of this world, 
the Dr Kissingers, realize that there is no future for us but there will 
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17 be destruction for all of us if this [crisis] situation goes on 
As an election became more imminent, the Whitlam government 
took steps to minimize political fall-out. Some of this was done 
through the finessing of policy, while some was aimed at keeping the 
ALP as free as possible from imputations of recklessness and dis-
orderliness. 
The Soviet request for a joint space-science facility in Australia, 
revealed less than two months before the double dissolution, was an 
example of Labor's caution. The Americans and the Australian 
Defence and Foreign Affairs Departments strongly advised against the 
facility. The government at first temporized, saying that it was taking 
its time to study the matter. Then, on 10 April, in a terse announce-
ment, the Soviet request was rejected. Even apart from political con-
siderations, it is unlikely that approval would eventually have been 
forthcoming. But there is little doubt that the impending election ex-
pedited the decision. We recall Willesee's comment, made on 1 April, 
that the examination of the proposal would proceed "from a scientific 
point of view, from a political point of view and in the context of the 
Indian Ocean" '* Internal evidence corroborates the weight of the 
pc;»litical factor applied in reaching a speedy decision. Such evidence 
also supports the view that the government's 9 April announcement 
of new capital outlays for military equipment was hastened by 
politics. 
To protect its flanks. Labor also needed to polish its image as a 
responsible and cohesive government, not constantly buffeted by 
"outside" interests and its own headstrong ministers. Hawke for the 
time being suspended his campaign against the government's Middle 
Eastern policy. In early 1974, there were no embarrassing union 
boycc:)tts against America, France or anyone else. The Omega station 
decision was in abeyance, pending a report from the Wheeldon com-
mittee. Labor strategists were gratified that there was relatively little 
noise and demonstration in the streets. Rightly or wrongly, such 
manifestations could have rubbed off on to the Labor Party, especially 
if some of its more prominent figures had been taking part. There was 
one exception to this tranquil atmosphere. This was the long march 
to the North-West Cape in May, sponsored by the Campaign Against 
Foreign Military Bases in Australia. The government was uneasy ewer 
it, even though the protest challenged prevailing Labor as well as 
L-CP policy on the station's retention. 
The most direct action taken by Whitlam to shield his party from 
opposition barbs related to the extracurricular expressions of 
ministers. We saw that several times in the past Whitlam had tried to 
impress on ministers that they should not speak out of turn, but he 
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had not been successful. At the 7 April Cabinet meeting, he made still 
another very forceful presentation. At least for the duration of the 
forthcoming campaign, ministers were to adhere rigidly to the subject 
of their respective portfolios. Labor's continuation in office was at 
stake, and single-voice, responsible spokesmanship, especially in ex-
ternal affairs, was imperative. 
There was a third fartor that helped to insulate Labor from eiec-
torally damaging external policy criticisms: the relative credibility of 
the two party leaders as foreign policy expositors. In breadth of ex-
perience and visibihty, Whitlam plainly outranked Snedden. Efforts 
were made in opposition quarters to narrow the disparity. As part of 
the "making of the alternative Prime Minister" image, Snedden spoke 
on external subjects with increased frequency, both in the House and 
outside, and issued a large number of press releases under his name. 
He also, first in mid-1973 and then in eariy 1974, undertook overseas 
tours, concentrating on Asian capitals, including Tokyo and Peking. 
All the same, Whitlam's overseas journeys were far more frequent, 
more prominently reported, and of course carried the weight of com-
mitting Australia to decisions in a way that Snedden could not. There 
was a rather half-hearted opposition effort to neutralize the partisan 
benefits accruing to the ALP from the Prime Minister's journeys, in 
the claim that his uncommonly frequent absences from home had 
prcxiuced neglect and delay in domestic programmes." But that par-
ticular criticism never t(X)k off and was not later employed as an elec-
toral argument. 
Snedden's own overseas trips were not accident-free. His mid-1973 
trip was partially overshadowed in Australia by publicity given to 
Labor's Federal Conference proceedings. In 1974, he had to share the 
limelight with Whitlam, who was also travelling in South-East Asia, 
and Snedden found it prudent to curtail his itinerary.^" Moreover the 
"Snedden, the statesman" image did not quite come off On his return 
home from ihe 1973 trip, his friends as well as critics were startled by 
the report—which he claimed was distorted—that he wanted Japan 
to undertake a major expansion of its military contributions.^' His 
comments on China were generally unexceptional, and his assess-
ment of China's view of Australian trade with Taiwan drew a fiercely 
deflating retort from Cairns. Snedden's remarks. Cairns argued, 
showed him to be "either unbelievably ignorant or he's pulling the 
public's leg". The Snedden performance was a "farce played by a ham 
actor—Billie the Kidder", who as "the synthetic Marco Polo of Liberal 
foreign policy has trouble living up to his new image"." Six months 
later Snedden's visit to South-East Asia persuaded him that 
Australian relations with states in the region had severely 
deteriorated, especially because of the troop pull-out from Singapore. 
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Actually. Whitlam's own visit to South-East Asia was, on its part, a 
major personal as well as diplomatic success. Much of the eariier ten-
sion between him and Lee had been dissipated. Singapore made no ef-
fort to urge a reversal of Australia's troop removal, and in fact Lee 
constmed Snedden's offer to negotiate a return of the trtwps as 
designed for Australian political consumption." 
We now deal with the 1974 electoral campaign itself In setting the 
stage, we first need to consider in some detail the considerations that 
persuaded strategists in both major party groups to downplay foreign 
and defence issues. 
The first consideration derives from much of our earlier discussion. 
Both party groups sensed the presence of electorally negative or 
doubtful features in their respective external policy records or posi-
tions. The opposition felt that recent international developments and 
Labor's own, often pragmatic moves partially neutralized prosperts 
for a strong and successful attack. Snedden was mismatched with 
Whitlam on foreign policy. The Liberals had produced refurbished 
foreign and defence policy documents, but the new trend was not 
well tested. The Liberals' overall adaptation on foreign policy issues 
had, at all events, brought the party closer to Labor, and the opposi-
tion did not wish to waste gains made towards the building of a 
"reformist" party image by indulging in hot and heavy attacks. On its 
part. Labor read the results of opinion polls. The public heart and 
mind had not been fully won ewer. Popular thinking seemed to be 
cautious, even somewhat critical of a number of policy results under 
Labor administration. 
A second factor was that both major party groups thought they 
recognized clues in the 1972 and preceding elections and incor-
porated this reasoning into their decisions on the electoral applica-
tions of external issues in 1974. To the L-CP, confusion in the 1972 
campaign seemed to suggest that the opposition must now choose a 
game plan and abide by it. and that external issues had been shown to 
have lost much of their electoral potency for the anti-Labor forces. 
The lessons drawn by Labor from 1972 in designing its 1974 cam-
paign were quite revealing. Party strategists concluded that a sub-
limation of external affairs had apparently worked in 1972 and 
therefore deserved similar treatment in 1974. All the same, the party 
was also persuaded that, at least since 1949, foreign and defence 
policies had tended to be electoral assets for the L-CP and liabilities 
for Labor. Therefore, rather than invite trouble, it was thought best to 
handle the subject circumspectly rather than, for instance, advertising 
the Labor gcwernment's own foreign policy accomplishments or 
Whitlam's personal involvement in such accomplishments. Regarding 
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conclusions drawn from 1972 by both party groups, it should be 
remembered that between the 1972 and 1974 House elections there 
had been no intervening Senate election at which to test hunches of 
this sort. There had been only one House by-election, in Parramatta, 
NSW, won by the Liberals with an increased majority. There, at all 
events, external issues were almost wholly bypassed by the candidates 
and a very local issue (the siting of an airport) conspicuously intruded. 
Party interest in stressing external issues was also depressed by 
readings that indicated that such issues lacked elertoral drawing-
power. The various survey research organizations as of 1972 and 
onwards into the 1974 campaign reported that foreign/defence policy 
was far dc:)wn the list of significantly regarded issues. In 1972 and 
then moving into the 1974 campaign, only about 7 per cent of the 
electorate ranked this as the prime national issue. There seemed to be 
no appreciable difference between opinions collerted throughout 
Australia at large and in marginal electorates. The Labor Party did 
not commission independent surveys prior to the 1974 election, but 
the Liberals did, over a period of some months, and were given much 
the same reading about low issue salience for external subjects. 
Survey data consistently showed that L-CP voters were twice as like-
ly as their Labor voting counterparts to construe foreign/defence 
policies as electorally salient. Thus from an L-CP standpoint, ALP 
supporters, as a group, were not especially suitable targets for exter-
nal policy publicity. Then, too, a survey published in early April 1974 
disclosed that while far more voters were favourably disposed 
towards raising spending for "overseas relations" (to be read: ALP ac-
tivism in foreign affairs?) than desired cut-backs, an increased 
defence budget (a potential L-CP electoral plank) was favoured by 
very, very few. Only 2 per cent desired much more, and 6 per cent a 
bit more defence spending, while 9 per cent wished for a bit less and 
34 per cent wanted much less than the incumbent Labor government 
Itself was then spending.^* ALP strategists saw young members of the 
electorate as generally supportive of Labor external policies, but this 
group was expected to vote disproportionately pro-labor in any event. 
There was one jarring event that nearly led Labor to switch to 
heavier emphasis on external issues. Early in the formal campaign, a 
university-based poll in the Labor-held Melbourne suburban seats of 
Diamond Valley and Casey described "swinging" voters as leaning dis-
tinctly towards the opposition. So much so that a national trend of 
equivalent magnitude would foreshadow defeat for the Whitlam 
government. A feature of the findings was that swinging voters in the 
two seats appeared to hold inordinately salient feelings about exter-
nal policies. At first, the Melbourne survey perplexed people in the 
ALP. But before demoralization (and a possible shift of issue emphasis 
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towards foreign/defence policy) could set in, party operatives ex-
amined the methodological basis of the poll and found it faulty. They 
reassured the party that it was not in electoral jeopardy or pursuing 
wrong-headed strategy. 
Another element that helped to downgrade external issues in 1974 
was major party perceptions of minor parties. Consider the DLP, 
which in the past had made a heavy and even shrill contribution to 
campaign dialogues. Early in 1974, Snedden sought out Santamaria's 
views on defence policy, given Santamaria's closeness to the DLP. The 
personal recollections of the two men differ somewhat. The upshot, 
however, was that Snedden, and the Liberals, decided to discount the 
DLP. The Liberals did not adjust their external policies to court DLP 
second preferences. They did not, with their "reformed" image in 
mind, wish to be associated with a hard-line party. At any rate, by the 
time the 1974 campaign opened, the DLP was in disarray and a 
declining electoral force. It had been thrown into confusion by the 
Gair affair was severely short of funds, was scrambling to avert sub-
mersion by associating itself with the Country Party in Queensland 
and in Western Australia, was flustered by its failure to reach accom-
mcxiation with the Liberals over Senate slates, was confined to Vic-
toria in presenting its own House candidates and was otherwise left 
behind as, with the arrival of the 1974 campaign, the external policies 
of the major parties gradually converged. 
To the extent that the Australia Party's role was noticed by either 
Liberal or ALP strategists, its earlier progressive, white-collar and in-
dependent voter appeal on foreign policy was discounted. In part, this 
was because the major parties did not stand on fundamentally dif-
ferent platforms. In part, because the Australia Party in 1974 moved 
to a position more striking for its romance than for its electoral cap-
tivation: non-alignment, cancellation of all defence treaties and 
foreign military installations and the conversion of Australia into 
what was poetically described as the "Samarkand of the South 
Seas".^' Nor did independent or mini-party candidates pose any 
problems for the major parties. As was written with a stroke of un-
derstatement, "The Indian Ocean Peace Zone party is not seriously 
expected to capture the blue-ribbon Liberal seat of Curtin in the 
forthcoming federal election"." 
Perhaps the foremost situational constraint resperting the uses of 
external issues by the major parties was the character of the im-
pending campaign itself Both Whitlam and Snedden, and their 
strategy advisers, became convinced that 'issuefocus, not diffusion, was 
the key to electoral success. In the first place, the campaign was to be 
very brief It had not been known until very late that there would be 
a double dissolution and a House election at all.. Secondly, within an 
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unusually brief time-frame, the parties were confronted with the dif-
ficult and unfamiliar tasks of actually waging campaigns in three 
directions simultaneously: the House election, an elertion for the en-
tire Senate, and four constitutional referenda on which the ALP and 
the L-CP assumed opposite and partisan positions. Hence focus and 
simplicity .in issue presentation was adopted on both sides. To Sned-
den, this meant hammering a clear understandable, pocket-book is-
sue: inflation. To Whitlam, it meant indicting the opposition for 
fmstrating progressive measures, and attacking the foreign economic 
presence in Australia. Eventually, Whitlam came into more direct 
clash with Snedden over inflation and economic conditions generally. 
The actual application of external issues in the 1974 campaign can 
be analysed by considering the extent of their use, the degree of major 
party efforts at policy differentiation and the tangential introduction 
of external policy issues. 
rhe opening shots of the campaign, fired by party leaders in their 
policy speeches, gave some indication of what the subjert-matter 
preoccupation was to be. In the published versions of their addresses, 
Whiflam's remarks on foreign and defence policies occupied 2Vi of a 
total 39 pages; Snedden's I of 13 pages. Anthonys ix)licy speech had 
no foreign or defence policy content, though it was identified as a sup-
plement to Snedden's, which was a joint statement of the Liberal and 
Country Parties." Moreover sections on foreign affairs and defence 
in the small book (136 pages) of policy papers issued by the L-CP 
were revealing, insofar as they made no attack on, or even men-
tioned, the external policy record of the Labor government.''* Signs 
such as these were consistent with the strategic design of the two 
party groups. Snedden was to seize the initiative, concentrating on in-
flation. It was hoped that, while he would not relinquish this in-
itiative, his interspersed remarks on other issues would be elaborated 
upon in "follow-up" speeches Py his front-bench colleagues. Labor 
strategy called for three stylistic phases: (i) attack the opposition for 
Senate obstruction of vital government programmes, i.e. "Go Ahead"; 
(ii) discredit the opposition as still being "men of the past"; 
(iii) stress Whiflam's qualities over Snedden's, i.e. "Whitlam—he's so 
much better" Programmatically, Senate-obstructed legislation and 
the good life made possible under Labor were to be highlighted. 
Whitlam's early concentration on the drawbacks of foreign economic 
influence was in a way his choice, but still consistent with an issue 
focus and an external policy avoidance approach. 
The electoral use of principal external policy spokesmen casts 
further light on campaign strategy. An e,%ainination of listed move-
ments by government ministers in the three weeks preceding 18 May 
disclosed that Willesee and Barnard each spent about two-thirds of 
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his time campaigning in his home (and indeed under-populated) 
state. This was arranged because the two men were felt to be per-
sonally popular on home ground and therefore electoral assets in 
Western Australia and Tasmania respectively. Also, given the 
downgrading of foreign and defence policy, their spokesmanship was 
not required for nation-wide campaigning. On the Liberal side, efforts 
at establishing a format for shadow Cabinet member movements 
were not well concerted. In the event. Peacock did travel a fair 
amount beyond his home state of Victoria, but Forbes largely con-
fined himself to his own home state. South Australia. 
Prepared electoral speeches by party leaders, and their replies to 
press conference or television questions, never indicated that external 
policies were regarded as superior or even equivalent to domestic is-
sues (if Labor's foreign economic influence theme is construed as es-
sentially domestic), though the L-CP was more inclined to mention 
them than was Labor Snedden delivered one speech on foreign policy 
as such, midway through the campaign. External issues were virtually 
overlooked in the leaders' widely covered speeches before the 
National Press Club in Canberra during the final week of campaign-
ing, and their closing campaign remarks were similarly domestically 
oriented. In terms of public speeches, perhaps the most outspoken 
person on external topics among the L-CP leadership was the one 
with the le^st national visibility. Country Party deputy leader 
Sinclair and his remarks were aimed more at defence than at foreign 
policy. Willesee and Barnard, of course, continued to issue statements 
in their official capacities, and a number of these releases had political 
content or inspiration. Forbes' and Peacock's offices issued a great 
many press releases, but many of these were either ignored or given 
only cursory attention in the media, in part because the campaign 
turned so prominently around the party leaders—who themselves 
were concentrating on domestic issues. The original Liberal plan fora 
harmonized "follow-up" campaign of various themes that were first 
to be broached by Snedden never really materialized. Into the last 
week of the campaign, with signs abroad that the Liberals were going 
to lose, Snedden diversified his campaigning to an extent. But the 
shot tended to scatter and, in the event, external policy subjects never 
tcxik hold. 
Consistent with presentations made by spokesmen, party advertis-
ing also de-emphasized external subjects, though here and there, es-
pecially under local or private auspices, both pro- and anti-
government material was inserted in newspajaers. This w.as most 
prominently done in Queensland, on the anti-Labor side. When the 
major parties used the media or other publicity outlets on these 
themes, the intent was usually incidental to publicizing foreign and 
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defence policy per se. Thus the Labor poster that recalled that it was 
L-CP politicians who had originally been associated with the in-
troduction of conscription—and that predicted that they would do so 
again and send conscripts back to Asia—was simply one asf:)ect of 
ongoing ALP strategy to assail the "men of the past". When the 
Liberals countered with newspaper advertisements that they had no 
intentions of this sort, it was to set the record straight and to help dis-
pel a "men of the past" image. The ALP produced a set of co-
ordinated film-clips for television screening. Whitlam was to be 
shown as a statesman figure: delivering aspects of his policy speech, 
then in the company of the Queen, Nixon, Mao, etc. The idea was not 
to inject foreign policy into the campaign, but to tie in with the 
Whitlam-is-better-than-Snedden theme of the closing phase of the 
campaign. For several reasons, the advertisement was found expen-
dable and was not broadcast. 
In the interests of perspective, it is helpful to illustrate some of the 
outward exceptions to the generalization that external policies were 
muffled by both sides in the campaign. The first question is whether 
Western Australia, where some believed security consciousness to 
have been especially prominent, was an exception to the rule. We saw 
earlier that Liberal Premier Court was on particularly poor terms 
with Whitlam. Court and his colleagues portrayed federal Labor as 
impervious to Western Australia's security requirements. During the 
electoral campaign, the government made certain pacifying gestures, 
such as requesting of Moscow that Soviet whalers, even in inter-
national waters, avoid hunting in traditional Australian catch areas, 
and the government announced the transfer of an RAN hydrographic 
survey vessel to a Western Australian base. Perhaps Barnard's 9 April 
announcement of intended military hardware purchases, so far as it 
had political content, had some bearing on assuaging Western 
Australian feelings. Interviewed in Perth in May. Whitlam himself 
made that inference.'' One motive for having Willesee operate in 
Western Australia was to permit him. as required, to counter argu-
ments hostile to Labor's defence policies. The federal Liberals made 
some effort to exploit Western Australian defence concerns, but by no 
means systematically. Snedden delivered his only major external 
policy speech in Western Australia, not in the suburbs of Melbourne 
or Sydney, and the party promised to accelerate construction at 
Cockburn Sound, to flesh out coastal patrols and defence capacity in 
the region generally and to maintain support for the upgrading of 
American facilities at Diego Garcia.'" 
The Christmas Island controversy underiined Labor's efforts to 
deccmtpress foreign and defence policy issues in Western Australia 
and elsewhere. It also illustrated the opposition's intention to focus 
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on inflation and related domestic issues, but to allow latitude for ex-
ternal policy attacks. There were press reports that Whitlam and Lee 
had secrefly agreed in principle to the transfer of Australian-held 
Christmas Island to Singapore. There was a chorus of outcries from 
the opposition, accusing the government of further compromising 
security interests in the Indian Ocean area, further denigrating 
Western Australia's security and of planning to part with phosphate-
rich property, a further demonstration of Labor's disdain for the man 
on the land. Peacock, Forbes and Sinclair (but not Snedden personal-
ly) expressed criticism and the L-CP attack did not subside until 
polling-day." Liberal politicians in Western Australia were vocal as 
well and the controversy had quite considerable publicity in Perth. 
What did the opposition hope to gain from its Christmas Island 
criticisms? In the first place, the author is persuaded from internal 
evidence that part of the quick and emphatic Liberal Party criticism 
had nothing to do with berating Labor It was designed to emphasize 
the Liberal Party's concern for the phosphate deposits on the island— 
of interest to mral Western Australians—and thereby to upstage the 
Country Party, against whom (as well as against Labor) the Liberals 
were competing in some Western Australian federal "seats. In the con-
text of opposition-Labor electoral competition, L-CP criticism really 
was a case of taking advantage of a windfall. The attack was left to 
lieutenants rather than L-CP leaders, and at all events Christmas 
Island could not be considered as a methodical gambit for drawing 
defence issues into the campaign spotlight. Labor treated the con-
troversy in accordance with governing party strategy. Whitlam issued 
an indignanfly worded denial of any agreements or negotiations for 
transfer of the island's sovereignty. Opposition imputations to the 
contrary were branded as falsehoods and as revealing commentary on 
the L-CP's flagging electoral fortunes.'^ The chosen tactic was to deny 
once and flatly: to suppress the issue and to avoid its possible 
proliferation into a broader debate over external policy. 
Unlike Christmas Island, Labor found it politically imprudent to 
dismiss by terse retort criticisms levelled against its attitude towards 
Middle Eastern problems. vVe have seen that there was much disquiet 
within the ALP itself, notably on Hawke's part. The opposition had 
been imputing non-even-handedness to the government. Jewish in-
terests exerted themselves to bring about change in official attitude. 
Labor was somewhat concerned that, in a tight elertion, the loss of 
Jewish votes in a few key seats (such as Philip in New South Wales) 
could be critical. It also wished to neutralize criticism that it was 
hypocritical in its professions of even-handedness. It worked hard to 
minimize any electoral fall-out. Willesee and Whitlam produced a 
flurry of statements. These explained the government's position. 
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denied charges of partiality and counter-attacked the opposition for 
allegedly dismal, partisan attempts to pursue "sectionalism" and for 
contradicting its own basic Middle Eastern position, claimed by Labor 
to have been no different from its own." The Department of Foreign 
Affairs undertook to provide personalized answers to critical news-
paper editorials and letters from prominent individuals. Members of 
the Prime Minister's staff worked in Melbourne and Sydney to dispel 
Jewish disquiet, while Hawke tried to play down the impart of the 
rift between himself and Whitlam and castigated the opposition for 
shameless electioneering.'* In the meantime, it was necessary to 
avoid the appearance of bending over backwards, since Australia's 
Arab community was beginning to assert itself 
We now ask whether the major parties tried to portray external 
policies as substantively congruent or divergent. However one might 
objectively view the content of party external policies, and apart from 
whether the parties consciously emphasized or de-emphasized exter-
nal policy differences, most commentators regarded the policies as 
basically similar. For instance, referring to "a new composite figure. 
Gill Sneddlam", the National Times remarked that 
the Liberals have abandoned the thought of reviving the "Red Bogey", en-
dorsed Labor's "equal partner" line on relations with America, retained 
the even-handed Middle East policy and supported Labor's China, Taiwan 
and North Vietnamese initiatives ... In defence, the Liberals have swung 
over to support the Labor line on American bases, and in all but one 
area—regional defence arrangement—the two policies are utterly com-
patible." 
The Melbourne Age, pleased that the L-CP was no longer tormenting 
the electorate with "atavistic fears of phantom foreign hordes", was 
also relieved by the "new pragmatism" that had largely replaced "the 
old anti-imperialist dogmatism which used to dominate much of 
Labor's thinking on foreign policy"." Thus by the very nature of ex-
ternal policy reception in the media, public concern over such subjects 
during the electoral campaign was diluted. 
Country Party leaders, while broaching defence preparedness and 
the US alliance, largely overlooked foreign policy themes as such. On 
his rare excursions into foreign policy, Anthony conveyed a mixed at-
titude. While stressing continuing dangers to Australia from com-
munist sources, he accepted Labor's close involvement with Third 
World and socialist nations." For the Liberals, Snedden did, to be 
sure, try to draw defence policy distinctions on a number of occasions. 
But when on a few occasions he drew distinctions with Labor's 
foreign policy, he tended to stress situational or stylistic material rather 
than embroidering larger thematic pictures. Hence he struck out at 
Labor's alleged non-even-handedness on the Middle East and against 
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the "double standard" response towards French and Chinese nuclear 
testing. He criticized a run-down in US-Australian relations and 
Labor's lack of enthusiasm for the Diego Garcia project.'* It fell on 
Peacock to serve as protagonist for the wider dimensions of L-CP ex-
ternal policies. Among his numerous press releases and public 
remarks could be found a reasonably coherent exposition of his 
party's outlcxik. However, it should be remembered that media 
coverage of foreign policy generally, and of remarks by party lieuten-
ants as opposed to leaders, was weak. In the face of these obstacles 
to getting a reasonable hearing, Peacock insisted upon "the very 
significant differences between the Liberal and Country Parties' posi-
tion and that of the Australian Labor Party"." The only other Liberal 
spokesman known to have tried his hand at presenting a broad-
ranging analysis of ALP-opposition external policy was Fraser; in-
terestingly, he did this in an address before a Jewish audience.*" 
Speakers' notes issued by the Liberals to candidates and others 
provided suggestions on how to distinguish between party external 
policies,*' but such material was not widely used among rank-and-file 
campaigners. 
Labor was committed to disengaging external affairs from the elec-
tion. It sought to do so not simply by striving to avoid the subject but 
by searching for opportunities to allege that there was little to debate, 
since gcwernment and opposition policies had largely become con-
vergent. Several days before the party speeches were delivered, a 
television interview programme held between Peacock and Willesee 
turned into a non-event. The former tried to open channels for sub-
stantive foreign policy discussion and to assert real inter-party dif 
ferences, while the latter dodged and minimized confrontation.*^ 
Commenting on the L-CP platform, the Foreign Minister "welcomed 
the acceptance by the Opposition of nearly all the foreign policy in-
itiative taken by the Whitlam Government ... Imitation is the 
sincerest form of flattery."*' In his policy sj^ ieech, Whitlam flatly an-
nounced that "Australia now has basically a bipartisan foreign 
policy."** And so Labor proceeded almost across most of the cam-
paign. 
As an electoral issue, defence proved more difficult for Labor to 
subdue than did foreign policy, since the opposition made defence one 
of its more explicit, though subsidiary, campaign themes. Labor was 
relieved, however, that the attack upon it was not more sustained or 
more penetrating. Party strategists had been genuinely worried that 
an all-out and well-co-ordinated L-CP offensive over defence policy 
could have cost Labor a close election. 
We are already familiar with L-CP criticisms of Labor's defence 
policy. These included the threat climate, the state of detente, officer 
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resignations, a run-down in personnel, equipment and spending, and 
so on. Forbes set the mcxxi: The Australian people would regard 
eleventh-hour decisions as "the panic reactions of a group of men 
frightened by the electoral consequences of failing to do anything".*' 
The L-CP's defence policy attack failed to secure a hold for several 
reasons. Firstly, the issue was never given anything approximating 
the attention lavished on inflation and surrounding domestic matters. 
This was consistent with established party strategy guidelines. 
Secondly, in April and May 1974, a threat-requires-respcmse argu-
ment was difficult to sustain. Vietnam was at last over, no security 
alarms were ringing around Australia's shores and there was a cer-
tain reticence in Liberal ranks to preach a heavy "military" theme at 
a point when the party was working to shed its "men of the past" im-
age. Thirdly, the L-CP found itself in a bind of its own making. It was 
difficult to elevate inflation to premier-issue rank, to argue for 
budgetary austerity (and a $600 million cut-back in federal spending), 
while simultaneously promising to perform expensive wonders for 
the nation's defence. This, in part, blocked the L-CP from con-
spicuously differentiating itself from Labor on defence upgrading. 
Matters became much worse for the opposition when, on 3 May, 
Anthony acknowledged that due to a combination of financial con-
straints and lack of immediate international danger, an L-CP govern-
ment would not quickly move to exceed Labor's level of defence spen-
ding.*" To Labor's delight, fresh ground for bipartisanship in external 
policies had been discewered. Barnard hurried to remark that 
Anthony had apparently accepted the ALP's strategic assessment.*' 
Had Anthony attended the late-April L-CP strategy session, at which 
these matters had been discussed, he might not have said what he did 
and thereby not handed Labor a splendid gift. 
Concurrently, the government tried to demonstrate that it was 
diligent about defence. A new capital equipment programme was an-
nounced and so ware promises to unionists that redundancy in 
defence industries would be strenuously resisted. A string of material 
improvements for service personnel was announced. Apart from their 
inherent merit, such measures were also tailored to mollify concerns 
about defence neglect, and in part were directed at service personnel 
themselves. In 1974, Labor conceded that most of the service vote, 
which now included no reluctant conscripts, would favour the op-
position. But even a few service votes changed might carry some elec-
toral advantage. One illustration of this was a letter written by a 
minister Kep Enderby, on behalf of himself and Labor's candidate for 
the newly created second Australian Capital Territory federal seat. 
On official Parliament stationery and addressed to the numerous ser-
vice personnel living in the Canberra area, it was a recitation of good 
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deeds performed by Labor on behalf of members of the armed forces 
and a frank appeal for electoral support: "There is much to be done, 
and a vote for the Whiflam Government on 18th May will be a vote 
for the continuation and expansion of these initiatives and pro-
grammes."** 
By asserting that there were no outstanding inter-party divisions 
ewer defence policy, and by deeds that pictured Labor as not selling 
out on defence, the government went about detaching defence issues 
from the electoral campaign. The overall result was not especially 
pleasing to the L-CP and was overtly depressing to persons and 
groups holding pronounced views on defence policy. Santamaria 
sensed that bipartisanship in both defence and foreign policy had ar-
rived in Australia, "the liberals having adopted the essence of the 
policies fastened on Labor by Dr Cairns and the Leff. To him: 
"Among all Australian parties, the DLP alone gives Australia's 
defencelessness its correct priority ... there is no other way of keeping 
Australia's defences alive than by keeping the DLP strong in the 
Senate."*' The DLP's external policy platform was indeed non-
imitative of allegedly "identikit" Liberals and Laborites. But there 
were signs that its principal Senate candidates recognized that a cam-
paign hung on vivid external policy presentation was not the wisest 
strategy. Back in 1973, Senator Jack Kane had already concluded that 
defence and foreign policy issues had by and large become electorally 
defused and had thereby caused defections among previous DLP sup-
porters.'" In the course of his bid to retain his New South Wales seat, 
Kane publicized non-external subjects, such as the abolition of death 
duties. Victorian Senator Frank McManus was less disposed to jet-
tison external policy. At a press conference, he mournfully remarked: 
"If the D.L.P. is to be unpopular for insisting that our Defence Policies 
be such that we could contribute to our own defence and be able to 
assist our allies, rather than be 'free loaders', then the D.L.P. is 
prepared to be unpopular"" Still, McManus' election material fol-
lowed a "Vote Mac Back" rather than a party political, DLP theme, 
and the emphasis was on his record and the need for an independent 
Senate voice, not on external affairs spokesmanship as such. 
A word is finally in order about ancillary manipulations of external 
policy themes by the parties, i.e. how such themes may have been 
mated with other features of electioneering. 
The L-CP might have chosen to confront Labor on its credibility as 
a government: radical influences upon it, ministerial disunity, un-
plugged security leaks, and so on. In fact, it did very little in this direc-
tion. One very importa-nt reason was that the April-May period was 
quite tranquil for Labor as a party and as a government. No major 
protest manifestations occurred to upset public sensibilities. The 
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marchers to the North-West Cape did skirmish with police and resi-
dents, but their cause, as we have seen, was anti-Labor as well as anti-
L-CP. At all events, the marchers did not reach their destination until 
just after polling had been completed. No new security breaches 
cropped up between 1 April and 18 May. Then, too, Whitlam's 
schoolmaster lecture to his ministers paid off There were no 
noticeable ministerial indiscretions on external policy matters. Dur-
ing the campaign, Whitlam tried to dismiss the importance of the 
matter. He squelched an interview question on whether out-of-turn 
ministerial comments might not have been unhelpful to his govern-
ment by retorting, "Well, to use an Americanism. Crapl"'^ The most 
independent external policy remarks from a prominent ALP figure 
came from Wheeldon—not then a minister—who urged the 
severance of Australian defence ties with America and the dismantl-
ing of US facilities." 
Labor's efforts to insulate itself from criticisms of stylistic fault in 
its handling of external affairs created some frustrations within the 
L-CP. Peacock, for instance, on several occasions tried to draw out 
and entrap Labor by accusing it of concealing its policies, and he in-
vited outspoken ministers such as Cairns and Uren to "put their case 
directly to the people-for approval or rejection".'* The bait was not 
taken. Still, the Liberals were not especially eager to precipitate an 
electoral slugfest in this area. The party had prepared dossiers on 
Cairns and others, but the material was hardly used. Men such as 
Snedden and Peacock were not temperamentally disposed to urge a 
personalized "boots and all" campaign. This was in keeping with the 
party's decision not to deviate much from an inflation issue emphasis 
and with organizational advice that, if Labor counter-attacked heavi-
ly, Snedden could not in substance or in style match the Prime 
Minister in an exchange over external policy. Also the opposition 
may have been reluctant to encourage ripostes in kind from Labor 
about party unity and the like, since Snedden and Anthony were 
themselves divided on several key issues during the campaign. 
If however in 1974, the L-CP was unable or unwilling to resort to 
tactics of emotive ridicule of Labor's credibility. Labor found an 
emotionally serviceable tool with which to beat the opposition. Much 
of Labor's campaigning, especially in the earlier stages, was targeted 
against the foreign economic presence in Australia. For some months 
prior to the campaign, and then during it, various ministers pictured 
the issue in highly picturesque terms. A number of imputations were 
levelled against foreign financial underwriting of the opposition, and 
both Connor and Whitlam, in the midst of the elertoral campaign, 
told audiences (in remarkably similar, perhaps orchestrated 
phraseology) that Australian independence, which in war foreign 
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arms could not conquer foreign money was now threatening to con-
quer. Whitlam predicted that this might be the Australians' last 
chance to choose to conserve their independent economic inheritance 
"for our children and our children's children"." 
Labor's treatment of foreign economic issues was viewed by a 
number of observers as transparent but probably profitable elec-
tioneering, and also as a contradiction of ALP professions, of being a 
party of social healers. As the Australian Financial Review editorialized, 
"The ploy is obviously to work foreign ownership, the multinationals 
and the mining companies into some new kind of foreign demon for 
which all red-blooded Australians can work up an understandable 
loathing."'" The opposition also took umbrage. Anthony, for instance, 
issued a special statement entitled "No Place for Hatred in Australia", 
in which he argued that the only legitimate fears were fears of Labor's 
erroneous domestic and external policies; here was a contrived, "old 
political tactic of a government in trouble—give the people a foreign 
enemy to hate"." 
Labor's attack is relevant not just because it was directed at 
"foreign" interests but because of a certain interface between ALP 
foreign economic attitudes and policies, and foreign policy more ex-
plicitly. In 1974, Labor was reluctant to debate foreign policy, but was 
not averse to permitting electoral windfalls that might result if 
emotional presentations about the foreign economic presence could 
remind the electorate of the government's pursuit of independence 
and national dignity in foreign affairs. Some ministerial remarks dur-
ing the campaign attempted to draw that connection'* and were con-
sistent with the government's perceptions of the meaning, 
relationship and handling of issues. 
We now examine the interplay between electoral politics and exter-
nal policy following the May 1974 election. For a number of months 
after the election, the author inquired of a number of Labor and op-
position politicians and organizational people whether from an elec-
toral standpoint, they felt their side had given about the right 
emphasis to external policies during the campaign. The answers were 
preponderantly in the affirmative. The dominant explanation was 
simply that the public was known to have been far more concerned 
about scxio-economic issues. Post-election survey data tended to con-
firm, or at least not to contradict, that the vast majority of voters had 
not been influenced by external policy considerations. A privately 
conducted Country Party survey of ewer 700 respondents in various 
rural electorates uncewered only one person who said that defence 
policy considerations had pre-eminently influenced his vote; no one 
alluded to foreign policy. On election day itself, the McNair organiza-
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tion polled 346 voters in six swinging Sydney electorates. Pre-election 
data were largely confirmed. Labor was thought to have had the bet-
ter programme on overseas-controlled Australian resources, the L-CP 
on defence policy. It vvas also confirmed that more Liberal than Labor 
voters felt that among the issues guiding their vote were superior 
foreign and defence policies. Within the survey group were thirty-six 
persons who changed their vote to Labor in 1974 from non-Labor in 
1972. Among these, four persons, or I I per cent, listed as a reason for 
their switch a better Labor foreign policy stance, and one listed the 
abolition of conscription. Njii one listed control over the foreign 
economic presence. While the 11 per cent figure seems high, the sam-
ple was very small and therefore statistically fragile. Moreewer, multi-
ple reasons for change of vote were given, preventing the isolation of 
the foreign/defence policy variable." Inferential evidence suggests 
that, despite disgruntlement over gcwernment Middle Eastern policy, 
very few Jews of usual ALP allegiance actually shifted to the L-CP. 
What evidence, if any, could political strategists on either side ad-
duce that after May 1974 the electorate might have given particular 
reception to various external policy issues? On the basis of available 
survey data, the opposition could take somewhat more comfort than 
the government. For instance, twice as many people disapproved of 
the Baltic states decision as approved of it; even normally Labor sup-
porters were about evenly divided."" Also there were strong ma-
jorities among both L-CP and ALP voters to keep South Africa in the 
United Nations, although in the Security Council the Labor govern-
ment voted against South Africa."' Early in 1975, there was 
overwhelming endorsement by both L-CP and Labor supporters for a 
neutral Australian position on the Middle East—an avowed govern-
ment attitude. But there also was very strong Labor and L-CP voter 
resistance to allowing a PLO delegation to enter Australia."' This was 
the original, but not eventual, government position. In September 
1975. though a very large part of the public (44 per cent) was un-
decided, persons favouring an independent Portuguese Timor out-
numbered those who would have wished it to be part of Indonesia by 
more than a two-to-one margin."' Connor's efforts to raise billions of 
petrodollars were disapproved of by a very considerable proportion of 
the electorate."* Perhaps most disconcerting to Labor was a poll taken 
in 1975. as the Thieu regime in South Vietnam was collapsing. Two 
out of three persons (58 per cent versus 29 per cent) believed 
Australia was likely to be menaced by another country within the fol-
lowing decade. The 58 per cent figure was 4 per cent more than had 
expressed a similar opinion in 1970. when the L-CP was in office and 
the Vietnam War was in full swing. In 1975. Labor supporters were 
themselves about equally divided on the foreseeability of a menace to 
the country."' 
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For some time after May 1974, electoral opportunities to test public 
receptivity to external issues were few, and at all events represented 
extremely imperfect barometers. There were state elections in 
Queensland and South Australia, but their state nature could not be 
adequately compared to federal campaigns. In Queensland, in 
December 1974, the incumbent non-Labor government was swept 
back into office. Bjelke-Petersen tried to tar the state ALP opposition 
with the sins of the Whitlam government in Canberra and made a 
number of pointed attacks on federal Labor's alleged flirtations with 
communist nations."" But the Premier's attack on federal Labor and 
on Whitlam, was wholesale, far exceeding external policy complaints. 
The weakness of the state Labor Party at that time, plus other con-
siderations, greatly overshadowed any impact the allusions to foreign 
affairs might have had on the electoral outcome. Bjelke-Petersen later 
entered into a dispute with the Whitlam government by threatening 
to block further Queensland coal sales to Japan, unless Japan bought 
Queensland beef This kind of excursion into state "resource 
diplomacy" was, if anything, an acute embarrassment to the L-CP op-
position in Canberra, which itself had been accusing Connor and 
others of excessive international arm-twisting."' At the July 1975 
South Australian election, the incumbent Dunstan Labor government 
was returned with a reduced majority, but Liberal Party fortunes slip-
ped even more drastically. In any event, the use of federal external 
policy issues was almost zero."* In June 1975, there was a federal by-
election in Barnard's former Tasmanian seat of Bass, and was carried 
by the Liberals on a massive anti-Labor swing. Whitlam and Fraser 
both campaigned in Bass. External issues were not entirely absent, 
but decidedly secondary, even tertiary. There was some discussion of 
Omega, especially since Tasmania was one potential site for it, but the 
twerall effect was ambiguous. Some independent Tasmanian unions 
declared that they would black-ban construction work on an Omega 
station, and environmentalists were also upset by the prospect of a 
facility. But there were signs of people eager to have an Omega 
famility nearby, to stimulate the local economy."' 
After the 1974 election, the federal opposition was not inactive in 
building a case against the government, a case that hopefully could 
sooner or later bring some electoral pay-off Some of the criticisms 
were highly situational, designed to exploit Labor's existing public 
relations or intra-party troubles. One such issue was the Prime 
Minister's lengthy European trip in December 1974 and January 
1975, during which some of his remarks and his artions received a 
poor reception in the Australian press and within Labor Party 
quarters as well. Hence Peacock's stab that there were "many 
Australians, not least in the Australian Labor Party, who believe the 
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Prime Minister would be better employed cutting back on expen-
diture and applying himself to Australia's future."'" When he 
returned. Whitlam made a special report to the nation. It was to serve 
a double purpose: to explain the accomplishments of his mission as 
such and to counter the political fall-out caused by criticisms of the 
trip. The opposition was pleased to watch the ALP tear at itself over 
issues such as the PLO visit and to hear Whitlam admit that "Mr 
Hawke and Mr Hartley have been responsible, as much as anyone, for 
exacerbating divisions in Australia on the Middle East."" 
Two, and to a degree overlapping, phases of the opposition's efforts 
to mount a general attack on government external policy were detec-
table. The L-CP felt that its external policy issue emphasis in the con-
text of the 1974 campaign had been reasonably appropriate. It also 
understood that there were few signs that the electorate's concern 
over external subjects had measurably increased. All the same, the 
judgement as of mid-1974 was to intensify foreign policy criticism 
and to offer a clearer appearance of Labor-L-CP differences. Little 
electoral mileage could be realized by the opposition if the impression 
of Labor-L-CP policy similarly continued to be widespread. Large is-
sues such as conscription, China, the status of American defence in-
stallations and the Singapore troop commitment had by then for 
most intents and purposes been settled. In the second half of 1974, 
there were no comparably large issues to be controverted, apart from 
the ongoing dispute ewer resource and foreign investment policy. But 
the opposition felt that the government's handling of individually les-
ser issues could be tied together and subjected to overall criticism for 
being clumsy, irresponsible and variously inconsistent with Labor's 
own professions. The opposition was in this way amassing foreign 
policy criticisms not just to say that Labor had been wrong on X, Y or 
Z, but to impugn its credit as a party of government, a credit already 
suffering some decline over economic performance. It also hoped to 
pin a gocxi deal of blame on Whitlam personally, in part to narrow 
the public-image gulf between him and Snedden. 
We have already dwelled on the kinds of issues over which the op-
position attacked and some of the rationales it presented. There had 
been the Gair affair (a piersonal Whitlam decision of "political im-
morality"). There-was the Ermolenko case ("deprivation of human 
rights" and "uneven-handedness" in favour of communist regimes). 
There was the South African vote at the United Nations (denial of the 
principle of universal membership in the world body). And, of course, 
there were the Baltic states. The opposition played up this decision as 
a biased, pro-Soviet action and slapped at Labor's rhetoric about the 
virtues of self-determination. Particular efforts were made to show 
that ethnic minorities in Australia were contemptuously treated by 
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the government. Snedden's remarks before a Latvian audience 
pointed up the electoral uses to which the L-CP put the Baltic 
decision: 
It was an action taken in direct contradiction of Mr Whitlam's own un-
dertakings given to you. There can be no clearer words. The words I 
remember were these: that the Labor Government in office would pursue 
the same policy as its predecessor Government, the Liberal Country Party. 
That undertaking was given. You were entitled to rely on it. Some of you 
may even have been misled into voting for them—relying on that under-
taking But now the reality of the unreliability of any word given by Labor 
is clear... It is a sad reflection on the chaos that is now the Labor Govern-
ment's foreign policy. Surely they have enough trouble in economic/ 
domestic terms. Why make such a mess of our foreign policy.'' 
Foreign policy was at least tangentially tied to Snedden's own fall 
from the Liberal leadership in March 1975. Snedden had originally 
played a useful accommodating role for a party badly shaken by its 
1972 defeat. The L-CP had made a respectable showing in a losing 
cause in 1974, but Snedden's substantial inability to match Whitlam's 
commanding political personality was upsetting. Not long after the 
election and the ensuing joint parliamentary sitting, there were signs 
that the opposition, via the Senate, might try to force another eariy 
election. But Snedden was seen as much the same decent yet 
pedestrian figure he had been before. His parliamentary perform-
ances were interpreted by party colleagues as undistinguished. 
Peacock was conducting most of the party offensive in foreign policy. 
In this area, Snedden was seen as particularly ineffective in challeng-
ing a government, or a Prime Minister, whose external policies 
seemed to invite crisp, aggressive spokesmanship from an alternative 
L-CP Prime Minister. Malcolm Fraser beat Snedden in a leadership 
spill for a number of reasons. But among those who voted for him 
were Liberals who felt he would be much more electorally credible, 
and marketable, when attacking Whitlam on the Prime Minister's 
own special field of interest, namely external policy. Fraser had at one 
time been Minister for Defence. While in opposition, he had main-
tained a close interest in external policy and had spoken on it in 
various settings. In foreign and defence policy, he was known to be 
rather more tough-minded, or conservative, than Snedden had been. 
Some Liberals found this appealing. Shortly after Fraser's election, a 
commentator related reactions he attributed to some Liberals. "Sud-
denly we feel thirty years younger," one said. Another averred that 
'"We never feel more secure than when we feel threatened, and never 
more at peace than when we are at war." A third was purported to 
have remarked that "Nothing exciting ever seemed to happen vvith 
Snedden. No red manaces. no yellow perils. Only money, money, 
money. Even Peacock, with all his charisma, couldn't whip up a fair 
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dinkum threat from the North."" Even after allowing for hyperbole 
and figures of speech, there seemed to be a mood abroad in Liberal 
ranks that welcomed Fraser as a substitute for Snedden in external 
policy spokesmanship. 
Following Fraser's election to the leadership, the intensity of L-CP 
external policy criticism did in fact rise. In part, as foreseen, this was 
because of Fraser's own interest in the field and his wish to give the 
subject more attention. In part, it was because Fraser held a 
somewhat more agitated view of world trends than Snedden had. In 
part, it was attributable to salient international events such as the fall 
of Indo-China to communism and violent disorders in Timor. Such 
events were seen as confirmation that Australia was living in an un-
stable and threatening region, and that Labor was too complacent or 
misguided to do whatever was needed. Moreover, under Fraser the 
opposition consciously enlarged on the strategy, begun in 1974, that 
called for impugning the veracity, credit and overall competence of 
the government in the course of L-CP attacks on the substance of 
policies. In 1974, issues such as the Baltic states, Ermolenko and the 
South African UN vote had served to build this kind of case. During 
Fraser's leadership, the issues that presented such opportunities 
seemed more fundamental or capable of being more publicly sen-
sationalized. Hence regarding the government's handling of its Viet-
namese diplomacy, or of the Connor and Cairns efforts to raise 
petrodollar loans, the opposition assailed Labor for misleading Parlia-
ment and the public, for its underhandedness, for its stark lack of in-
tegrity, and so on. Regarding Vietnamese refugees, the opposition 
tried to picture Labor as weak, vacilating, over-sensitive to com-
munist regime reactions, and in the last resort, callous towards vic-
tims of war and dislocation. 
The opposition also revived the technique of trying to discredit the 
government by discrediting a controversial minister. Cairns had long 
been a L-CP target, for what were regarded as his outrageous 
pronouncements on foreign policy and his ability to defy Whitlam's 
injunctions about extramural ministerial remarks. But the political 
value of criticisms against Cairns had been somewhat elusive, since 
Cairns' remarks often did not reflect the government's own more 
moderate thinking. Connor was different. He had long been the butt 
of opposition criticism. In his case, since his views were very often ac-
tual government policies, the wrongness of his views, and the 
gracelessness of his style, could more easily be used to indict the 
government as such. By mid-1975, Connor's, and therefore, the 
government's, political vulnerability was more exploitable in the 
aftermath of the loan episode. Cairns had been sacked, but Connor 
remained and was defended by Whitlam. For Anthony, "The con-
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tinned survival of the Minister for Minerals and Energy in the 
Ministry must remain one of the greatest mysteries surrounding the 
Whitlam Government." He could not understand why, in addition to 
wrecking the mining industry, alienating foreign countries and ir-
ritating various officials and departments In Canberra, Connor "is al-
lowed slowly to wreck the Labor Party".'* When Whitlam sacked 
Connor in October the opposition's reaction was that this was more 
than a vindication of its misgivings about Connor and his methods. It 
also provided a basis for redoubling attacks on the government's 
credibility and rationale for holding up Labor's budget in the Senate. 
Fraser said that, "The Opposition in the Senate has acted to bring 
about an election—in accordance with Constitutional practice— 
because the Government has lost the confidence of the people. Its sor-
did scandals have caught up with it—the Prime Minister and his 
Government can no longer evade responsibility."" 
The opposition was not itself free from intra-^lite problems. 
Peacock was somewhat less intense, more modulated in his views and 
words than were the two coalition party leaders. Hence in August 
1975, apparent;y with Fraser's support but against the grain of 
Peacock's thinking, Anthony raised a communist takeover vision of 
events in Timor and urged the establishment of an Australian 
presence there.'" There also were some press imputations that the 
new opposition policy statements on foreign policy and on defence, is-
sued in October had involved serious differences among party elites. 
It was said that Fraser had caused substantive rewritings in what 
Peacock and Killen had desired in their respective papers." This im-
pression is believed to be misleading. The author understands that the 
original drafts of these papers were authored by academics and then, 
with guidance and consent from Peacock and Killen, were refined by 
the opposition's Policy Co-ordinating Committee. Fraser's hand was 
not obtrusive and no meaningful modifications were apparently "im-
posed" by him. A good test lies in the policy documents themselves. 
While the foreign affairs and defence statements reflected many of 
the opposition's familiar differences with Labor they were couched in 
essentially cautious and pragmatic terms.'* The L-CP's foreign invest-
ment statement," prepared by Lynch and his staff, was closely tied to 
the Canadian model and was remarkably close to the position Labor 
had reached by the closing months of its tenure. 
Government spokesmen, apart from exploiting any discord they 
noticed in opposition ranks, rebutted charges of error or duplicity in 
external affairs in two ways. They pictured thegovernment as apply-
ing a sober and intelligent approach to difficult problems, and pic-
tured the L-CP, especially under the more pungent. Eraser-style of 
criticism, as cynical and opportunistically unworthy. Also they tried 
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to portray the opposition as unreconstructed crisis-mongers, men 
who had taken Australia into the mire of Vietnam and who now had 
the effrontery to speak of honour. 
How much of this party political sparring seemed applicable to 
building foundations on which electoral advantage could be laid? In 
the second half of 1975, knowledgeable persons on both political sides 
were inclined to think much as they had in 1974, that for the elec-
torate, economic and other domestic issues continued to overshadow 
external policy. Therefore the parties were not counting on sub-
stituting questionable issue emphasis priorities. As one L-CP figure 
expressed it: 
Unless there is unexpected resurgence of communist activity in southeast 
Asia, it seems unlikely to expect that Foreign Affairs or Defence will as-
sume any substantialelectoral prominence. It is quite remarkable how 
quickly the communist takeover of all of Vietnam has ebbed from public 
prominence. This is very regrettable as the Red devils are very active at 
the moment in Malaysia.*" 
However, there was some guarded feeling that, in the large sense, 
events ranging from the fall of Into-China to turmoil on Timor may 
have restored some of the respectability of anti-communist sentiment. 
Perhaps one small evidence of this was the previously cited 1975 sur-
vey, which indicated that two out of three Australians believed the 
country would face an external menace within the next decade. 
In any event, much of the 1975 inter-party debate, on external af-
fairs and otherwise, was conducted in an atmosphere that indicated 
the possibility that the opposition might try to force an early election. 
That in itself placed a premium on the sharpening of opposition at-
tacks on all policy fronts and helped to explain the explicit coupling 
of imputations of irresponsible government with imputations of im-
proper policies. It also tempted speculation that some of the Labor 
government's policy movements may in part have been designed to 
neutralize opposition external policy criticisms that could be expected 
to arise in an electoral campaign. There was the fairly extensive 
shopping-list of military capital equipment announced in the 1975-6 
budget and the government's rapid moves towards a major relaxation 
of policies governing foreign investment. 
The prospect of some kind of early election arose when the opposi-
tion used its numbers in the Senate to block Labor's budget. On 11 
November the deadlock was broken by the Governor-General, Sir 
John Kerr who argued that the provision of supply was paramount. 
Whitlam's commission was withdrawn. The L-CP was to allow 
Labor's budget to pass. A double dissolution was called, with elections 
scheduled for 13 December. In the meantime, Fraser was to head a 
caretaker L-CP government, which was not entitled to undertake 
new policy Initiatives. 
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The 1975 electoral campaign is essentially beyond the scope of this 
study, insofar as Labor was no longer the government after II 
November Some comments are, however, in order to complete the 
transition from Labor in power to the election in December of a 
Fraser government that was swept to office with an unprecedented 
majority in the House and full control over the Senate. 
Survey data collected during the campaign showed that only about 
1 per cent regarded foreign and defence policy as the single most im-
portant national issue,*' though between 13 and 16 percent ranked 
"defence" as one of the three most personally important issues.*^ As 
in the past, non-Labor voters were proportionately more interested in 
foreign and defence issues than were Labor supporters. Some special 
circumstances were noticeable. In Victoria, for instance, Jews went 
out of their way to promote the defeat of Hartley, who had been 
placed on the ALP's Senate ballot.*' 
The low salience of external issues in the 1975 campaign was ctm-
siderably influenced by the climate generated by the political crisis of 
the time. The L-CP operated a low-key campaign, focusing cm Labor's 
economic mismanagement and more generally on its lack of credit as 
a party of efficient and upright government. These had been the 
ostensible opposition rationales for obstructing the budget and forc-
ing an election. Labor had been caught by surprise by the Governor-
General's action. It was furious with what it construed as Kerr's con-
stitutionally unjustifiable intervention and possible collusion with 
Fraser. Hence, for the first part of his campaign, Whitlam hammered 
on the theme that Labor had been cheated of the right to govern, 
since its control over the House had remained intact. Only later did 
Whitlam shift more to a defence of his government's economic 
policies and a challenge of L-CP alternatives. 
While the atmosphere was not conducive to the exposition of a 
wide range of issues, it was, at least on Labor's part, conducive to 
some highly emotional imputations. Shortly after Labor's dismissal. 
Cairns exhorted a political rally, arguing that, "The Liberal and 
Country Party, with the help of the multi-national companies and the 
CIA, is spending $1 million in television and advertising. We will 
answer them with one million people."** Shortly before the campaign 
ended, as Labor's electoral prospects were fading, Whitlam told a 
television interviewer that while he would not assert that there had 
been CIA involvement in his dismissal, "I wouldn't blankly refute the 
possibility."*' Imputations such as these were perhaps understandable 
in the heat of Labor's anger frustration and dismay over what had 
happened. Their veracity is another matter. They were not substan-
tiated, and of course were firmly denied by both American and L-CP 
sources. On balance, for reasons we discussed earlier about the 
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American position in and attitude towards Australia, and towards 
Labor particularly, their plausibility is questionable. 
When substantive external issues did appear in the 1975 campaign, 
they more often than not were presented in a hit-and-miss and un-
edifying manner. L-CP spokesmen, for instance, said that Labor had 
sanctioned aggression by its Baltic states decision, had followed a pro-
Soviet policy in the Middle East, and that Hartley's place on the 
Senate ballot was a sign of further Labor betrayal of Israel's interest.*" 
The ALP, with its preoccupation with recent domestic Australian 
political events, tried to tie some external issues to the crisis. For in-
stance, Morrison warned that Fraser's obsession with austerity could 
lead to defence cutbacks under an L-CP government and thereby en-
danger Australia's security.*' On his part, Whitlam suggested that 
with Australia distracted by an election forced by the L-CP, Indonesia 
may have been given incentive to intervene full scale in Timor.** 
Electoral considerations were, of course, only one, and a not always 
easily distinguishable influence upon the mosaic of Australian exter-
nal policy. Historical legacies, party conceptions and dispositions, the 
roles played by key personalities, the peculiarities of Australia's 
political structures, the host of advisory inputs and of group pressures 
and, above all, unfolding international developments also contributed 
to what became the substance and the stylistic conduct and presenta-
tion of external policy. A change of government in 1972 had brought 
some new definitions, directions and methods. These were greeted by 
boasts of great achievements and by condemnations of outrageous 
bungling. Taken in perspective. Labor's record and performance can 
probably be characterized as adaptive. There were real shifts of 
emphasis in both substance and style from what had been done under 
L-CP governments, but continuity was preserved in the basic outlines 
of Australia's external policy. 
As in any open society, openly expressed disagreements over as-
sumptions, programmes and priorities remained. On occasions, these 
differences were embittered. Much more often, especially in the 
gewernment-opposition dialogue, beneath the layer of rhetoric and 
political-posturing was noticeable inter-party consensus on Australia's 
interests, and even on the means of their achievement. Australia had 
not achieved and was not likely to achieve bipartisanship in external 
affairs. During the pericxi of Labor government, however both the 
ALP and the L-CP made adjustments, resulting in a measure of con-
vergence between the two sides. Changing international realities 
played their part in this process. So did the reversal of roles that took 
place in December 1972. We recall Bruce Grant's comment, men-
tioned earlier in this bcxik, that, with reference to foreign policy, by 
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1972 both the L-CP government and the ALP opposition had, in dif 
ferent ways, become irresponsible. After twenty-three years, the L-CP 
no longer understocxi the role of an opposition, while Labor had lost 
sight of the obligations of power.*' The two party groups were not 
transformed by their experience after December 1972, but they were 
sobered by it. 
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